Verbal and Visual Rhetoric in a Media World
Verbal and Visual Rhetoric in a Media World

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Introduction

HILDE VAN BELLE

Rhetoric in society
Since Aristotle, the study of rhetoric has focused on the persuasive aspect of discourse in the political, forensic and ceremonial domains. Rhetoric deals with *doxa*, the shared opinions and reasons people consider plausible and acceptable in a specific situation, in the realm of appearance, ambiguity, change and opinion. Rhetorical action involves decisions taken by participants in public discourse on the basis of common deliberation and free choice in domains such as social and political life, in which there is no absolute knowledge, truth, certainty or fixity.

No doubt the title of the *Rhetoric in Society* conferences in Aalborg (2006), Leiden (2009) and Antwerp (2011) sounded attractive to many scholars. It clearly attributed to rhetoric the position it inherently occupies: in society. The tautological element in this title reveals, however, that this idea is not self-evident. The field of rhetoric is fragmented, and dispersed over several disciplines, such as literary criticism, stylistics, or debating. In domains such as philosophy or politics, and not only there, rhetoric is easily associated with lies, emotion and manipulation, in contrast to a more respectable concept such as truth, be it factual, scientific, or ideological. Generally speaking, since Plato, through the seventeenth and eighteenth century enlightenment of reason and well into the scientific modernism of our times, Western thought has favoured theories of knowledge in which the values of universality and objectivity prevailed over those of particularity and subjectivity or intersubjectivity (Lucaites 1999, p. 6).

Although the rejection or depreciation of rhetoric often comes down to the condemnation of the rhetoric of others, thus mystifying one’s own rhetorical skills, or explaining away the lack of them, it does not discharge us from this basic question in rhetorical studies: what is rhetoric? In its oldest form, rhetoric is an important power in the communication of societies. Verbal communication is a pre-eminently human skill, and rhetoric is the earliest discipline that studies how people build communities when talking.
to one another, negotiating with one another, or convincing one another in deliberations about political action, in cases of guilt or innocence, in matters of fame or dishonour. In its most classical version, rhetoric refers to the Greek ideal of the *rhetor* as the highest form of citizenship, or Quintilian’s idea of the *vir bonus*: the good man speaking well.

Yet the definition of rhetoric is highly contested and we cannot speak of a coherent or definite version of ancient rhetoric. Rather, we can determine and follow through history an extensive set of similar perspectives, a vast body of theoretical reflection and practical devices (for an overview see e.g. Conley 1990; Kennedy 1994; Fumaroli 1999; Meyer 1999; Herrick 2005, etc.). All the early scholars, such as Gorgias and Protagoras, Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian are associated with the Western, liberal-democratic tradition of ancient Greece and Rome, and with the creation of democratic forms of government. Hence, in the classical tradition, the focus on rhetoric typically emphasized ‘the public, persuasive, and contextual characteristics of human discourse in situations governed by the problems of contingency’ (Lucaites 1999, p. 2; see also Herrick 2005, p. 7). Classical rhetoric concerns the public sphere, where audiences are part of social life, where language is assumed to play its role in the persuasion processes, where specific contexts modify the production of meaning, and where decisions are inherently based on probabilities, rather than on fixed certainties.

Rhetoricians examine how people use arguments and language in order to convince or persuade an audience. More than a set of devices, rhetoric is the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion, as Aristotle stated. Scholars such as Reboul explicitly refer to rhetoric as an art:

> La rhétorique est l’art de persuader par le discours […] Mais ’s agit-il d’une simple technique? Non, il s’agit de bien plus. Le véritable orateur est un artiste en ce sens qu’il découvre des arguments d’autant plus efficaces qu’on ne les attendait pas, des figures dont personne n’aurait eu l’idée et qui s’avèrent être justes; un artiste dont les performances ne sont pas programmables et ne s’imposent qu’après coup (Reboul 1998, p. 4-6).

This inventiveness highlights the heuristic function of rhetoric and the important aspect of invention. It appeals to our creativity in our search for relevant questions and answers to specific matters. The art of rhetoric has many
social functions, such as the testing of ideas and the discovery of facts (Herrick 2005, p. 16), and the open and creative character of rhetorical thinking is mentioned by most scholars.

Rhetoric is an acquired competency, a manner of thinking that invents possibilities for persuasion, conviction, action and judgment; it may be developed and sophisticated and, above all, critiqued and improved. [...] Rhetoric helps us to invent public thought (Farrell 1993, p. 16).

But as our discourse and arguments develop in interaction with other discourses, rhetoric encompasses a hermeneutic moment as well. One does not argue in isolation. Rhetorical interaction also calls for analysis, interpretation and for theoretical reflection. In this sense, the history of rhetoric might as well be called the history of philosophy of communication. It should come as no surprise that this art of speaking and writing well is an established intellectual tradition that has been considered a cornerstone of our cultures and our educational systems for many centuries. The restriction of rhetoric to the study of formal aspects, *elocutio* and rhetorical figures in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries cut the discipline loose from argument, function and meaning and caused it to lose relevance and eventually to disappear as such from the curricula. But even in our times, scholars such as Wayne Booth consider rhetoric as a kind of master art, structuring all other fields of knowledge. He wrote that rhetoric ‘held entire dominion over all verbal pursuits. Logic, dialectic, grammar, philosophy, history, poetry, *all* are rhetoric’ (Booth, quoted by Herrick 2005, p. 2).

A danger that comes with such all-encompassing views on rhetoric, however, is that the discipline comes to stand for any human symbolic interaction and thereby loses its focus. In this light, it is not surprising that much work has been done exactly on the relation between rhetoric and all kinds of adjacent fields: the tension between rhetoric and dialectic, logic, epistemology, hermeneutics, philosophy, stylistics (Groupe Mu), or between doxa and episteme, persuasion and narrative, argumentation and information.

An interesting proposal to situate rhetoric in our times is offered by John Lucaites and Celeste Condit. According to them, a rhetorical perspective on the world opens the possibilities for constituting a distinctive alternative to the projects of modernism and postmodernism.
Instead of living inside the absolute totality of modernism, or living outside modernism in perpetual critique, the rhetorical perspective describes a relatively stable and relatively fluid community that eschews any clear distinction(s) between inside and outside (Lucaites & Condit 1999, p. 610).

The rhetorical perspective focuses on the way communities negotiate and debate their decisions, thus acknowledging that their truths are provisional: ‘good enough for daily use, but also open to challenge when necessary’ (Ibid., p. 610). The rhetorical tradition does not search for timeless truth; instead, it is situated in societies, where communal experiences and knowledge guarantee certain ‘substantial anchors against totalitarianism (whether fueled by monarchial will, the tyranny of the majority, of solipsistic individualism)’, and where a focus on the pragmatic, emancipatory possibilities in any given situation can feed ‘strategic liberation’ in this contingent world (Ibid., p. 611).

Rethinking rhetoric
The rich and respectable tradition of the rhetorical discipline does not stipulate, however, that rhetoric scholars should restrict their work to the traditional areas and questions of rhetoric. On the contrary. As we have come to realize, the importance of rhetoric and rhetorical interaction in all forms of discourse, the scope of rhetorical scholarship is enlarged. Rhetorical studies should not be limited to the three basic areas of law, politics and the ceremonial oratory, but should include all forms of public discourse, written or multimedia. The paradigm of the monologic and oratorial speech delivery has expanded to all verbal communication and comprises both public and private interaction, official and vernacular speech, planned and spontaneous discourse. Its scope has widened from exclusively verbal language to the study and interpretation of other symbolical languages, such as art and visual artefacts. This evolution shows how rhetoric is an interdisciplinary activity that does not conform to a fixed method or a rigid theory.

The ongoing discussion about the status, scope and value of rhetoric as a discipline is part of the rhetorical project. The changing cultural, political and scientific conditions of our time urge us to adapt rhetoric to this new era. In the Sixties of the last century, for instance, new media such as television and new social movements such as feminism or the social rights movement urged rhetoricians to widen their focus and reformulate their
questions about language, power, and the public sphere. As a consequence, many scholars turned away from the neo-Aristotelian project that strives for objective knowledge about the rhetorical effect of a given artefact, and work on new concepts of rhetorical praxis such as the production of discourse by social forces and the engagement of the rhetorical scholar in the performance of her interpretation.

The neo-Aristotelian perspective featured basically the traditional analytical tools of rhetoric, such as the canons (invention, arrangement, style, memory and delivery), the three modes of proof (logos, ethos, pathos), the three levels of style (plain, middle or grand style) and the virtues of style (purity, clarity, decorum and ornamentation). Other methods of analysis originated, drawing from the close reading movement, or from philosophical (e.g. Kenneth Burke, Michel Foucault), social, or literary theories. This evolution evokes central topics in recent scholarship such as the relationship between theory, criticism and practice, and the nature of rhetorical criticism.

The assumption that discourse reflects and consolidates socio-political power structures marks the complex and paradoxical position of rhetorical scholars. As critics choose and define their objects, varying from concrete texts to wider phenomena such as the discourse of social groups or movements, they also define their function as either promoter of ‘good’ rhetorical practices or as revealer of processes of power. On the one hand, the traditional critical norm of disinterestedness obliges a critic to be neutral and objective (Jasinski 2001, p. 135); on the other hand, it is assumed that the analysis and evaluation of effective practices reinforce the dominant discourse. How can the critic be a scientific observer, when, in fact, she is always a participant in human discourse and society as well?

McKerrow (1999) presents two levels of criticism: scholars can work towards emancipation and formulate a ‘critique of domination’ by revealing the discourse of power that structures social hierarchies. Although it is important to study ‘the discourse which flows from or expresses power functions to keep people ‘in their place’, this should not keep us from challenging the power-repression formula and examine the critique of power relations across a broader social spectrum’ (McKerrow 1999, p. 446). Drawing from Foucault, he shows how the second level, ‘critique of freedom’, is a continuous self-reflexive investigation that tries to lay bare underlying structures in discourse that either prevent or enable social change. Criticism is not a methodology, McKerrow ascertains, but a perspective that results from a
certain orientation towards the object of study. This theoretical rationale supports the eight well-known 'principles of praxis', which show how ‘a critical rhetoric celebrates its reliance on contingency, on doxa as the basis for knowledge, on nominalism as the ground of language meaning as doxastic, and critique viewed as performance’ (Ibid., p. 459).

Criticism is a central activity in the discipline of contemporary rhetorical studies. One of the main challenges in the critical interpretation of texts or phenomena is the apparent self-evidence or transparency of public discourse. Institutions and conventions mould its appearance and forms, and it is by critical analysis, in the project of a close reading, that the underlying tensions or dynamism can be revealed (Jasinski 2001, p. 129).

The specific methods or procedures that guide the critical work of rhetoricians are very diverse. In order to demonstrate this ‘methodological pluralism’, Jasinski quotes the

Matlon (1995) Index to Journals in Communication Studies, that identified more than sixty critical methods under the heading for methodology in rhetorical criticism. Among the methods listed were archetype, axiological, Burkeian, dialectical, dramatic, ethical, existential, factor analysis, fantasy theme, genre studies, historical, inferential, intersubjective, language-action, Marxist, myth or mythological, organismic, phenomenological, philosophical, sociolinguistic, structuralist and symbolical analysis (Jasinski 2001, p. 137).

All these methods have their representatives and their merits, and the sheer diversity of this survey particularly reveals the richness and power of rhetorical criticism. The crucial point to be made here is the risk of closure. Rhetorical work should resist the all too easy reduction to preset classifications and show creativity and nuance in the overall search for critical interpretations.

Apart from rhetorical criticism, there is another particular field of rhetoric that has received intense attention during the last decades, namely the field of argumentation. It is beyond the scope of this introduction to discuss the historical factors that caused argumentation to be expelled from rhetorical studies, but by focusing on argumentation, scholars such as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) unmistakably brought a neglected area in the study of rhetoric firmly back to the centre, where it belongs. Although their work originates from the disappointment in the rigidity and limited focus of formal logic, it is their rejection of traditional rhetoric as a superficial
formal style device collection that determines the originality of their work. Form and content should not be studied separately, they claimed, because style and argument are similarly functional in the process of discussion and persuasion. Truth is never manifest, and the purpose of argumentation is nothing more and nothing less than to elicit or increase the adherence of members of an audience to theses that are presented for their consent. The quality of argument is also determined by the audience, be it particular or universal, and the task of the speaker or writer is to find and formulate arguments that work. The New Rhetoric not only generated a revival of rhetorical studies, but it also claimed the position of rhetoric in the expanding field of argumentation studies right from the start.

Perelman’s constructive understanding of rhetoric as the study of the methods of argument encourages us to view it as fundamentally a communicative practice. Scholars such as Tindale have elaborated this understanding in showing that argumentation as a human practice is essentially rhetorical in ways that far exceed methodology alone (Tindale 2004, p. 19). Referring to Bitzer, who defined the rhetorical situation in terms of exigence, audience and constraints, Tindale proposes a constructive understanding of rhetoric as ‘a mode of altering reality […] by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought and action’ (Bitzer 1968, p.4). Argumentation is to be appreciated as an activity that changes how we perceive the world by changing the way we think about things.

By linking the logic perspective to the product of argumentation, the dialectic perspective to the procedure, and the rhetorical to the process, Tindale manages to develop a theory that accommodates the relationship among the three. Yet, ‘it is the rhetorical that must provide the foundations for that theory, and it will influence how we understand and deal with the logical and the dialectical in any particular case’ (Tindale 2004, p.7).

‘In a very general sense’, Tindale claims, ‘an argument is the discourse of interest that centers, and develops in, the argumentative situation’ (Ibid., p. 23). This situation does not only involve logos, or argument itself, but also the two other Aristotelian means of persuasion. The concept of ethos is linked to the arguer, who is always involved in, or even constructed by the text, and the concept of pathos refers to the audience, that does not in the least play the role of a passive receiver, but on the contrary is characterized mainly by its dynamism and engagement. The argumentative situation is the ‘dynamic space in which arguer and audience interact, but interact in a way
that makes them coauthors’ (Ibid., p. 23), since this space of the argumentative situation is crucial to our self-understanding and our understanding of others. After all, as social beings, we all are ‘in audience’ most of the time. Referring to Bakhtin and Todorov, Tindale highlights the aim for agreement and ‘co-voicing’ in what he calls dialogical argumentation: ‘Argument, like dialogue, is ongoing’ (Ibid., pp. 104-105).

Although many scholars propose new and open frames for the study of argumentation (Gilbert 1997; Amossy 2010), most argumentation theories, such as the Toulmin model, the Informal Logic tradition, or the Amsterdam pragma-dialectic school, offer more normative views on argument (for an overview or discussions see O’Keefe 1977; Gilbert 1997; Jasinski 2001; Van Eemeren 2003, etc.). Those approaches are more normative in their focus on the logos of argument schemes or the dialectics of procedures for the reconstruction and critical evaluation of an argument, and in their interest in fallacy theory. It is not within the scope of this introduction to elaborate on argumentation theory; nevertheless, the work of both the Informal Logicians and the Amsterdam School of pragma-dialectics has functioned as a constant touchstone and as an invitation to reformulate the specific rhetorical aspects of argumentation. Especially the expansion of the pragma-dialectic programme to the concept of strategic manoeuvring that started in 1999 has triggered a considerable production of work on the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic (e.g. Garver 2000; Van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002; Leff 2002; Krabbe 2002; Blair 2003).

Contemporary rhetorical studies are involved in a broad spectrum of academic fields, which offer many chances for interdisciplinary research. Conversely actual language and communication theories and disciplines extensively draw on ancient rhetoric (e.g. Barthes 1970). Primary rhetorical disciplines such as speech analysis or rhetorical criticism are closely related to fields like rhetorical citizenship, argumentation studies, pragmatics, critical discourse studies, text linguistics, art, literary criticism and cultural studies, but they also have their part in the fields of communication studies, journalism studies, political, social and educational studies, history, psychology and philosophy. Many of those disciplines show an increasing interest in the rhetorical aspects of their own paradigms and methods.

Because of their specific interest in speech and language processes, linguistic approaches such as (critical) discourse studies (DS) show particular similarities with rhetorical studies. Like rhetoric, discourse studies aim at a
qualitative interpretative approach; but DS are more data-driven rather than theory driven. Analyses start from close attention to linguistic details of records of discourse. As Eisenhart and Johnstone put it:

Working upward from particular, situated instances of text and talk rather than downwards from abstract models of discourse, they take systematic approaches to exploring why particular utterances take the particular shapes they do. […] They are empirical, in the sense that they are based in observation rather than introspection alone; they are ethnographic, in that they seek to understand the rhetorical workings of discourse and context through the eyes and minds of those engaged in them, and they are grounded, returning again and again to their data as they build theory to account for it (Eisenhart & Johnstone 2008, p.3).

The interest for particular language processes and for an interpretation of the ways in which people persuade one another links discourse studies to new rhetoric projects that are not limited to speech analysis but aim at interpretation of other kinds of discourse and interaction. For example, scholarship on political discourse is growing (e.g. Charaudeau 2005), and also fields such as cultural studies are examining possibilities for discourse analysis (Carpentier & Spinoy 2008).

In a way, Critical Discourse Analysis (cda), a recent school of discourse analysis, is particularly closely connected to the rhetorical project, in that it concerns itself with relations of power and inequality in language, and with the position of the reader/interpreter/scholar. cda scholars like Fairclough, Blommaert & Bulcaen, Wodak & Meyer, and Van Dijk state that discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned, and that it should be studied in terms of (sometimes opaque) processes in hegemony. They explicitly incorporate social-theoretical insights into discourse analysis as they strive for social commitment and interventionism in research. Nevertheless, cda is but one of the many ways in which rhetorical studies have come to focus on language as the basic phenomenon from where to start an analysis. Discursive psychology, for one, is another field in which rhetoric as a discursive practice takes a central position (see e.g. Potter 1996). The themes and questions of traditional rhetorical theory and practice have thus been extensively picked up by linguists working in the field of pragmatics.

Another new research area that is connected to rhetoric comes from a psychological or sociological perspective. Scholars such as Daniel O’Keefe or
Hans Hoeken study the effects of persuasion processes, and try to determine the factors that trigger changes in attitude or behaviour. So far, no theory has been able to develop a model that explains all observed phenomena, and notably people such as O’Keefe keep warning us of the pitfalls of this kind of scholarship (O’Keefe 2011, pp.127-129). Persuasion processes are indeed very complex, and difficult to separate from social factors as well (Kienpointner 1995, p. 268). Yet these challenges do not prevent even further remote research areas such as neurosciences from taking up questions based on rhetorical processes of persuasion in their programmes.

Rhetoric and media

The Western tradition of thought about language has tended to privilege referential discourse and to imagine that discourse (at least ideally) reflects the pre-existing world. But as twentieth-century philosophers (Foucault 1980), rhetoricians (Burke 1945), and linguists (Sapir 1949, Wolf 1941) showed again and again, the converse is also true, or perhaps truer: human worlds are shaped by discourse (Eisenhart & Johnstone 2008, p. 12).

At first sight, rhetoric and media have quite different aims and features. Traditional rhetoric is about persuading an audience while media claim to inform the public in the first place. And even though most media also provide large portions of explicit ‘opinion’, journalists and readers alike consider the rendering of correct and factual information to be the core business of news media. Although nobody will deny the epideictic function of media in society, in that they should praise or blame persons or institutions (Herrick 2005, p. 81), there seems to be a general understanding that media ‘represent reality’, and that consequently, journalists can/should report facts that ‘speak for themselves’. When the media are criticised for lies or bias, the critique is based on this very factuality, or rather the lack of it.

Meanwhile, a lot of research in a variety of academic disciplines is oriented towards distinct rhetorical questions such as the implicit rhetoric that emphasizes the importance and truth of media messages, the rhetorical processes that determine news selection, the way in which journalists manage competing opinions or, more generally, the way in which journalists and other public figures alike participate in public discourse. Important questions are taken up by scholars such as Teun van Dijk (1988), who examines
the ways in which the importance and truth of the message is enhanced in media discourse.

One of the basic conventional conditions of truth is direct observation: ‘I have seen it with my own eyes’ is the ultimate warrant of truthfulness [...]. Within the limits of their financial budget, newspapers therefore try to get first-handed evidence from their correspondents or reporters and may even send a special envoy to places where dozens of other reporters already are present. The immediacy of the description and the closeness of the reporter to the events is a rhetorical guarantee for the truthfulness of the description and, hence, the plausibility of the news (Van Dijk 1988, p. 86).

An important challenge for all media studies, then, is to examine how the ideal of fact finding and objective scientific rendering of verbal and visual information influences the selection and formulation of news. In other words, a critical attitude towards the media should comprise more than the indispensable search for facts that are inadequately or incorrectly reported, and the ideological, commercial, or other factors that influence this process (e.g. Parenti 1993). It should also question the very paradigm of objective observation and transparent language. One example of such a fundamental media critique is to be found in the field of peace journalism. Scholars such as John Galtung established a worldwide interest in conflict and peace studies, and stimulated rhetoricians such as Samuel Peleg (2006) or Annabel McGoldrick (2006) to examine meticulously the rhetorical elements in contemporary ‘objective’ media reporting habits that stimulate the very conflicts they lament, thus confirming the commercially and ideologically based media bias in favour of conflict and war. An important challenge for this kind of journalism is the delicate position of the journalist, who no longer functions as a ‘neutral observer’, but has to construct a new ethos as a participant in the resolution of a conflict, with all the (other) risks that this position involves.

Another challenge for media studies in this struggle with the objectivity ideal is the coming to terms with both narration and ideology. Information, or ‘content’, is always structured within narrative and ideological frames. News stories come in highly ritualized narrative structures, marked by fixed features such as the absent I-narrator or the inverted pyramid structure. In their urge for ‘neutrality’, media stage well-defined and unilateral characters, often in polarized positions. Moreover, the dependence on ‘ob-
jective’ visual information urges them to concentrate on stories that can be presented in (or proven by) visual narration that puts concrete people and places in the picture, rather than abstract elements such as politicalprogrammes or historical context. From this inclination towards concrete and visual stories, it follows that more complicated ideological or argumentative elements are often suggested rather than explicitly formulated. This is even more the case in sports and other entertainment media, where the inoffensive and superficial stories can barely conceal the deeper interests involved. These are but a couple of the narrative choices media make day by day, and while many choice mechanisms can be detected or studied by means of quantitative research, it is a particular mission for rhetorical studies to reveal as meticulously as possible the utter complexity and interconnectedness of the different factors that influence those choices.

The media do tell stories, and an interesting point here is made by John C. Hartsock, who, in his study of the intricate historical relationship between literature, narrative journalism, and journalism, explains how the dominant attitude of the journalist as a scientist originated in the divide between literature and journalism that emerged during the nineteenth century. He shows how the establishment of a social scientific approach as a dominant paradigm for journalistic study based on positive assumptions promoted by scholars such as W. Bleyer and W. Schramm (Hartsock 2000, p. 233) can be interpreted as a way to save journalism from the derogatory attitude of the defenders of ‘high’ literature that appealed to a transcendent universality that journalism never aspired to (Ibid., p. 218, p. 244). Hartsock describes how ‘the study of journalism moved from being a humanistic and rhetorical enterprise to being a social science, with a quantitative, empirical, and behavioral focus’ (Ibid., pp. 236-237). Thus, many a definition of communication sciences ‘excludes the possibility of interpretation based on critical, not empirical, induction and deduction. In turn, they miss the point that all texts, even scholarly empirical texts, are fundamentally interpretive’ (Ibid., p. 238). As such, in his work on literary journalism, Hartsock describes how both the profession and the study of journalism are part of historical and rhetorical processes that include elements of context, status, and authority.

Media not only present story, they present opinion as well. Needless to say, media take part in the rhetorical processes that constitute our societies: they formulate or neglect questions, statements, and arguments, they stimulate or suppress discussion and debate, and they criticize or praise
persons, events, and actions. Ever since the concept of public opinion arose in the eighteenth century context of enlightenment, media have been connected to what Jürgen Habermas later coined as ‘the public sphere’. It is up to rhetoricians to propose interpretations of all kinds of media discourses, and to show how rhetorical elements like style and argument determine those particular public discourses. They can describe and analyze texts in their complexity and totality, paying attention to aspects such as the balance between logos, ethos and pathos, the underlying dynamics of certain recurring words, frames or metaphors, the strategic structuring of themes or arguments, or the subtle play with different styles. Rhetoricians try to do more than lay bare the static underlying ideas that are being imposed on media consumers, but rather they consider the artefact in its context and in the dynamic exchange of views and arguments between different individuals and groups in public space.

Rhetoric and new media

The focus on dynamism is very much at stake in light of the media’s current digital revolution. This is a new and important challenge for rhetorical scholars. According to some, we should show unrestrained enthusiasm about the dialogic power of multimodal communication and the new media, in the name of a reinvention of older traditions of oral discourse. Thus, the old textual rhetoric is defined as static, authoritative, linear and hierarchical, and new forms of rhetoric are envisioned as dynamic and interactive networks of associations driven by a multiplicity of languages and voices. Instead of the traditional knowledge inscribed and enshrined in printed text, the promise of individual freedom to think and read and write creatively in digital space reigns. Conversation and interactivity surpass monologue, association and hypertext take over linear and hierarchical communication, multimodality beats monomodality. People will participate in networks that are horizontal and associative, rather than vertical and hierarchical, logical, and abstract (Zappen 2004, p. 145).

In his qualitative analysis of the digital media, Zappen reconsiders the role of dialogue within the rhetorical tradition. He turns to Bakhtin’s concept of dialogue, which seems to challenge traditional rhetoric by directing rhetorical activity away from persuasion and towards a wider range of ends or purposes. To Zappen, dialogical rhetoric should be conceived as a kind of rhetoric that is responsive and accountable to others.
Bakhtin describes the kind of double-voicedness that he finds in the earlier Platonic dialogues: the testing and contesting and creating of ideas that occurs not as a result of a single speaker speaking but only as a result of a change, and an exchange, of speaking subjects by which old ideas are challenged and new ideas are born (Ibid., p. 2).

Zappen proposes to link the hybrid form of the Socratic dialogue to the actual hybrid forms of electronic discourses, ‘which are at once oral and written and graphic and which seem to provide new opportunities for interactivity, intersubjectivity, collaboration, and dialogue’ (Ibid., p. 15). This view also offers an opportunity to rethink the very meaning and purpose of public discourse ‘not as persuasion but as an ongoing exchange in which we test and contest and create ideas in cooperation and when necessary in conflict with others’ (Ibid., p. 2).

Zappen realizes how new media entail dangers as to privacy or manipulation or isolation of individuals (Ibid., p. 156), but a negative attitude towards new media is above all a question of cultural authority, he argues. Controversy about the authority of the old and the new media proves that the discussion is not so much about old and new media as it is about the cultural values and beliefs presumed to be embedded within them (Ibid., p. 142). It is an important project for rhetorical scholars to study how these underlying controversies and values find their way to new media as well as to the discussions about the phenomenon.

One of the challenges here is the choice (and presentation) of the artefact under scrutiny. The quantity, multimodality and volatility of the new media, together with parallel phenomena such as social media and civil journalism, ask for a quite particular corpus selection, and specific questions and methods of analysis. As the tradition of rhetorical studies mainly focused on verbal communication throughout the ages, a particularly important aspect in the study of new media rhetoric is the topic of multimodality, and the way in which audiovisual and verbal communication interact with each other and with their audiences who can take on a much more active role than was previously possible.

**Visual rhetoric**

Most traditional thinking about rhetoric is restricted to verbal communication. The art of rhetoric found its origin in the oratory, and books on rhetoric specifically taught speakers how to compose appealing speeches that
convince their audiences. This means actually that rhetoric not only handled the invention and writing of speeches, but also their delivery. The attention paid to speech delivery brings into play elements of voice and body language and the audio-visual aspects of presentation. In the classical tradition of rhetorical devices, even non-verbal elements such as the showing of a scar or a bloody weapon were brought into play, as they could contribute to the success of a speech. ‘The audience’s senses were all called on in this oratorical culture, rather than being fragmented and addressed in a single focus, the pictorial eye for seeing art, the ear for hearing music, the eye and intellect for reading, the nose for food and perfume’ (Hobbs 2004, p. 58).

Throughout Western history, writing and speaking instruction often handled the translation of visual images into verbal text – and the other way around. Numerous _ecphrasis_ devices deal with the composition of vivid descriptions and show how to bring places and actions before the eyes clearly and vividly (Ibid., p. 56). In line with the major link between seeing and understanding that predominates Western philosophy and that can be traced back to Plato’s allegory of the cave, many rhetoricians were aware of the power of images all too well. Quintilian, for example, saw visualization as the most powerful means of arousing emotion, possibly the best way to convince an audience (Ibid., p. 57). In short, rhetorical theory may have its roots in oral discourse, and may have focused on verbal communication too easily, yet we could observe with Bruce Gronbeck that ‘visuality always has been integral to rhetorical consciousness’ (Olson, Finnegan & Hope, p. xxiv). The distinctions between linguistic and visual discourse should not prevent us from studying visual discourse on rhetorical grounds.

Kress and Van Leeuwen, who explore the interrelation between the two, assume that ‘All texts are multimodal. Language always has to be realized through, and comes in the company of, other semiotic modes’ (Kress and Van Leeuwen 1998, p. 186). This goes for speaking (sounds, facial expression, etc.) as well as for writing (words, lay out, etc.). According to them, the traditional insistence on the monomodal – that favours, for instance, written text on a densely printed page – only reveals that this once was the most highly valued kind of writing. Indeed, this status of the verbal is possibly one of the reasons why verbal texts are still very much considered to be standing on their own, and studied apart from other modalities, while most work on visual communication does not exclude the verbal at all.

Argumentation scholars like David Birdsell and Leo Groarke refute
the ‘visual scepticism’ by showing, for instance, how both words and images can be clear or vague, and how context and cultural aspects play an important role in the interpretation of verbal and visual communication alike (Birdsell & Groarke 2004). In their search for the conceptualizing of visual arguments, they examine how words and images can and do function together not only in the construction of meaning, but also in the construction of argument (see also Blair 2004).

The expression ‘visual rhetoric’ is used by Olson as ‘a shorthand to emphasize culturally-shaped practices of seeing in their relationship to historically-situated processes of rhetorical action’ (Olson 2007, p. 3). The growing interest in visual rhetoric results in the reshuffling of historical and intellectual status cards. Experts in visual communication often react against the supremacy of written words in the Western intellectual tradition; they claim that images do not deserve to be banned to categories of illiteracy, delusion, subjectivity, irrationality and emotion, as they are at least as basic to human communication and intelligence as verbal language (Hobbs 2004; Foss 2004; Hill & Helmers 2004). It is important to realize that, like most forms of communication, visual communication rarely stands on its own and, notably, the increasing multimodality in our times comes down to the merging of the different modes into hybrid texts and/or narrations. Newspapers explain and frame their pictures in different verbal ways, documentaries construct an internal narrative and discursive logic, online news presents a collage of texts, photos, videos, along with invitations to interact and the presentation of hyperlinks. This means that the study of visual rhetoric does not focus on visual elements in isolation, but rather on their complex relation to the context that frames their meaning and supports their interpretation.

Nowadays, most scholars agree that the resources of rhetoric are useful for analysing, interpreting and assessing visual media. Yet, visual rhetorical studies can also benefit greatly from interdisciplinary work, particularly with fields such as art history and the humanities in general.

Other scholars rely on a more applied and cognitive basis: they examine how graphic and verbal lines of argument can work together, interfere, or contradict; how different messages can be conveyed simultaneously; how words can generate images and vice versa. Although there is no consensus on the name and the study is scattered over many disciplines and academic departments, the field of visual rhetoric is expanding rapidly as it is part of the
‘pictorial turn’ (Mitchell 1994) in the humanities and in our culture. Many studies on visual rhetoric are set up with regard to the type of medium: television, film, radio, or the hybrid forms in new media. Other work focuses on the visual symbols that play a central role in certain class, race, or gender movements, both historical and actual. The case studies draw from intellectual resources such as Kenneth Burke, Roland Barthes, or Susan Sontag. Lately, the focus has shifted from artefact or media to interpretive practices of observing and seeing, and to the institutions that control the selection and circulation of images (Olson 2007).

**Verbal and visual rhetoric in a media world**

This collection brings together articles that examine how rhetoric functions in society and how the field can reconcile tradition with renewal. The themes cover a wide range of topics, such as the rhetoric of popular philosophy, the use of metaphors in financial reports on the financial crisis, or the proposal of new functions for neglected fields like *actio* and *memoria*. It offers analyses of media discourse on various themes, like the wearing of religious symbols or the ethos of victims and criminals. Many of them explore the new and most important topics of new media and visual rhetoric. At an increasing pace, a greater part of news and comments is rendered in the form of images such as pictures, graphics, cartoons, documentaries and videos. The possibility and the features of visual rhetoric as such are examined, but also and particularly the question as to how the visual and the verbal interact. Visual rhetoric is not limited to the study of media discourse, but applies to the field of advertising, or to domains like education or law as well. It is important to examine how the verbal and the visual work, how they relate, what specific strengths and dangers are involved in new and increasingly complex combinations of those two forms of information and argumentation.

The natural field of rhetoric is the field of the concrete and the contextual. But rhetorical and argumentation analyses start from certain assumptions that should be cleared out and discussed continuously. Rhetorical theory, an inherently interdisciplinary project, should keep up with the changes in discourse as well as with the evolution in academia. In the first chapter of this book, fundamental questions are formulated in areas that, at first sight, are situated as far away from rhetoric as from one another, like epistemology, Qur’an translation, and neuroscience (Part 1). Next to these theoretical reflections, the collection offers a series of rhetorical analyses.
that evolve from more familiar themes and topics such as style, metaphor or humour (Part 2), narrowing down towards the more specific and closely related topics of the media (Part 3), the new media (Part 4), and finally visual rhetoric (Part 5).

**Theory and explorations**

Rhetoric can serve as a way of knowing, it is assumed. In exploring the importance of the social and interactive ways in which knowledge is generated, the two epistemological contributions to this book continue the work that was initiated by Robert L. Scott, who put that ‘rhetoric is epistemic’. Christopher Tindale examines the role played by rhetoric ‘in an important source of knowledge – that derived from the words of other people’. With testimony being the most ‘social’ source of knowledge, it brings to the fore questions about ethos, authority and audience and the development of a model that accounts for the way in which ‘the epistemic work is shared between speaker and audience’.

Drawing on a recent experimental social-psychological study of group deliberation, Frank Zenker suggests that affect may not only influence, but replace cognition. Vis-à-vis this result, he presents a weak version of the rhetoric-as-epistemic thesis. Rhetoric is understood to provide a probable form of knowledge of the available means of persuasion that may contribute to achieving the epistemic ends of groups. In particular, the use of argumentative and suasive devices in a broad sense may facilitate that information possessed by individuals is reflected in the group’s decision. Thus, with respect to deliberative discourse, rhetoric need not *create* knowledge, but may help to socialize it. The chapter stresses the importance of studying the conditions under which a person’s knowledge provides the reasons for which a collective decides.

Rhetoric can also play an important role in domains that focus on language, such as translation studies. Hanadi Behairi considers rhetoric in the Qur’an to be a basic element of interpretation that should enable translators to move beyond the idea of translating the *meaning* of the original text. In focusing on the translation of the literary and rhetorical aspects of the Qur’an, she shows that the study of rhetoric can be an important tool in the promotion of cross-cultural understanding.

With Jens Koed Madson’s article, we leave the domain of humanities altogether and turn to one of the new discussions in the rhetorical milieu:
is it possible for rhetorical theory and analysis to learn from neuroscientific evidence or not? According to Madson, this is possible in four main areas: assumption testability, theoretical predictions, analyzes and as inspiration for future research. The example shows how the interaction between emotional appeals and mirror-neuron systems opens up a series of possibilities for further research.

**Rhetorical analysis**

In his study of the bank crisis financial credit metaphors in *The Economist*, Eric Caers highlights the location of specific metaphors on the macroeconomic terrain and investigates how *The Economist* metaphorically frames certain specific target domains (deficit spending, austerity packages, bank bailouts), as typified by its multiple responses to the financial crisis of 2008-2010. This study, therefore, pursues a qualitative analysis of metaphor use in *The Economist* during the aforementioned period, with a view to measuring to what extent the choice of metaphors used by the editors reflects their arguments/ideology against the backdrop of a worldwide liquidity shortfall followed by a dramatic recovery plan. To meet this end, this study methodologically adopts a slightly modified form of Lakoff and Johnson’s Critical Metaphor Theory, which is complemented with Musolff’s theory of entailment: while it is perfectly possible for a journalist to accept (and produce) a metaphorical mapping, one may not subscribe to all its entailments if the goal is an undesirable one.

In his book *Status Anxiety*, Alain de Botton faces the difficult task of demystifying the arbitrary processes through which status and authority are mediated in modern cultures without, however, giving his audience the opportunity to question his own equally arbitrary authority to speak as a philosopher. Jeroen Lauwers aims to expose the rhetorical techniques through which de Botton manages to achieve a bond of trust with his audience and yet to stay in the position of the philosophical critic of social life. The results thus reflect on the nature of the rhetorical discourse used in the field of popular philosophy.

The effect of self-deprecating humour on speaker ethos in an informative speech is examined by Sarah Gagstein, Bas Andeweg, Jaap de Jong and Martijn Wackers. Three speech versions were tested by means of a questionnaire (n=239): a control version, a mild version (seven self-deprecating remarks) and an extreme version (14 instances). The extreme version
was created to find a ceiling effect where the humourous content would be overstated and therefore harmful for speaker ethos. In this experiment, self-deprecating humour turned out to be problematic for humour, ethos, and interest. The ceiling effect was reached much faster than anticipated. Ethos was not harmed in the mild version, but was harmed in the extreme version. Humour and interest both suffered from the manipulations, both in the extreme and the mild version.

In her work on the non-verbal resources of rhetoric Marie Gelang introduces a new concept, ‘Actio Capital’. It is a theoretical model that describes the development of a speaker’s actio from actio resource to asset, and finally to actio capital. The model is intended to provide an overall description and understanding of a speaker’s resources with regard to actio. Actio Capital is inspired by Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of *habitus* and *symbolic capital* along with the analysis of both classical and modern handbooks and recent research about actio, as well as an empirical study of university lecturers. The model will create a modern understanding of the last step in Rhetorica Partes, the delivery of a speech.

Smaragda Papadopoulou and Fotini Egglezou study the contribution of rhetoric to the teaching of argumentative writing of 25 eleven-year-old students of a Greek primary school. Their case study research has been influenced by the social constructivist theory of Lev Vygotsky. In the context of teaching for thinking, rhetoric facilitated the acquisition of students’ literacy in two ways: as the art of effective use of language and as the bipolar view of every subject-matter (Protagoras’s *dissoi logoi*). The development of communicative and persuasive techniques in teaching mother tongue activated social interaction among students through the confrontation of ideas and judgements. Their argumentative writing was influenced positively. Statistical analysis of data proved a significant augmentation of counter-arguments and rebuttals in the final written argumentative texts.

**Media discourse**

Across Europe, the wearing of religious dress and symbols has recently become a matter of controversy. Ruth Breeze examines the rhetorical approaches in the media so as to delimit the arguments that are taking shape. The chapter explores British media discourses surrounding the wearing of religious symbols by Sikhs, Muslims and Christians, by applying frame analysis to a corpus of articles from eight major British newspapers (Janu-
ary-June 2010). Five master frames are identified as organizing frameworks in a large proportion of the articles. The clarity and specificity of these frames is assessed to determine whether they are likely to become politically functional.

Women’s magazines show a special type of media discourse, in which rhetoric plays an important role. In their study, Van de Voorde and Temmerman examine how two popular Flemish women’s magazines try to impose their ideas on women and their relationships with their partners on their women readers. They focus on relationship advice in the problem pages of the magazines and they carry out a diachronic analysis: Het Rijk der Vrouw of the year 1958 is compared with the 2008 volume of Flair. ‘Interpretative repertoire’, naming analysis and a systemic-functional transitivity analysis cater for the theoretical framework for this study.

Fernando López Pan and Javier Serrano support the idea that the rhetorical strength of the journalistic column is based on ethos. This concept contains three dimensions: nuclear (topics and values of the speaker), formal (stylistic features) and poetic (the speaker himself becomes a character of his own discourse). The authors explain the relation of the journalistic column with the rhetorical ethos, and analyze the poetic ethos of a collection of columns published by three Spanish columnists and writers: Pérez Reverte, de Prada and Muñoz Molina.

Rhetoric in journalistic discourse reveals how events are appropriated through a polemical schematization that corresponds to Grize’s tripartite schema. In her chapter on the heuristic function of rhetoric in journalistic discourse, Veronique Magaud aims to show how the term hysteria appears in media texts and how it structures each level of the polemical schematization. She adds the notion of doxopraxie in order to analyze the way common sense is implemented through the term. The chapter focuses on the term hysteria as a narrative reported speech, as a nominalization, and finally as a notion linked to quotations.

Willem Koetsenruijter analyzes the roles of victims and offenders in crime news and, in particular, the way these roles can switch. The roles of victims and offenders are viewed as the result of a social construction process, achieved by rhetorical means. These rhetorical means – as components of verbal text, photographs and pictures – serve to persuade the news consumer of the guilt or innocence of the person in question and thus give us anchor points in our perception of what good and evil looks like.
In their case study, Janno Lanjouw and Peter Burger merge rhetorical and discourse analysis with narrative analysis in order to describe the way the press represented the gangsters who kidnapped multimillionaire brewer Alfred Heineken and his driver in 1983. The coverage saw the ethos of the kidnappers shift from ruthless criminals to daring criminal entrepreneurs to victims of the state. By highlighting their audacity, loyalty and cleverness, and downplaying their brutal treatment of the victims, the press moulded the kidnappers’ ethos in a Robin Hood-like fashion, using the full journalist’s toolbox of rhetorical, discursive and narrative means.

New media
New media discourse is characterized and operated by a rhetoric the description of which calls for more than the functional modification of the traditional canon. In the discussion on new media rhetoric, Petra Aczél introduces a new term: netoric. It determines an ontologically ‘different’ rhetoric manifest in new media communicative practices; a new rhetoric to which, paradoxically, ancient traces lead back. Starting off from where digital rhetoricians locate the functions of rhetoric, Aczél aims at offering other ways to grasp the phenomena of new media rhetoric. In her attempt to redefine rhetoric she uses intellectual sources of new media and communication theories, philosophy and anthropology.

Margarita Esther Sánchez Cuervo examines rhetorical argumentation in celebrity gossip blogs, a phenomenon that resembles the journalistic mechanism that spreads debate globally. Comments represent the main feature of this exemplar of argumentative discourse, for which rhetoric becomes a tool of interest for practitioners. In this line, she analyzes Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s arguments based on the structure of reality, by which bloggers promote fresh judgements starting from a previous solidarity. In particular, she refers to the interaction of act and person and the use of narratives, and she also considers the presence of some figures of communion like acronyms, rhetorical questions and the enallage of person.

The new internet culture seems to be the culture of participation. Recent changes in web technologies, leading to the creation of web 2.0 systems have put emphasis on the users’ activity online. Anna Tereszkiewicz concentrates on the content of the iReport section of the CNN web site with the aim of analyzing the language of iReporters and their approach towards the presentation of the messages. The goal was to find out whether they resort
to the use of any specific rhetorical strategies, whether their descriptions are more factual and informative or rather more personal or opinionated.

Sue A. Kuykendall and Matthew Kim explore how to teach students to be critical prosumers of cultural artefacts. The Aristotelian canons of Invention-Arrangement-Style-Memory-Delivery may no longer be sufficient for rhetorical intervention in the global media society where communication has become consumer activity. Public discourse in the post-industrial consumer-capitalist economy of meaning calls for a revision of the canons in order to move toward unity and persuasion grounded in lived experience, taking into account the multiple modes in which messages are disseminated. They answer this call by reconstructing rhetoric pedagogy at the college/university level with a remapping of those canons, aimed at critical production and consumption of social texts for active, meaningful participation of global citizens in public discourse.

**Visual rhetoric**

In his discussion of *Memoria* in documentary film, Christoph Sauer examines how spectators remember sequences and actualize public memory. Documentary films proceed in analogy with orators in classical antiquity. Films use multimodal ‘cues’ to support the audience’s remembering of what has been processed already and relating it to what is going to be processed now and later on. This instance of *active remembering* is linked with a tangible ‘memory theatre’ the film provides; as is archive footage that evokes a ‘revitalization’ of the *collective memory*. Thus, *memoria* can be related to the viewers’ support of filmic information processing: they are treated as *overhearers* and ‘*oversers*’. The rhetoric of multimodal remembering, then, sheds light on the *audience design* of (documentary) films.

For argumentation theorists who are interested in forms of strategic manoeuvring with argumentation in different contexts, the way in which cartoonists use images taken from common cultural sources as a form of argumentation constitutes an interesting research topic. Eveline Feteris analyzes the strategic manoeuvring with such images and shows how cartoonists adapt to the audience in their choice from the topical potential of persuasive means to convince this audience of a critical standpoint with respect to the behaviour of politicians or other public officials. In her contribution she starts from a pragma-dialectical perspective of cartoons in which the message of the cartoonist is considered as an indirect form of argumentation. She...
analyzes the argumentative message underlying the cartoon and describes the way in which the cartoonist manoeuvres strategically to convince the intended audience of his critical standpoint.

José Plug tackles the question as to how transformations of well-known visualizations of metaphors may be used to manoeuvre strategically when criticizing politicians or political actions. In his attempt to convince the reader of a particular standpoint with respect to a particular political situation, a cartoonist manoeuvres strategically. This implies, in the terms of Van Eemeren, that the cartoonist tries to reconcile dialectical and rhetorical goals, the dialectical goal being to resolve the difference of opinion in a reasonable way and the rhetorical goal being that he chooses from the dialectically relevant moves those that serve him best to convince the intended audience.

Newhagen’s under discussed assertion that ‘the more immersive a presentation is the more persuasive it will be’ is the premise underscoring the arguments in Susan Hogben’s text. Using Goodman’s typology of possible reader roles, which acknowledge different levels of possible participation, she proposes to understand degrees of immersion in terms of actual readerly activity. She concludes that texts that encourage readerly action on the text itself can help to realize readerly action beyond the text; thus, it can serve as a method of releasing a text’s persuasive potential.

Every year, organizations such as World Press Photo, The Pulitzer Prize or Picture of the Year choose between thousands of submitted pictures in order to award the best press photographs of the year. Even though press photography in general has been studied we still do not know much about the rhetoric of these photographs. Jens Kjeldsen examines the common traits of prize winning photographs. What do they share in content and form? What kind of subjects, situations, compositions and aesthetic features are typical for a winning picture? One dominant content trait seems to be pictures of pain and misfortune, a formal trait appears to be visual contrasts based on synecdochal relations.

A limited amount of empirical research deals with the question about the impact of (dominantly) pictorial texts on legal decision-making. Most studies claim that the empirical results show that the pictorial evidence is prejudicial. However, analyzing the data from an argument theoretical point of view, Paul Van Den Hoven tends to refute this conclusion. He argues that from an argument theoretical point of view, the information that the pictorial texts add to the verbal ‘equivalent’ qualifies as probative, or at least
as non-prejudicial. A challenge for a theory about ‘visual’ legal argumentation is whether evaluative propositions such as ‘This crime is gruesome’ are established by pictorial texts.

This collection tries to determine the position of traditional rhetoric in our actual society. It starts with a series of chapters that offer theoretical possibilities for rhetoric to find a place in the twenty-first century. The following part presents rhetorical analyses where traditional concepts are practiced and tested for their actual potential. Part three and four focus on the (new) media and as such offer rhetorical analyses of one of the most characteristic phenomena of our times. And also the last part features renewal: rhetorical concepts are tried out on visual communication. There may be more questions than answers in this book and, of course, this is exactly what we aim for. To a large degree, the art of rhetoric consists in finding the right questions and formulating them as accurately as possible. If this perspective is what we created in this collection, we will be happy with even more questions from your side.

There is one thing, however, the editors of this collection are quite determined about, and that is our wish to express our gratitude towards the many people that helped us in realizing this project. We thank our colleagues at Lessius / Thomas More and kuLeuven for their support and enthusiasm during the ris3 Conference (January 2011 / Antwerpen). Frieda Steurs, Ken De Wachter and Raf Steenwegen were of invaluable help to us. Special thanks also goes to Christopher Tindale, Jef Verschueren, Bart Philipsen, Ronald Soetaert, Luc Van der Stockt and Michel Meyer. Finally, we thank the LUP reviewers for their remarks and suggestions, and Anniek Meinders and Chantal Nicolaes for their professional backing during the production of this book.

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INTRODUCTION

Anyone who has a view: Theoretical contributions to the study of argumentation.
New York: State University of New York Press.
PART I

Theory and Explorations
1 The Words of Other People: 
The Fundamental Role of Testimony 
in Rhetorical Argumentation.

CHRISTOPHER W. TINDALE

1.1 Introduction
Early discussions of rhetoric and epistemology – and I think here primarily of the work of Robert L. Scott (1967) and the responses to his ideas – view the relationship in terms of truth and certainty and what contributions rhetorical might make to such goals. Very little, is the answer. As Perelman (1982) had earlier argued, certainty is the domain of demonstration, and this lies outside of argumentation (the domain of rhetoric that interests him). In questions of uncertainty – those questions that most engage us in society – we should consider, argued Scott, truths that are not fixed, but arise from the particular circumstances. To this end, rhetoric serves as a way of knowing.

How it operates to such an end is less clear. In this chapter, I am interested in the role played by rhetoric in an important source of knowledge – that derived from the words of other people. Among the sources for knowledge, testimony is the most ‘social’ insofar as it relies not on an individual’s faculties but her relations with others. I am interested in how we learn from others, and the judgements we make about them and what they say in the process.

1.2 Sources of evidence
Much of the argumentation received by audiences involves the communication of evidence to provide warrants or justification for claims. One of the main reasons why arguments are persuasive is that they are deemed to provide the right kinds of evidence for the circumstances involved. Or, in terms reviewed below, they are deemed to be trustworthy. What counts as evidence can vary enormously across diverse disciplinary fields, from witnesses and statistics, to documents and experiments, and even divine revelation (Bell et
But outside of the contents involved in evidentiary discourse, the types of source are more limited. Perception, memory, inference and testimony all contribute to how we come to know and believe what we do. When asked to defend our claims to know something, we may respond that we saw it, remembered it, inferred it, or were told it, depending on which of these four is deemed the principal source in a particular situation. One might hold that all of these reduce to perception in some way, since memory is of a previous perception and what we are told we perceive (through hearing or seeing), and the data from which we infer is perceptual in nature. But this seems no more than to equate perception with experience in general, and we still find that the four traditional sources of knowledge are quite distinct in nature. For my purposes, the most interesting among these four is testimony. This is because while memory, reason, and perception – whether of the outer world or introspection – are faculties of the individual mind, testimony constitutes ‘the social side of knowledge’ (Kusch 2002, p. 15).

We will see that this is the case in a number of ways, and consider its import. For example, in making an assertion under Robert Brandom’s model, a speaker does not just take on the responsibility to justify her claim with reasons if challenged, she also lends her authority to the asserted content, licencing others to undertake a corresponding commitment (Brandom 2000, p. 165). On these terms, testimony is a kind of inherited entitlement and creates an epistemic interdependence. The audience is entitled to undertake the commitment on the basis of the speaker’s testimony, although the legitimacy of that entitlement is presumably predicated on the appropriate assessment having taken place.

This shifts attention from the testifier to the audience and that audience’s experience. Part of accepting testimony involves a judgement about the testifier (even if we are only interested in the testifier’s statements and not her beliefs). Thus, there is an important ethotic dimension to testimony viewed in this way. Aristotle’s three rhetorical proofs (logos, ethos, and pathos) seem unbalanced in terms of their epistemic roles. Logos has a clear epistemic association, as does Aristotle’s cognitive model of the emotions. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle tells us a lot about witnesses but very little about testimony per se. Attending to an audience-based view of testimony with associated conditions of reliability, clarifies the epistemic role that ethos also has.
1.3 Concerns with testimony

The importance attributed to testimony is a relatively recent observation. Traditional epistemology has held a lesser opinion of it and for quite serious reasons. Chiefly, we can surmise, testimony is viewed as a crutch that encourages us to depend on others and forego our own resources. Immanuel Kant advocated as a principal maxim of human understanding that one should ‘think for oneself’ (1951, p. 131. His emphasis) in order to avoid error.

The concern is illustrated further in the domain of science, where ‘the best of the natural sciences’ methodological principles’ are deemed to begin with the evaluation of ‘the validity of a proposition on the basis of the facts and reasoning supporting it, without regard to the personal qualities or social status of its advocates or detractors’ (Sokal & Bricmont 199, p. 178). While this might be deemed a commendable sentiment, it is one that can be challenged.

In the first instance, it does not seem to conform to actual scientific practice. Experimentation is built on earlier work and assumes the trustworthiness of that work. Not only do scientists appeal to the testimonies of others, they have to make such appeals in order to draw information from cognate fields and avoid replicating studies that it would be impractical to repeat.

A second problem relates back to the remark from Kant. It is not a matter of whether we should investigate for ourselves rather than relying on the say-so of others; it is a question of whether we are able to do anything but rely on others, whether they are experts or otherwise. The kinds of testimony at issue in science and elsewhere are those involving authorities or experts. Charles Willard (1990) presents the problem of authority as not so much that we have difficulty assessing the claims made, but that the predisposition to acquiesce to such authorities or experts threatens autonomy.

Willard argues that public decision-making is firmly rooted in a reliance on authorities: ‘Public decision-making doesn’t use knowledge, it uses testimony – a tapestry of positions maintained by authoritative representatives of knowledge domains who presumably bridge the gap between disciplines and public decision-making’ (1990, p. 16). But this poses a real dilemma, because while Willard believes that ‘it is presumptively rational in a consensualist world to argue from and acquiesce to authorities’ (1990, p. 11), this has the tendency to undermine personal autonomy. Willard makes the important observation that we are not concerned with the appraisal of whether experts are correct – that is the job for experts themselves. We must
decide how to view expert testimony, whether it is the direct attesting to some fact or experience, or the challenge of one expert by another.

We are presented, then, with a dilemma: testimony is indispensable, but with its rise comes an almost commensurate loss of autonomy. This is a dilemma that should be astutely felt by those working in argumentation. As Willard notes:

Argumentation and Informal Logic pedagogies won’t come to much unless based on a coherent stance toward authority. They are premised on rhetorics of mass enfranchizement that often do not square with their commitments to acquiescence to expertise, and – more important – they build a naive picture of the competent citizen (Willard 1990, p. 20).

Implied here is a considerable challenge. But it also announces an important shift of focus in discussions of testimony in argumentation, away from the testimonies of authorities or experts and onto those who must operate in their midst.

Willard’s analysis captures much that is important when considering the value of testimony. But it also fits into and continues the thinking that relegates testimony to a position of inferiority when sources of belief are considered. This is not just because testimony undermines individual autonomy, but also because it is set in opposition to knowledge. Recall that he writes of public decision-making that it ‘doesn’t use knowledge, it uses testimony’ (1990, p. 16). But recent work in the epistemology of testimony has largely challenged this way of thinking. I will draw on this work by way of arguing for the social fabric that characterizes our epistemic relations and the cognitive environments in which the audiences of argumentation operate.

1.4 Learning from others: The foundational role of testimony

The dominant view of testimony can be called the transmission, non-generative view. This is the position that testimony works by transmitting beliefs or knowledge from one person (or source), the testifier, to the audience. This process transmits the original belief. T, the testifier, holds \( p \) and after a successful act of testimony, \( A \), the audience, comes to hold \( p \). Thus, no new knowledge emerges (other than that it is new for \( A \)); nothing new has been generated. Thus, Elizabeth Fricker writes: ‘A belief of S gives rise to
an utterance by him, which utterance produces in his audience H a belief with the same content; and all this happens in such a way that, if S’s belief is knowledge, then we may allow that title to H’s belief too’ (1987, p. 57). On these terms, the audience’s acquisition of knowledge depends upon the testifier already possessing that knowledge. Jonathan Adler explains this, with an emphasis on testimony as the medium of transmission: ‘If S knows that p and S asserts that p to H, and H accepts p on the basis of S’s testimony, then H knows that p’ (2006). While standard and straightforwardly plausible, this is a view that has come to be challenged quite seriously (Lackey 2008).

Adler’s conditions indicate that we need more than just the transmission of a belief for a successful act of testimony to occur. The audience must accept that p on the basis of the testimony. Moreover, the act of testimony is given as explicit and intentional: S asserts that p to H. This latter point raises the issue of whether we can learn from testimony that is not addressed directly to us, or intended for us. Or, would such instances not be regarded as technically testimonial? Among the ways in which we learn from others is through following directions on the side of the road and reading letters addressed to others or journals intended only for the writer but made public at a later time, perhaps posthumously. The requirement that the audience accept p on the basis of the testimony points to the need for conditions of such acceptance.

It is not sufficient for the testifier to claim to know, for example. The audience needs to have good reasons to believe not just the testimony, but also the testifier. This requires some judgement of the character involved. John Hardwig suggests that the testifier must be truthful, competent, conscientious, and have ‘adequate epistemic self-assessment’ (1991, p. 700). For our purposes, an audience needs reasons to believe these things. While I will want later to detach what a person says from what they believe. From an audience’s point of view, we cannot also detach what someone says from what is known about their character of from what, in Aristotelian terms, they convey about their character through what they say. There is a reliance on the testifier, best understood as trust, and such trust needs a justifiable foundation.

1 Transmission is not restricted to a single case like this. Some activities that depend on testimony, like scientific discovery, will involve chains of transmission where different bits of knowledge may be distributed throughout the chain.
Unlike perception, memory and reason, testimony is grounded in our dependence on others. In this way, we find questions of character introduced that do not pertain to the other three. We enter an ethotic dimension where trust and credibility become important (Adler 2002, p. 139). Learning from others cannot be appreciated without consideration of not just what is said but who is saying it and reasons an audience has for believing them.

1.5 Reductionism and non-reductionism
An enduring debate among epistemologists who take testimony seriously is the degree to which it is an independent source of knowledge for an individual. Is it of primary value or can it provide knowledge only in conjunction with information derived from one or more of the other main sources? Traditionally, the two sides of this debate are identified as reductionists, for whom testimony is one among several inductive sources, and non-reductionists, for whom testimony stands as an autonomous source. The view I am interested in straddles these two camps, but I need to say something about them. The traditional champions of these positions are David Hume and Thomas Reid, respectively.

Hume’s reductionism characterizes his account of testimony in several places. In his Treatise (2000), Hume explains that our faith in matters of fact that we get from human testimony is based upon experience of the governing principles of human nature. But we are more rash in drawing our inferences from testimony since it depends on resemblance with our own direct experience (I.3.9.12). Thus, what is acquired from testimony is weighed against what is received from perception, and also depends on reason. In order to accept testimony, then, what is reported must correspond to what is observed.

Reid’s version of the contrasting view is found in one of his more popular essays:

The wise author of nature hath planted in the human mind a propensity to rely upon human testimony before we can give a reason for doing so. This, indeed, puts our judgments almost entirely in the power of those who are about us in the first period of life; but this is necessary both to our preservation and to our improvement. If children were so framed as to pay no regard to testimony or authority, they must, in the literal sense, perish for lack of knowledge (Reid 1983, pp. 281-282).
On Reid’s terms, testimony is a foundational source of knowledge, as valuable as the three other basic sources and not reducible to any of them. Testimony cannot be reducible to the others since children rely on the reports of their parents before they can begin to assess the nature of those reports. Contemporary non-reductionists, like C.A.J. Coady (1992), continue in this tradition of assigning to testimony a status equal to other primary sources of knowledge. Lorraine Code (2006), for example, observes the strangeness of epistemologists who discredit testimony in favour of an image of the self-reliant knower who learns directly from the world when testimony functions ‘as the starting point for so many epistemic negotiations and justificatory projects’ (Code 2006, p. 173).

A number of objections can be raised to this position. The very structure of successful testimonial acts that were central to the accounts of people like Adler, where conditions of acceptability are included, seem absent from non-reductionism. Granted, there is a definite element of trust involved, but it is at the least a naïve trust, and not the kind of justified trust envisioned earlier. Acquiring knowledge through the testimony of others seems a process far more involved than the simple paradigm of the childhood model suggests. And we may even wonder whether the early cognitive activities performed by children accurately reflect the kind of social interdependence that interests us. Which is to wonder whether we should even call the simple model ‘testimony’ in the senses I am exploring it here.²

1.6 The epistemology of testimony
I now turn to one of the more detailed, and I think promising, accounts of testimony provided by Jennifer Lackey in her book Learning from Words (2008). Lackey’s work is noteworthy, and relevant to this discussion, for two principal features or theses that characterize it. Her position is an audience-centred approach that shifts attention away from what speakers know or believe and onto what they say. In the first instance, then, we learn from another’s shared statements rather than her beliefs. She calls this position the Statement View of Testimony (svt) and defines it accordingly as: ‘a speaker

² Lackey (2008) takes a different tack in challenging accounts like Reid’s. She draws on studies of early childhood to argue (chapter 7) that the simple model of childhood learning is wrong and that children are far more discriminating in what (and who) they choose to believe.
offers a statement to a hearer, along with the epistemic properties it possesses, and a hearer forms the corresponding belief on the basis of understanding and accepting the statement in question’ (Lackey 2008, p. 72).³

Lackey’s svr is, of course, a direct attack on the transmission model popular with epistemologists of testimony. Her principal method of delivering this and other challenges is to offer hypothetical cases that undermine the traditional view. Sometimes these work, sometimes they are less successful, but they always invite scrutiny of assumptions that might otherwise go unquestioned. The primary case that addresses the transmission thesis is one she calls creationist teacher. This involves a fourth-grade teacher who is a devout Christian committed to central Christian beliefs, including the truth of creationism (and the falsity of evolutionary theory). Yet she is aware that a vast body of scientific evidence contradicts both these beliefs. She remains a steadfast creationist not because of the science but because of her faith. So when required to teach evolutionary theory in her biology lessons, she asserts propositions that she neither believes nor knows, and withholds from her students her own faith-based views. Lackey contends that the students subsequently ‘form the corresponding true belief solely on the basis of her reliable testimony’ (Ibid., p.50). It is hard to disagree that if the students learn from what she says, rather than what she believes (assuming this is unavailable to them), then they will acquire knowledge from someone who does not believe what she has asserted. Thus, the transmission of beliefs is not required for successful testimony to operate. In terms of the formula provided by Adler, it is not necessary for S to know (or believe) that \( p \) in order for H to then know (or believe) that \( p \) on the basis of her testimony.⁴

Lackey’s thesis further accommodates situations like that of the posthumous publication of letters or journals, where it may be impossible to recover the author’s intentions. Where such materials provide information from which an audience learns, the testimony involved depends not on the speaker as much as on the needs of the audience. In realigning things this

³ Lackey holds a wide concept of ‘statement’ such that it can include things like gestures, which fulfil the role of communicating served by the statement paradigm.

⁴ Lackey also argues that it is not even necessary for a speaker to know that \( p \), nor even that she reasonably believe that \( p \), but only that it is reasonable to believe that \( p \) (2008, pp.106-140). This weaker condition conforms well to the prescriptions of the cognitive environment that will be discussed below.
way, Lackey provides an important service in shifting the focus in discussions of testimony away from thinking of it as the act of a testifier and seeing it instead as a source of knowledge or belief for the hearer (Ibid., p. 27).

Lackey further develops her svT so that the speaker's statements are reliable or otherwise truth-conducive. We might expect, for example, that situations governed by something like Grice's cooperative principle would furnish the kinds of presumptions to support reliability. An additional condition requires the audience to have no ‘undefeated defeaters’ for believing the statements in question. That is, for example, there should be no reasons by which the audience sees the speaker's ethos undermined.

Another feature of Lackey's account addresses the non-generative claim of the traditional model. Her position on testimony takes a middle course between reductionism and non-reductionism that attempts to accommodate both positions. She calls the result 'dualism'. Despite holding some general concerns with reductionism, she believes non-reductionists have faltered in not recognizing the need for audiences to be reliable recipients of testimony (Ibid., p. 164). A dualist position avoids such concerns. It is reductionist because it holds that the acceptance of testimony must be justified by other things believed by the audience. But it accommodates non-reductionism because it still takes testimony to be an irreducible source.

To extrapolate from Lackey, a dualist model can be judged to require the following set of conditions in order for an audience to be justified in believing something on the basis of someone's testimony:

1. the belief is based on the content of the testimony,
2. the testimony is reliable (fits in a consistent way),
3. the audience is also reliable/competent,
4. the (cognitive) environment of the exchange supports the reception of reliable testimony,
5. the audience has no ‘undefeated defeaters’ for the testimony,
6. and the audience has relevant positive reasons for accepting the testimony.

Each of these deserves more elaboration than can be provided here, but we can see the reductionist nature of what is at stake and that the positions of both speaker and audience are covered by conditions that govern the reliability of the first and the rationality of the second. The epistemic work of testimony is shared between speaker and audience. We also have acknowl-
edgment of the importance of the environment in which testimony takes
place. Lackey has in mind environments filled with massively unreliable tes-
tifiers. But we do not need to go to such extremes to see how environments
can impact successful testimony, since they can provide both the defeaters
and positive reasons that affect the rationality of the audience. It may be
unreasonable for someone to accept a speaker’s testimony if that person lives
in an environment where the speaker has a poor reputation. I will return to
the issue of cognitive environments shortly.

One objection to the kind of model offered in this dualism is that
ordinary agents do not have enough information to acquire positive reasons
as required. But as Lackey notes (2008, p. 180), while this does weaken the
case of reductionism generally, it is less damaging to dualism because of the
distribution of epistemic work between the parties involved. Since the con-
ditions require the reliability or competence of both speaker and audience,
the positive reasons then possessed by the audience must make it rational to
accept the testimony, or at least not irrational to accept it. In the kinds of
contexts with which an audience is familiar (in contexts where they receive
argumentation, for example) enough background information will be avail-
able to support the judgement that an audience’s acceptance of testimony is
rational. An important distinction is suggested between the information that
ordinary agents have and the information they have indirect access to and
from which they can draw inferences relevant to the judgements being made.

Regardless of reservations we may have, this theory of testimony pro-
vides several important proposals for a theory of audience in social argu-
mentation. In the first case, the statement view of testimony shifts attention
onto what is said, while not completely divorcing it from who says it. The
character of the testifier is an important consideration when statements are
assessed. But the beliefs or intentions of the testifier are not at issue. Given
the general inaccessibility of such matters, compared to the public assertions,
this is a welcome shift. Moreover, because of this shift testimony can play a
larger epistemic role than the traditional transmission model would allow.
On that model, what one gets out is what was put in; a belief is transferred
from one party to another. But the SVT allows for testimony to generate new
knowledge. Testifiers do not need to believe what they say, while audiences
may still come to know what is the case through hearing it. Again, where the
beliefs and intentions behind statements – like those in journals, letters, or
historical documents – are lost, this is a valuable suggestion. Finally, some
of the conditions in the account place attention right where we would see it placed, on the audience whose own competencies and rationality need to be considered and measured. The connections between individuals and an epistemic community are implicit in these suggestions.

1.7 Community knowledge
John Hardwig provides a principle of testimony – ‘If A has good reasons to believe that B has good reasons to believe p, then A has good reasons to believe p’ (1991, p. 697) – that issues in the strange result (one he has observed elsewhere, 1985, p.337) that A has good reasons to believe p but these reasons somehow do not constitute evidence for the truth of p. Hardwig concludes that we must allow A’s belief to be rational, otherwise we are left with the result that a vast number of beliefs in any culture are simply irrational (Ibid., p. 339).

One way to address this problem is to not see A as an isolated knower, but as a member of a community of knowers. Such a community is well reflected in the activities of the scientific ‘community’ suggested earlier. And is also anticipated in the conditions of the dualist concept of testimony I have been considering.

While it is rare to see teamwork in the research of disciplines like philosophy, it seems a necessary feature of scientific success. That such cooperation is the norm in the scientific community is supported by Hardwig’s work (1991, 1985):

Scientists, researchers, and scholars are, sometimes at least, knowers, and all of these knowers stand on each other’s shoulders in the way expressed by the formula: B knows that A knows that p. These knowers could not do their work without presupposing the validity of many other inquiries which they cannot (for reasons of competence as well as time) validate for themselves (Hardwig 1985, p. 345).

Hardwig’s test case for this involves a physics research paper on charmed particles produced by 99 authors representing different specializations in particle physics. In such a community, one member knows one thing, another knows another thing, and each knows that the other knows. So where in the resulting chain or web of knowing does the knowledge really reside? Hardwig ventures the conclusion that p may not be known by any one person, but by the community, composed of A, B, C, D, E, and so forth. ‘Perhaps D and E
are not entitled to say ‘I know that \( p \)', but only, ‘We know that \( p \)’. This community is not reducible to a class of individuals, for no one individual and no one individually knows that \( p \)’ (Ibid., p. 349). As Faulkner (2000, p. 596) observes of such a community, the pronoun ‘we’ could refer distributively to the subjects as individuals, or it could refer collectively to the subjects as the members of the community, raising the question of how a community as a single entity possesses knowledge. Of course, some version of the transmission model of testimony, where someone in the chain or web knows that \( p \), could explain such collaboration. But as Hardwig’s test case illustrates, the transmission model places an enormous, perhaps impractical, burden on a single knower; the community model has far greater plausibility.

An important aspect of this work on testimony in science is that it also ‘provides us with empirical arguments for granting testimony the status of a generative source of knowledge’ (Kusch 2002, p. 51). The inputs from the various sub-groups in the teamwork of a project are so rich and fertile that the lines between contributions begin to blur and ideas are stimulated or adopted into new scenarios such that it becomes impossible to treat testimony simply as the non-generative transmission of fixed beliefs.

The crux of Martin Kusch’s own contribution to the testimony debate lies in the claim that once such knowledge communities arise they are epistemically prior to individual members. ‘This is so since the individual community members’ entitlement and commitment to claiming this knowledge derive from their membership in this community. The individual knows ‘as one of us’ (Ibid., p. 60). The language used to express this claim deliberately brings Robert Brandom’s work to mind, appropriately so, since Kusch’s position is a serious challenge to some of Brandom’s ideas.

There is a growing appreciation among those working in the epistemology of testimony that it needs to be understood within the game of giving and asking for reasons. As Paula Olmos captures the value of this:

> Once delivered and interpreted within a pragmatic frame of giving and asking for reasons, utterances can become usable testimonies, that is become part of a heritage belonging to a more or less extended group – a field, a community – that can make use of them in subsequent exchanges (Olmos 2006, p. 220).

This places testimony within a dynamic social frame involving a common ground of authority that licences a community’s inferences. This is
Brandom’s inheritance of commitments stemming from the authority of the speaker.

Kusch’s dispute with Brandom centres on the latter’s claim that objectivity cannot be grounded exclusively in intersubjectivity, or a ‘we’ because this cannot account for the possibility of error: ‘what the community takes to be correct is correct’ (Brandom 1994, p. 599). Kusch argues to the contrary that any judgement that a whole community is wrong can only come from another community (or the same community at a different time), and this judgement would have to be based on the consensus in that other community (2002, p. 259). Judging beliefs to be right or wrong is itself an activity that can be subject to error, and there is no right or wrong outside of social institutions with their levels of consensus. A ‘we’ is thus presupposed and Brandom’s attempt to make the ‘I-thou’ relationship primary is unsuccessful.5

Examples of community-based knowledge dependent on testimony, like those we see in scientific practice, do not necessarily replace the local with the global. Both construals of intersubjectivity are consistent with the results we see and the question of primacy practically (rather than theoretically) depends upon the context and the stages involved in the processes of developing knowledge. However, the dualist theory of testimony grounds this source of knowledge in a web of interdependence that strongly supports taking community connections as primary. The complexity of research like that in the particle physics example indicates that at some point individual competence is replaced by community judgement of the team and, eventually, by the wider community judgement, rooted in peer review and corroborative testing of the community as an institution. At that level it seems appropriate to say that what the community takes to be correct is correct and groups can give assent. But, importantly, this community response can always be identified in the persons of representative individuals. Teams have spokespersons; journals have editors who vouch for their peer reviewers; committees have heads speaking for the whole. And the correctness of

5 This clashes with the primary way in which Brandom approaches the nature of judgement. For him, the idea of communal performances, assessments or verdicts is a fiction. Assent is something done by individuals and so the authority of communal assent is a heavily problematic idea (Brandom 1994, p. 38). His ‘I-thou’ construal of intersubjectivity thus replaces global privilege with local privilege. The relevance of this dispute lies in its pertinence to the discussion of testimony.
the community judgement is always open to challenge or revision (from within that community at another time or, less likely, from within another community).

1.8 Cognitive environments

Lackey’s shift of attention from what people believe or know to what they say provides a useful way for helping us understand how testimony operates in the generation of understanding; but it is not, of course, the full story. As we saw in some of the earlier conditions, a dualist or hybrid model still recognizes the roles played by other sources of knowledge. Likewise, situating testimony’s place within a community of knowers does not fully explain how audiences receive and use such information within these communities. Our dependence on others extends beyond just what they say to us; it extends also to the ways in which they modify the social environments in which we live.

Much of the work done in the epistemology of testimony shows some dependence on the problematic idea of mutual knowledge. Hardwig’s studies of scientific research rely, to varying degrees, on formulae such as ‘B knows that A knows that $p$’ (1985, p. 345). But there are serious difficulties involved in explaining how B can know what A knows. In a similar way, claims to know what is commonly known are difficult to justify, and such difficulties support the position advanced in this chapter. How do we know what people know in common? Yet appeals to common knowledge are so ubiquitous as to be presumed non-problematic.

Sperber and Wilson (1986) addressed these concerns by replacing ideas of common knowledge and mutual knowledge with the concept of a cognitive environment, modelled on an analogy with the visible environment in which each of us operates. In this environment, manifest facts and assumptions are to conceptual cognition what visible phenomena are to visual cognition. A fact is manifest to someone at some time if that person is capable of representing it mentally as true or probably true. Note here that this is a claim about cognitive capabilities in a particular time and place and need not involve a judgement of what is actually the case. It follows that a cognitive environment is the set of facts manifest to a person, and an assumption (which could be true or false) is manifest if a cognitive environment provides sufficient evidence for its adoption. A more detailed statement of what is involved is given in the following description:
To be manifest, then, is to be perceptible or inferable. An individual’s total
cognitive environment is the set of all the facts that he can perceive or infer: all
the facts that are manifest to him. An individual’s total cognitive environment is
a function of his physical environment and his cognitive abilities. It consists of
not only all the facts that he is aware of, but also all the facts that he is capable of
becoming aware of, in his physical environment. The individual’s actual awareness
of facts, i.e. the knowledge that he has acquired, of course contributes to his ability
to become further aware of facts. Memorised information is a component of

This defining statement may be as significant for what it omits as what it
includes. Sperber and Wilson talk here about what is perceptible, what is
inferable, and what is memorized, accommodating three of the four primary
sources of knowledge: perception, reason, and memory. Is there, then, a role,
we might ask, for testimony?

Cognitive environments, like physical environments, will overlap. In
this way, we can begin to talk about an epistemic sharing that has relevance
for shared knowledge without being equivalent to it. When the same facts
and assumptions are available in the cognitive environments of different
people we have a shared cognitive environment, and any shared environ-
ment in which it is manifest which people share it is a mutual cognitive en-
vironment (Sperber & Wilson 1986, p. 41). Mutual manifestness is weaker
than mutual or common knowledge in just the right ways. No claim is
made about mental states or processes, about what people know; the claim
is only about what they could be expected to infer and come to know given
the cognitive environments they share. Depending on the nature of par-
ticular cognitive environments, it is reasonable to attribute knowledge to a
person, although such attributions are quite defeasible. Many things in our
visual fields pass unnoticed until or unless our attention is drawn to them.
It is quite reasonable for people to make assumptions about what we see
or might have seen given what they know about our physical environment,
and they will often express surprise should we seem not to have noticed
something. Likewise, we make assumptions about what is manifest to other
people, and make weaker assumptions about what assumptions they are
making. This is the crux of much communication, occurring in situations
where ‘a great deal can be assumed about what is manifest to others, a lot
can be assumed about what is mutually manifest to themselves and oth-

[ 55 ]
ers, but nothing can be assumed to be truly mutually known or assumed’ (1986, p. 45).

Such assumptions provide an important resource for communication, for they allow Sperber and Wilson to claim that we communicate in order to alter the cognitive environments of those we address and thereby affect their actual thought processes. This is where what people say becomes a source for knowledge. And part of the reason we feel justified in trusting the testimony of some people (and not of others) is because it is manifest to us that we share a cognitive environment with them. We recognize the talk as we recognize the things talked about, and our experience provides corroboration for what is said. This is only part of the reason, because also available to us are signs of the person’s character.

Our cognitive environments connect with a wide range of community beliefs. We have available not only the facts and assumptions manifest to us, but also a fund of collateral beliefs, in light of which we interpret and understand those facts and assumptions once they become noticed. While not directly part of cognitive environments as these have been described, because not mutually accessible, they form an important role in the ways we relate to others and test what they say against what we understand to be correct.

1.9 Conclusions
The sources for argumentation, like those for rhetorical invention, derive from the givens of our particular circumstances, situated as we are in social relationships and communities. There we receive the words of others, the intentions behind which, with the corresponding beliefs, may not be recoverable. But ideas are ‘transmitted’ and newly generated as we learn from what others say. Our models of testimony should be equipped with conditions to justify the trust involved, and this basic requirement cannot be removed. Trust emphasizes the importance of personal credibility and character and their role in the value of testimony needs further attention.

Some objections to the account developed must be considered here, the first of which is the suspicion that what is at stake is not really testimony at all. Certainly, what has been discussed here understands ‘telling’ in a non-traditional way. But the basic structure of saying and hearing remains. While this does not preclude a traditional model of testimony continuing, that model has problems beyond those considered here, not least of which is the confidence a hearer is justified in having about a speaker’s intentions,
especially when that speaker is no longer present or the intentions are not recoverable for some other reason. If we learn from what others say, then the source involved is testimony.

Secondly, we might ask whether the kind of knowledge derived in this way is reliable, since it appears to avoid traditional concerns over ‘misinterpretation’ of what is said. Indeed, here interpretation is redesigned in terms of the needs of the hearer rather than the intentions of the speaker. Reliability needs to be similarly understood on different terms. But the model encourages the development of tests for that reliability, in terms of both the epistemic state of the hearer and the cognitive environment provided by the relevant communities. In situations of uncertainty, it is as good as we might expect. All testimony understood in these terms remains subject to the corroboration of experience and continuously open to revision. That is, testimony does not stand alone and the knowledge it contributes is not final. While the most social of our traditional sources of knowledge, testimony must always be checked against the experiences of the individuals and communities who are modified by its assertions. Thus, individuals are not licenced to accept anything they receive simply because it conforms to prior, perhaps idiosyncratic, beliefs. The deeply cooperative nature of this model embeds the speaker-hearer construct within the cognitive life of a community. Similarly, like all rhetoric-based knowledge, testimony is defeasible; that is, open to revision in light of new evidence and insights. This is, after all, a feature of cognitive environments; their modifications are a constant part of our epistemic lives.

Another important thread in my discussion has been the attention to ethos demanded of the audience in their judgements of a testifier’s reliability. This stresses the epistemic dimension of that member of Aristotle’s foundational triad of rhetorical proofs that is often seen to carry less weight epistemically. Statements are connected to those who say them, and character gives weight (or not) to what is said. Thus, character considerations contribute to how we come to know from this important, social source of knowledge.

Finally, what Willard lamented as the loss of autonomy now appears something to be welcomed. This ‘loss’ shifts attention to an important in-

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6 At least as this arises with respect to the speaker’s ethos in Book One of the Rhetoric, rather than the audience’s own ethos that is addressed later. I am grateful to Manfred Kraus for pointing out the importance of this qualification.
terdependence, stressing the value of learning together through listening to what we say. This is one place where autonomy is not an obvious value. In a world of non-Cartesian selves, each individual stands out from the backdrop of being with others.

References


2 In Support of the Weak Rhetoric-as-epistemic Thesis: On the Generality and Reliability of Persuasion Knowledge

FRANK ZENKER

2.1 Introduction
Assume you know something. Assume further that a deliberating group in which you participate may adopt what you know as the group decision, or not. How do you go about persuading the group? What should you better not do? This problem-setting, or so the following argues, may promise a fruitful reorientation of the rhetoric-as-epistemic debate.

We take rhetoric to provide probable knowledge of the available means of persuasion in a given speech situation. These means may bring about the assent of an audience, but they do not guarantee it. This stance might surprise especially those who take rhetorical knowledge to be bound to contexts, i.e. available only as particular speech situations ‘unfold’, and therefore closed to systematic generalization. In contrast, we do not exclude that rhetorical knowledge of some generality is possible. Rather, we suggest that there are trade-offs between the level of generality and the reliability of rhetorical knowledge.

Our claim is that a weak rhetoric-as-epistemic thesis suffices to leave – or, depending on the reader’s point of view, to make – rhetoric relevant to social-epistemology. Our purpose is twofold. We stress the value of rhetorical knowledge for questions of social epistemology. Secondly, we lay out the rationale for an interdisciplinary research project featuring, amongst others, communication, rhetoric, social psychology, philosophy, political science, i.e. an experimental version of what Simons (1990) calls ‘new rhetoric’.

On the weak version of the rhetoric-as-epistemic thesis, probable knowledge of the available means of persuasion is relevant for deliberative group discussions, because the best available reasons forwarded in a group discussion should support the decision reached by a deliberating body (Sec-
tion 2). We contrast this norm with a result from group discussion research in social psychology obtained by Boy and Witte (2007). This result suggests that under specific experimental conditions, humans track affects rather than cognitive contents. Importantly, these conditions cite ‘emotional involvement’. When similar conditions apply in non-experimental contexts, this could go some way towards explaining why groups may flout the epistemic ends of group discussion, i.e. choose badly (Section 3). In turn, such results support the systematic inquiry into the conditions under which ‘rhetorical and suasory devices’ (Harpine 2004), widely understood, do reliably serve epistemic ends, e.g. to avoid error and acquire true belief (Goldman 1999), or not. Before concluding, we respond to four objections (Section 4).

2.2 The rhetoric-as-epistemic thesis
In the following, we briefly trace the rhetoric-as-epistemic thesis to Robert L. Scott, then work out the difference between knowledge and certainty (Sect. 2.1), introduce the idea of investigating the reliability of suasory devices (Sect. 2.2), and finally opt for the weak version of the rhetoric-as-epistemic thesis (Sect. 2.3).

Robert L. Scott (1967, 1976, 1993) coined the phrase ‘rhetoric is epistemic’. Broadly put, he held that rhetoric pertains to more than ornament or style. Rather, rhetorical discourse creates – or, at least, it may create – both objective truth and subjective certainty. Following Aristotle, rhetorical discourse is regularly said to establish probable claims, rather than necessarily true ones. Further, since propositions with deontic contents are potential deliberative results, rhetoric may therefore be said to establish moral claims.

It is some variant of the above that has surfaced as the rhetoric-as-epistemic thesis. Sadly, compared with philosophical analyses of the conditions under which humans possess knowledge, a fact about the extant debate within rhetoric is sloppiness. As Harpine points out, ‘rhetoricians have long shown a fondness for poetic definitions’ (2004, p. 340). This holds for both the terms epistemology and rhetoric. Evidence seems to implicate Scott as well as those who have meanwhile declared his thesis dead. See Jasinski (2001) for an overview.

Notably, Scott (1993) later regretted having used the term epistemic because, to him, this term suggested a state of certainty. In contrast, his mature position is: whenever ‘uncertainty cannot be obviated … rhetoric has a genuine role. [However, i]n the world of certainty, it does not’ (Ibid., p. 133).
2.2.1 Knowledge is distinct from certainty

Harpine’s (2004) critique of the rhetoric-as-epistemic debate contains two constructive contributions. The first consists of making clear that certainty has – and already at the time of Scott’s first essay had – little to do with what philosophers normally call knowledge. After all, for some proposition \( p \) to count as known by subject \( S \), it is for good reasons considered non-necessary that \( S \) is in a state of certainty with respect to \( p \). Borrowing symbolism from epistemic logic (Hintikka 1962), placing certainty in the analysans of knowledge amounts to conflating first with second order knowledge, i.e. \( K_S p \) (‘\( S \) knows \( p \)’) and \( K_S K_S p \) (‘\( S \) knows that, \( S \) knows \( p \)’).

Already in the standard, though no less problematic, definition of knowledge as justified true belief (aka. the ‘jtb-analysis’) – traced to Plato’s Thaetatus and Meno – \( S \)’s state of mind did not feature. Likewise, the standard challenge to the jtb-analysis – the ‘Gettier problem’ (Gettier 1963) – does not invoke certainty either. Rather, it trades on the possibility of being right for the wrong reasons, e.g. by sheer luck. In such cases, we normally are, and we should be, disinclined to speak of knowledge.

Recall that Gettier’s case presents true belief that is ill-justified. For example, I (can be said to) fail to know that ‘Jones, owns a Ford’ provided that 1) \( p \) abbreviates ‘Jones owns a Ford’; 2) Jones does own a Ford; 3) my belief in \( p \) is entirely based on observational evidence of ‘Jones driving what – unbeknownst to me – is his wife’s Ford’; and 4) I never receive evidence of Jones owning a different car.

Meanwhile, numerous variations of the above have given rise to a philosophical industry of Gettierized knowledge. Standardly, next to jtb, a fourth condition, G (for Gettier), is often assumed to be necessary. The details differ widely. Granted, then, that the jtb-analysis of knowledge is less than perfect, it is not clear either that subjective certainty is part of the problem, or the remedy.

Note that Gettier’s paper was published some four years before Scott’s first essay, and has meanwhile become a classic among epistemologists. In contrast, Scott took until 1993 to admit that he used classical terms in a loose fashion, although these had meanwhile been subjected to severe criticism. Sadly, some scholars still evaluate Gettier’s case as nothing but an ‘abstruse problem for analytical philosophy’, as remarked by an anonymous reviewer in response to an earlier version of this chapter.
2.2.2 The reliability of argumentative and suasive devices

Harpine’s second constructive contribution consists of using the notion of reliability to propose a reorientation of the arguably imprecise discourse on the rhetoric-as-epistemic thesis towards a research programme that is relevant to social epistemology. Unaware that it is currently executed in greater detail, we modify the following with the term ‘social’.

Rhetoric-as-epistemic theorists would have plenty of room to discuss the reliability of the various argumentative and suasive devices that rhetoricians employ and to discuss when rhetoric does and does not reliably contribute to [social] knowledge (Harpine 2004, p. 348; italics added).

Adding ‘social’ makes more precise that the rhetoric-as-epistemic thesis is most promising with respect to the question: What should the group do? As Hintikka states: ‘You can remove knowledge from the contexts of decision-making, but you cannot remove a relation to decision making from the concept of knowledge’ (2007, p. 12). Following Hintikka (Ibid., pp. 11-37, 189-210), in everything below, the term information may be substituted for knowledge, such that ‘S knows p’ comes out as ‘S has (fallible) information with respect to p’.

Assume, then, that some group member has knowledge of a decision problem of some magnitude such as: ‘Shall we go to war today or not?’ (Exchanging the term ‘war’ for ‘the movies’ does not alter the problem, it apparently trivializes it). Further, assume that other group members fail to have knowledge, but are nevertheless opinionated or display various preferences. If so, should not the knower try to turn what she knows into part, or even the whole, of the group decision?

We can note that it does not make an immediate difference if a knower knows that she knows (see Section 2.1). We do not need to assume second-order knowledge, but can ground her rational interest in effecting persuasion – and also the group’s rational interest in being persuaded – in the agent’s possession of first-order knowledge. If she also possesses second-order knowledge while her interlocutors fail to have first-order knowledge, this would only strengthen the verdict that she should persuade the group.

In variation, one might assume that group members know different parts of the truth. Then, should they not try to appropriately integrate (only) the true parts into the group discussion? The latter case amounts to
more than a complex version of the first. In both cases, truth is part of the discussion. In the former case, one would like to see truth retained in the group-decision. In the latter, an intermediate issue is the aggregation of partial truths. We let this case fall to the side.

If discussants are subject to persuasion – as, at times, it seems they can be –, then given assumptions, some uses of ‘argumentative and suasive devises’ in deliberative contexts may reliably contribute to a group’s convergence on the truth, rather than on falsehoods. Two such assumptions are: 1) a decision-problem has a preferred solution (or a similarity-class of solutions); 2) a group member made the best solution, as well as the reasons why it is the best solution, part of the deliberation. These assumptions state that the truth (alternatively: the best available information) was accessible to the group, and it was supported by the right reasons, as opposed to the wrong ones.

2.2.3 A weak version and two variants of the strong version
The above should have made clear that if decision problems have preferred solutions, it is an issue of social relevance whether groups converge on the right decision. Insofar as the group’s convergence on the right decision depends also on the use of argumentative and suasive devices, one endorses the rhetoric-as-epistemic thesis in its weak version. Since this places rhetoric into its Platonic role as the handmaiden of truth, the weak version is normally found less interesting, and may appear trivial to some (cf. Harpine 2004, p. 341).

We can compare this with Zhao’s (1991) characterization of the weak version. He presents truth as ‘hidden’ from human perception, but in principle accessible (Slogan: ‘The truth is out there’). Rhetoric is placed in the role of that which facilitates access ‘through the clash of subjective minds in open argumentation’ (Ibid., p. 255). Further, Zhao presents the strong version in two variants. On the mild variant, truth is not ‘out there’ – nor, of course, hidden. Rather, truth is created through rhetoric 1) for a restricted realm of reality, e.g. for deontic propositions, such as ‘Thou shalt not kill’; or – this is the strong variant – 2) for all of reality, including, e.g. the temperature of your cup of tea, say, 66 degrees Celsius at five percent measurement-uncertainty.

Unless suitably qualified, the latter variant seems to be too strong. Otherwise, ‘truth would be rhetorical’, whatever kind of post-modernist metaphor this might be. Yet, on qualifications such as: ‘Rhetoric is for the
New Rhetoric [in the wake of Perelman] … a descriptive theory of truth in the sense that it tells why and how an audience adheres to some theses, opinions, or beliefs presented for its agreement ….’ (Corvellac 2008, p. 7; italics added), the thesis is not strong enough. Understood descriptively, the strong variant is not immediately relevant to epistemology, but to psychology, political science, or sociology.

Moreover, the mild variant is also only prima facie defensible. After all, its defence seems to incur a position on moral realism (Boyd 1988). If so, then proponents of this variant seem committed to the claim that there are no true moral values (nor true statements referring to them). Otherwise, if moral realism is non-false, endorsing the mild variant of the strong version is to defend the weak version of the rhetoric-as-epistemic thesis. This point may not sit well with everybody. Remaining non-committal with respect to moral realism, then, provides a good reason to endorse the weak version of the thesis.

In summary, the weak version suffices to leave rhetoric relevant to social epistemology. To the extent that group decisions regularly follow their production and uptake, the reliability of argumentative and suasory devices is immediately relevant to the epistemic ends of group deliberation, such as error avoidance and truth convergence.

### 2.3 Affect and cognition

Presumably, Section 2 will have prepared readers for the claim that rhetoric can support epistemic ends, and entails endorsing that rhetoric may be the handmaiden of truth. This section presents an experimental study of group discussions, which varied the group atmosphere and the group performance (Sect. 3.1) in a hypothetical survival problem (Sect. 3.2), then reports and interprets its results, which support the claim that human affects may over-ride cognitive contents (Sect. 3.3). Moreover, this study also supports the claim that although (probable) knowledge of the reliability of argumentative and suasory devices contributes to the epistemic ends of collectivities, specificity and reliability of such knowledge seem to be inversely related, to which we return in Section 4.

Boy and Witte (2007) provide evidence consistent with the assumption that under some experimental conditions, humans may be more sensitive to the affective than to the cognitive aspect of argumentative interaction. Their study suggests that the affective aspect can replace the cognitive one
such that epistemic merits (‘good grounds’) lose out. They had groups of three enact a group-solving task according to a script, then video-recorded the group discussion. Subjects (‘observers’) then watched one or more recordings, reporting their (subjective) evaluation of group atmosphere and group performance on Likert scales (n = 180; average age 27; 70% students; Ibid., p. 13).

Rather than a live interaction, observing and rating video-taped interaction is assumed to avoid unwanted influences on the evaluation. ‘Observers get the chance to purely evaluate group performance and atmosphere without being directly involved into the group interaction’ (Ibid., p. 7).

2.3.1 Group atmosphere vs. group performance
Discussions exhibit one of four types, generated by two independent binary variables: 1) epistemic merits are part of the discussion and are either selected for use in the group decision or not (good vs. bad performance); 2) the interaction is either cooperative/fact-oriented or antagonistic/emotionally-charged (good vs. bad group atmosphere).

In the good group atmosphere […] people were instructed to behave less dominantly and very person-oriented. Three characters were presented accordingly: A friendly and task-oriented character, a cooperative and initiative character and an emotional and friendly character. In the bad group atmosphere condition, people were instructed to behave very expressively in their interaction style and two people were instructed to behave very dominantly. The three roles were characterized either by an aggressive and powerful behaviour or by authoritarian and emotionally reserved behaviour or by a calm and withdrawn behaviour (the person who gets oppressed by the others) (Ibid., p. 12).

This separates ‘how’ and ‘what’ – or the process and the result – of group deliberation in a two-by-two design.

**TABLE 2.1** **TWO-BY-TWO DESIGN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>good Performance</strong></th>
<th><strong>bad Performance</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>good Group Atmosphere</td>
<td>gGA / gP</td>
<td>gGA / bP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bad Group Atmosphere</td>
<td>bGA / gP</td>
<td>bGA / bP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The question studied is, to what extent cognitive and affective factors matter for the perception of group-deliberation quality? One may say that perceptions track epistemic merits when observers’ (individual or averaged) ratings of the group performance are consistent with the following ordering:

\[(1) \quad \text{gGA / gP} \geq \text{bGA / gP} > \text{gGA / bP} \geq \text{bGA / bP}\]

(1) says that the ratings for a good group atmosphere crossed with a good performance (gGA / gP) are greater or equal to a bad group atmosphere crossed with a good performance (bGA / gP) which, in turn, are strictly greater than a good group atmosphere crossed with a bad performance (gGA / bP), and so on. (1) appears to be immediately plausible as a norm for group discussions.

### 2.3.2 Scenario and expert solution

The scenario of this study is known as the desert survival problem (Lafferty & Pond 1974). Actors adopt the characters of victims of a plane crash in the desert. Three passengers survive without harm. Observers learn that an emergency signal could not be sent, that the expected daytime temperature is 54 degrees Celsius, and that the following 15 objects were saved before the plane burnt out:

- Torch
- Jackknife
- Aerial map of crash area
- Plastic raincoat (large)
- Magnetic compass
- Bandage kit with gauze
- .45 caliber pistol (loaded)
- Parachute (red/white)
- 1000 salt tablets
- Book: ‘Edible Animals of the Desert’
- Two pairs of sunglasses per person (p.p.)
- Two litres of vodka
- One cosmetic mirror

The decision is whether to stay at the wreck and wait for help, or whether to leave for a mine (120 km away) where help is expected. Being a group decision, the constraint is to stay together. On expert opinion, the chance of being saved alive is reported as 80%, provided one stays at the wreck and uses the above objects correctly. Leaving is almost equivalent to suicide; the primary challenge to survival is dehydration. Experience shows that most – Boy and Witte (Ibid., p. 11) report a figure of 85% – prefer leaving for the mine. ‘Presumably this decision is connected with the need to do something for oneself to survive instead of waiting passively for help’ (Ibid.). Hence, most subjects vastly underestimate the risk.
Observers assessed the group decision (‘stay or leave’), and how well actors had ranked the saved objects according to their importance for survival. This ranking being part of the group decision, the ordering is a function of grasping dehydration as the primary challenge, or not. For instance, the mirror is useful as a signal. Wearing overcoats decreases perspiration. Water should be consumed on the first day (when making decisions). In contrast, the bandage kit is not helpful (it is known that no survivor was physically harmed in the crash; dehydrating bodies rarely bleed), consuming vodka or salt tablets increases the amount of water needed.

In all experimental conditions, reasons such as the above are part of the discussions. In our terms, this means: epistemic merits are present. Briefly, the expert-ordering is:


2.3.3 Results
We report results qualitatively; for quantities and measures of statistical significance (results were significant), see Boy and Witte (Ibid., pp. 13ff.). Repeating for purposes of comparison the (normative) expectation from above as 1), below, 2) and 3) summarize observers’ average ratings of the group atmosphere and the group performance, respectively. Here, ‘\( \geq \)’ denotes ‘is almost the same as’.

(1) \( g_{GA} / g_{P} \geq b_{GA} / g_{P} \geq b_{GA} / b_{P} \geq b_{GA} / b_{P} \) (Expectation)

(2) \( g_{GA} / g_{P} \geq g_{GA} / b_{P} \geq b_{GA} / g_{P} \geq b_{GA} / b_{P} \) (Atmosphere)

(3) \( g_{GA} / g_{P} \geq g_{GA} / b_{P} \geq b_{GA} / g_{P} \geq b_{GA} / b_{P} \) (Performance)

Results show that observers reliably identify only the cooperative one as the preferred group atmosphere. Secondly, they do not rate a good group atmosphere significantly higher when it correlates with a good group performance.
Participants of this study were not able to make a clear distinction between group atmosphere and group performance in their performance evaluations. If there is a possibility of simple comparisons then the group atmosphere was used as a cue for evaluation of the group performance. A clear influence of the factual information on the learning function was not observed (Boy & Witte 2007, p. 22f).

Hence, when rating the group performance, a group converging on the expert decision for the right reasons, or not, fails to be a relevant factor. Put differently, in this experiment, observers fail to demonstrate sensitivity to epistemic merits. It seems that the threat to one’s life cannot bias subjects towards leaving the plane, rather than waiting for help. After all, subjects only observe the discussion (but see Section 4.1). Still, the study supports the claim that although they are part of the discussion and sometimes featured as its result, the right reasons can, in a literal sense, become impotent.

2.4 Discussion

In contrast to studies demonstrating that group discussions increase the quality of the group decision vis-à-vis an individual’s choice prior to such discussion (see Kerr & Tindale 2004; Seibold & Meyers 2007; O’Keefe & Jensen 2011 for overviews), the above results discourage high expectations as to the epistemic aspect of group decisions. Should similar studies be externally valid, then it would be unsurprising to learn that under conditions of ‘emotional involvement’, a group consensus is not based on the best grounds featured in discussion. Rather, one might expect various biases to motivate decisions. On their potentially positive role in group deliberation, see Mercier and Landemore (2012). A rather upbeat interpretation of affect in groups is provided in Spoor and Kelly (2004).

Furthermore, or so one learns from extending Gettier’s case (Section 2.1) to groups, even if a group decision features the solution supported by the best grounds, it may still have been adopted for the wrong reasons. So, if groups get it right after discussion, this may still be for reasons of luck. Here, we assume that discussants may behave just as observers did in the above experimental study. This means that group decisions are likely based on non-epistemic cues. As Seibold and Meyers put it:

The overview of our research program and allusions to the work of others, as well as the challenges discussed, underscore the important role that argument
plays in group decision making processes and outcomes. Still, we are far from understanding the complexity involved in group members’ argumentative practices and group products (Seibold & Meyers 2007, p. 329).

In further developing this line with respect to the goal of this chapter – to have rhetoric immediately relevant for social epistemology –, below, I discuss four objections.

2.4.1 External validity?
It may seem natural to object that the result presented above does not generalize, i.e. it only holds for the sample available to Boy and Witte, but the pattern might break down in replication. Different groups, and different decisions – or so goes the objection – may lead to different results. Call this the ‘lacks external validity-objection’.

Reply: It is an empirical question whether the above result transfers beyond the laboratory. Crucially, when studying the effects of affect, it may not be enough that the decision problem has a solution that is supported by expert opinion; it may also need to be a problem that humans are emotionally involved in to begin with. Anything with a lower emotional investment than the kind of life-threatening choice presented by the desert-survival problem might cease to provide the right conditions. Yet, this question, too, is open to empirical study.

2.4.2 Undercutting the cognitive-affective distinction
One may object that the distinction into cognitive and affective factors (i.e. those related to the information-content of messages vs. the mood of discussants) is a rough and typically analytic distinction that may be without a real counterpart. It may take much finer grained distinctions and, perhaps, a ‘clean’ separation of cognitive from non-cognitive – or, more generally, the separation of types of – message factors (see Powers 2007, p. 135 ff) may not be possible.

Reply: While the above results have been produced on the basis of an admittedly rough distinction, it does not convince us to doubt that there is any reality to it. The demand for more fine-grained distinctions – e.g. source, channel, message, receiver context, and effect factors (Ibid., p. 136) – is laudable, and nothing stated here contradicts it. Rather, more fine-grained distinctions should (somehow) recover the cognitive vs. affective distinction. Its ‘roughness’ is a reason to develop, rather than to reject it.
2.4.3 Moot point!
One may object that the weak rhetoric-as-epistemic thesis, as presented here, is trivial, uninteresting, and far from new. Especially rhetoricians may be more attracted to the strong version (Section 2.3), as it seems to lend greater importance to their field.

Reply: It is clearly important to learn – again, in principle, this is an empirical question – which argumentative and suasory devices do reliably (fail to) bring discussants to adopt superior information as the group decision. Such knowledge being exhausted by finding out which devices do not work is not necessarily a useless result. Boy and Witte’s study suggests one basic insight: Under normal conditions, antagonistic behaviour is reliably non-conducive; discussants perceive it as non-preferred. Beyond this insight – this is the point to make – , we seem to have little in the way of knowledge about the reliability of argumentative and suasory devices. For lack of a better term, let us call this a knowledge gap.

2.4.4 Persuasion knowledge is not general
A research programme that seeks to remedy the above gap demands interaction between epistemologists, rhetoricians, and social-psychologists, amongst others. The first may be expected to provide what we called good grounds; the second possess the requisite background to make persuasive effects measurable in experimental settings; the latter have insight into the communicative conditions to be varied. So, all possess something the others (presumably) want, or – if the foregoing is accepted – should want.

This is not a new idea! Worse, perhaps, it might be for a specific reason that social judgement theory (Sherif & Hovland 1961), as well as similar and contrasting work, has had little success in producing information on the reliability of argumentative and suasory devices: ‘[T]here is no single way of presenting information that guarantees persuasion. Much depends on the relations between communicator, audience, the nature of the communication, and the particular circumstances of the communication’ (Billig 1996).

Hence, this seems to be the strongest objection: General persuasion-knowledge is not possible.

Reply: One may have to accept a trade-off between, on the one hand, the specificity and, on the other, the reliability of persuasion-knowledge. Consider that, across conditions, antagonistic behaviour is dis-preferred. This does provide some guidance; it informs us about what behaviour not to
display. Prima facie uninformative as this may seem with respect to each particular situation in which one seeks to persuade, the insight is nevertheless comparatively robust. There may be few situations (though, perhaps, not none) in which antagonistic behaviour is conducive to deliberating groups converging on the truth.

Provided agents accept that reliable information on what does persuade, or not, is desirable for group deliberation, they may also be inclined – perhaps more so than they otherwise would be – to accept that specific action cannot be ‘squeezed out’ of such information. Conversely, the greater the action guiding value (‘textbook advice’), the less reliable such information may be for particular deliberative situations. The alleged failure of social judgement theory, then, may potentially be explained by accepting that comparatively informative persuasion-knowledge is comparatively unreliable, while comparatively reliable persuasion-knowledge is comparatively uninformative, in the sense of suggesting specific communicative acts in given situations.

2.5 Conclusions
If the main result of Boy and Witte’s (2007) study is accepted, it becomes clear that when deliberating bodies adopt the best reasons offered in the discussion to support the group decision, then it is likely that these reasons were presented in a manner that is perceived to be cooperative. Furthermore, it seems clear that emotional investment in a situation can screen-off whatever epistemic merit a discussion may feature. It is an open question whether this extends to situations of emotional non-investment.

Insofar as argumentative and suasory devices do influence which decision a group adopts, it becomes pertinent to study conditions under which said devices reliably lead to social knowledge, or to falsehoods. We have defended such research against four objections, and suggested that the reliability and the specificity of persuasion-knowledge may be inversely related.

Along these lines, one may potentially explain the failure of social judgement theory, and make the claim more precisely that rhetorical knowledge (in the full sense of the word) is contextual, i.e. available only as particular communicative situations develop.

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References


IN SUPPORT OF THE WEAK RHETORIC-AS-EPISTEMIC THESIS


The Function of Rhetoric in the Translation of the Qur’an

HANADI BEHAIRI

3.1 Introduction
The Qur’an is the first and most important source for those who wish to understand Islam, both for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. For Muslims, the Qur’an is the revelation of God, a message sent from God through the mediation of his angel Gabriel to his chosen messenger Muhammad, to convert the then inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula from polytheism to a belief in one God. For non-Muslims, the Qur’an is a highly literary text in Arabic heritage. It is neither poetry nor prose. It contains in a unique way all the elements of rhetorical features that Arabs, both Muslim and non-Muslim, fully understand. For both groups, the Qur’an is an independent genre in its own right; it is a genre in the sense that it exclusively enjoys prototypical linguistic and rhetorical underlying recurrent features. The Qur’an has its own, what Hasan (1978) calls, ‘generic structure potential’ (Hasan 1978, pp. 228-246).

The translation of the meanings of the Qur’an is a major human contribution in cross-cultural interfertilization; it is a unique charity to humanity. The translation, however, should not be looked at as replacement for the original version of the Qur’an in Arabic, for we cannot produce a Latin Qur’an no matter how accurate or professional the translator attempts to be. Qur’anic expressions and structures are Qur’an-bound and cannot be reproduced in an equivalent manner to the original in terms of structures, effect on the reader, and intentionality of the source text. The translation of the Qur’an remains in limbo, because the word of God cannot be reproduced by the word of man (Abdul Raof 2001, p. 179).

3.2 Arabic rhetoric
Rhetoric is a linguistic discipline that deals with discourse analysis at the sentence level, but can also deal with the other two levels of analysis: the
word selection and the text level interrelations. Arabic rhetorical studies have taken a well-defined theoretical shape encompassing three independent disciplines: figure of speech, embellishments\(^1\) and word order.\(^2\)

Arabic rhetoric is concerned with semantics. It is an extension of Arabic grammar and is interrelated to Arabic stylistics. It is concerned primarily with effective interpersonal communication. Based upon human communication, Arabic rhetoric pays attention to the addressee’s psychological and ideological state so that the communicator’s message is driven home and received well by the audience. Arabic rhetoric takes into consideration the communicative context of a given discourse activity and accounts for the pragmatic functions of word order change in the Arabic sentence. Arabic rhetoric provides a pragmatic account of linguistic deviation, linguistic structuring, and conversational implication. It is the discipline that accounts for the communicative event in which the communicator favours a verbal predicate over a nominal predicate, or vice versa. It is the linguistic know-how of taking the addressee by surprise through the production of an eloquent speech act that is distinct from the ordinary style and familiar linguistic patterns. Arabic rhetoric provides a pragmatic analysis of the implications and the prelocutionary effects of Arabic discourse. In rhetorical studies, the truth of a given speech act might or might not correspond to the external world. Thus, we are concerned with speech acts that are either true or false and those that are neither true, nor false. In other words, rhetoric has bridged the gap between logic and language (Abdul Raof 2006, p. 1).

Therefore, in order to understand the Arabic rhetorical construction of any text a study of stylistic features of Arabic language should be made. The miracle of the Qur’an lies in its entire construction, in its nazzm. *Ilm al-ma’ani*\(^3\) is the particular rhetorical science that reveals the uniqueness of the Qur’anic nazzm. However, translators of the Qur’an do not pay much attention to the exploration of this side of the Qur’anic construction, even

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\(^1\) In Arabic rhetorical studies, embellishments are referred to as ‘ilm al-badi’, an independent rhetorical discipline that appreciates the mechanisms of beautifying the discourse that is required to be linguistically unambiguous and compatible with context.

\(^2\) Word order ‘ilm al-ma’ani’ is a grammar-governed sentence-level approach that is concerned with the pragmatic and aesthetic effects of the judicious ordering of lexical items within a given preposition.

\(^3\) See footnote no. 2
in their footnotes. They concern themselves with such problematic issues as explaining a religious meaning, introducing the historic events and finding equivalent meanings. The translators believe that rendering rhetorical features of the Qur’an is impossible because of the specific features of Arabic language. Because other languages do not share these features, they believe that the translation is doomed to fail. Therefore, these features cannot be tasted if they are handed to any target language⁴ (Baker 1992, p. 17). There is no doubt that understanding the Qur’anic expressions and idioms is a fundamental requirement for understanding the Qur’an as a scripture book. Yet, this understanding is only a first step towards the underlying meaning of the Qur’anic construction. In fact, highlighting rhetoric in the Qur’an’s words and utterances is the only way to prove the inimitability of the Qur’an, what is called in Arabic Ḩijaz.

The notion of Ḩijaz has always been interrelated to rhetorical studies. For ‘Abd al-Qahir al-jurjani (d. 471 or 474 H), the inimitability of the Qur’an is attributed primarily to the order system of the Qur’anic genre and to Qur’anic-specific stylistic and grammatical prototypical features, rather than to its individual lexical items or their meanings. The order system is a grammar-based linguistic notion that refers to the various orders of sentence constituents for different communicative functions. Thus, the order system belongs to the grammatical system of Arabic. It is originally attributed to the prototypical linguistic features of Qur’anic discourse and its special arrangements (Al-Jurjani 1984, p. 28).

Translators currently believe that translation of the Qur’anic text into a different language and culture does not always require keeping intact the source language linguistic and/or rhetorical constitutes of texture; and that target text linguistic/ rhetorical constituents of texture have to be employed instead. In other words, target language texture has to be governed by target language linguistic and rhetoric norms of texture in order to achieve acceptability (Neubert & Sherve 1992, p. 104).

To argue the above belief, it is important to ask that if we accept the ‘text’ as ‘language that is functional’, would the new target ‘text’, which has been induced through translation, still be functional? Hussein Abdul Raof answers this question by stressing the fact that the flavour of interfertiliza-

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⁴ Lack of equivalence among languages at lexical, textual, grammatical, or pragmatical level is a common fact and a problem that is persistently encountered by translators.
tion between syntax and rhetoric, which is a feature of Qur’anic discourse, will be relinquished or diluted. In his opinion, the translator of the Qur’anic text should compromise between translations highlighting the prototypical linguistic and rhetorical features of the Qur’anic text and translations reproducing the information in the main text by finding formal equivalents.\(^5\) (Abdul Raof 2001, p. 111).

In my opinion, however, the translation process is a strategy that does not need a compromise action. The translator of the Qur’an should decide his strategy for dealing with the rhetorical components in Qur’anic composition. Selecting cognitive equivalents of the Qur’anic meaning does not contradict selecting close formulation that could express even a part of the uniqueness of the Qur’anic composition.

The main objective of my study is to highlight the need for an effective, accurate, informative, and expressive translation of the meaning of the Qur’an that would express these rhetorical features. To this end, I will analyze a modern translation of the meaning of the Qur’an by Muhammed ‘Abdel Haleem (2004). The author claims that his translation is unique in terms of considering the rhetorical features of the Qur’an. The research question is: To what extent does ‘Abdel Haleem succeed in conveying the rhetorical features of the Qur’anic discourse? In this chapter, I will select examples from the Qur’an, which the author tries to translate rhetorically, in order to show the gap between the original meaning of the rhetorical features of the Qur’an and the translation of the meaning in the author’s attempt.

3.3 Qur’an translation and the footnotes

Footnotes in Qur’an translation are useful for highlighting the value of the rhetorical Qur’anic components. They are used to demonstrate specific elements such as historical facts, geographical facts, ecological words, metaphor, cultural expressions, religious concepts, scientific facts, parables, and lexical meaning (Abdul Raof 2001, pp. 141-174). But there are no footnotes that handle the rhetorical features of the Qur’an composition. The reason may be that most of the translators are not specialized in Arabic rhetorical science. They focused on translating the meaning of the Qur’an in order to

\(^5\) Additionally, the translation of the Qur’an, in the view of al-Ghazali (1991) is impossible. For Asad (1980) it is untranslatable. Pichthall (1969) also believes that the Qur’an cannot be translated.
reveal the message of the Prophet Muhammad. Rhetorical knowledge is regarded as an embellishment that will not affect understanding the meaning of the Qur’an.

It is worthwhile to note that some Qur’anic studies scholars who are concerned with the matter of Qur’an translation into the English language, such as John Wansbrough (Wansbrough 1986, pp. 496-485), Andrew Rippin (Rippen 1983, pp. 7-20), Angelika Neuwirth (Neuwirth 2003, pp. 27-40), Neal Robinson (Robinson 1996, pp. 45-80), Michel Cuypers (Cuypers 2009, pp. 32-56), Mustansir Mir (Mir 1986, pp. 14-34), Hussein Abdul-Raof (Abdul Raof 2006, pp. 5-17), and Muhammad Abdul Haleem (Abdul Haleem 2004, pp. 4-10), all discussed the importance of the rhetorical features of the Qur’an by underlining or analyzing some of these features. Yet, they focused mainly on two disciplines of the rhetorical sciences: figure of speech and embellishments. The third discipline word order, i.e. semantic syntax, has not attracted the Qur’anic translators’ attention. Despite that, this discipline reflects the uniqueness of the Qur’anic style and underlies its style miracle.

3.4 Word order fields

Word order is concerned with the juxtaposition of sentence constituents in various word orders that lead to distinct pragmatic significations. It is interrelated to semantic syntax and discourse analysis. Applying word order in Qur’anic studies or translations requires the study of eight fields: subject status, predicate status, interrelationship (between subject and predicate) status, attachments verb status, restriction style, informing speech, conjunction and disjunction, brevity and verbosity.

These eight fields of Arabic rhetorical study concern the sentence constituents. Every sentence in Arabic language should be formed by subject and predicate, or vice versa, and the interrelationships between them. These are the first three fields. If the predicate in the sentence occurred as a verb, a study of the attachments verb status is required. If the speech is restricted by any of the restricted Arabic particles, a study of the style features is needed. The interrelationship between the sentences in terms of conjunction or disjunction is another important approach to studying the sentences’ semantics. These sentences could be analyzed from the perspective of brevity and verbosity and the meaning expressed. Finally, the speech could be formed in informing style, which could indicate a requesting form or a non-requesting...
form; this is an independent field of Arabic rhetorical study (Abu Musa 1980, p. 43).

In the next section, I will explain the importance of every field in the matter of Qur’an translation with regard to ‘Abdul Haleem’s translation by giving an example from the Qur’an in order to show the function of rhetorical features in understanding the meaning of the Qur’an and convening its unique eloquence.

3.4.1 Subject status
Syntactically, al-musnad ilaibih⁶ occurs as the subject of an active voice sentence, or the subject of a passive voice sentence. The sentence constituent of al-musnad ilaibih can occur as an explicit pronoun, a common noun, an abstract noun, a demonstrative pronoun, and as a relative pronoun.

For rhetorical reasons, al-musnad ilaibih in the Qur’an has different status functions: such as ellipses or formative forms, foregrounding or backgrounding forms, definiteness or indefiniteness forms and shifting forms. All these statuses should be highlighted by the Qur’anic translator in order to achieve the pragmatic functions of these various statuses in the Qur’an formulation. I will give an example of the first state (ellipses or formative forms).

3.4.1.1 Ellipses or formative forms
It is agreed that the complete and the clear sentence is more effective than the foggy one. A more precise sentence reflects the exact meaning. However, in Arabic rhetoric, ellipses for an essential sentence component should have a reason that lies behind the ellipsis status. These reasons should be pointed out in Qur’an translation in order to taste the beauty of such unusual Qur’anic constructions. For example, Allah says,

فَأَوْجَسَ مِنْهُمْ خِيفَةً قَالُوا لَ تَخَفْ وَبَشَّرُوهُ بِغُلَامٍ عَلِيمٍ . فَأَقْبَلَتِ امْرَأَتُهُ فِي صَرَّةٍ فَصَكَّتْ وُجْهَهَا وَقَالَتْ عَجُوزٌ عَقِيمٍ

⁶ Al-musnad ilaibih is a vital component in Arabic basic sentences. In Arabic rhetoric, the grammatical category ‘subject’ in English can, in principle, be employed to refer to al-musnad ilaibih, which is defined as ‘that to which something is attributed’. Literally meaning ‘that upon which the attribute leans or by which it is supported’.
Beginning to be afraid, but they said, ‘do not be afraid’. They gave him good news of a son who would be gifted with knowledge. His wife then entered with a loud cry, struck her face, and said, ‘A barren old woman?’ (51:28-29).

In the verse, Zakryyah’s wife is astonished because she will have a boy while she is old and barren. The original word order of the last sentence contains a subject انَّا ‘I am’. In the verse, the subject is elliptical because it expresses her astonishment: she feels the news is strange and unexpected. The ellipse of the subject reflects her feelings towards the good news (Basiwni 2004, p. 81). The translator should reflect her feelings and give the reader a hint of the elliptical word in the footnote. ‘Abdel Haleem’s translation does not indicate any ellipsis in the Qur’anic translation. Moreover, by placing a question mark at the end of the verse, ‘Abdel Haleem’s translation does not keep the astonished mood of her discourse. Pickthal and Yusuf Ali’s translations, on the other hand, keep the exclamation mark.

In other verses, al-musnad ilaihi seems to be important in the sentence. The sentence will be clear and informative either having a lexical clue or contextual clue of the elliptic word. For example, Allah says,

ٌومَا تِلْكَ بِيَمِينِكَ يَا مُوسَى . قَالَ هِيَ عَصَايَ أَتَوَكَّأُ عَلَيْهَا وَأَهُشُّ بِهَا عَلَى غَنَمِي

Moses, what is that in your right hand?’ ‘It is my staff’, he said, ‘I lean on it; restrain my sheep with it’ I also have other uses for it.’ (20:17-18)

In Moses’ answer to God’s question, Moses could answer in one word (a staff) or (a stick) without formulating a complete sentence (this is my staff), and if he does so the meaning will be conveyed in the rules of Arabic construction. Yet, Moses intends to answer in a complete form because speaking to God is one of Moses’ desires. He answers God’s question in long descriptions of what has been in his right hand (I lean on it; restrain my sheep with it; I also have other uses for it). Moses believes that God knows what is in his right hand. However, he is glad to be having a conversation between him and God. The translator of the verse should highlight this rhetorical remark in the footnote to justify to the reader the verse formulation in Moses’ situation (Abu Musa 1980, p. 87).
3.4.2 Predicate status
Grammatically, *al-Musnad* occurs in verbal sentences and in nominal sentences. Therefore, the pragmatic functions of *al-Musnad* are grammar-governed. Most importantly, *al-Musnad* performs a different pragmatic function in a verbal sentence and in a nominal sentence, and these differentiations should be considered by the translators. For example, Allah says:

أَوَلَمْ يَرَوْا إِلَى الطَّيْرِ فَوْقَهُمْ صَافَّاتٍ وَيَقْبِضْنَ مَا يُمْسِكُهُنَّ إِلَّا الرَّحْمَنُ إِنَّهُ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ بَصِيرٌ

Do they not see the birds above them spreading and closing their wings? It is only the Lord of Mercy who holds them up: He watches over everything. (67:19)

The Qur’an forms the two actions of the birds into two different formulations. The first action is ‘spreading’, which is formulated in Arabic text in nominal form. The second action is ‘spreading’, which is formulated in Arabic text in verbal forms. This is because, in Arabic, a nominal formulation is used to denote a given state and stability of this particular state and profession, whereas the verbal formulation is used to indicate renewal of the same action at different times (al-Zamakhshari 1980, p. 213).

It is noticeable that the translation of these two forms does not indicate the two types of construction. The translator cares about the direct meaning of the verse without pointing to the Arabic different forms even in the footnotes. However, the Qur’an shows the actions of the birds in precise forms in order to portray the birds’ flying movements. These movements are a universal knowledge that needs to be highlighted in equivalent constructions.

3.4.3 Interrelationship (between subject and predicate) of reporting status
Understanding the pragmatic rhetorical function of any reporting construction requires rhetorical analyses that identify the interrelationships between the sentence components. These interrelations should be examined from various dimensions such as affirmation techniques, foregrounding and definiteness. Allah says:

The predicate in Arabic rhetoric is referred to as *al-musnad*, i.e. that which leans upon or is supported by the inchoative (*al-musnad ilaihi*).
Yet they made the Jinn partners with God (6:100)

Here, the rhetorical analysis is focused on the order of the words *shuraka'* and *al-jinn*. Syntactically, the word *shuraka'* (associates of Allah) is the first object of the verb *Ja'ala* (to make) and *al-Jinn* is the second direct object because the verb *Ja'ala* in Arabic takes two direct objects. If we amend the sentence into *wa ja'alü li Allah al-jinn shuraka'*, then it will be grammatically correct. Yet, stylistically, placing the word *shuraka'* before *al-Jinn* has a meaning which cannot be achieved if the words are reordered. The general meaning of the verse (abstract meaning) is that the Jinn are not seen as associates of Allah and cannot be worshipped in the same way. Although this meaning can be conveyed by both orders (*shuraka'* first or *al-jinn* first), the verse in this order conveys another deeper meaning (contextual meaning): Allah should not have *any* associate, whether Jinn or any other being (al-Jurjani 1984, p. 263).

‘Abdul Haleem’s translation does not point out the word order at the footnotes despite the importance of the word order and the interrelationships between them in Arabic construction.

3.4.4 Attachments verb status
In Arabic rhetoric studies, the verb is investigated in terms of other sentence constituents that co-occur with it. These constituents that are related to the verb are called ‘attachments’. The notion of verb’s attachments is concerned with the grammatical processes in the verbal sentence and has semantic and pragmatic impact on the overall signification of the proposition. The major attachments of the verb are the subject, the object, the propositional phrase, the circumstantial noun phrase, the temporal noun phrase and the conditional particle.

For example in the story of Moses with al-Khidr Allah says:

"فانطلقا حتى إذا ركبا في السفينة خرقها قال أخرقتها لتغرق أهلها لقد جئت شيئاً إمروا. قال ألم أقلك لن تستطيع معنى صبرًا قال لا نواحي قلما بما نسبت ولا ترغموني من أمري غسرًا. فانطلقا حتى إذا لقيا عارياً قال أقتلت فمنا زكيةً بغير نفس لقد جئت شيئاً تأجزر. ألم أقلك لن تستطيع معنى صبرًا"
They travelled on. Then, when they got into a boat, and the man made a hole in it, Moses said, 'How could you make a hole in it? Do you want to drown its passengers? What a strange thing to do!' He replied, 'Did I not tell you that you would never be able to bear with me patiently? Moses said, 'Forgive me for forgetting. Do not make it too hard for me to follow you'. And so they travelled on. Then, when they met a young boy and the man killed him, Moses said, 'How could you kill an innocent person? He has not killed anyone! What a terrible thing to do! He replied, 'Did I not tell you that you would never be able to bear with me patiently?' (18:71-75)

When Moses travelled with al-Khidr, they got into a boat; al-Khidr made a hole in it. Moses denied the action and asked al-Khidr to justify the reason. Al-Khidr replied: did I not tell that you would never be able to bear with me patiently? However, in the next journey stop, they met a boy and al-Khidr killed him. Moses asked al-Khidr to justify the reason. In this stage, al-Khidr blames Moses for not being patient with him, al-Khidr replied: Did I not tell you that you would never be able to bear with me patiently?

The construction of the second blame is different from the first blame in Arabic text, while the translation used a similar construction and ignored the rhetorical function of the differences. In the second blame, the Qur’an presents al-Khidr’s reflection by adding the subject (you) while in the first blame the subject was elliptic. In Arabic construction, adding the subject in proposition form indicates anger and blame more than if the construction is elliptic and understood from the context (Basiwni 2004, p. 177). Unfortunately, the translator does care about the surface meaning of the story and does not mention the differences between the two sentences even in the footnotes.

3.4.5 Restriction style
Rhetorically, restriction means ‘to restrict someone or something by something else’. It is a stylistic technique of affirmation of the reporting proposition. The sentence in the restriction style implies the meaning of negation and affirmation together, such as ‘my friends came except Muhammad’. It is a kind of verbosity in Arabic construction. It is realized through the employment of special linguistic tools. There are: the negation particle, the exception particle, the coordination particle, the detached pronoun and the employment of foregrounding (’Abbas 1989, p. 361).
Every restriction tool provides a rhetorical and pragmatic function that could not be replaced by one another. Despite the importance of the restriction tool’s function, these functions are not recognized in Qur’an translation. For example, the method of the negation particle plus the exception particle is a powerful method of restriction. It usually occurs in the religious meaning such as prove the divinity, prove the resurrection, while the method of using the direct exception particle usually occurs on the topics of ethics and morality. However, these differences are not recognized by the translators for both methods. Let us highlight some Qur’anic verses to clarify this point. Allah says,

"إِنَّمَا الْمُؤْمِنُونَ إِخْوَةٌ فَأَصْلِحُوا بَيْنَ أَخَوَيْكُمْ وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُرْحَمُونَ"

The believers are brothers, so make peace between your two brothers and be mindful of God, so that you may be given mercy (49:10)

"رَبِّ أَعِنَّكَ عَلَى الْغَيْبِ لَا يَعْلَمُهَا إِلَّا هُوَ أَلَّا يَعْلَمُهَا إِلَّا هُوَ"

He holds the keys to the unseen: no one knows them except Him (6:59)

It is clear that the translation does not highlight the restriction style in either verses or the differences between the two methods that are used. The translator clarified the meaning of the verses generally and ignored completely the pragmatic function of the restriction style in both verses. It seems to the reader that the verses contain a general formative sentence without any implied meaning. Lack of testing of the rhetorical function of every method in the restriction style is a possible reason for the translation above.

The translation of the first verse in the part of restriction should be ‘brothers are but your believers’. And the translation of the second verse in the part of restriction should be ‘no one knows them except Him’. Furthermore, the translator should explain the function of selecting the method of restricted style in every verse.

3.4.6 Informing speech
An informing proposition is that which does not qualify to be true or false. There are two modes of informing speech acts in Arabic construction. These are request and non-request informing. In Arabic rhetoric, request inform-
ing is more important than the non-request informing. This is because the request informing implies various rhetorical pragmatic functions according to the contexts. The mode of requesting discourse includes five categories of request informing, which are interrogative, imperative, prohibition, vocative and wish modes of discourse.

Every category includes different particles. The particle seems to have a similar meaning in the discourse. From a rhetorical point of view, every particle in every category gives a unique fingerprint in the discourse which the translator does not recognize. For example, in the interrogative mode of discourse, there are different requesting particles; one of these particles is the time-requesting particle. This includes two kinds of particles, one to request a near time future such as,

وَيَقُولُونَ مَتَى هَذَا الْوَعْدُ إِن كُنتُمْ صَادِقِينَ

And they say, ‘When will this promise fulfilled, if what you say is true? (36:48)

And the other for requesting a long time future (Abu Musa 2004, pp. 207-245) such as,

يَسْأَلُونَ أَيَّانَ يَوْمُ الدِّينِ

They ask, ‘When is this judgement Day coming?’ (51:12)

The translator deals with the two examples equally in the translation form without giving the reader a hint in order to be able to recognize the reason for using a different particle in a different context to request a different future time.

3.4.7 Conjunction and disjunction
Al-Jurjani said that Arabic rhetoric is to know the core concept and the function of conjunction and disjunction. Using the conjunctive element or leaving the conjunctive element in the discourse construction is a matter of very precise and accurate knowledge.

Conjunction and disjunction are grammatical processes that have a semantic bearing on the sentence. Arabic rhetorical studies have focused mainly on the conjunctive element and with reference to Qur’anic discourse. This
is because the conjunctive element and does not imply any meaning other than the meaning of sharing the same purpose of the first sentence and the sentence following the conjunctive elements. All other conjunctive elements in Arabic language imply another meaning behind the original meaning of sharing, such as the use of فِ to signify an immediate action without delay, the use of حَثَ to signify a delay in action.

Disjunction refers to the absence of any conjunctive particle, particularly the coordination particle and. The major pragmatic function of disjunction is affirmation. However, disjunction could occur in different linguistic environments for example, it occurs when listing several adjectives modifying the individual (Al-Zamakhshari 1980, pp. 454-455), for example, Allah says:

قَالُوا رَبِّنَا إِن طَلَّقْتُنَّ أَن يُبْدِلَهُ أَزْوَاجًا خَيْرًا مِّنكُنَّ مُسْلِمَاتٍ مُّؤْمِنَاتٍ قَانِتَاتٍ تَائِبَاتٍ

عَابِدَاتٍ سَائِحَاتٍ ثَيِّبَاتٍ وَأَبْكَارًا

His Lord may replace you with better wives if the Prophet decides to divorce any of you: wives who are devoted to God, true believers, devout, who turn to Him in repentance and worship Him, given to fasting, whether previously married or virgins (66:5)

However, in the Qur’an, conjunction could also occur when listing several adjectives modifying the individual for different rhetorical function (Al-Zamakhshari 1980, p. 263), for example, Allah says:

الَّذِينَ يَقُولُونَ رَبَّنَا إِنَّنَا آمَنَّا فَاغْفِرْ لَنَا ذُنُوبَنَا وَقِنَا عَذَابَ النَّارِ 

وَالصَّادِقِينَ وَالْقَانِتِينَ وَالْمُنفِقِينَ وَالْمُسْتَغْفِرِينَ بِالأَسْحَارِ

Those who say, ‘Our Lord, we believe, so forgive us our sins and protect us from suffering in the fire. Those who are steadfast, truthful, truly devout, who give [in God’s cause] and pray before dawn for forgiveness’ (3:16-17)

Obviously, the translator deals with the adjectives in a way that is permitted in the English linguistic rules. In English, adjectives should follow each other without coordination particles whereas in Arabic, adjectives normally occur with coordination particles. This structure rule has a rhetorical justification. In the verse above, the adjectives occur with coordination particles
and among them. Rhetorically, this indicates that the person described by one of these adjectives is absolutely perfect in this attribution separately and could not be gathering all attributions at the same time.

On the other hand, the absence of the cohesive particle among a number of adjectives – as in the first verse – indicates that the person who is described by these attributions is perfect in these attributions altogether, at the same time. This precise difference in using the cohesive particle leads to different diversions in understanding the indirect meaning of the verse or the second intended meaning. In ‘Abdl Haleem’s translation, nothing is shown to indicate these rhetorical functions of using or leaving a cohesive particle among consecutive attributions (Al-Zamakhshari 1980, p. 246).

3.4.8 Brevity

Brevity is a stylistic technique, which could or could not involve ellipsis. The Qur’anic discourse is marked by this rhetorical feature in both ways, as in the following verse:

وَإِذْ يَرْفَعُ إِبْرَاهِيمُ الْقَوَاعِدَ مِنَ الْبَيْتِ وَإِسْمَاعِيلُ رَبَّنَا تَقَبَّلْ مِنَّا إِنَّكَ أَنتَ السَّمِيعُ
الْعَلِيمُ

As Abraham and Ishmael built up the foundations of the House [they prayed],
‘Our Lord, accept [this] from us. You are the All Hearing, the All Knowing (2:127)

It is clear that the translator was concerned to render the elliptic words in the Qur’anic text between brackets in order to give the right meaning of the text. In Arabic formulation, the meaning of elliptic words is understood without additional brackets. The ellipse occurs in the situation of vocation by Abraham and his son in order to present the scene of vocation as a live scene (Qutub 1980, p. 59). However, if the translator explains in the footnotes the reason for these elliptic words in Arabic text, this will help the reader to recognize the rhetorical function of brevity in the Qur’an. Another example, in the verse:

خُذِ الْعَفْوَ وَأْمُرْ بِالْعُرْفِ وَأَعْرِضْ عَنِ الْجَاهِلِينَ

It is clear that the translator was concerned to render the elliptic words in the Qur’anic text between brackets in order to give the right meaning of the text. In Arabic formulation, the meaning of elliptic words is understood without additional brackets. The ellipse occurs in the situation of vocation by Abraham and his son in order to present the scene of vocation as a live scene (Qutub 1980, p. 59). However, if the translator explains in the footnotes the reason for these elliptic words in Arabic text, this will help the reader to recognize the rhetorical function of brevity in the Qur’an. Another example, in the verse:

خُذِ الْعَفْوَ وَأْمُرْ بِالْعُرْفِ وَأَعْرِضْ عَنِ الْجَاهِلِينَ

Be tolerant and command what is right: pay no attention to foolish people (7:199)
In some words the Qur’an presents the way of Muslim behaviour through addressing the Prophet Muhammad. It is said that this means: forgive the one who transgresses against you, and give to him who withholds from you and keep ties with him who severs his ties with you, (and enjoin kindness) and benevolence, (and turn away from the ignorant) Abu Jahl and his folk who mock you. (Basiwni 2004, p. 394).

3.5 Conclusion
The gap between translation theory and practice remains unbridged in religious books, and what applies as a solution to one language cannot apply to another. The targeted reader for any religious book needs to be aware of the fact that the translation of these books that he/she is reading is merely an aid to assist in reading and understanding the information and not the rhetorical features of the main texts.

The translation of rhetorical features for any sacred book cannot be achieved by general translators, whether religious or official. It needs specialized translators with a rhetoric background in both the text language and the target one. For the Qur’an, translation is a major positive contribution to mankind and a magnificent promotion of cross-cultural rhetoric understanding. Therefore, the translation process of the Qur’an has to be based on the fact that the output will be an interpretation of the underlying meanings of the Qur’an, rather than a substitution for the original text; it is vital that a distinction is made between translating the meaning of the Qur’anic text and the rhetorical function of Qur’an composition.

The Qur’an has been translated many times into English. Each translation represents one person’s understanding of the text. This understanding could concern the meaning, looking for words, highlighting cultural differences or focusing on religious values. None of the previous Qur’an translations considers the rhetorical function of the Qur’an composition, which underlies the uniqueness of the Qur’an as an inimitable Arabic text.

On the basis of the rhetorical study of ‘Abdul Haleem’s Qur’an translation, the research discovered that the current translation failed to convey some of the rhetorical elements of the Qur’an. This is because highlighting rhetorical features needs to be undertaken by rhetoricians themselves.

As a major contribution of the study, a set of procedures to be applied in the translation process has been developed so that an effective translation of the rhetorical features of the Qur’an may be achieved. First, it is suggest-
ed that a combination of various translation approaches be employed in any effort to translate the Qur’an. Second, the researchers from different backgrounds set forth a procedure to maintain equivalence. Third, the study proposes the application of certain translation methods taking into account the second meaning of the Qur’an composition. Finally, the study proposes a collective work of Qur’anic translation under the supervision of major Islamic institutions worldwide.

References
THE FUNCTION OF RHETORIC IN THE TRANSLATION OF QURA’N

4 A Cognitive Supplement to Rhetorical Theory: Potential Benefits from Investigating Neuroscientific Evidence

JENS KOED MADSEN

4.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen the field of neuroscience develop with impressive haste. Indeed, it may now be interesting for theorists from other areas to investigate whether or not the knowledge obtained in neuroscientific experiments might inform the assumptions, theories and analyses in those areas. This chapter discusses the methodological, technical and explanatory limitations of neuroscientific evidence in general (although some remarks concerning individual methods are presented as well) in order to investigate whether or not rhetorical theory may learn from neuroscientific evidence. This chapter takes neuroscience to be a specific empirical discipline. One of the main claims of the article is that presumably neuroscience is not more reductionistic than other empirical disciplines as long as the researchers conducting the experiments are aware of the methodological, technical and assumption limitations of the approach and that neuroscientific evidence is not over-extrapolated to cover concepts that are not warranted in the study. The complexity of the neuroscientific approach puts serious demands on readers (such as rhetorical theorists), since we must understand the strengths and weaknesses of the methods used and the statistics employed in order to be able to evaluate whether or not a given neuroscientific experiment is of use to rhetorical theory and analysis (for a discussion on this topic within the field of experimental psychology, see Henson 2005).

The rhetorical milieu has engaged in such discussions in recent years. Thus, *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* published a special issue on the topic November 2010 (Jack; Jack & Appelbaum; Jackson; Johnson; Pryal), and Daniel Gross (2006) argues that neuroscientific data may be too reductionist to be useful to rhetorical theory. The main aim of the chapter, then, is to
discuss this issue and to investigate neuroscientific methodology and the implications with regard to limitations and potential benefits for rhetorical theory. This is briefly exemplified by exploring some illustrative data concerned with emotional appeals. However, the main aim remains to discuss whether or not neuroscience as an academic discipline may be of use to rhetorical theory and analysis.

The chapter falls in seven parts. Firstly, I will comment on the distinction between normative and descriptive approaches in order to appreciate that neuroscience primarily functions as a descriptive approach. Secondly, I will discuss the methodology and technology of neuroscience. Given the limitations of the article and the complexity of the methods and technology used in neuroscience, this presentation is indicative rather than exhaustive. Thirdly, objections to neuroscience are presented and discussed – in particular the worry that neuroscience posits culturally reductionistic studies, which are of little or no use to rhetorical theory. After discussing potential reductionism and basic assumptions, I move onto discussing the potential benefits from neuroscience. The chapter is concluded with a brief example of emotional appeals and some concluding remarks.

4.2 Normative and descriptive approaches

The distinction between normative and descriptive sciences is pivotal in the discussion concerning whether or not cognitive theories and neuroscience may contribute to rhetorical theory. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) define the difference between the two:

The normative analysis is concerned with the nature of rationality and the logic
... The descriptive analysis, in contrast, is concerned with people’s beliefs and preferences as they are, not as they should be (p. 341).

The normative analysis is constructed from basic assumptions. As Kahneman and Tversky mention, this might be a theory of, for example, rationality, logic, or maths, but the role of normative analysis extends into theories constructed from these basic assumptions such as rhetorical theory. Kock (1997, p. 15) notes that ‘rhetoric is an empirical and normative science concerned with the production and reception of utterances, considered in their entirety’ (my translation; see also Kock 2002; Jørgensen & Villadsen 2009, chapter 1 and 3). That is, the normative element in rhetorical theory enables
rhetorical theorists and analysts to evaluate whether a persuasive attempt falls within sound rhetorical practice – or in other words, rhetorical theory posits normative benchmarks against which it is possible to evaluate a rhetorical artefact in a given context. This stance towards rhetorical theory has notably lead to the development of rhetorical criticism (see e.g. Foss 2004). Compared with the normative approach, the descriptive approach offers analyses concerned with how people actually behave – either in experimental settings, by observation or investigation of statistical relevant information or similar methods. The purpose of this kind of investigation is to determine whether or not the normative assumptions and predictions hold true in a setting that resembles real life as closely as possible. As an example, Kahneman and Tversky (1984) investigate human beings and their actual approach to losses and gains. In doing so, they were able to question the basic assumptions of pure rationality that have been dominant in normative, economic theory. Whereas the normative predictions stem from these assumptions, the descriptive methods (in neuroscience) often rely on experiments to test these assumptions (amongst other experimental aims). That is, descriptive methods primarily rely on empirical data. However, no experiment can be created without basic assumptions since normative predictions are deduced from them. This means that if an experimental setting fails to show the results predicted by the normative theory, the assumptions may be questioned.

The two approaches are both important to the constructing, testing and revision of theories and analyses. Thus, normative theories inform theorists of the predictions/benchmarks against which the descriptive data should be measured. Experimental settings designed to collect descriptive data are informed by the same normative considerations in order to construct their experiments, evaluate statistical data and so forth. Normative approaches may then confer with the results of such descriptive data to re-evaluate and revise the basic assumptions that function as the theoretical framework for the normative theories. In other words, descriptive approaches rely on normative predictions, and normative approaches may revise theoretical predictions and analyses when faced with descriptive evidence. This, in turn, calls for revision of basic assumptions and further experiments.

That is, there is a constant theoretical back and forth between normative and descriptive approaches. Therefore, if we construe rhetorical theory primarily as a normative approach, we – as rhetoricians – should constantly look to descriptive data to ensure that our basic assumptions are as correct as
possible. I claim that neuroscience (in the same manner as other descriptive disciplines) may offer empirical evidence that rhetorical theory and analysis may benefit from investigating. If we accept this general claim, for the purpose of the present article we are left with two central questions: 1) what are the strengths and weaknesses of neuroscientific methodology and data; and 2) what are the potential theoretical and analytical benefits that may be gained from inspection of neuroscientific data?

4.3 Neuroscience: Methodology and technology

In order to assess the potential benefits and pitfalls of neuroscience as a supplement to rhetorical theory, it is necessary to know the methodological and technical background of the various techniques used to provide empirical evidence. Naturally, the methods are complex and differ substantially across the discipline. Consequently, I will limit this presentation of methodology and technology to some fundamental issues (for more detailed information on the various methods and technological issues, see Ward 2006). Neuroscientific research generally falls within two general lines of data collection: lesion/behavioural studies and brain scans. The methods describe temporal resolutions (when a cognitive event occurs) and spatial resolutions (where a cognitive event occurs). It is evident that neuroscientific work involves a number of ethical issues, but I will not touch upon these in this chapter.

In neuroscience, the behavioural data come from two main sources: lesions studies and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Lesion studies examine patients with neural damage ‘...in which one attempts to infer the function of a component (or region) by observing what the rest of the cognitive system can and can’t do when that component (or region) is removed’ (Ward 2006, p. 79). That is, subjects are given tasks and the deficiencies caused by the lesion gives tentative indications concerning the regions involved in the given cognitive task. Lesion studies have consequently benefitted from the development of imaging techniques since this makes precise lesions location possible. Comparable with lesions studies, TMS is said to induce ‘virtual lesions’ that are brief, controlled and reversible. TMS makes use of electromagnetic induction that is centred on an area covering roughly 1 cm². The electric currents stimulate the neurons at the targeted area due to the fact that ‘If these neurons are involved in performing a critical cognitive function then stimulating them artificially will disrupt that function’ (Ibid., p. 93). That is, if I perform the cognitive function of speaking, disrupting
that function will cause me to have trouble speaking. Thus, TMS may be used to investigate lesions behaviourally in a controlled and non-invasive manner. The TMS setting differs significantly from natural lesions in their reversibility and controllability, whereas natural lesions may unearth unexpected patterns that may inform future research. In other words, TMS cannot replace natural lesion studies, but should be seen as supplementary to these.

The most prevalent scan or measuring methods used in neuroscience are functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron emission tomography (PET) and electroencephalographical event related potential (EEG/ERP). Quite naturally, each method investigates different aspects of the responses in the brain – both in terms of what they measure, at what physical level they measure and how fast they measure. Both fMRI and PET are functional imaging methods and thus both rest on the assumption that when investigating a region of the brain ‘…neural activity produces local physiological changes in that region of the brain. This can be used to produce dynamic maps of moment-to-moment activity of the brain when engaged in cognitive tasks’ (Ibid., p. 49). In order to use PET, it is necessary to inject a radioactive tracer into the bloodstream. Detectors placed around the head measure brain activity. The fMRI scan, on the other hand, measures a blood-oxygen level dependent in functional tasks. These scans, in general, have spatial benefits.

Lastly, EEG/ERP is a frequently used method in neuroscience. Compared to the imaging methods (fMRI and PET), which has good spatial resolution, but low temporal resolution, EEG/ERP is a temporal method. The method records electric signals via electrodes placed at numerous places on the scalp. The aim of these recordings is to gain insight into the temporal relationship of brain activation. For the EEG to give a reading, it requires that a cluster of neurons is active in synchrony. Otherwise, the signal will be too weak. Therefore, the area of interest is contrasted with areas that are assumed not to be involved with the particular task. Thus, EEG/ERP measures the timing and peaks of electrophysical changes ‘…elicited by particular stimuli and cognitive tasks’ (Ibid., p. 38).

Common to these methods is that they are non-invasive. That is, the researcher does not need to operate in the brain or open the skull in order to conduct the experiments. By comparison, one of the most precise measurements, single-cell recording, is invasive and very rarely performed on humans (I only know of Mukamel et al. 2010; see also Glenberg et al.
One of the most important aspects of these various methods and their respective limitations (e.g. EEG/ERP has poor spatial resolution, fMRI has poor temporal resolution and so on) is the type of theoretical predictions and consequences that may be extrapolated from each respective method. Furthermore, they measure different aspects of brain activation. Where PET and fMRI measure ‘downstream consequences of neural activity (i.e. changes in blood flow/oxygen to meet metabolic needs)’ (Ibid., p. 53), EEG/ERP measure the electrical charge created by the neurons themselves.

In general, none of these methods may point towards definite conclusions on their own. Rather, neuroscientific evidence often stems from a particular task being investigated with the different methods to see if they converge.¹ In general, modern neuroscience acknowledges individual methodological limitations, carefully considers the conclusion drawn from the data, and bears in mind the potentially reductionistic pitfalls in order to differentiate itself methodologically, technically and in terms of scope and aims from classic phrenology (e.g. Friston 2002; Horwitz et al. 1999). I will touch upon this subject in the following section.

4.4 Objections to cognitive theories
One might rightly object to the use of laboratory and experimental work in arts and humanities due to fears of reductionism. Indeed, several scholars have noted this risk. Within social psychology, Babbie (1975) notes that ‘The greatest weakness of laboratory experiments lies in the artificiality. Social processes observed to occur within a laboratory setting might not necessarily occur within more natural social settings’ (p. 254). The main scepticism towards experimental data derived from a laboratory in general and neuroscientific evidence in particular may be summed up in the following three critical points. First and foremost, the potential reductionism is a viable point of criticism. This is applicable to experimental data gathered from a laboratory in general. Secondly, the technical and methodological limitations of neuroscience are important to consider. Last but not least, it may be questioned how the conclusions from the data collected are extrapolated into theories of human behaviour and cognition.

One of the most pressing objections to neuroscience as a supplement is the potential risk of oversimplified experiments omitting cultural e.g. variables. Indeed, given the fact that persuasive communication always takes place in a social, contextual setting, omitting these variables from the experiments, make scepticism towards the findings important. In his interesting book, Gross (2006) voices this concern when he argues that

...subjective experiences such as emotion have an essential social component and are best treated with social analysis of the sort developed in the rhetorical tradition, not scientific analysis that must reduce social phenomena in certain critical ways so as to function properly as science (p. 33-34).

This is a very valid point of criticism. Neuroscientists must indeed consider and deal with these challenges when creating and analysing experiments, and rhetorical theorists will have to bear the potential reductionism in mind when reading neuroscientific studies. However, Gross suggests an interesting dichotomy since the basis of the claim cited above seems to rest on the assumption that emotions (and by power of extrapolation: other concepts important to rhetorical theory as well) are best investigated by traditional, rhetorical social analysis instead of scientific analysis. This assumption indicates that arts and humanities have no potential use for the scientific analysis. Gross further remarks that

I will concede that it is trivially true and therefore uninteresting to assert that everything human, including the judgment of trustworthiness, has some localizable and theoretically measurable manifestation in the body or the brain (p. 34).

The reductionism criticism against the use of neuroscience can thus be formulated into two separate claims. One, scientific analysis is oversimplifying the experiments and two, the data gathered from neuroscience are trivially true and thus uninteresting. Concerning the first claim, I will point towards the previous section concerned with empirical and assumption reductionism. Concerning the second claim against neuroscience, I argue that conclu-

2 For instance, a study was conducted investigating Japanese subjects’ reaction to linguistic connotations. The findings were not in line with the findings conducted in European subjects, indicating cultural differences (see Niki, 2010).
sions drawn in neuroscientific research do not posit the claim that the brain is involved in cognition – instead a neuroscientific aim is to investigate how the brain is involved, i.e. localization, speed etc. In the same manner, it is trivially true that persuasive attempts exist in contextual and cultural relationships – however, this does not render the investigation of these concepts, their functional relationships and so on uninteresting. Rather, it is of great interest to discuss how these concepts work in the same way that it is very interesting to discuss how the brain functions, not that it functions.

A response to the kind of scepticism towards neuroscience (and indeed any empirical science) concerning the potential reductionism may revolve around a general remark concerning theory and analysis construction. As I will discuss later in the chapter, it seems that no theoretical foundation – scientific or cultural – can avoid some form of reductionism, assumption leaps of faith, etc. Rather, as researchers we have to acknowledge the limitations of various approaches in order to understand the potential contribution from the respective fields. Indeed, we have to remain sceptical towards empirical data. But scepticism does not entail blatant rejection. Instead, we should look towards empirical sciences (including neuroscience) and investigate what these findings tell us of how the brain functions and use these if they are applicable to rhetorical theory and analysis.

In addition to the pitfall of oversimplification, there are technical and methodological limitations to each of the methods presented in the above. As briefly presented in the section concerned with the methodology and technology of neuroscience, there is a significant difference in what the methods measure and how these measurements are acquired. Thus, some methods have poor spatial resolution (such as the EEG/ERP), whilst others have less good temporal resolution (such as PET). This means that we cannot get any clear indication from individual experimental data without realizing the shortcomings of the method in question. Indeed, this is in some ways tied together with the aforementioned potential reductionism that neuroscientific research faces, since the methods and technologies used in experiments puts a limiting strain on the experiment given the fact that the individual methods on their own cannot account for all that is neurologically interesting. Note, however, that this is a significantly different type of reductionism than the one described previously, since this is not concerned with the general use and applicability of neuroscience as a discipline. Rather, this potential reductionism (or rather: limitation) is caused by technological
and methodological strains. The most prudent circumvention of this limitation is twofold. Firstly, the experiments should be replicable (indeed, this goes for any empirical data) and secondly, a clearer and stronger picture is gained by investigating the same phenomenon with a multitude of methods. In other words, to gain a stronger neuroscientific indication of activity and connectivity it is necessary to make use of the various methods available.

Lastly, it is important to consider how the explanatory conclusions are drawn from the collected neuroscientific data. In order to posit indications drawn from neuroscientific evidence, such as the methods presented previously, it is essential to consider what the neural activity means in terms of human cognitive activity. Thus, it is generally assumed that neural activity picked up by measurements indicates that the active area is involved with the particular cognitive task. Thus, if superior temporal sulcus (STS) activates in language tasks, it is assumed that STS is involved in the process of perceiving and producing linguistic content (see e.g. Scott et al. 2000, 2009; Avad et al. 2007). However, the limit to which what kind of conclusions can be drawn from the data may be questioned (see e.g. Sidtis 2006). That is, it seems theoretically viable to consider whether activation is a sign that a particular area may be involved in carrying out the task, or if the areas are activated due to the possibility that they are struggling when faced with the particular tasks. Methods such as TMS may help to alleviate these kinds of questions by behaviourally investigating the particular tasks.

As another example of possibly questionable conclusions, a researcher might hypothesize that adding a cognitive task simply activates additional areas connected with the task in question. Then, the researcher simply subtracts the previously observed activation with the new activation and recovers the neural areas involved with the cognitive task. This is the approach known as cognitive subtraction. There are however, some basic problems with the approach (see e.g. Friston et al. 1996; Ward 2006, pp. 57-64). For instance, ‘… the addition of an extra component in the task has the potential to change the operations of other components in the task’ (Ward 2006, p. 58). That is, there may be an interaction effect. Therefore, simply adding a cognitive task is not directly translatable to the addition of new active areas in any clear manner. It is mandatory that neuroscientific researchers control for these potentially fallacious conclusions drawn from cognitive subtraction, and when reading experimental reports, rhetorical theorists should consider whether or not the conclusions and indications drawn from the
neuroscientific data are warranted and probable. Otherwise, we run the risk of the empirical fallacy as described in the following section.

These are three notable objections to the possible limitations of experimental data derived from laboratory settings. However, we may still gain interesting insights into the workings of the human mind by investigating experimental data as a *supplement* to traditional social analysis such as the analyses developed in the rhetorical tradition. That is, with a proper understanding of the neuroscientific methodological and technical limitations, we may appreciate the findings for what they are without overextrapolation and with consideration of the importance of cultural influences. However, before discussing the potential benefits of investigating neuroscientific evidence from a rhetorical point of view, I will consider reductionism more carefully.

### 4.5 Empirical and assumption reductionism

The most serious claim against the use of neuroscience as a supplement for rhetorical theory and analysis is that it potentially reduces the complexity of social situations in order to fit them into an experimental setting; it further reduces these findings by ad hoc investigation of neural peaks, which may not necessarily lead to valid conclusions. Indeed, reductionism is not only a possible fallacy of neuroscience: it is a possible fallacy of any empirically based science.

*Empirical fallacy.* I label the empirical fallacy that of extrapolating experimental evidence to areas that are not specifically covered and controlled for in the actual experiment. Thus, discovering the code-like bee communication in the form of various dances or collective decision-making (e.g. Gould 1974; Passino et al. 2008) or other animal communication, does not entail code-like, stimuli-response communication in human beings (Dawkins & Krebs 1978; Krebs & Dawkins 1984). That is, we might *speculate* about the larger ramifications of the observed and collected experimental data, but it should *never* be considered more than speculation. The investigation of empirical data, quite simply, does not warrant more (for a discussion on experimental methodology, see e.g. Howitt & Cramer 2005; Rasmussen et al. 2006). The potential pitfalls of overextrapolation of observed data, oversimplification of the experimental setting and the omittance of subtle variables such as cultural values remain a constant *challenge* to researchers within the field of neuroscience. But as long as researchers and readers of scientific data understand these limitations, the distinction between experimentally war-
ranted conclusions/indications and speculation should be clear. Another less obvious fallacy is the assumption fallacy. This is more difficult to observe, but no less reductionist if not treated carefully.

Assumption fallacy. Assumption fallacy is overconfidence in normatively and deductively derived theorems resting on basic assumptions. An example of this type of fallacy is the confidence in pure rationality assumed by philosophers in argumentation theories and economists in classical economy (e.g. Neumann & Morgenstern 1953). Recent studies (e.g. Thaler 1980; Kahneman & Tversky 1984; Stewart et al. 2006; Hahn & Oaksford 2007) have questioned the basic assumption of rationality and, consequently, the very foundation of the theories constructed from these. That is, these thinkers believe some basic assumptions to be true and construct theories accordingly from these relying on the perceived truth of the assumptions. This fallacy operates behind the theories, so to speak. This makes it more difficult to detect, but no less fallacious. The assumption fallacy, then, is the overconfidence and subsequent overextrapolation of the validity of the constructed theories derived from basic assumptions.

In order to circumvent the most ostensible assumption fallacy, researchers should confer with data gathered from empirical evidence and continuously discuss and revise these assumptions. Conversely, to manage the empirical fallacy, it is pivotal to consider the basic assumptions that the experiment relies upon as well as the subtler variables that might not be incorporated into the experiment. In other words, to control for the empirical and assumption fallacies, we need to move between normative and descriptive disciplines to constantly update our basic assumptions, theoretical predictions, analytical tools and experimental settings.

4.6 Potential benefits from cognitive sciences and neuroscience
Keeping the aforementioned methodological, technical and assumption limitations in mind, rhetorical theory might gain potential benefits from the investigation of neuroscientific evidence in four main areas: assumption testability, theoretical predictions, analyses and as inspiration for future research. I will limit these discussions to brief general remarks since I attempt to exemplify the potential benefits in an example concerned with the case of emotional appeals.

Assumption testability. The descriptive approach aims to provide evidence either in support of or against the basic assumptions, whereas the
normative approach uses the assumptions to posit theoretical predictions and construct analytical tools. As a descriptive, empirical science, then, neuroscience may inform us about elements of the basic assumptions—in other words, neuroscience may inform normative researchers about elements concerning the foundation of theory and analytical constructions.

Along these lines, I will posit a potential meta-theoretical distinction between theories and analyses on a macro and a micro level. By macro, I mean the cultural and interpersonal phenomena as well as philosophical considerations concerning the moral acceptability of cultural phenomena. By micro, I mean basic features of human capability such as speed of reaction/understanding, valence of reactions and so forth. On the face level, neuroscience is concerned with micro issues. In other words, the indications drawn from neuroscientific data should not be confused with cultural theories. Rather, often neuroscience is concerned with localization, temporal issues and so forth, i.e. relevant for basic assumptions on a micro level.

**Theoretical predictions.** Whenever basic assumptions are revised, it follows as a natural consequence that theory and theoretical predictions are revised as well due to the internal set-up of normative approaches. For example, as empirical data challenged the assumptions of pure rationality, the theories derived from these assumptions were challenged as well. In other words, amongst other theories the empirical findings have sparked prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1984) and Decision-by-Sampling (Stewart et al. 2006), which have revised the basic assumptions posited in traditional economy and decision-making. Could neuroscience, in the same manner, challenge, develop or enrich assumptions in rhetorical theory?

**Analytical benefits.** In the same way that theories are influenced by the revision of assumptions, so analytical tools should be influenced by assumption revision. As an example, if neuroscientific evidence indicates audience differences in the speed of recognition, it may influence the theoretical predictions of audience reactions to a particular appeal, which, in turn, will influence the potential analysis of a given rhetorical artefact. In general, theory and analysis will be influenced by any and all assumption revisions on a micro-level and, consequently, should be informed by the investigations conducted in neuroscience.

**Inspiration for future research.** The last remark is concerned with inspiration for future research, since neuroscientific evidence might provoke or inspire the readers of the chapters to investigate the issues investigated in
neuroscience – either empirically or theoretically. Thus, the indication of mirror neurons (as discussed in the example of emotional appeals – see Appendix) might inspire and inform assumption discussions and consequent potential revision of theory and analysis.

4.7 Concluding remarks

Neuroscientific evidence is – at least on the face of it – no more reductionistic than other empirical data. Consequently, it should not be looked at with more suspicious eyes than any other empirical evidence. This is not to say that we should conform to any and all neuroscientific evidence. Rather, due to the potential limitations and general empirical reductionism, we should always be extremely careful in our reading of these experiments and their methodology sections. Furthermore, we should know how the researchers extrapolate their data and whether or not the conclusions are warranted by the experiments. However, this requires that the rhetorical theorist is highly trained in methodological, technical and analytical issues concerning neuroscience. Otherwise, it becomes impossible for the rhetorical theorist to evaluate the potential contribution and pitfalls of a given study.

The various techniques posit different investigative benefits and limitations. Thus, some methods are well equipped to explore the spatial resolution of a particular task, whereas other methods are better at exploring temporal relationships. It is vital that rhetorical theorists understand and appreciate these methodological benefits and limitations in order to gain any form of insight into neuroscientific studies. Furthermore, the conclusions drawn from the data may be questioned and investigated in the same way that any empirical data should be revisited. This is reflected in the constant back and forth between normative and descriptive approaches: neither of the approaches can theoretically stand by themselves. They should always confer with the other and revisit the concepts and experiments used. Otherwise, researchers run the risk of committing either the empirical or the assumption fallacy.

When neuroscience is appreciated as an empirical discipline in the same way as other empirical sciences, we may then turn towards the potential benefits from neuroscience. The major potential contribution is concerned with the investigation of the basic assumptions that are used to posit theoretical and analytical predictions in normative approaches. That is, neuroscience may shed some light on the assumptions that revises our expectations and consequently revises both theory and analysis. The very
brief investigation of neuroscientific evidence concerning emotional appeals indicates this potential benefit. In this investigation, we see that neuroscience posits theories of behaviour stemming from mirror-like systems. That is, when a person hears another person laugh, she will instinctively invoke some of the same pre-motor cortex that she would use to smile. Or, in other words, a smile is contagious. This is well known intuitively, but neuroscientific evidence supports this intuition and further supplements this by positing speed of recognition, valence and other interesting aspects of emotional appeals. Thus, a more complex image of emotional appeals appears that may be taken as a supplement to more traditional, cultural approaches since these micro-level mechanisms inform macro-level questions and vice versa.

In sum, by supplementing the traditional rhetorical approach with neuroscientific evidence, we gain at least three benefits. First and foremost, it (and other empirical sciences) provides ample opportunity to test the basic assumptions we posit in order to create our theories of the means of persuasion. Given the fact that these assumptions are the foundation for the creation of rhetorical theory and analysis, we secondly get the possibility of revisiting our theoretical predictions and analyses by modification of the basic assumptions. By adopting this theoretical position of going back and forth between normative and descriptive theories and analyses, we reduce the risk of the empirical and assumption fallacies since the experimental work is kept in check by normative predictions and the basic assumptions are constantly challenged and revised by findings in descriptive explorations. Lastly, neuroscience may spark interesting inspiration in researchers from the classical rhetorical tradition. In conclusion, then, the field of rhetoric may well benefit from neuroscience as long as we recognize the methodological and technical limitations of the experiments and understand the potential conclusions drawn from the data. Crucially, without this understanding of neuroscientific method and technology we are unable to pass judgement on the discipline.

4.8 Appendix: A brief example of emotional appeals and mirror-neuron systems
Alongside the general argument that I have outlined in this chapter, a theoretical claim is best served by example. In keeping with this, I want to exemplify the potential benefits for rhetorical theory and analysis by investigating neuroscientific evidence concerning emotional appeals. Indeed, emotional appeals are central to rhetorical theory and, as it is well known, have been so
since Aristotle’s treatise on the subject. The discussion may thus be seen as pads pro toto for the general claim that rhetorical theorists might benefit from neuroscientific evidence. Due to lack of space, I will merely focus on some of the main findings without discussing the evidence in-depth. The possibility of investigating a cognitive basis for emotional cues in a persuasive setting as a supplement to traditional rhetorical theory and analysis is explored more in-depth in Madsen (forthcoming). In the investigation, I will focus on how a rhetoric of emotions might develop the basic assumptions from this kind of empirical data. As mentioned previously, at the face level the primary benefit from investigating neuroscientific evidence rests on the potential revision of micro-level assumptions. Figure 1 illustrates this by exemplifying issues on macro and micro-level. Alongside illustrating the theoretical distinction between micro and macro-level questions, the double-headed arrow in the middle illustrates the back and forth between the levels. Thus, macro-level questions concerning emotional appeals should confer with micro-level assumptions in the same way that micro-level investigations (such as neuroscientific research) should look to macro-level issues such as culture theory.

Figure 4.1 Examples of micro and macro elements

3 In this investigation I will focus solely on the short inflamed emotional appeal, i.e. pathos rather than pathos and ethos. This is because the inflamed emotional appeal is easier to trace and replicate in experimental settings whereas there has not been conducted neuroscientific experiments on the subtler ethos appeal.

4 Quite naturally, the illustration is rather crude and is to be taken as an example. I in no way intend for the categories mentioned to be understood as exhaustive.
Some of the immediate benefits from neuroscientific and behavioural evidence concerning emotional appeals may be the success rate of recognition and the theory of mirror neuron systems (MNS, see e.g. Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004; Iacoboni & Dapretto 2006) – the latter being the most important contribution in terms of rhetorical theory.

Spoken emotional appeals are complex stimuli relying on, amongst other things, facial interpretations (e.g. Ekman 2003), neural word-processing (e.g. Wise et al. 2000) and pragmatic inferences (e.g. Carston 2002). Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence to support the fact that human beings are very good at picking up emotional cues. Recognition rates have been above chance level for both positive and negative cues across cultures as well as culturally encapsulated (e.g. Banse & Shcerer 1996; Scherer et al. 2001; Sauter & Scott 2007; Sauter et al. forthcoming). That is, speakers may rely on the fact that the audience are very apt at picking up their emotional cues in a persuasive setting. The behavioural evidence supports this.

Neuroscientifically, emotional cues are shown to activate several areas of the brain such as the amygdala (Scott et al. 1997), left middle temporal gyrus, right anterior insula (Morris et al. 1999), pre-motor cortex (Scott et al. 2009) and bilateral superior temporal sulcus (Scott et al. forthcoming). This is in line with the claim that emotional appeals are complex stimuli. I will focus on the pre-motor cortex activation since this area is of interest when concerned with mirror-like systems – MNS (in general, see Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004; Iacobini & Dapretto 2006). In general, MNS in monkeys are defined as being “…discharged both when the monkey does a particular action and when it observes another individual (human or monkey) doing a similar action [i.e. the monkey does not do the action when observing]” (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). That is, the same neuroanatomical structures are activated when performing and as when observing a particular type of action. This is argued to form a basis for emulating action.\(^1\) An fMRI and EMG study by Warren et al. (2006) indicates that ‘passive perception of nonverbal emotional vocalizations automatically modulates neural activity in a network of premotor cortical regions involved in the control of facial movement’. Thus, if we encounter laughter, we are prone to smile. Wicker

\(^1\) In the neuroscientific literature it is still debated how translatable this data is to humans. Nonetheless, the studies conducted on humans strongly indicate a mirror-neuron type of system.
et al. (2003), Arnott et al. (2009) and Scott et al. (2009) report similar kinds of mirror response with disgust, yawning and laughter.

Thus, neuroscientific evidence points towards a theory of physical emulation to some degree. This experience by emulation may then be hypothesized as a basic assumption for the persuasive potential of emotional cues. That is, the mirror-like activation in human beings may then be extrapolated to a theory of emotional appeals that include empathy by emulation and experience by emulation. Furthermore, if we may detect these mechanisms in human beings, it is possible to record response time, connectivity and so on. These response recordings may, in turn, inform rhetorical analysis by indicating how fast and reliable we may assume pathos to be in an audience. Even more interesting, it opens up the possibility of investigating effects stemming from pathos appeals neuroscientifically. This line of research, however, requires a more complex understanding of the neural responses to emotional appeals and, as such, may be an interesting area of interdisciplinary research between the field of rhetoric and neuroscience. Rhetorical theory as a normative approach may inform neuroscientific experiments by positing predictions for emotional stimuli, whereas these predictions may then be tested empirically to see whether or not the basic assumptions are realistic. In sum, it seems that rhetorical theory may benefit the basic assumptions, theoretically and analytically from investigating neuroscientific evidence concerning emotional appeals both in terms of studies already available and in terms of interesting potential research. To what extent this may be developed will be determined by future research.

References


PART II

Rhetorical Analysis
5 Time for a Euro Currency Syringe Injection? Bank Crisis Financial Credit Metaphors in The Economist

ERIC CAERS

5.1 Objectives of the study
This study highlights the location of specific metaphors on the macroeconomic terrain. It starts from the assumption that in order to make ‘sense’ of the outside world, categorization should take place. For Eubanks (2000), there is a close relationship between metaphors and frame restructuring – that is, the perspective that is taken on a social issue is determined by the way it is metaphorically represented.

This study investigates how The Economist metaphorically frames certain specific target domains (bail-outs, deficit spending), as typified by its multiple responses to the financial crisis of 2008-2010. This study, therefore, pursues a qualitative analysis of metaphor use in The Economist during the aforementioned period, with a view to measuring to what extent the choice of metaphors used by the editors reflects their arguments/ideology against the backdrop of a worldwide liquidity shortfall followed by a dramatic recovery plan. A qualitative analysis is needed to interpret the pragmatic role of metaphors – for example, as to whether they communicate a positive or a negative evaluation of a specific government policy. As Charteris-Black pointed out, ‘qualitative approaches answer questions such as: what are the different meanings that are attached to particular words or phrases? Are senses literal or metaphoric? What type of evaluations do they convey?’ (2004, p. 32). Since metaphors are context dependent, the case for qualitative analysis is further enhanced. To meet this end, this study draws on Lakoff and Johnson’s Critical Metaphor Theory (1980). In order to illustrate this theory, it was necessary to systematically analyze the instances of conceptual metaphors in the ‘leaders’ (i.e. the editorials) and financial columns of all the weekly issues of The Economist over a three-year period, i.e. from September
2008 (the draft of the US Emergency Economic Stabilization Act) until December 2010 (the European sovereign debt crisis).

5.2 Historical background of the sample of discourse under analysis
In the years leading up to the 2007-2010 financial crisis, significant amounts of foreign money had flowed into the US from fast-growing economies in Asia and oil-producing countries. This inflow of funds, combined with low US interest rates from 2002 to 2004, contributed to easy credit conditions, which fuelled both housing and credit bubbles. From 2000 to 2003 the Federal Reserve had kept the federal funds rate low in order to soften the effects of the collapse of the dot-com bubble and of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, and to combat the perceived risk of deflation. The Federal Reserve then raised the federal funds rate significantly between 2004 and 2006, making adjustable-rate mortgage resets more expensive for homeowners. This contributed to the deflating of the housing bubble, as asset prices generally move inversely to interest rates and it became riskier to speculate in housing. The US subprime mortgage crisis was one of the first indicators of the 2007-2010 financial crisis, characterized by a rise in subprime mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures. As a result, properties became worth less than the mortgages secured on them, resulting in the decline of securities backing these mortgages. The five largest US investment banks, with combined liabilities or debts of $4 trillion, either went bankrupt (Lehman Brothers), were taken over by other companies (Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch), or were bailed-out by the US government (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) in late 2008. Government-sponsored mortgage finance agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, with a similarly weak capital base, were placed into receivership in September 2008. As many financial institutions worldwide held similar toxic assets linked to falling house prices, the US financial crisis quickly became a global crisis, triggering a debt crisis (Greece, Ireland) and putting the Eurozone to the test.

5.3 Metaphor in socio-economic discourse
On the one hand, scholars have studied metaphor mostly from a linguistic or literary point of view and, on the other hand, they have most often studied world politics embedded in so-called hard ‘facts’. By contrast, *Metaphorical World Politics* (Beer & De Landtsheer 2004) illustrates that metaphors and world politics have appeared together many times in recent history. The blended space that results is metaphorical world politics. In this regard, *Met-
aphorical World Politics shows that facts are misleading in their compactness, the facts are often meaningless, that metaphors, by contrast, are energetic processors of meaning, and that facts in world politics are nothing more than weak emulsions of metaphor: metaphor as *energeia*. In Lakoff and Johnson’s Critical Metaphor Theory (1980), the analogical relationship of source and target concepts involves not only the transfer of semantic structures but also of emotive and evaluative aspects as integral parts of seemingly self-evident conclusions. Conceptual metaphors equate two concept areas, as in politics is war. The term ‘source domain’ is used for the often relatively concrete concept area from which the metaphor is drawn: here, war. ‘Target domain’ is used for the more abstract concept area to which the metaphor is applied: here, politics. Conceptual metaphor theory sees the connections between concept areas in terms of ‘correspondences’ or ‘mappings’. In this respect, Eubanks in *A War of Words in the Discourse of Trade* (2000) focuses on the conceptual metaphor trade is war – a metaphor found wherever people discuss business and commerce – to develop his rhetorical model of metaphor, e.g. trade war, conquering markets and defeating the competition (Eubanks 2000, p. 31). He argues that metaphor is not just influenced by but actually is constituted by its concrete operation. CMT deals mostly with conventional figurative expressions (so-called dead or frozen metaphors) and shows that these are actually instantiations of conceptual metaphors that are psychologically very much alive, although we are not usually aware of them. The language of the press is crammed with metaphors and figurative language to categorize events, people and relations. The use of metaphor may reflect the ideology of the language user and the rhetorical effect on the reader that is pursued (Eubanks 2000; Rohrer 1995; Zdravko 1995). The metaphors appearing in editorials and ‘financial notebooks’ are rarely value-free. Health, fitness and race metaphors are frequently used in the discourse of those in favour of a free market. Comparative analysis has shown that these metaphors occur more often in articles from *The Economist* and *The Financial Times* than in the more left-of-centre *The Guardian* (Boers 1997, 1999). In Boers’s study, target domains were mostly limited to abstract entities, such as the economy in general. However, Boers refrained from investigating the underlying system of evaluation related to any specific domains, i.e. the exploration of the inner subjectivity of journalists and their perception of specific target domains within the socio-economic world (e.g. bail-outs, deficit spending, quantitative easing). Since this study focuses on the bias (either
positive or negative) of journalists regarding the socio-economic issues under
discussion, Musolff’s theory of ‘entailment’ (2004, p. 32) provides a useful
tool for qualitative research: An implication of the metaphorical mapping ‘X is war’ can only count as an entailment if X has already been accepted as the
source concept – otherwise it is meaningless. This study therefore proposes
to argue that while conceptual metaphors include a metaphorical mapping,
one does not necessarily have to subscribe to all its entailments. In other
words, there is no guarantee for unproblematic acceptance. In this respect,
we should heed Musolff’s warning that Lakoff and Johnson’s theory seems to
work only as an explanation for those metaphors that become self-fulfilling
prophecies: their source implications are confirmed in the target domain by
actions that ‘suit the words’, and thus give them a practical political coher-
ence (Musolff 2004, p. 32).

5.4 Research questions
It is a commonplace idea that The Economist is widely read by economically
liberal business people and captains of finance, who favour deregulation, pri-
vatization and low interest rates to boost consumption and investment. It
is worthwhile, then, to set the metaphors against these preconceived notions
and consider the outcome. In this regard, Caers (2006, pp. 5-20) showed
that The Economist, which has always endorsed both the Labour party and
the Conservative party in recent British elections, and both Republican and
Democratic candidates in the United States, metaphorically expressed strong

1 Musolff (2004, p. 32) elaborates his view by referring to the salient metaphors used by
former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who is widely recognized as a Eurosceptic
Conservative: ‘Thatcher’s explicit rejection of the [pro-European] leaving train metaphor
[…] provides a clear example of non-acceptance, which is typical for public disputes.
She questions the suggested “entailment” of the train journey metaphor (i.e. that it
is important to get on the train before it is too late) and immediately introduces a new
one (i.e. that it is better not to be on the train if it is going in the wrong direction). She
thus demonstrates that it is perfectly possible to accept a metaphorical mapping (i.e. a
political process is a train journey) without subscribing to all its entailments’.

2 In his authoritative study of fascism, Paxton (2004, p. 21) is right in claiming that
‘Americans consider liberals the far Left while Europeans call liberals advocates of a hands-
off laissez-faire free market such as Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan and George W.
Bush’.

[ 1 2 2 ]
reservations about hardline monetarism, i.e. the economic centrepiece of the New Right throughout the 1980s. Hence, this article investigates how *The Economist* metaphorically frames certain specific target domains within the socio-economic world. In addition, its response to particular situations and particular ideas during the 2007-2010 financial crisis is investigated, which leads us to the following research questions: 1) Does the use of metaphor in *The Economist* advocate bail-outs, low interest rates and an expansionary fiscal policy (deficit spending and low taxes) in times of economic recession with a view to stimulating the economy? 2) Does the use of metaphor in *The Economist* metaphorically condone consensual capitalism (the ‘German model’) and creative destruction with a view to increasing competitiveness and economic growth? 3) Which conceptual metaphors are used to reveal these biases and to what extent do they defy any binary opposition, i.e. metaphorical language merely explained in terms of its operation *either* in favour *or* against a government policy?

5.5 Method
In order to attempt to answer these questions, it was necessary to systematically analyze the instances of conceptual metaphors in the ‘leaders’ (i.e., the editorials) and financial columns of all the weekly issues of *The Economist* over a three-year period, i.e. from September 2008 (the draft of the US Emergency Economic Stabilization Act) until December 2010 (the European sovereign debt crisis). Only articles that clearly dealt with (macro)economic subjects were selected by keyword search on the newspaper’s website, amounting to 64 articles yielding a total sample of about 70,000 words. It should be noted that *The Economist’s* editors and financial experts are never explicitly mentioned in the by-line (it is a longstanding tradition that an Economist editor’s only signed article during his tenure is written on the occasion of his departure from his position).

In view of poststructuralist theories about the reflexive problem of infinite metaphorical regress, it may seem futile to indulge in metaphor anal-

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3 Monetarism was developed by Milton Friedman (1912-2006) from the Chicago School, economic advisor to Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, whose contentious monetarist experiment (or purgative) in the early 1980s sought to bring down inflation by means of high interest rates, a necessary cure not less painful than the condition remedied. See also *The Economist* (13.10.79, p. 18).
ysis. In this respect, Beer and De Landtsheer (2004, p. 25) claim that there is ‘no degré zéro, no metaphor-free zone’, and that ‘it is hard to avoid Derrida’s conclusion’. It is simply not possible to return to non-metaphorical proper origin in face of ‘ubiquitous difference, which fundamentally rejects metametaphorics’. From this perspective, metaphors eventually merge with the infinite web of dynamic symbolic interaction. This study recognizes the distinction between clear and unclear instances of metaphorical utterances: while unclear instances (e.g. frozen metaphors or highly conventional items) are not simply dismissed as non-metaphorical, their metaphorical degree is significantly lower than salient ‘novel’ metaphors.

5.6 Results and discussion
In keeping with the Keynesian warning that government should interfere when the economy is on the brink of collapse, *The Economist* argues that a short-term Keynesian stabilizer or fiscal boost in the form of deficit spending is desirable when bank lending can be expected to decrease as aggregate demand drops during recession. Moreover, with respect to the rather un-American notion of nationalization, *The Economist* claims that ‘[n]ationalisation carries risks, but […] may still be the best way to deal with American banking’s undead’ (*The Economist* 26.2.09). An array of health metaphors advocates the need for short-term government intervention but urges for long-lasting structural reforms, as in example (3):

(1) The doctors’ bill. The chairman of the Federal Reserve [Ben Bernanke] and the treasury secretary give Congress a gloomy prognosis for the economy, and propose a drastic remedy (*The Economist* 25.9.08).

(2) Nationalization should not be a goal of policy, but the worsening economy, the scale of likely bank losses and the banks’ lack of capital means that some will survive only with a capital infusion big enough to leave them largely in public hands (*The Economist* 26.2.09).

4 John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) taught that fiscal policy and government economic intervention, particularly through the annual budget, could be used to maintain a high level of economic activity leading on to full employment, economic growth and constantly rising living standards.
Fiscal boost is vital for America’s economy. This package, albeit imperfectly, administers it. [...] Fiscal stimulus, indispensable as it is, cannot create a lasting economic recovery in a country with a broken financial system. [...] Debt-laden balance-sheets must be restructured and troubled banks fixed before real recoveries can take off (The Economist 12.2.09).

The complex make-up of macroeconomic policy can be summed up as follows: in the short-term, it would be risky and counterproductive to tighten fiscal policy too quickly when the economy is weak. The American economy can only be revived by the combination of a loose monetary policy with low interest rates (quantitative easing) and a fiscal boost (deficit spending, low taxes). Due to the hangover from its financial crisis, America’s recovery will be slow. That suggests monetary policy will stay loose for longer, pushing the dollar down. A weaker dollar should also assist global economic rebalancing by helping reorient America’s economy towards exports. These federal measures, however, fuel worries about the ballooning government debt, which President Obama inherited from the discredited Bush administration, and higher inflation. Thus, in the long-term, the perceived risk of inflation and debt financing problems will have to be countered by high interest rates (to attract foreign investors), which stifle consumption and investment, and hence economic growth. Hence, at a metaphorical level, the adjective ‘toxic’ is applied both to the ailing financial markets (examples 4 and 5) and to the huge government deficit (example 6), whose ‘toxic nature’ is macroeconomically contagious:

(4) Tim Geithner’s new effort to treat America’s financial toxins […] troubled assets clogging up banks’ balance-sheets (The Economist 23.3.09).

(5) Using taxpayers’ funds to prop up America’s banking system was a necessary evil. […] The government says banks that fail the stress tests must raise capital within six months (from the state if necessary) and sell toxic assets (The Economist 16.5.09).

(6) A new fiscal boost would bring unemployment down. Yet […] increasing the deficit is politically toxic (The Economist 28.10.10).

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In this respect, the Government’s difficulties are defined as an interlocking set of macroeconomic concerns. Since the current combination of low interest rates, crumbling tax revenues and massive fiscal deficits is unsustainable, the economic ‘pain’ or ‘ills’ relate to the housing market as well as the impending retrenchment (long-term fiscal austerity). These well-established health metaphors are intertwined with mobility metaphors, illustrating Musolff’s theory of entailment (2004: 32): while it is perfectly possible for a journalist to accept (and produce) a metaphorical mapping (i.e. a political process is motion along a path towards a goal) one may not subscribe to all its entailments if the goal is an undesirable one:

(7) Don’t cut the deficit now – but explain how, eventually, you will. [P]rocrastination no longer seems painless. A giant hole has opened in the budget because of stimulus, bail-outs and a recession that has savaged economic growth and tax revenue. […] Yet ignoring the future is also costly (The Economist 19.11.09).

(8) The end of a tax credit has caused the housing market new pain (The Economist 16.9.10).

(9) A sticky gas-pedal. America contemplates yet more fiscal stimulus and leaves pain for later (The Economist 27.5.10).

(10) America’s economy looks set for a good year. But investors should beware the treacherous path beyond 2011 (The Economist 29.12.10).

Long-term overspending is metaphorically compared with addictive behaviour:

(11) America is injecting itself with another dose of stimulus steroids just when Europe is checking into rehab and enduring cold turkey (The Economist 9.12.10).

Moreover, The Economist dreads the spectre of big government disrupting the ‘natural order’, i.e. the free market it has always advocated. In ‘Leviathan stirs again. Big government. Stop!’ it discusses the rise of the ultra-conservative Tea Party Movement (Taxation Enough Already!), claiming that ‘the size and
power of the state is growing, and discontent is on the rise’ (The Economist 21.01.10). Leviathan is the mythical sea monster that stands for the public sector gobbling up taxpayer’s money and crowding out the private sector. It warns that ‘this newspaper strongly prefers small government and low taxes, but if Americans are to have bigger government and a sustainable budget, tax revenues will have to rise’ (The Economist 19.11.09). It explains that government debt is a serious long-term problem. But growth is a serious short-term problem. Hence, The Economist argues, the two should be addressed simultaneously, by adopting a credible medium-term deficit reduction plan of the sort Britain’s government has announced. Doing that will take courage, for it means coming up with a scheme for cutting entitlements and health care that will not go down well with voters (The Economist 28.10.10). In addition, The Economist claims that America taxes consumption too little and income too much. Redressing this imbalance could help economic growth by broadening the income-tax base (eliminating tax exemptions) and broadening consumption tax, such as a value-added tax. Moreover, it sees the financial crisis as an opportunity to improve the supply-side of the economy, i.e. increase flexibility in the labour market: ‘For decades, America’s public-sector workers have been coddled and spoiled. The recession may change that’ (The Economist 10.12.09). Touching upon the logic of Social Darwinism (as opposed to the much dreaded spectre of Leviathan), as in example (12), low wage rises and fiscal austerity will increase competitiveness, as evidenced by Germany’s exemplary economic record: ‘Germans feel aggrieved. While others were living on easy credit and blowing bubbles, they practised virtue’. (The Economist 25.9.08). The commendable (German) model of ‘consensual capitalism’ is metaphorically contrasted to Greece’s bad reputation of deficit spending and dire industrial relations through the conceptual metaphor ECONOMY IS HEALTH:

(12) Creative destruction. The struggle is ugly, but the survivors will be stronger (The Economist 28.3.09).

(13) Greece [must] change its social contract [consensual capitalism] in ways that will render its economy sustainable. If it cannot, the Greek bushfire will spread. Above all, EU officials fear contagion spreading to Spain, a much bigger economy. […] A convergence of social contracts – getting Greeks to behave more like Germans – may be the euro’s best hope (The Economist 6.5.10).
Advocating macroeconomic coordination, *The Economist* (23.9.10) admits that adjustment by cutting wages is quite brutal, especially without the support of an expansionary fiscal policy. An alternative would be for competitive, trade surplus countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, to spend more: the combined deficits of the euro zone’s periphery (Greece, Spain, Ireland) would thus be more or less offset by surpluses at the zone’s chore.

Should a country default or abandon the Euro for a new currency, it would destabilize banks in other Euro-zone countries. A protectionist move is described as ‘bad politics, bad diplomacy and economic vandalism’ (*The Economist* 17.9.09). At a metaphorical level, protectionism and disconcerted action within the Euro-zone are cast in terms of a contagion threatening the fabric of the single market and the EU itself (health as in example 15), paralysis (mobility as in examples 16 and 17), mutiny and anarchy (conflict as in 18), with speculators or risk-taking investors being likened to ‘barbarians’ anticipating future price movements in the hope of making quick, large gains:

15 If a weaker country left, risking not just European banks but also the currency, it would become a pariah exporting its pain to neighbours. […] countries unable to repay their debts means that some pain will have to be inflicted on bondholders (*The Economist* 2.12.10).

16 The EU and the euro have been Germany’s post-war anchors. […] Europe’s leaders must move further and faster (*The Economist* 2.12.10).

17 Three-way split. America, the euro and the emerging world are heading in different directions (*The Economist* 9.12.10).

18 [A] Gang [of European leaders] that can’t shoot straight. The biggest gun they could muster: a trillion-dollar loan fund. Many hoped the weapon would prove such a deterrent that, like the ‘bazooka’ of Hank Paulson, America’s treasury secretary under George Bush, it would never have to be used. Yet, just as with Mr Paulson’s guarantee, the euro zone’s weapon…
barely deterred the barbarians. Now Ireland is under assault and the euro zone has loaded the first bullet into the chamber. [...] The German chancellor, Angela Merkel, is at the forefront, but she is also the subject of much mutinous talk since leading her colleagues into the badlands at last month’s EU summit. [...] Ranged against the shotgun of America’s quantitative easing, and the shield of China’s capital controls, Europe does at least have leaders who are well drilled in shooting themselves in the foot (The Economist 18.11.10).

5.7 Conclusion
Comparative analysis by Boers (1997 and 1999) has shown that health, fitness and race metaphors are frequently used in the discourse of those in favour of a free market and minimal government, such as The Economist. In Boers’s study, target domains were mostly limited to abstract entities, such as the economy in general. This study has shown that short-term government intervention in the economy may be positively valued by The Economist through the conceptual metaphor economy is health, which positively frames a short-term Keynesian stabiliser or fiscal boost in the form of deficit spending (e.g. the doctor’s bill, survival by a capital infusion), but that the same conceptual metaphor can also be used to make a statement to the contrary: as long as economies are ‘healthy’, intervention is unnecessary. Long-term state interference (deficit spending) causes distortions (inflation and devaluation) and may be damaging in the long-run (e.g. more fiscal stimulus leaving pain for later, contagion spreading from the EU periphery). Moreover, The Economist regards the financial crisis as an opportunity to improve the supply-side of the economy, i.e. to increase flexibility in the labour market. Touching upon the logic of Social Darwinism (as opposed to the much dreaded spectre of Leviathan, which represents ‘big government’), low wage rises and fiscal austerity will increase competitiveness, as evidenced by Germany’s exemplary economic record (e.g. Germany taking bitter medicine, creative destruction, the survivors will be stronger). These well-established health metaphors are intertwined with conflict and mobility metaphors (e.g. The EU and the euro as Germany’s post-war anchors, Europe’s leaders moving further and faster towards the desired goal) supporting concerted action at supranational level. In view of the wide-ranging evaluations made at metaphorical level, explaining these conceptual metaphors exclusively in terms of binary oppositions or strict dichotomies (i.e. metaphorical language merely explained in terms of
its operation either in favour or against a government policy) disregards their context-dependency, and should therefore be discounted.

There is, of course, a need for a more extensive use of larger corpora to explore further the questions raised in this study. As this chapter is going to print, the global (debt) crisis is deepening and the lack of concerted action could consign Europe to decline. The recently elected French President Hollande has publicly avowed that (German) fiscal austerity is no longer the only option as retrenchment dangerously dampens growth, witness Spain’s youth unemployment exceeding 50% (!). It would be interesting to investigate The Economist’s metaphorical response to the current trend in ‘loosening the buckle’, which some critics have already denounced as dangerous backtracking. Metaphors, it seems, can go a long way…

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TIME FOR A EURO CURRENCY SYRINGE INJECTION?

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6 Let’s Philosophize: The Rhetoric of Popular Philosophy in Alain de Botton’s *Status Anxiety*

JEROEN LAUWERS

6.1 Introduction

In an interview with *Der Spiegel* in 1966, Martin Heidegger asserts that one person alone is not capable of gaining insight into the world as a whole, and that, as a result, a philosopher cannot claim to give any firm advice to other people as to how they should organize their lives. It may be abundantly clear, however, that this approach of philosophy is not supported by everyone, as we are nowadays overloaded with popular philosophical essays and manuals promising insight and a happy life to whomever reads it. This type of philosophizing is much more tangible than Heidegger’s austere search for the place of man in a technocratic world, in that it overtly engages in a vivid interaction with contemporary society, using all modern media to convey its message. Popular philosophy has claimed its place in bookshops, television programmes, political debates and even conference rooms. It has done so, I believe, by exploiting the modern need for instruction to conduct a meaningful life in an era that has increasingly been deprived of firm criteria according to which such a life ought to be lived.

To my mind, Chaïm Perelman’s assertion that rhetoric is omnipresent in every form of human communication, and thus also in philosophical discussions, holds a fortiori true for the kind of popular philosophy that interferes with mass media such as the book market. In a certain way, when-

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1 This interview was promulgated under the title ‘Nur ein Gott kann uns retten’ in *Der Spiegel* of 31 May 1976, ten years after Heidegger’s death, on his explicit request. It has received most attention for Heidegger’s defence against accusations concerning his so-called nazistic sympathies during World War Two, but it can equally well be regarded as Heidegger’s philosophical testament.
ever a writer aims to translate the ideas of great philosophical thinkers to a large audience, his objective can almost directly be seen as an attempt to persuade the common man that his book is actually worth reading – or at least buying. This is not to say that every self-proclaimed philosopher is only obsessed with his own prestige and sales records; he can just as well believe that the message he is putting forward is so important that it should be received by as large an audience as possible. I do not want to dwell upon the hidden psychological impulses that lay behind the eventual actions of these popular philosophers. I will leave that to psychoanalytical approaches, and opt for a rhetorical point of view instead.

The basic question that I ask myself while addressing these matters is whether it is possible to extract some rhetorical schemes adopted by these writers of popular philosophical essays that might explain how they intuitively conceive their own position vis-à-vis their audience. The best way to study these schemes is, I think, to start from an author who is regarded as a successful popular philosopher by a broad audience. For in such a case, we can actually claim that the rhetorical techniques deployed in this writer’s essays are apparently effective enough to persuade the audience of his philosophical authority.

Therefore, I choose to analyze a work written by one of the most famous popular philosophers of the modern era, Alain de Botton. De Botton was born in Switzerland in 1969. His works are often called a ‘philosophy of everyday life’, although this fairly positive attribute is definitely not shared by everyone. Apart from public lectures and TV work, his main

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2 Cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958. There has always been a difficult relationship between rhetoric and philosophy, because each appears to lay claim to the same field of intellectual activity and education (see Ijsseling 1976). In philosophical discussions, rhetoric often has a negative connotation of cunning sophistry. Fortunately, the work of modern researchers such as Chaim Perelman, Kenneth Burke and Lloyd Bitzer has shown that rhetoric has an important place in human communication, which resulted in the study of philosophical discourse from a rhetorical angle (e.g. Mason 1989).

3 The most negative comment that I could find was that ‘... [Alain de Botton]’s an absolute pair-of-aching-balls of a man – a slapheaded, ruby-lipped pop philosopher who’s forged a lucrative career stating the bleeding obvious in a series of poncey, lighter-than-air books aimed at smug Sunday supplement pseuds looking for something clever-looking to read on the plane’ (Charlie Brooker, The Guardian, 1 January 2005).

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occupation consists of book writing. De Botton has written a number of large essays concerning important aspects of modern life, such as work, architecture, travelling, literature, status, love and the consolation of philosophy. Moreover, in 2008, he founded the ‘School of Life’ in London, an initiative that enables people to reflect on aspects of their social life in a non-academic setting.

The book I wish to focus on in this chapter is Status Anxiety, probably de Botton’s most socio-critical book. De Botton’s main goal is to demystify the processes through which people are wealthy and successful or exert authority on others. By showing the arbitrariness of the criteria by which we evaluate ourselves and other people in our contemporary society, the work eventually hopes to free the individual from the paralyzing idea that there are no other ways to gain social respect than to strive for a higher income and cultivate an aristocratic (or snobbish) life.

Interestingly, de Botton’s attempt to denaturalize the values of modern society entails a serious risk, as his reader might realize that de Botton’s authority is equally well attributed by society on the basis of rules of prestige and economy. The hypothesis of this chapter is, therefore, that it is de Botton’s subtle rhetoric that enables him to play his role as a critic of social life, despite his own precarious position as a successful popular philosopher.

6.2 Rhetorical schemes in Status Anxiety
A first quick look at the table of contents teaches us that Status Anxiety consists of two major parts, viz. ‘Causes’ and ‘Solutions’ (de Botton 2004, p. 1). In a sense, this cause-solution dichotomy is what the entire book is about. The immediate impression of the work is thus a very self-conscious and confident one: whereas some philosophers feel inclined to emphasize their uncertainty concerning their conclusions and downplay their own authoritative voice (either genuinely or as a rhetorical trick), a first encounter with this book reassures the reader that there are solutions to his problems, and, even more importantly, that he will get these solutions in this very essay. This is most probably what people who buy popular philosophical books would expect from the author, viz. that he looks at society as if from the outside, perceiving the wider picture that might be blurred by the reigning social discourses of the time, and coming up with some alternative viewpoints.4 De Botton’s methodology, which consists of a precise analysis of the problem and some proper suggestions as to how the reader might henceforth get rid
of his anxiety, anticipates the social role that is demanded from his ‘philosophy of social life’ by his public of readers.

Moreover, the fact that de Botton will suggest some solutions himself has the important consequence that he wants to go further than just raising questions and leaving the answer up to his audience. De Botton’s position as an ‘outsider’ intellectual gives him the authority to instruct his audience as to how they should behave and what they should think about status anxiety. The book is not, as in a dialectical discussion or as in most academic environments, a communication between peers deliberating about ‘the truth’, but rather a communication between a teaching author and a reader who is being taught. This somewhat presupposes an authoritative tone that manifests itself in the author’s freedom to choose which cases to forward, which examples to give and which general arguments to defend.

De Botton’s intrinsic authoritative position vis-à-vis his public of readers is however compensated for and thus quite efficiently ‘disguised’, so to speak, by a rhetoric of inclusion. By speaking of the reading public and of himself in the first person plural, he creates the impression that he is an insider in the world of his audience, who knows well what they suffer from. In a tone that suggests an intimate bond of kinship, de Botton thus cultivates the impression that he writes from the readers’ standpoint, with which he himself has grown familiar through personal experience. Look, for instance, at the use of personal pronouns in the following excerpt:

> How are we affected by an absence of love? Why should being ignored drive us to a ‘rage and impotent despair’ beside which torture itself would be a relief? The attentions of others might be said to matter to us principally because we are afflicted by a congenital uncertainty as to our own value – as a result of which what others think of us comes to play a determining role in how we are able to view ourselves.

4 A famous case of an intellectual addressing a popular audience is the collection of *Mythologies* by Roland Barthes, a series of articles in which popular beliefs, images, discourses were demystified in order to raise the public’s awareness of the strong workings of ideology. Quite significantly, in the theoretical foundation of the function of mythology and the mythologue, Barthes complains about the precarious position of the intellectual, who almost automatically adopts the position of an outsider because of his aim to formulate criticisms on the society in which his readers partake (see Barthes 1957, esp. p. 267).
Our sense of identity is held captive by the judgements of those we live among. If they are amused by our jokes, we grow confident of our power to amuse. If they praise us, we develop an impression of high merit. And if they avoid our gaze as we enter a room or look impatient after we have revealed our occupation, we may fall into feelings of self-doubt and worthlessness (De Botton, *Status Anxiety*, p. 15).

The author and the readers are here ‘subjectified’ against the objectified others, who are perceived as a negative disturbance. We see the same mechanism when de Botton speaks about the pernicious influence of snobs on people’s well-being. At the same time, de Botton warns ‘us’ against turning into snobs ‘ourselves’:

Yet it is hard to renounce snobbish tactics on our own, for the disease is a collective one to begin with. A youthful resentment of snobbery isn’t enough to save us from gradually turning into snobs ourselves, because being insolently neglected almost naturally fosters a hunger to gain the attention of our neglecters (disliking people rarely being a sufficient reason for not wanting them to like us⁵) (De Botton 2004, p. 27).

To my mind, this rhetorical technique has a number of effects on the reader, which amplify the persuasiveness of de Botton’s general arguments. Obviously, by rhetorically displaying that he understands what his readers go through on the basis of his own experience, he is likely to be able to achieve a bond of trust with his public.⁶ As a result, the public might get the feeling of being in safe hands with regards to what they should do about their problems. De Botton’s inclusive rhetoric mitigates the author’s authoritative voice, in that it emphasizes de Botton’s own representativeness as a member of the group he is addressing and gives his arguments a self-evident flair. It also defends de Botton against the possible critique that he is in fact a successful author and that he therefore has no insight into the status anxiety of the common man. It seems fair to state, then, that much of the rhetoric in *Status Anxiety*

⁵ The italics are de Botton’s, but I would have placed them in just the same place to stress my point.

⁶ Trust is, to my mind, achieved through the speaker’s *ethos* as constructed during the ‘performance’ of the text (either in person or on paper). For an exploration of the meaning of trust for the analysis of classical rhetorical situations, see Yunis 2009.
serves as a communicational model in which the authoritative opinions are quite self-evidently put forward by the author, and are equally self-evidently received by the readers because they are confident that the author knows their problems and knows how to solve them.

Moreover, de Botton appears to distinguish himself from the people causing status anxiety, but by speaking inclusively of ‘we’ instead of ‘I’, he evokes the same feeling of distinction in his reader. Throughout the book, the reader can enjoy the description of the social processes which he recognizes around them, but without being blamed for them himself. Through this representation, de Botton and his readers are victimized, in that they are seen as the victims of the dynamics of social life rather than as the causers of these same dynamics. In this respect, de Botton’s discourse radically differs from the cynico-stoic tradition of the so-called diatribe, which is often said to stand at the cradle of the tradition of philosophical (and religious) preaching. In the cynico-stoic tradition, the addressee is often verbally assaulted for his vicious lifestyle, so that he will hopefully grow conscious of his ethical missteps and turn to philosophy or religion as a cure for the misery in his life. No signs of such a discourse, however, in Status Anxiety. De Botton presents himself as a mild and understanding guide through life, who is not so much aiming to radically turn people’s lives around as to teach his readers how to make their life, as they conduct it, a little bit more agreeable.

7 The history of the diatribe and its reception is a blurry and complicated one. It is traced back to the Greek philosopher Bion of Borysthenes (4th-3rd century BC), and is said to have exerted influence on philosophical preaching by the Stoics and the Cynics, on the Roman satire and on early Christian preaching. However, it is quite certain that the diatribe has never been conceived as a genre by the ancients themselves. Therefore, studies like that of Oltramare 1926 might provide a fairly good overview of texts that are conventionally grouped under this label. However, one ought to realize that the so-called tradition of the diatribe is a modern construct that has undergone the mediation of modern forms of philosophical and religious preaching (for a good and fairly recent discussion of Greek texts traditionally labelled as diatribes, see Schenkeveld 1997). In this chapter, the diatribe tradition, with its provocative tone, is merely introduced as an antipode of de Botton’s discourse in order to expose the wide variety of rhetorical techniques adopted in philosophical texts, each with a different (desired) effect on the reader.
Since it is quite apparent that de Botton stages a number of philosophers and other thinkers who add philosophical credibility and authority to his discourse, we can ask ourselves what the position of these authorities is in this book. It might be surprising that de Botton does not include himself among the philosophers he is discussing. His rhetoric of inclusion appears stronger than the urge to explicitly claim the title of philosopher for himself:

According to the rules of reason, a given conclusion is to be deemed true if, and only if, it flows from a logical sequence of thoughts founded on sound initial premises. Considering mathematics to be the model of good thinking, philosophers began to search for an approximation of its objective certainties in ethical life too. Thanks to reason, our status could — philosophers proposed — be settled according to an intellectual conscience, rather than being abandoned to the whims and emotions of the market square. And if rational examination revealed that we had been unfairly treated by the community, philosophers recommended that we be no more perturbed by the judgement than we would be if we had been approached by a deluded person bent on proving that two and two amounted to five (De Botton 2004, p. 121).

De Botton does not present himself as an original philosopher, but rather as someone who translates the opinions of other thinkers to his audience. More often than not, he simply quotes fairly extensive paragraphs from other works without any comment of his own (of course, the process of selection already being an important intervention by de Botton himself). The author’s position is thus that of the middle man, who knows about the philosophical tradition and other aspects of social life but nevertheless remains an accessible speaker, a member of the community he is addressing. By doing so, de Botton uses the institutional authority of philosophy (in which his own philosophical authority is only established through rhetorical innuendo) without putting at risk the bond of kinship with his reader. The rhetorical way in which de Botton stages many other philosophers to support his central thesis has an important advantage: he can suggest instructions to his readers and yet avoid appearing as a pedantic and self-opinionated wisenheimer. However, all this does not imply that the book is an entire cento of scattered opinions by others. From the amalgam of philosophical authorities as selected and discussed by de Botton, there appears to be one coherent message running through the work, in that all philosophical and other au-
authorities are selected and discussed with the particular goal of reassuring the reader that there is more to life than just the quest for fame and status. At the same time, however, the frequent introduction of authoritative or illustrative opinions distracts the reader’s attention from the book’s ingenious rhetorical composition by the author.

Even when de Botton speaks in his own right, it is often hard to define whether he is approvingly following the opinions of others, or whether he is defending his own beliefs. This writing procedure closely resembles the literary use of free indirect speech.\(^8\) In fact, it would take a long passage to illustrate this procedure, but we can already begin to detect this discursive strategy in the lines almost immediately subsequent to the passage cited above, and especially in the contrast between the first two sentences, which seem to be de Botton’s own interpretation (but is it?), and the following sentences, in which the philosophers’ authority is explicitly mentioned again (but, even here, are we reading the philosophers’ opinion – whatever that may be –, or what de Botton makes of it?):

\[
\text{We should not deduce from this that the condemnation of censure of others is invariably undeserved. Leaving our assessment of our worth to an intellectual conscience is not to be confused with an expectation of unconditional love. Unlike parents or lovers, who may value us whatever we do and however great our faults, philosophers continue to apply criteria to their love, only not the shaky, unreasonable criteria that the wider world is in danger of resorting to. There may indeed be times when an intellectual conscience will demand that we be harsher on ourselves than others have been. Instead of rejecting a hierarchy of success and failure altogether, philosophy merely reconfigures the judging process, it lends legitimacy to the idea that the mainstream value system may be unfairly consigning some people to disgrace while perhaps equally unfairly consigning others to respectability – and in the case of an injustice, it helps us to hold on to the thoughts that we may be lovable even outside the halo of the praise of others (De Botton 2004, p. 122).}
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\(^8\) Traditionally, the invention of free indirect speech is being associated with the nineteenth-century novel and especially Gustave Flaubert (see, e.g., Roy 1977). See also the very illuminative study on the subject by Fludernik 1993. To my knowledge, the use of free indirect speech in modern academic research or popular studies is an understudied domain.
The previous examples already illustrate that de Botton’s use of philosophy is not very technical. Moreover, philosophy is not presented as a wide amalgam of independent thinkers with dissonant voices, but rather as one unanimous voice that has a clear message to convey. De Botton thus seems to suggest that many of the authorities that he cites implicitly tell the same story of truth. This so-called ‘irenic’ position strengthens his own discourse, since it enables him to stage many authorities in support of his own viewpoints, sometimes even from very diverse fields of thought such as French philosophy and American psychology:

Rousseau’s comparison of the levels of happiness of primitive and modern man returns us to William James’s emphasis on the role of expectations in determining levels of happiness. We may be happy with little when we have come to expect little. And we may be miserable with much when we have been taught to expect everything (De Botton 2004, p. 63).

A similar technique can be found on p. 119, where three citations from very different philosophical works, viz. Schopenhauer’s Parerga and paralipomena (1851), Chamfort’s Maximes (1795) and Epictetus’ Dissertationes (ca. 100 AD), are bluntly put next to one another. Furthermore, the sources of wisdom are not confined to the field of philosophy, as there are, for instance, also references to the motive of ‘vanitas’ in art, to the ‘Graveyard poets’ in literature, and to many historical models and anecdotes. This careful process of selection and juxtaposition suggests that there are some universal truths to pursue over time, and by tracing these ‘truths’ back to original philosophical texts, de Botton gives every impression of being a prime intellectual who can pass all this wisdom on to his public. This is illustrated quite well by the ultimate conclusion of Status Anxiety:

Philosophy, art, politics, Christianity and bohemia did not seek to do away with a status hierarchy; they attempted to institute new kinds of hierarchy based on sets of values unrecognized by, and critical of, those of the majority. While retaining

9 See also, e.g. p. 193: ‘One might, without making scientific claims for the portrait, sketch at least some of the concerns and qualities of the prototypical modern successful person, the inheritor of the high status once claimed by the warrior, the saint, the knight or the aristocratic landed gentleman’ (my italics).
a firm grip on a distinction between success and failure, good and bad, shameful and honourable, these five groups endeavoured to remodel our sense of what could rightfully be said to belong under these weighty headings. In so doing, they helped to lend legitimacy to those who, in every generation, will be unable or unwilling to follow dutifully behind the dominant notions of high status but who may yet deserve to be categorized other than under the brutal epithets of loser or nobody. They have provided us with a set of persuasive and consoling reminders that there is more than one way – and more than one judge or pharmacist’s way – of succeeding at life (De Botton, 2004, p. 303).

Quite significantly, the element of persuasion occurs in the very last sentence of the work. If de Botton believes that all these domains of wisdom can serve as persuasive reminders of the arbitrariness of social hierarchies, then it follows that his effort to bring these domains to the attention can be seen as his own attempt to persuade his readers of the relevance of these theories, and, indirectly, of his own book.

6.3 High brow, low brow, pleasure and usefulness
In the aforementioned analyses, I have primarily made use of the inside/outside metaphor in order to describe how Alain de Botton rhetorically reconciles these two perspectives in his search for trust and authority. In the subsequent discussion, I will readdress de Botton’s rhetorical pose from a different angle, viz. the high/low metaphor. This perspective enables us to situate a book such as Status Anxiety within the wider discussion of so-called ‘high culture’ and ‘low culture’.

Status Anxiety presents a large number of philosophical and other sources which are traditionally perceived as situated in the canon of high culture. Philosophers such as Rousseau, Epictetus, and Schopenhauer, all of whom are cited in this book, enjoy quite a self-evident reverence in philosophical circles and give the book some philosophical credibility. Through consulting de Botton’s thematic gathering of information, a reader can extract information about authoritative figures and doctrines, which he can reproduce as a sort of cultural marker. Status Anxiety thus presents itself as a remedy for people who do not want to go through the harsh (and perhaps even boring) task of reading canonized books by philosophical authorities whose ideas are formulated in a more technical and complicated way than in de Botton’s essay. Moreover, the fact that Alain de Botton has become a
philosophical authority on his own – not per se in the field of philosophy itself, but definitely in the popular media – may cause people to no longer cite the philosophical authorities that de Botton himself cites in his book, but to immediately refer to the ‘middle man’ de Botton as an authority in his own right. This process explains how the opinion of a popular audience concerning the authority of a certain figure may differ significantly from that of a public of experts, as the latter are capable of tracing thoughts back to their original sources, and are inclined to attribute more authority to the first person who articulated a certain idea. The different reception of an author such as Alain de Botton in various strata of society thus illustrates that high culture is generally more concerned with anteriority and originality than low culture.

De Botton’s authority as a philosopher is thus closely connected with his knowledge of high brow philosophy, knowledge which he passes on to his reader. However, this transmission of knowledge is not the only reason to read de Botton’s book. After all, Status Anxiety is stuffed with humour, anecdotes and images, all of which contribute to an enjoyable reading experience. We must not forget, indeed, that not everyone who reads a book like Status Anxiety is anxious about his or her status, or wants to alter his or her view on the world. There is a large amount of pleasure and amusement to derive from the book as well, and this might well be held equally responsible for the book’s abundant sales records.

In the end, one may wonder what precisely constitutes the pleasurable reading experience of a book such as Status Anxiety. In his study of popular literature (or ‘pulp’, as he calls it himself), Scott McCracken discovers two shared characteristics in most popular novels, viz. utopianism and transgression (McCracken 1998, pp. 154-180). Both these aspects, which can be linked to the ‘visceral’ fun of reading these books, can to a certain extent also be found in Status Anxiety. The utopianism consists in the fact that the reader receives a portrait of an intelligible (‘better’) world that he can shape

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10 Bayard 2007, pp. 32-46 discusses the information obtained by hearing others talk about books as a valid method to enlarge one’s own knowledge of literature. More generally, Bayard’s book illustrates that there is a certain difference between the personal experience of reading and the versatile way in which books function within a society as a sort of cultural marker for those who ‘know’ literature (‘knowing’ of course being a problematic term in this debate).
after his own demands. The aspect of transgression is reflected in the fact that de Botton offers a worldview in which intrinsic values are seen as an imaginary alternative to the reigning social discourses, which may have a consoling effect on people who consider themselves less fortunate according to the current structures of power. These two aspects illustrate once again the paradoxical character of de Botton’s message (which he shares with many intellectuals who address a popular audience): in order to get rid of the social structures imposed on him from the world outside, the reader needs to look for values within himself that give meaning to his life; however, the sine qua non for this inward look appears to be the instructions in de Botton’s book. The prime instigator of the reader’s search for meaning through introspection is, in the end, still a social and rhetorical one.

6.4 Conclusions
This circumspect study of Status Anxiety has brought to light some aspects that may (partly) explain Alain de Botton’s success as a popularizer of philosophy. The analysis of the rhetorical schemes in this book has shown the paradox that an author of an intellectual work for a popular audience almost necessarily has to face. On the one hand, he cannot simply follow the superficial public opinion, for if he were to do that, the author could probably no longer claim the title of independent and learned thinker; on the other hand, however, he must also prove that his status as an intellectual does not make him seem less perceptive of the problems of his readers. It is my belief that the success of a popular philosopher is partly dependent on the extent to which he manages to combine this insider and outsider perspective and gain his public’s trust. In this process of authorial self-representation, rhetorical tropes such as the ones discussed in this chapter appear to play a significant role. My analysis has exposed how Alain de Botton reconciles the authoritative position as an instructor of life with an empathetic form of inclusive rhetoric, while abundantly supporting and embellishing his discourse with a selection from philosophical and other traditions. In the end, all these rhetorical techniques contribute to de Botton’s desired ethos of a trustworthy intellectual whose knowledge can provide confident and well deliberated answers to the concrete problems of everyday life.

In addition to this rational rhetorical analysis of de Botton’s work, one may also pay attention to the ingenious way in which it distorts the rigid distinction between high and low culture. By frequently alluding to a
large corpus of illustrations, viewpoints and anecdotes from high as well as low culture, de Botton brings these two poles closer to one another, which may encourage his reader to enjoy the book he is reading without feeling guilty about it (in an era that demands from us that most of the actions we undertake have at least some relevance or usefulness). Status Anxiety thus presents an hospitable environment in which the acquisition of some relevant knowledge about various aspects of life is ‘sweetened’ by a discourse that fruitfully combines the in and the out, the high and the low, the visceral and the rational, and the personal pleasure of reading with wider social expectations. Therefore, despite its own assertion that it offers an alternative view on our contemporary society, this book is still firmly anchored in the world we live in.

References
7 Self-deprecation as a Hazardous Humour Technique in Informative Speeches

SARAH GAGESTEIN, BAS ANDEWEG, JAAP DE JONG AND MARTIJN WACKERS

7.1 Introduction
A young student once asked John F. Kennedy how he became a war hero. ‘It was absolutely involuntary’, was his answer; ‘they sank my boat’. This kind of self-deprecating humour is not only used by presidents, but also by many people in their everyday lives: lawyers use lawyer-related jokes, experts joke about ‘how little they actually know’. At first sight, using yourself as the object of humour seems to be quite functional.

In various textbooks on public speaking, self-deprecating humour is highly appreciated as a way to lighten up the atmosphere and to enhance the speaker’s ethos (Osborn & Osborn 1997; Lakowski 2001). Others claim self-deprecation may create a bond between speaker and audience (Spolders 1997), propose the technique as a ‘harmless’ way to include humour in a speech (Rozakis 1995) or as a way to create common ground (Leanne 2009). However, some authors acknowledge the hazard of damaging ethos when one belittles his competence (Detz 2002) or when one creates a large gap between expectation and reality (Carlson 2005). In general, textbook authors are mostly positive about self-mockery as a humour technique.

The positive feeling about self-deprecating humour is further supported by Bippus (2006). She found that people tend to value this technique highly, in contrast to making fun at the expense of someone else. Some experiments in the 1980s suggest otherwise. Hackman (1988), for instance, reported that self-deprecation may corrode the presumed speaker expertise. Chang and Gruner (1981) found neither a positive, nor a negative effect on speaker credibility. These results do not present a consistent view on the effect of self-deprecating humour. Instead, this ambivalence shows the need
for further research. As Wanzer, Frymier and Irwin (2010) write on the relationship between humour and learning: ‘presumably self-disparaging humor enhances motivation to process; however, additional research is needed to better understand how students process this form of teacher humor’ (p. 11).

Can speakers in informative presentations or instructors in an educational context benefit from the use of self-deprecating humour or not? Advice in textbooks seems to differ from most of the existing experimental research. The main question asked in this chapter is therefore: ‘What is the effect of self-deprecating humour on speaker ethos in an informative speech?’

This chapter opens by linking up three central theories of humour with self-deprecation (section 2). A further literature review then gives way to the research design (section 3) and the results (section 4). The fifth and final section discusses the value of our observations.

7.2 Self-deprecating humour

Self-deprecating humour is a special kind of humour that draws on a person’s or an in-group’s perceived social, behavioural or physical shortcomings with a non-serious intention. This makes clear that if the humour fails, the ironically used shortcoming may be taken literally. It is not always premeditated; it is more often a form of improvisation. Self-deprecating humour is therefore not without risks. What makes self-deprecating humour funny?

7.2.1 Three humour theories and their functions

In humour research, several functions of humour are distinguished (e.g. Martin 2007). These functions are not mutually exclusive; all three focus on another function of humour and therefore all seem useful to explain at least some aspect of the individual experience of humour. By understanding these three explanations, a possible function of self-deprecating humour could be categorized in a broader, general concept of humour.

The first cluster of theories is called incongruity theories. Emmanuel Kant already distinguished this function: ‘Laughter is an affection arising from a sudden transformation of a strained expectation into nothing’ (Kant, in Teslow 1995, p. 8). This means that humour is formed by the psychological need for consistency between internal frames and the external environment (Lynch 2002, p. 428). When something happens that people do not expect, they tend to laugh (and thus experience humour). Berger describes this as follows: ‘The term ‘incongruity’ had many different meanings – in-
consistent, not harmonious, lacking propriety, and not conforming, so there are a number of possibilities hidden in the term’ (Berger 1993, p. 3). On one of these levels, an incongruity has to take place, which is processed by the intellect. The perception of ‘switching’ between the ‘real’ and humorous solution to the incongruity, leads to the experience of humour. Language-related jokes, for example, could be explained with these theories.

With regard to self-deprecating humour, the incongruity could come from the fact that an instructor uses self-mockery where it is not expected by his public. Solving this incongruity by realizing that the instructor is being ironic could lead to a humorous effect.

The next cluster is called superiority theories. Aristotle once called humour ‘an imitation of men worse than the average’ (Aristotle, in Berger 1992, p. 2). This quote perfectly suits the superiority theories; it is about the comparison between the self and the other, wherein the self turns out to be superior. The fact that we perceive this as humour is explained by Hobbes:

> The passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from a sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly (Hobbes, in Berger 1993, p. 2).

That this understanding happens in a ‘sudden’ fashion (sudden glory), makes us process it as humorous. This could explain why we joke about other countries, the opposite gender, and so forth.

These theories explain self-deprecating humour thus: by ironically emphasizing vices of the speaker himself or his in-group, the technique makes the public realize that the speaker (and sometimes the in-group) are, in fact, superior. By stressing the superiority of the speaker, a positive ethos effect is engendered.

The third group is known as the relief theories. This idea was fuelled by Spencer (1860) who stated that laughing is a result of letting go of physical energy that has been built up because of negative feelings (Spencer, in Lynch 2002, p. 427). Freud also interpreted humour in this way:

> Jokes, with their compact ambiguities, elude the simple-minded censors – which react to only innocent surface meanings – enabling a person to vent aggressive or sexual feelings and anxieties in a disguised manner (Freud, in Teslow 1995, p. 8).
By joking or by laughing about jokes, we can get some relief from the anxieties we have to bear. By breaking the rules of language or the maxims of Grice (for example, that of relevance, or sincerity), one can discharge some of the anxiety.

The relief theory explains why the use of (self-deprecating) humour lowers the anxiety that was built up after a mistake made by the speaker or a different awkward situation.

The three clusters of theories make clear why people laugh about a non-expected joke at the expense of the speaker himself, while the speaker maintains or even enlarges his ethos (superiority) while repairing an awkward situation.

7.2.2 Observed effects of self-deprecating humour

When applying the technique of self-deprecation, the speaker displays his or her positive self-image and, in particular, one of the virtues in contemporary societies: the ability to laugh at one’s inabilities or problems (Dynel 2009). Bippus (2007) asked her subjects what they expect from the use of self-disparaging humour in a political speech. A majority of the subjects anticipated that mockery directed towards the other candidate would be more effective than self-mockery. In contrast, the subjects also anticipated that the self-mocking person’s image (his motives) would be judged more positively, comparable to the image of someone mocking someone else. This positive feeling about self-deprecating humour is confirmed in Wanzer, Frymier and Irwin (2010). They found that their subjects positively associate self-deprecation with teacher affective learning, course affective learning, and learning indicators (Wanzer, Frymier & Irwin 2010, p. 11). Neither Bippus, nor Wanzer, Frymier and Irwin tested the assumptions in an experimental design.

Has any experimental research been performed on self-deprecating humour in presentations? The research stems from the last century and has mixed results. In the 1960s, Gruner performed an experiment in which he had students listen to speeches with and without humorous moments (Gruner 1967). Gruner observed differences in seriousness (the speech with humorous moments was less serious) and ‘character’ (the speaker using humour was higher evaluated on ‘character’). Gruner is rather vague on the type of humour used; it is ‘neither extremely ‘clownish’ nor extremely ‘sarcastic”’ (p. 232).
In a 1977 research review, Markiewicz showed that in some experiments, presentations with humour moments result in more positive speaker evaluations (character, expertise, trustworthiness, and dynamism) and in other experiments they do not. She suggests that ‘the type of humor used is likely to influence source perceptions’ (p. 412) and calls for more specific research. In the same decade, Zillmann and Stocking (1976) showed that men and women differ in appreciation of self-deprecating humour. Women like it better than men, and women prefer other women making fun of themselves. However, Zillmann and Stocking did not use presentations; their subjects listened to a situation that was acted out and looked at cartoons and newspaper articles.

In the 1980s, Gruner published several studies in which self-deprecating humour played a role. ‘Humor that is self-disparaging may further enhance speaker image. […] The evidence seems to support the use of such humor’ (p.143) he concluded in 1985, although he also wrote that ‘self-disparaging humor in a speech may harm speaker ethos’. However, none of the experiments Gruner mentions uses real presentations (only paper texts). Later experiments on speakers using self-deprecating humour by Hackman (1986, 1988) show a positive score on the factor ‘sense of humour’, but a negative score on competence (qualifications and skills). Hackman also observes that the use of self-disparagement causes an already interesting speech to be experienced as less interesting. In a follow up research – with speeches read by experimental subjects – Hackman found a negative score on the factor expertise: ‘Direct and personal disparaging humor, be it self or other-disparaging, should be used cautiously in public address’ (p.129). To our knowledge, more recent experiments with presentations with (or without) self-deprecating humour have not been conducted.

In summary, on the one hand, experimental research does not seem to present an optimistic view on the benefits of self-deprecation. On the other hand, people (when questioned) seem to find that a speaker who uses self-deprecating humour has more character. This feeling of ‘common sense’ is confirmed in Wanzer, Frymier and Irwin (2010). The subjects in their research positively associated self-deprecation with teacher affective learning, course affective learning, and learning indicators (Wanzer, Frymier & Irwin 2010, p. 11).
7.3 Research design
Laughing at your own faults, at your own bloated existence, and putting life’s problems in perspective seems to be a highly valued human characteristic. However, (dated) experiments suggest that the rhetorical effectiveness of this behaviour can be questioned. In a new systematic experiment we try to shed light on this controversy. The main purpose is to compare presentations that differ only in the presence of (an amount) of self-deprecating humour. How do listeners experience speaker ethos (trustworthiness; expertise and reliability) in the different conditions?

The literature suggests a rather complex relation between ethos and self-deprecating humour. Figure 1 shows the hypothetical inverse relation between ethos and self-deprecating humour.

**Figure 7.1 Hypothetical relation between self-deprecating humour and speaker ethos**

The figure illustrates the hypothesis that with the use of self-deprecating humour speakers strengthen their ethos up to a point where the increase of humorous moments begins to harm the speaker’s ethos.

Four hypotheses can be deduced from Figure 7.1:

H1: A presentation containing self-deprecating humour will be assessed as more humorous than one without such moments (control condition).

H2: A presentation with many self-deprecating humorous moments (extreme condition) will be judged as more funny than a presentation with a limited number of such moments (mild condition).

H3: The mild version will achieve a higher ethos score than the control version.

H4: The extreme version will achieve a lower ethos score than the mild version (see figure 7.1).
The presentation. A 23-minute lecture, was written on a specific subject about communicating science. It discussed the use of ‘human measures’ in large number comparisons. ‘Using human measures’ signifies a specific presentational strategy for making large dimensions comprehensible to the listeners (e.g. in the presentation, the dimensions of the largest iceberg ever were discussed and, to clarify the amount of trees cut down in the Amazon rainforest each day, a strategy was discussed of expressing the area in ‘football fields’ to make the large number more conceivable to the audience). This subject was chosen for the lecture because it was supposed to be an interesting and relevant subject for the attending science students. The lecture was not accompanied by slides, and the lecture was presented by a young, talented instructor unknown to the intended audience. He introduced himself as a new (young) staff member. The presentation was recorded in a studio (without audience).

### Table 7.1 Examples of Self-Depreciating Humor

| Making fun at your own personal characteristics / faults | “ten quadrillion [makes a slip of the tongue] and really, I did practice at home pronouncing it correctly” (#6) |
| Making fun at your own professional life | “my job as communication teacher is like that; I lose sleep over correcting your reports and presentations. Look at the bags under my eyes” [bags are not apparent/visible] (#1) |
| Making fun at your profession (sociological in-group) | “they [colleagues] wrote a text book on the subject and they are as fond as I am of using football fields and Boeings in comparisons involving large numbers” (#9) |
| | “one could use the results to make a more reliable coffee machine at our faculty; the present one is often overloaded by our heavy use” (#12) |
Humorous moments. To the existing presentation three types of self-deprecating humourous moments were added. Table 7.1 shows examples of these types of humour.

The concretization of the humorous moments used in the presentation is somewhat arbitrary. Current textbooks do not expand on the precise characteristics of self-deprecating humour. The given examples in text books are often from known speakers like John F. Kennedy. Chang and Gruner (1981, in Gruner 1985) seem to have used canned jokes like ‘You know what a psychologist is. That’s a guy who would father a set of twins, have one baptized, and keep the other for control purposes’ (said by a psychologist) instead of the more improvized utterances. Hackman (1988) simply states that the speech contained examples of self-deprecating humour without giving examples. The division in table 7.1 in personal / professional / profession humour targets seems to cover often used sources for this kind of humour (among others, Chang & Gruner 1981).

The humourous moments were evenly scattered throughout the presentation. Figure 7.2 shows the places in time. The extreme version contained fourteen self-deprecating humorous moments, the mild version only half (seven).
The resulting presentations differed somewhat in length. The control version was 22.37 minutes in length, the mild version 23.24 minutes and the extreme version was the longest with 24.12 minutes. Potential effects of the small variance in presentation length on speaker ethos are unknown to us.

The dependent variables. How did we attempt to measure potential differences that resulted from the intervention? The dependent variables were a list of statements accompanied by a 5-point Likert-like scale to measure the attitude of the listeners. The statements could be grouped into three factors: humour, ethos, and interest (see table 7.2). A reliability analysis showed that the statements were closely enough connected to be counted as representative for each of the three factors (Cronbach’s Alpha > .70)

An earlier set of the three presentations (control – mild – extreme) was pre-tested in a paper version. A variance analysis showed no significant differences between the conditions. This could possibly be accounted for by two
options. Firstly, because of the small sample size (N=44), it is likely that the effect size between the conditions is not very large. Secondly, the method of pretesting was not optimal. By testing on paper the self-deprecating effect might have faded, because self-deprecating humour is closely linked to the speaker. On the basis of the pretest results, we tried to enhance the humorous moments of the speech and minimize the risk of finding no significant effect in the main experiment.

**Audience.** The presentations were shown to three groups of first year engineering students from the Delft University of Technology (N-total=239). They were told that the presentation was part of an experimental educational programme designed to support their regular course. A small questionnaire (two questions; 5-point scale) was used to assess possible differences between the groups. A multivariance analysis showed no significant differences between the conditions (F(4, 470)=0.834 p=.504). A more detailed analysis showed that the groups did not differ on (self-assessed) prior knowledge of the topic (mean: 3.06; F(2, 239)=.936). Secondly, the subjects felt that the lecture was necessary for their future profession (mean: 3.40; F(2, 239)=1.656 p=.193).

7.4 Results of the experiment

Does making fun of yourself harm your ethos as perceived by the audience? In this section, we report on the outcomes of the questionnaires completed by the viewers/listeners after seeing the presentation by the speaker. Table 7.3 summarizes the main results.

The presentation was seen by 239 subjects. They were evenly distributed over the three conditions. On average, the presentation was not experienced as a humoristic presentation (mean 2.48). The ethos (expertness; reliability) of the speaker was judged a score 3.53 on a 5-point scale: on the positive side of the scale. The interest in the subject of the presentation is neither positive, nor negative (mean 2.76).

A multivariate analysis of the data in table 3 shows an effect for condition (F(6, 452)=4.328 p<.001). A closer analysis demonstrates that the three groups differ on all three factors.
## Table 7.3 Differences Between Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humor</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>0.728</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mild</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>0.773</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>0.729</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>0.773</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethos</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mild</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>0.536</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>0.717</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mild</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>0.848</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>0.837</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>0.822</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# 5-point scale: 1 (low) – 5 (high)

### Figure 7.3 Humorousness in Presentation

![Bar Chart](image)

- **Conditions**: 5-point scale: 1 (low) - 5 (high)
The first, somewhat disturbing observation – as shown in figure 7.3 – is that the presentations with added ‘funny’ remarks by the presenter are not experienced as more humoristic (F(2, 231)=10.712 p<.001). The Tukey post-test comparisons show that the listeners in the mild and extreme conditions experience the presentation as significantly less humoristic than the listeners in the neutral condition. The numbers are corroborated by informal observations made by the teachers who were present during the experiment. They reported seeing students sighing at the moments that the presenter made his self-deprecating humoristic remarks.

Secondly, as is shown in figure 7.4, the ethos of the presenter (expertness; reliability) did appear to suffer under the increase of self-deprecatory remarks (F(2, 231)=4.930 p<.01). The Tukey post-test comparisons show that the listeners in the extreme condition value the ethos of the speaker significantly lower than the speaker in the neutral condition. The listeners in the mild condition take a middle position: not significantly different from the neutral condition and not significantly different from the extreme condition.

Thirdly, figure 7.5 shows that the self-deprecating humoristic sentences seem to have an effect on how interesting the listeners find the presentation (F(2, 231)=8.301 p<.001). The post-test comparisons suggest that the listeners lose interest with the growing number of self-deprecating moments. The listeners in the mild and extreme condition find the presentation significantly (p<.01) less interesting than the listeners in the neutral condition. The difference between the listeners in the extreme condition and the mild condition is not significant.
7.5 Conclusion and discussion

The research reported here addressed the following question: ‘What is the effect of self-deprecating humour on speaker ethos in an informative speech?’ This section presents some conclusions and possible implications of this experiment for self-deprecation in humour theories, self-deprecating humour by instructors, and average public speakers.

The results of this experiment show that a speaker who uses self-deprecating humour is walking a fine line. Using many self-disparaging remarks is not beneficial for the audience's impression of a speaker’s trustworthiness and reliability. Furthermore, he or she runs the risk that the use of self-deprecating humour will negatively influence the interest of the audience in the presentation.

The experiment exposed a ceiling effect for the use of self-deprecating humour with regard to ethos and interest.

In comparison to rather positive textbook advice (e.g. Osborn & Osborn 1997; Leanne 2009), audience estimations and assessments (Bipphus 2007; Wanzer, Frymier & Irwin 2010), these results appear to be counter-intuitive. Taking the results of this experiment into account, a speaker that does not already enjoy a strong previously established ethos (such as J.F. Kennedy) would be advised to be very cautious about using self-deprecating humour in a presentation. An interesting effect, however, is that the presentation versions that contained self-deprecating remarks were considered to be significantly less humorous than the control version.

Four hypotheses were tested in this experiment, which provide a more detailed insight into these general findings. H1 and H2 were both focused on the factor ‘humour’, whereas H3 and H4 concentrated on the effect of self-deprecating humour on the speaker’s ethos.

\[ 159 \]
Both H1 and H2 could not be confirmed: the two presentations containing self-deprecating humour were assessed as less humorous than the one without such moments (H1), and the extreme version was not considered to be funnier than the mild version (H2). This supports the claim that the self-deprecating humour used in this experiment was not conceived to be humorous. If the subjects had thought the self-deprecating humour to be funny, the scores would have turned out to be much higher. The self-deprecating remarks are thus not found to be funny, but they do have an effect: apparently one of failed humour. In this experiment, it did not matter whether this kind of failed humour was used seven or fourteen times to create the negative effect. This means that the presumed exuberance effect is thus falsified.

Hypotheses H3 and H4, which focused on speaker ethos, show a more ambiguous picture. The mild version did not achieve a higher score on ethos than the control version (H3), but the extreme version did score significantly lower on ethos than both the mild and the control version (H4). This means that implementing a lot of self-deprecating remarks will damage the speaker’s ethos: a ceiling effect was found. The experiment did not expose where this ceiling effect exactly sets in. The results on H3 and H4 show that in the case of ethos, self-deprecation is a dangerous technique – in contrast to the advice in most of the literature on self-deprecation.

Furthermore, results show another reason for a speaker to be careful in using self-deprecating humour: both the mild and extreme version were found to be of less interest. This means that the mild version already overdid it and that the extreme version was just as bad to the subjects.

This research has some notable methodological restrictions. A remarkable result of the experiment was that the inserted self-deprecating remarks were not considered humorous. Because a DVD was used, the expected humorous effect might be hurt. In a live presentation the speaker would have had the chance to establish rapport with the audience, which could be important for the success of self-deprecating humour. However, live presentations are much more difficult to time; the speeches would have to be exactly the same for comparative reliability. The use of canned laughter might have increased the humorous effect, but this did not fit the context of the speech that was used. Furthermore, laughing along with canned laughter could be more of a social effect than a humorous effect. Last but not least, the speaker was introduced with low ethos. It might be interesting to
see whether speakers with high ethos (like J.F. Kennedy) can afford more self-deprecation without damage.

To obtain more insight into the use of self-deprecating humour in general, in 2.1 three general humour theories were linked to this specific type of humour: the incongruity, superiority, and relief theories. Interpreting the results of the experiment in the context of these theories, there is no reason to suspect that there was a positive incongruity-effect. An incongruity-effect was detected (the subjects reacted to the manipulations), but there was no humour experience. Superiority theories are also problematic in the light of the results of the experiment: ethos was damaged so the speaker did not show this superiority at all. Finally, relief theory does not correspond with the results, as the interest dropped in the mild and extreme versions. Without suggesting that interest and relief are one and the same thing, one could expect that the subjects would have showed more interest in a relaxing state. Furthermore, the subjects did not experience humour, so relief theory seems not applicable at all. In summary, these three theories are applicable in theory to self-deprecating humour, but in practice it is shown that this relationship is much more difficult, because of the ambiguity of self-deprecation as successful humour.

Taking the educational context in which this experiment was conducted into account, the possible consequences of these findings could be of interest for instructors’ use of self-deprecating humour. Wanzer, Frymier and Irwin (2010) reported that students positively associated teachers’ use of self-deprecating humour with teacher affective learning, course affective learning, and learning indicators. However, this result did not come without reservation, as they noted:

Additional research is needed to explore the boundaries of appropriate use of self-disparaging humor since it seems likely that too much of it could be harmful to an instructor’s credibility (Wanzer, Frymier & Irwin 2010, 13).

In this experiment, too much self-disparaging humour proved to be harmful to the instructor’s ethos indeed. More insight into the boundaries of instructors’ use of self-deprecation has been provided: somewhere between the mild version (7 instances of self-deprecation) and the extreme version (14 instances) a ceiling effect occurred. It seems advisable for an instructor to carefully balance the amount of self-deprecating remarks, especially when the instructor’s ethos is not perceived to be high.
The boundaries for the effect of self-deprecating humour on speaker ethos have been sketched, but more research is necessary to draw these boundaries more convincingly. From this research, it can be concluded that the use of self-deprecation does not come without checks and balances: humour, interest and ethos drop significantly as the amount of self-deprecation increases. A ceiling effect occurs, but has not been pinned down exactly. Further research should find the effect of different types of self-deprecating humour in different contexts, combined with different previously established ethos levels. The effects of using self-deprecation only once in a whole speech could be explored. Another interesting perspective is the use of self-deprecating humour as a reparation technique. Hackman (1988) and Van Eijck (1986) already suggested that self-deprecating humour might be useful in a situation where one needs to save face. Such a damage control tool could be very interesting and useful for average speakers.

In conclusion, this experiment has shown some of the restrictions one should consider before using self-deprecation in a speech. The average speaker should refrain from using a lot of self-deprecating humour in his speech. Using this technique is not safe for just any speaker. The speaker should have a talent for decorum, know how and when to use it, and emphasize how far he can go with this technique. History shows that John F. Kennedy put this talent to good use when he communicated with his people. The rest of us should consider communicating our modesty differently.

References


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8 Actio Capital: The Non-verbal Resources of Rhetoric

MARIE GELANG

8.1 Introduction

Actio capital is a theoretical model that describes the development of a speaker’s actio through the stages of actio resource, actio asset, and finally actio capital. The theoretical model is inspired by Pierre Bourdieu’s (1990) concepts of *habitus* and ‘symbolic capital’, along with the analysis of both classical (e.g. Bulwer 1644; Blair 1783; Sheridan 1762) handbooks and recent research about actio (e.g. Guerrero 1999; McNeil 2000; Poyatos 2002) as well as an empirical study of university lecturers’ non-verbal communication (Gelang 2008).

This chapter is focused on the concept of actio, non-verbal communication, as a part of rhetorical theory and practice. Actio concerns delivery and was an essential part of rhetorical training in the classical period, with Quintilian and Cicero setting the standard. Today, research about non-verbal communication concerns a variety of modalities such as facial expressions, hand gestures, movements, postures, and the use of the voice. When rhetorically performed in public speaking, I refer to all of these non-verbal modalities as *actio*.

Studies of non-verbal communication, regardless of academic discipline, primarily focus on understanding a selected body of empirical material (e.g. Streeck 2008; Kendon 1990; Sandlund 2004), which is why this presentation of a theoretical model may appear far-fetched to researchers within the field. But a theoretical model for studying actio ought to yield more opportunities to compare the results of different studies and create better conditions for generalizing research findings. The intention with this article is therefore not to describe how a speaker should act in order to be convincing, but to present a theoretical model for the purpose of deepening our understanding of actio as a historically, socially, culturally, and individually situated activity.
Even though I am referring to some of Bourdieu’s concepts in the following text, my intention is not to explore the concept of actio in comparison to his collection of concepts concerning human socialization. Bourdieu’s way of using capital, not in an economic but in a sociological sense, was the starting point for the actio capital – model. Bourdieu means that an asset, let us say a degree of skill at speaking, functions as capital if and only if its value is recognized within societal domains. At that point, one has appropriated the capital, so to speak, and is capable of using it in particular situations (Bourdieu 1993, pp. 290-291).

The Actio Capital – model is an abstract framework designed to increase the understanding of actio as a rhetorical concept. I have chosen to divide the Actio Capital – model into three stages. These can function as theoretical starting points, separately or together, depending on the topic of interest. One need not apply them in the chronological order as presented here, but can just as well begin with stage three and work backwards, or use all three stages in parallel. Apart from actio capital, a speaker is likely to need other forms of capital such as, for example, ‘social capital’ and ‘linguistic capital’ in order for actio to be recognized as actio capital. Nevertheless, in this model I have focused on actio.

8.2 The acquisition of actio-capital
The first stage of the model describes how an individual’s actio resources are converted into actio assets. On the whole, all human beings – assuming they are healthy – have the same resources of actio, meaning: the same basic physical ability to use their bodies for gestures, variation of voice, and so on. This means that all physically healthy people possess the same fundamental actio resources that can be converted into actio assets.

The extent to which individuals will convert their actio resources into assets, meaning: utilize and develop their actio resources, depends on a number of circumstances such as, personality, age, which environments they spend time in, and which experiences and habits these things lead to. One can say that Bourdieu’s (1990) concept of *habitus*, in which body language expresses the consequences of what a person has experienced and learned, describes how actio resources are converted into assets. The experiences that an individual encounters in life will influence the scope and nature of her available actio resources. The extent of different individuals’ actio assets can accordingly differ.
Hence, an individual’s actio assets could primarily consist of voice and gestures, for instance. The remaining modalities of the body – eyes, facial expressions, poses, etc. – are present of course, and are active to some extent, but because of this person’s specific experiences of life, she for the most part uses gestures and voice, which makes these modalities her available actio assets. A speaker can accordingly hold a speech using minimal facial expressions and eye contact, yet with gestures and a well-developed speaking-voice. For another individual with different experiences and abilities, the available resources may primarily consist of, e.g., facial expressions and eye contact. One can picture a speaker who delivers a speech in a monotone but with lively facial expressions and eye contact. In this way, every individual possesses a certain range of actio assets. These are uniquely and personally shaped by what he or she has learned in the course of life.

Even if an individual’s prior history leaves its imprint on her non-verbal communication, one can assume that it is possible for her to expand and change her actio assets. This does not need to involve fundamental changes in an individual’s non-verbal communication. Rather, it can be a question of adding or removing certain expressions on specific occasions, such as when giving a talk. A speaker could also conceivably increase her assets in many different ways, e.g. by spending time in different social milieus or by consciously practising her delivery.

Speakers’ abilities to vary their delivery is affected by the range of their actio assets. The greater their assets, the better equipped they are to vary their actio.

8.3 Ethos, personae, pathos
This range of available assets can have consequences for, e.g. the ethos that a speaker wishes to convey in her presentation. By ethos I refer here to a speaker’s character in connection with her actio. If the speaker has limited actio assets it is less easy to switch between different personae and in this way vary her ethos with the help of actio. Choosing personae is a matter of varying and developing different sides of one’s personality by toning down some personality traits in order to emphasize others (Alcorn 1994; Mral 1999; Gelang 2008). Limited actio assets can therefore result in the delivery having less variety and subtlety than the speaker may desire. On the other hand, a speaker with extensive actio assets can more readily refine her delivery so that it will accord with the ethos, the personae, and the pathos that she wishes to convey.
in the speaking situation. By *pathos* I refer to the reflection of a speaker’s own emotional resources and the skill needed to express them in her delivery (Montgomery 1999; Gelang 2008).

Hence, there can be a discrepancy between the *ethos* or *pathos* that the speaker wishes to portray and what is possible to express because of limited actio assets. For instance, one can imagine a politician who feels and verbally expresses sympathy for the victims of a disaster but is not able to express this with the help of actio. The discrepancy that arises between the verbal and non-verbal messages make the communicative act ambiguous and difficult to interpret, which in the long term can be assumed to affect the perception of the politician’s *ethos*.

8.4 Actio capital’s assets

Nevertheless the range, that is to say, the number of modalities, need not be the decisive factor for the value of a speaker’s actio assets. Not only can the available actio resources comprise different numbers of modalities, they can also be practised and utilized to different extents.

The second stage describes how actio assets can be utilized and made more nuanced with the help of the actio qualities. By actio qualities I do not mean what a speaker does (for instance, nodding her head) but how she does it (nodding eagerly or hesitantly). It is the ‘how’ perspective that I would like to call actio qualities, meaning the aspects of actio that create the nuances, and make actio appear in a variety of forms. It is with the help of the actio qualities that a speaker can increase the value of her actio assets. The way a gesture is performed is at least as important for its rhetorical impact as the gesture chosen.

A wide range of studies suggests that actio affects the audience in their liking or disliking of different speakers/debaters (e.g. Atkinson 1988; Jorgensen et al. 1998, p. 283; Seiter et al. 2009). Some research, my own as well as that of others, points at energy as an especially important factor in actio (McCroskey 2001; Mehrabaian 1972; Babad et al. 2004, p. 3).

In addition to energy, two other dimensions of actio qualities stood out clearly in my early research: dynamism and tempo/rhythm. Naturally, these occur most often in parallel, and energy and dynamism can be combined at the same time. But in order to clarify the different characteristics of these qualities, I have defined them as follows.

Energy concerns flow, intensity and focus. Flow refers to the ener-
gy, constant or variable, that exists in the succession of expressions that the speaker produces in a public appearance. Intensity refers to the degree of energy in a particular modality or in the multimodal expression of the body. Focus refers to the way in which energy is concentrated on the most meaningful, in relation to the verbal message, modalities.

Dynamism concerns variations. Dynamism is a quality that is related to the variations in actio. The dynamic variations usually occur with the help of other qualities such as energy, rhythm and/or the magnitude of the expressions.

Tempo and rhythm concerns speed, flow and timing. I have chosen to separate the definitions of tempo and rhythm. Tempo refers to the basic rate (speed) that pervades the entire performance, while rhythm refers to the variations of pace (flow) that can occur by means of changes in one or more modalities. Timing is about kairos, meaning doing the right actio at the right time.

The following diagrams will explain how actio qualities increase the value of actio assets. The diagrams are intended to illustrate the actio assets of different individuals. The white area in the circle shows unutilized actio resources, that is, those resources that for various reasons the person does not use. Each pie slice represents a modality, e.g. voice, facial expression, gestures, postures. The size of the slice depends on how well the modality is utilized. If a speaker is able to successfully employ her actio resources, the white area in the circle will shrink.

**FIGURE 8.1**

![Diagram 8.1A](image1.png)  ![Diagram 8.1B](image2.png)
For instance, one individual can have significant assets comprising several modalities all of which have been skilfully practised and are ready to use, in which case the white area of unutilized actio resources is narrow, as shown in diagram 1A. Another individual may have a similar range of actio assets, that is to say, in terms of number of modalities, but these are poorly practised and utilized; therefore the white area of unutilized actio resources is larger for this person, as shown in diagram 1B. The speaker who is illustrated with the first circle (1A) is an optimal example; she has actio assets of great worth in which the full range of actio resources are in use, and the actio assets are utilized to their fullest potential with the help of the actio qualities. The other speaker (1B), however, does not have a similarly optimized value for her actio assets despite having the same range as the previous speaker because the actio assets are not used together with the actio qualities.

A further example that illustrates the importance of the actio qualities is an individual who despite scanty assets, that is, few available modalities, employs her modalities with the help of the actio qualities thereby causing the value of the assets to increase (see below diagram 2A). Their value grows because one can presume that a speaker who can utilize her actio assets to their full capacity has a better chance of converting them to capital. In contrast, the individual illustrated in diagram 2B, has a similar range of available modalities but lacks actio qualities, which reduces the value of her actio assets.

**FIGURE 8.2**

![Diagram 8.2A](image1)

![Diagram 8.2B](image2)
Hence, speakers can raise the value of their actio assets by mastering and employing the actio qualities. This means that a speaker whose assets are limited to a single modality can compensate for the lack of further modalities by utilizing the available modality in a qualitatively nuanced and varied manner. It is accordingly not the number of modalities included in an individual’s actio assets that decides whether they can be converted into actio capital.

Imagine a speaker who is standing behind a rostrum that hides the greater part of her body and who is clutching the lectern with her hands. One’s spontaneous reaction is that this speaker will fail to engage her audience because she is ‘hiding’ behind the lectern. But it turns out that she has a nuanced voice in which all the qualities are utilized to their full capacity. Her voice has a pleasing tempo, varied pitch, suitable volume, energy, well-timed pauses, etc., and the audience is captivated. Such a speaker has practised her ‘only’ available modality with the help of the actio qualities in order to amply compensate her weaknesses in the other modalities such as, e.g. gestures. A comprehensive judgement of the speaker will naturally take into account other factors such as the contents of the speech, the language, the structure, and so on.

Hence, the range of actio assets, that is, the number of modalities used, is not necessarily decisive for the value of the assets. A speaker with limited actio assets can compensate for this by means of the energy, dynamism, and tempo/rhythm with which the available modalities are used. In this way, a spoken presentation can take many different forms because the combinations of the different modalities, and between the modalities and the actio qualities, are nearly endless. This demonstrates that every speaker’s actio is unique; no two speakers are alike. A speaker can put together her own personal actio with limited assets and nevertheless come across as interesting, engaged, trustworthy, convincing, and so on.

But whether or not the actio assets and their value can be converted into actio capital, that is, be appreciated as interesting, engaged, trustworthy, convincing, is determined in the rhetorical situation, which leads us to the final stage of the model.

8.5 Actio capital
The third stage of the actio capital model deals with a speaker’s actio assets in relation to the rhetorical situation. Here, the degree, strength, intensity of the actio assets, combined with the number of available modalities, are of
importance. It is in the rhetorical situation that it is determined whether the speaker’s actio assets can function as capital in Bourdieu’s sense, that is, be recognized and acknowledged as valuable.¹

The receivers in a rhetorical situation interpret a speaker’s actio based on, among other things, the situation’s inherent ‘constraints’, one of three factors that Lloyd F. Bitzer used to define a rhetorical situation in the 1960s (Bitzer 1968). Bitzer’s constraints, which resemble Bourdieu’s (1990) concept of doxa, refer to, among other things, the preconceptions and expectations concerning actio in any given situation. For instance, one can presume that the preconceptions and expectations concerning actio in a stand-up comedy act differ from those when a defence attorney is pleading a case. Hence, what is considered valuable actio can differ between different rhetorical situations.

Provided that the speaker has sufficient actio assets, modalities as well as qualities, she can deliver her speech in a way that in the situation is deemed to be valuable and therefore is acknowledged as capital. A speaker with limited actio assets, on the other hand, has less of a chance of meeting the existing expectations on actio, which affects the possibility of getting the actio assets recognized as capital.

Politicians belong to an occupational category where one’s range of actio assets can be decisive for successful communication. Because a politician speaks and debates in widely differing contexts, a varied and flexible actio is needed. That which is considered actio capital at a union meeting can be assumed to differ from what is considered actio capital at a meeting with teenagers at a youth centre.

Furthermore, a speaker’s own choice of actio qualities and modalities also affects whether actio assets are recognized as actio capital. It is a matter of ‘calibrating’ one’s actio assets to match the situation’s constraints/doxa. The speaker must consider what is fitting, decorum, and based on these considerations make her own decisions. It is the sum of the actio assets, modalities as well as qualities, which must be weighed against the circumstances of the rhetorical situation. How well speakers succeed in converting their assets into actio capital depends not only on their available actio resources and how well these are handled, but also on their knowledge and judgement regarding the circumstances of the situation. Hence, in relation to the expectations

¹ Bitzer’s definition of a rhetorical situation is, to some extent, compatible with Bourdieu’s notion of field.
that exist in the situation speakers may under- or overuse their actio assets. In some situations, if a speaker employs all her assets – uses all the modalities and actio qualities to their full effect – it may be perceived as overdoing it. Or perhaps the speaker misjudges the situation and fails to use her actio assets to the extent that the situation demands, where the actio assets do not meet the expectations in the situation.

For instance, one can imagine that a university lecturer who makes sweeping, enthusiastic gestures, stares intently at the students, and utters every sentence quickly and emphatically would be perceived as excessive, while similar behaviour would be acceptable, or even desirable at, say, a political debate. Another lecturer whose actio is unembellished, with few gestures, and a low, slowly droning voice, can be perceived as underperforming, while the same behaviour would be expected and accepted at a ritualized high mass.

8.6 Conclusion

In conclusion: on the whole, all human beings – assuming they are healthy – have the same resources of actio, i.e. the same basic physical ability to use their bodies for gestures, variation of voice, and so on. Which of these actio resources a person will use, which will become a person’s actio assets, depends on a variety of different things like personality, what kind of life she has lived, etc. Depending on how these assets are used, for instance with the help of actio qualities, they can become actio capital. Which of a speaker’s actio assets that will be recognized and valued as capital varies from situation to situation according to the circumstances. The actio capital model can give structure to actio as a constantly changing activity in society and be useful as a theoretical foundation. The model can function as a framework when researchers are, for example, interested in the relationship between actio and individuals’ ethos, personae, and pathos. By way of an example, a study was conducted to compare how two French politicians, Prime Minister Nicolas Sarkozy and the leader of the Socialist Party Ségolène Royal, use their voices (Martín 2010). The results showed that Sarkozy is able to adapt his voice to the context and audience, while Royal more one-sidedly uses her acquired upper-class dialect with regard to emphasis and melody. A study of this sort could benefit from using actio capital as a theoretical model; to understand how they used their voices one must first have some understanding of how, through their experiences in life, they have converted their actio resources into actio assets, and which of these assets that are considered capital in different situations.
References


9 Teaching for Thinking and Rhetoric: The Contributions of Rhetoric to the Argumentative Writing of Students of a Greek Elementary School

SMARAGDA PAPADOPOULOU AND FORINI EGGLEZOU

9.1 Introduction
An optimum medium for developing abilities such as critical thinking and analysis of an argumentative text down to its components, is the early and systematic training of students in argumentative writing within a school context. An effective way of reaching this goal could be to expose the students to interactive practices conducive to writing as a social act – able to ‘address self in society and social relation in self’ (Shor 1987, p.95). Rhetorical pedagogy is closely related to this effort (Freeley & Steinberg 2009, p. 3; Johnson 1996, p. 46; Sternberg & Spear-Swerling1996, pp. 66-8).

9.2 Theoretical framework: Rhetorical argument and metalinguistic coherence of arguments in writing
Argumentative theories underline the close relationship between argumentation and rhetoric as well as dialectics and their ‘fruitful integration’ (Eemeren van & Hout-lusser 2000, p. 296). Since the ancient Greek Sophists and Aristotle’s Rhetoric until the New Rhetoric (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969), scholars have drawn attention to two attributes of the rhetorical argument, relative to its teaching: 1) its necessary formation in a certain context through the interaction of arguer and audience for the achievement of persuasion in language communication; and 2) its dialectic nature and practice (Tindale 1999; Tindale 2004, p. 89).

The first attribute of the rhetorical argument presents an organic proximity to theories that insist on the social construction of reality and knowledge (Berger & Luckmann 1996; Vygotsky 1978, p. 86; Vygotsky
As regards the second attribute of the rhetorical argument, its dialectic character is directly related to the development of thinking through the bipolar view of every subject matter (Billig 1993, p. 49). It seems that this would lead to the desirable empowerment of student's reasoning.

Children's preparation in the teaching of rhetoric depends a lot on metalinguistic procedures that help practitioners express themselves in terms of intellectual argumentation through writing and parallel thinking, for example Edward's De Bono _Thinking Hats_ (1985). Accordingly, it provides a basic vocabulary and designs in-class teaching routines that may influence children and their maturity. Our option to use argumentation with children can be described as a method of persuasive attack on excessive rationalism, on vicious intellectualism and the kind of conceptual thinking that ignores the ever-shifting quality of real life experiences just to prove that formal logic is considered as an adequate representation of how minds really function. A strong influence on research at this level has been the work of theorists, psychologists, and language researchers such as Vygotsky (1978), as well as the furthering of his work by Rogoff (1990, p. 78), Luria, (1976) Scribner and Cole (1981), Wertsch (1985) and many other researchers.

Our study on students of a Greek Primary school is also influenced by dialogic argumentation. Since ancient times, the study of ‘dittoi logoi’ of _Protagoras_ in Plato proved that human nature and human mind function in the same way in time. There is a physical inclination of humanity to argue and move forward with rational understanding and speech.

Socrates could not fight for writing debates in his era. He believed that a script is speechless, dead; it cannot defend itself from misunderstandings or awkward commentators. For Socrates, writing is a thinking process without motion and this is also said in _Faidros_ by Plato, where writing appears more vulnerable in comparison with orality (275d3-275e6). The art of speaking well in Plato has moved towards the art of writing well, which involves a lot of persuasive writing. If something has changed since then, it is the revolution of typography that reduces demand for the oral exposure of thinking and the fact that writing has gained ground at every linguistic exposure.

What could be considered as the result of Socrates’ debate in _Protagoras_, as to whether or not virtue «ἀρετή»[aretı] as knowledge «γνώση»[gnosi] is an inherent quality or one that could be taught, influences our case study. Simultaneously, it answers this question by teaching argumentative writing.
in educational institutions even with primary school children or with young adults.

9.3 The study: Data and methodological framework

9.3.1 Participants
Our case study\(^1\) research describes a classroom intervention with 25 pupils in the fifth grade, (eleven years old), of a public elementary school in an urban zone of Athens. Both the experimental group (E’1) as well as the control group (E’2) (24 students) in the same school shared a homogeneous middle class social background.

9.3.2 Procedure
The intervention programme with the experimental group was carried out for a total of seven months, once a week, for two 45 minute sessions (a total of 28 sessions). The control group got the standard training in argumentative writing according to the Greek national curriculum.

9.3.3 Purpose
The purpose of the intervention was the enrichment of the text structure of the students’ written argumentative texts due to the integration of counter-arguments and rebuttals.

9.3.4 Description of the intervention
The following description aims to provide a clearer view of the cognitive and social strategies involved during the intervention.

   a) Direct instruction of basic elements of the argumentative genre. This strategy was used more often during the first ten sessions in order to present the essential elements of the procedural knowledge of argumentation to students. Furthermore, the teacher-researcher presented some of the most used common places (cause and effect, antithesis, similarity) and some types of proof found in text-models (such as statistics, testimonies, quotations, examples). Students were taught all the different expressions of modality

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\(^1\) This case study refers to data by F. Egglezou, PhD dissertation research work in progress, submitted to the Department of Primary Education at the University of Ioannina, Greece in 2011 under the supervision of the Associate Professor Smaragda Papadopoulou.
(must, should, it may be useful, etc.), which are necessary to the expression of a thesis as well as to the various connectives which characterize the identity of an argumentative text (oppositional, concessive, etc.). The time dedicated to this strategy varied from seven to ten minutes in each session.

b) **Modelling.** The model, based on the journey metaphor of argumentation, was called the ‘train of argumentation’. As papercraft, it was placed in the classroom, above the blackboard, in order to remind students of the schema of an argumentative text (thesis/reason(s)/counter-argument(s)/rebuttal(s)/conclusion).

c) **Reading, listening and analysis of various text-models.** Students became familiar with argumentative common topics by reading and analyzing advertisements. The reading of journalistic texts concerning, for example, the use of video games offered to students the chance to sort their arguments regarding this topic and to prepare a debate in classroom. In addition, the reading of Aesop’s didactic fables and listening to various types of argumentative dialogues helped the primary school students to cultivate their critical thinking in a variety of contexts and to understand the multiplicity of argumentative functions: persuasion, catharsis, amusement, defence, attack, creation and resolution of differences (Andrews 2009).

d) **Oral interactions.** Questioning, doubting, searching for reasoning and working with vocabulary expansion and other tools led the students along alternative paths of creative and argumentative thinking. In the beginning, various language games contributed to the co-construction and confrontation of the first produced arguments, counter-arguments and rebuttals as well as to their linguistic and syntactic formation and expression. The topics of the children’s exposure to persuasion and to argument were related to common conflicts in the family circle, among close friends and in their daily school life. Progressively, students wore the six thinking hats of De Bono (1985). The brainstorming technique was used for the invention of arguments relative to topics taken from mythology such as: Theseus is trying to persuade his father, Aegaeus, to allow him to go to Crete and kill the Minotaur. What are his arguments? The realization of multiple role playing debates, inspired either from the reading of a text or after the listening of a political debate, helped students to create the necessary context for the development of their argumentation. The dramatization methods of argumentative dialogues found in ecological fairytales, progressively helped children understand a philosophical dialogue such as Plato’s and the Socratic methods. Peer
collaboration and participation structures contributed to the creation of the new context.

e) Individual or collaborative writing. The produced oral argumentative discourse, either as an individual monologue or as a result of an ‘exploratory talk’ (Mercer 2000, p. 98) was always accompanied by argumentative writing of a simple or a more complex form. Groups of four students or students in pairs invented argumentative common topics by writing ads or a text. The individual writing represented various argumentative sub-genres. Exhortative argumentative letter writing was among them.

f) Observational learning. Every three sessions, five written texts were randomly chosen and read by the students-authors in the classroom. The texts were evaluated by the classmates-observers who had, in this way, the opportunity to re-evaluate personal writing strategies (Braaksma, Rijlaarsdam et al. 2004, p. 4).

9.3.5 Data source and analysis
The corpus of data was composed: a) by transcripts from audio-taped or video-taped argumentative speech; b) by individually or collaboratively written texts; and c) by students’ individual pre- and post-test in the form of informal argumentative letter. Both the pre- and the post-test were carried out before and after the completion of the intervention. The effects of the intervention on students’ writing were analyzed in qualitative and quantitative terms (triangulation of data) in order to provide validity and reliability to the research.

The qualitative analysis of oral and written texts was based on Fairclough’s three-dimensional model of critical discourse analysis which focuses on the linguistic and intertextual analysis. The first feature of analysis stresses not only grammar or vocabulary but, mostly, the textual organization. The second one relates the textual influences to broader social structures and the appearance of genres in the produced texts (Fairclough 1995, pp. 188-9; Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000, p. 448). In certain cases, a quantification of data was carried out in order to achieve a clearer view of the obtained experience (Altrichter, Posch & Somekh 2001, p. 188).

The quantitative results of the pre- and post-texts of the experimental group were analyzed in terms of descriptive and inferential statistics (Gillham 2000, pp. 80, 86). The reliability of the measurements identified for the analysis was checked by calculating Cohen’s Kappa coefficient for two raters.
Alpha values of 0.62 were obtained for the first observation regarding the existence of counter-arguments in the student’s written text; and 0.82 for the second observation regarding the existence of rebuttal arguments. Therefore, there was evidence that the observation system used by the researcher was valid.

9.3.6 Analysis of the oral argumentative interactions

During the intervention, rhetoric contributed to the development of the desired oral argumentative abilities. Various language games contributed to the internalization of the basic vocabulary of the argumentative genre. In the game ‘Explain to me, why…’, students expressed their points clearly and gave sound reasons in order to support them. Completing their teacher’s introductory phrase ‘In my opinion…’, students had the opportunity to make ‘value’, ‘policy’ or – more rarely – ‘factual’ claims. For example:

I believe that we should wear belts in the car, because we will be more secure in the case of an accident (Marianna).

At the same time, students started to use necessary introductive, argumentative phrases and progressively, a more frequent use of causal sentences for supporting arguments was noticed as well as the tendency to link their arguments, to arrange them in a more organized way.

Linguistic games which caused controversies served as a means to the development of students’ bipolar thinking. The Pumpkin of Arguments, as a variation of a traditional Greek game, familiarized students both with the notions of a) the justification of their opinion; and b) the negotiation with the opposite one. The students, sitting in circles, tried to find arguments that strengthened the value of a certain job and counter-arguments that weakened the arguments of the previous player:

(Magia): In my opinion the best job is to be a nurse, because you help people recover. A nurse is a person who gives and receives care and love.
(Antigoni): I disagree that this job is the best one. First of all, it’s very common to be a nurse and difficult to find such a job nowadays. It’s also hard to always remain calm and not lose your temper when you see blood. On the contrary, I believe that the best job is to be a gardener. His creations make the whole world and the human soul more beautiful. At the same time he finds joy at work.
Another inventive-creative game that was applied in class, *The Piggy Bank and the Coins*, helped students view arguments and counter-arguments as the two sides of a coin. Students used the necessary adverasive and concessive connectives upon matters like: *Must men do household chores?* or *Should parents get a divorce?* The majority of them (83%) developed rational arguments. For example:

(Argument): Parents shouldn’t get a divorce, because they make their children unhappy. (Nikos)

(Counter-argument): I disagree with the above argument, because if their relation is in a crisis, children feel more hurt listening to their quarrels. (Dora)

After six months of practice, students were able to detect and criticize the absence of correct dialogue habits. For example:

Catherine didn’t respond to John’s argument. (Sotiris)

Often, the exchange of opposite arguments in role-playing debates issued from the lecture and the conceptual extension of various fables, narrative, journalistic, mythological or texts of ancient Greek literature. Both imagination and logic were motivated in order to convince the audience of the soundness of the proposed claims.

Through the continuous role-playing debates students developed the notion of empathy or ‘otherness’ by repeating an argument in diverse forms, by adapting their arguments to the interests and the characters of their roles (Snider & Schnurer 2002, pp. 69-70) and by reasoning in different ways. The rhetoric varied, according to the person who was addressing its argument, according to the audience and the communicative goal of every situation.

It was a pleasant surprise to notice that the voice of the ‘other’ was spontaneously introduced to the students’ monologues. Furthermore, during classroom elections the students’ arguments revealed personal visions in the service of the common good and stressed that the notion of right is interwoven with the notion of the consequent obligation. Sometimes, the arguments were addressed to the effective, future citizens of the society as shown in the following examples (i), (ii):
(i) Also, some more notice boards will be added, in order to show more of our paintings. So, our classroom will not be dull, it will be colourful and we will feel happy. (Katerina)
(ii) Of course, if you want these things to be done you must, also, abide by your duties. Not everything depends on me. (Aris)

The continuous dialogic interactions highlighted the value of evidence in argumentation. Students came up with examples and testimonies in order to empower their arguments. As an audience they continuously examine the quality of the evidence offered. It was the case of the game *Let's weigh our friends' arguments and counter-arguments* upon subject-matters such as: *Should children go out alone for a walk?* Critically, students were looking for clarity, accuracy, logic, breadth, relevance and precision of the produced arguments. (Paul & Elder 1999, pp. 10-11).

The exchange of student’s ideas during the philosophical dialogue upon the topic of truth helped children’s involvement in the ‘practice of moral inquiry’ and the cognitive and moral maturity acquired through it. (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan 1985, p. 24). For example:

(Sebastian): …uh… I feel guilty for one lie… When I was in kindergarten, I had told that my grandfather died and then he came to pick me up from school.
(Konstantinos O.): That was as big lie. Seb…
(Teacher): Why is it a big, a huge lie?
(Konstantinos, O): Eh…because human life is sacred and you can’t play with it.

Parliamentary debates gave students the opportunity to defend their controversial viewpoints. The creation of definitions, the reference to own or common experiences and social representations contributed to the sense-making of the world and to its transmission to each other:

(Petros): Today, we are all here to argue about homework. Our team supports the idea that homework is necessary, as a brain practice for better results in classroom. For example, an athlete must train every day, if he wants to have the best scores in the races. He must also eat healthily and make some sacrifices. Another example is, as we all remember, that when we were little kids we used the little plastic sticks for counting. Our mum was showing us 30 sticks and we should count them.
(Jonathan): I disagree with your opinion, as homework isn’t a brain practice.
We are talking about exercises relative to the lesson which intend to help you consolidate it. My team supports that homework shouldn't exist for several reasons. First, students prefer to do other activities such as sports. Consequently, they don't have time for doing their homework.

9.3.7 Analysis of the written argumentative texts
The oral controversies among students were reflected in their writing as a symbolic reappearance of internalized conversations which constituted students’ thoughts. (Bruffee 1984, pp. 641-2; McCarthey & McMahon 1992, p. 18). In Aristotelian terms, ‘written words’ became ‘symbols of spoken words’, which in their turn constituted ‘symbols of mental experience’ (Aristotle 1938, 16a, 3).

The analysis of the produced texts showed that the students’ oral interactions brought about important changes to their writing. First, students became more sensitive to the purpose of the argument and to their audience. The rhetoric developed in the exhortative letter to the mayor in order not to cut down a hazel tree was, mainly, based on persuasive strategies. The majority of students (84%) used arguments that appealed to the mayor’s motives, personal fears and bias. By contrast, the rhetoric developed in students’ apologetic letters intended to dissipate the accusations and to avoid their consequences. The majority of the apologetic texts were based on strategies such as the denial of the accusation or the denial of intent for the action (48% of the students), on bolstering (92%) and on differentiation (72%).

Second, the introductions and the conclusions of the text were better articulated and elaborated. For example:

My dear classmates, girls and boys. My name is Kalliopi and I believe that it would be useful to become the president of our class. I support this argument for the following reasons… (Kalliopi)

Also, writing became more lively and readable. The use of rhetorical common places proved useful to the genesis of arguments during the collaborative writing of students’ advertisements. For example:

Do you not want to be sunburnt this summer? Buy now the new sun-screen a-burnol. It acts like a protective umbrella for your body!!! (topic of similarity) (Petros)
From a stylistic point of view, a more frequent appearance of antithesis and rhetorical questions in the produced exhortative texts was noticed. Students, as sellers or as responsible citizens, were trying to persuade the addressees to accept their invitations to ‘different forms of life’, (Schwartzman 1988, p. 4). For example:

Another reason is that unlike you, the mayor of Vari organized tree planting and planted 2000 trees. And you can offer us not even one tree?(Konstantinos)

In addition, the produced texts were more coherent due to the extended use of connectives, which facilitated the expression of relations as justification, opposition and concession (Akiguet & Piolat 1996, p. 267). The extended use of subjective epistemic modality markers attested to a better conceptualization of the self, of others and of society and to the capacity of a better negotiation of personal ideas.

9.3.8 Quantitative results
The quantitative analysis of students’ pre- and post-argumentative tests was carried out using the software programme spss (statistical package for the social sciences). There were two basic criteria of analysis. First, the awareness of the argumentative structure due to the appearance of the following structural elements: a) statement (0-1); b) supporting arguments of the statement (0-1); c) counter-arguments (0-1); d) rebuttal arguments (0-1); e) conclusion (0-1). Each element was marked with one point, if it was present at least once in the text, creating a rating scale from 0 to 5.

Second, the number of counter and rebuttal arguments appeared in the produced texts.

The intervention was the independent variable of the research (yes/no) (Verma & Mallick 2004, p. 201). Students’ awareness of the argumentative text structure and the number of the produced counter- and rebuttal arguments constituted the dependent variables. Two kinds of statistical controls were used: a) the Paired Sample T-Test for the analysis of results referring to the experimental group (E’1) before and after the intervention; and b) the Independent Samples T-Test, appropriate for the confrontation of means of two independent groups (Voelkl & Gerber 1999, p. 139), in our case the experimental group (E’1) and the control group (E’2).

Data obtained from the argumentative post-test of the experimental
group indicated that the mean score of awareness of the argumentative text structure increased significantly from M=3.2 (SD = 1.47196) to M=4.56 (SD = 1.04403) between its pre- and post-test (Figure 9.1), producing a bilateral significance (p=.000<0.005) for a confidence level of 95%.

In addition, the statistical analysis of the post-test revealed a significant difference relative to the awareness of the argumentative text structure between the mean score M=4.56 (SD =1.04403) of the experimental group and the mean score M=2.54 (SD=1.21509) of the control group (Figure 9.2). The application of the T-test control attested to a bilateral significance (p = .000<0.05) in favour of the experimental group for a confidence level of 95%.

**FIGURE 9.1**

![Graph showing awareness of argumentative structure](image)

**FIGURE 9.2  AWARENESS OF ARGUMENTATIVE TEXT STRUCTURE (POST-TEST)**

![Graph showing comparison between experimental and control groups](image)

With regards to the mean score of the counter-arguments in the pre-test, it was noticed that the experimental group (E’1) produced a lower score (M=1.04, SD=1.136) than the experimental group (M= 1.17, SD=1.341), although no further significant difference was noticed (p=.813>0.005). After
the accomplishment of the intervention the post-test of the experimental group attested to a significant increase of the mean score of the counter-arguments (M=1.92, SD=1.256) in contrast with the mean score of the control group E’2 (M=0.33, SD=1.02) (Figure 9.3).

The initial mean score of rebuttal arguments of the experimental group M=0.32 (SD=0.627) was low as well as the mean score of the control group (E’2) (M=0.79 (SD=1.641). No further significant differences were noticed. In the post-test, the experimental group increased the mean score of the rebuttal arguments to M=1.12 (DS=0.881) in contrast with the control group (E’2) which decreased the score to M=0.42 (DS=0.929) (Figure 9.4).

**FIGURE 9.3 NUMBER OF COUNTER-ARGUMENTS (POST-TEST)**

![Graph showing the number of counter-arguments post-test](image)

**FIGURE 9.4 NUMBER OF REBUTTAL-ARGUMENTS (POST-TEST)**

![Graph showing the number of rebuttal-arguments post-test](image)
The use of the T-Test revealed a significant difference in favour of the experimental group (E’1), not only in the production of more counter-arguments \(p = .000 < .05\) but, also, in the production of more rebuttal arguments \(p = .009 < .05\) in confrontation with the control group (E’2) for a confidence level of 95%.

9.4 Conclusions

The results that appear in the previous figures, stress the instructional strength of rhetoric to the teaching of argumentative reasoning, speech and writing in a school context and encourage its further application in pedagogy. A noteworthy point found by the research was that even the experimental group continued to encounter difficulties in the production of rebuttal arguments until the end of the school year. The ‘weak point’ of the opposite argument wasn’t always recognizable in order to be refuted. Students were, often, just limited to the production of a con argument, irrelevant to the semantic content of the previous argument (Gárate & Melero 2004, p. 334).

Despite these limitations of the study, it was clearly indicated that the cooperative and co-constructive context based on the principles of active learning, can be affected by rhetoric and that argumentation contributed as a didactic technique to the efficient teaching of thinking and arguing (Gélat 2003, p. 342). The familiarization of students with ill-structured problems of real life in different contexts activated the generation of their ideas (Duray 2010, p. 58). Students achieved the production of the ‘conversational argument’ through oral interactive practices.

Moreover, the familiarization of students with various sub-genres of argumentation entailed a better comprehension of their functions in a social context and produced the writing of more persuasive texts. The individual enhancement of students’ argumentative capacities stressed at the same time the success of the school community to promote the construction of literacy as ‘a rhetorical act’ (Young & Kendall 2009, p. 342).

References


PART III

Media Discourse
British Media Discourses on the Wearing of Religious Symbols

RUTH BREEZE

10.1 Introduction

Controversy surrounding items of clothing or jewellery worn for religious reasons has arisen with a certain frequency in many western democracies over the past few decades. This seems to occur most frequently in the case of immigrant groups who bring religious customs, and their outward symbols, into countries with a different mainstream culture. However, such controversy is not confined to these situations, since it also arises in contexts where ethnicity is not a factor. Although some countries, such as France and Belgium, have taken definite steps towards legislating on such issues, most politicians in the United Kingdom have preferred to invoke a spirit of tolerance. Nonetheless, issues such as the burka were raised in the campaign running up to the general elections of May 2010, and some prominent figures, including politicians and journalists, expressed dissatisfaction with the current situation. This article explores how the wearing of religious symbols (RS) was framed in four major British newspapers in the first six months of 2010.

Techniques of frame analysis are used to identify and evaluate how issues involving religious symbols worn by Sikhs (turban or kirpan), Christians (cross or crucifix) and Muslims (burka or niqab) were reported. The emergent issue culture is discussed, and some conclusions are drawn about the usefulness of frame analysis to explore the media representation of controversial questions of this kind.

The term ‘religious symbols’ will be used throughout, because the British newspapers in question tend to associate items of dress or jewellery of this kind with religion, rather than with ethnic identity, possibly in order to avoid issues connected with race and situate any controversy within the sphere of religious freedom.
10.2 Theoretical background

Although the concept of framing is frequently used in media studies, it is fair to say that a definitive theory of framing in this area remains to be developed (Entman 1993; Reese 2001; Gamson 2001; D’Angelo 2003; D’Angelo & Kuypers 2009). In the broadest terms, frames are understood to be cognitive structures that guide the perception and representation of reality (Goffman 1974). Frames are not usually created consciously, but are generated in the course of communicative interaction. According to Gitlin (1980, p. 6), ‘Frames are principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters’. In the case of media texts, such interpretive frameworks are made up of elements that are commonly juxtaposed, or non-factual elements (arguments, ideas), which are frequently associated with a specific phenomenon, and which are thought to contribute to structuring the way in which readers or viewers come to think of a particular issue. In Entman’s highly influential essay (1993), frames are defined in the fullest sense as consisting of a problem definition, with diagnosis of causes, a moral evaluation and a solution. Such frames make a powerful contribution to the way ideas are formulated and communicated in public life.

The concept of framing with relation to discourse perhaps requires further clarification. The two notions are obviously closely related, and can be used to research the same social and linguistic phenomena, but they may also be used in isolation of each other within different research paradigms. Frame analysis is often associated with the cognitive paradigm in sociology, psychology and media studies, and framing is often studied in cognitive terms, taking account of issues such as problem identification and locus of attribution, rather than exploring their concrete linguistic realisation (Benford & Snow 2000). In contrast, discourse analysis takes in an extremely broad field of inquiry, but places aspects of language or other semiotic systems in the foreground. Despite the apparent differences, many authors have explored the interrelationship between frames and discourse. Goffman himself became increasingly interested in the actual language used by participants, and in analysis of the language produced in real texts and interactions, which ‘provides us with the cues and markers’ through which people’s positioning towards particular ideas are made manifest (1981, p. 157). In Tannen’s view (1993 pp. 3-5), framing refers to the metacommunicative message about what is going on, that is, what overarching frame of interpretation can be
applied to a particular physical or discursive action. Such interpretive frames operate on a more abstract level than the actions themselves, and enable the participants to understand the meaning of specific actions beyond the immediate context in which they occur. According to Tannen (1993), discourse analysis provides insight into the linguistic means by which frames are created and maintained through communicative activity. In fact, in discourse analysis, the term ‘framing’ has sometimes come to be used quite loosely to mean the general way that a particular utterance is brought into relation with wider issues (Fairclough 2000, p. 111). Thus, a rather complex pattern emerges in which analysis of discourse can support a study of framing, while analysis of frames can help to make sense of discourse. The present chapter will take the view that an investigation of framing will enable the analyst to reach a deeper understanding of media discourses in a subject area in which these discourses appear to be somewhat confused and contradictory.

Although the concept of framing has gained wide currency, it often proves difficult to identify and measure frames in practice (Maher 2001). In general, several problems beset attempts to find and quantify frames, including possible researcher bias (Tankard 2001; van Gorp 2005, 2009), the intrinsic complexity of measuring multiple variables (Esser & D’Angelo 2003), and the difficulty of applying externally derived coding systems (Matthies & Kohring 2008). In media texts, frames are often not fully worked out, in the sense that any given news story or television interview may be seen to frame some aspect of a given issue in a particular way, but may also contain some contradictory elements, which mean that no coherent frame emerges. Moreover, since frames consist of tacit rather than overt conjectures, it may prove surprisingly hard to define them clearly.

One particular problem that arises when analysing media texts from the perspective of framing is that in shorter texts it is common to find elements that could form part of a frame, but rare (except in specific opinion articles such as leaders) to find the frame in a fully developed form (Rojec-ki 2005). Nonetheless, it is undoubtable that the interpretations and evaluations offered in the context of news stories are important aspects of the media representation of those issues, which may have an impact on public opinion, even if they are not presented as fully reasoned arguments. Equally, it may also be true that the somewhat inchoate assessments of particular recurring situations in the media reflect emergent patterns of social thinking on the issues at stake.
For this reason, it would seem to be appropriate in the present context to conduct an analysis based on the frame elements – whether occurring in isolation or as part of a developed argument – rather than focusing on the small number of articles that contain all the components of a frame. The present study therefore follows and builds on the methodological approaches described by Rojecki (2005) and Matthies and Kohring (2008), which set out from an identification of what could be termed ‘framing elements’, such as evaluative statements or causal connections. In these approaches, a frame is understood as a pattern in a text which consists of several elements, which may all be identified and coded separately (Matthies & Kohring 2008, p. 263). An analysis of the way these elements cluster together should produce evidence for the existence of consistent patterns operating across texts, which can be termed ‘frames’. Frames are therefore neither identified beforehand, nor systematically associated with a single variable. The researcher has to examine the texts to detect possible framing elements, quantify their presence in the texts, and then explore the way in which these elements cluster together in order to assess the extent to which they form coherent frames containing all or most of the elements outlined by Entman (1993). Although such a methodology may be applied across a large corpus of text, supported by statistical tools to determine the significance of any clusters that emerge (Matthies & Kohring 2008), a similar method can also be implemented manually in a smaller volume of material. In this case, the researcher should adopt an exploratory approach, first extracting all potential framing elements, then collating them to test for the emergence of frames (Rojecki 2005). Since single elements can be more reliably identified than overarching frames, such a method should prove more reliable than earlier ‘holistic manual approaches’ (Matthies & Kohring 2008). However, care must be taken with the interpretation of any clusters that emerge, and the researcher may need to return to the original text in order to obtain a deeper understanding of the way different elements fit together. The research for the present chapter also draws on the notion of the ‘issue culture’, that is, ‘the taken-for-granted knowledge around a given topic’ (Rojecki 2005, p. 66), which is the set of common frames used to structure analysis of an issue (see also McCombs et al. 2000); and the concept of probative value, which is a product of the clarity of diagnosis and proposed resolution. Analysis of the issue culture and the probative value of particular frames should provide a guide for analyzing media discourses. This, in turn, may shed light on their role in both shaping and reflecting public opinion.
10.3 Corpus and method

Searches were conducted on the online versions of four major British newspapers; namely, the *Guardian*, the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Sun* and the *Mirror*, aimed at finding references to the wearing of religious symbols by Sikhs, Christians and Muslims in news and opinion articles published during the period from 1 January to 30 June 2010. These newspapers were selected because of their political and socio-economic profiles: two are quality broadsheets and two are popular tabloids, on the one hand, while two represent a more right-wing stance and two lean more to the left. All had a large average daily circulation during the 6-month period in question (*Guardian*: 290,912; *Daily Telegraph*: 687,663; *Sun*: 2,976,115; *Mirror*: 1,237,860) (Audit Bureau of Circulations 2010).

The results yielded 100 articles that mentioned or focused explicitly on the wearing of religious symbols by Sikhs (turban and kirpan) (12); Muslims (burka and niqab) (58); and Christians (cross or crucifix) (30). The articles contained a total of 25,923 words. Nineteen of the articles could be classified as opinion articles, while the others were news or feature articles. None of the articles was a leader. Fuller information concerning the articles is displayed in Table 10.1.

**Figure 10.1 Distribution of articles by newspaper and religion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>No. of words</th>
<th>Articles: Sikhs</th>
<th>Articles: Muslims</th>
<th>Articles: Christians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Daily Telegraph</em></td>
<td>11,568</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian</em></td>
<td>43,940</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sun</em></td>
<td>7,207</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mirror</em></td>
<td>2,208</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We conducted an initial reading of the entire corpus in order to identify the interpretive or non-factual elements that could potentially be functioning as part of a frame. These elements were listed, and then compared with each other in order to avoid unnecessary proliferation, and to discard any elements which occurred only once in the entire corpus. Each article was coded for the framing elements which it contained, in order to determine how many articles contained each of the elements that had been identified. The number of times a framing element occurred within a particular article was not counted.
10.4 Results
This first stage yielded a list of 14 different elements, most of which either offered a diagnosis or a moral evaluation of the problem, criticized solutions that had been mooted, or proposed a solution. It was rare to find all the elements of a coherent frame (problem definition, diagnosis of causes, moral evaluation and solution) in one article, except in opinion articles. Following Rojecki (2005), we assumed that it is valid to consider the frame elements even when they do not occur in a coherent sequence or as part of a complete frame, since even when they appear in a fragmented form they may reflect or influence public opinion, and set the scene for future development. The framing elements encountered most frequently are listed below. After this, three extracts from articles in the corpus are discussed, to illustrate how framing elements were identified. Finally, we provide the overall rank order of the different framing elements, and their rank order within each newspaper for each religion.

10.4.1 Framing elements
The framing elements that occurred most frequently in the corpus are set out below. In each case, a quotation is supplied as an example.

A. RS constitute a problem for safety or security: ‘women pose a potential security threat because their faces are completely shielded from view’. (Daily Telegraph)

B. RS pose a threat to (mainstream) values: ‘the burka demeans women by preventing people from seeing their whole faces’. (Daily Telegraph)

C. People have the right to wear RS. ‘If women can choose to wear as little as they like, it is unacceptable that they can’t wear as much as they like too’. (Sun)

D. Different religions are being treated differently: ‘it’s one rule for Christians and another for other faiths’. (Mirror)

E. The state persecutes religious believers in general: ‘perceived clampdown on religious freedom’. (Daily Telegraph)

F. Religious groups are provoking a conflict: ‘the Christian Legal Centre, backed the case of Nadia Eweida, the BA employee who was prevented from wearing a small cross’. (Guardian)

G. Bans on wearing RS cause tension: ‘Racial tensions have been growing as France – home to 5,000,000 Muslims – prepares to introduce an outright ban on wearing the burka’. (Sun)

H. A ban on wearing RS will harm women: ‘a ban may lead to further segregation of women… Muslims may keep them behind locked doors’. (Daily Telegraph)
BRITISH MEDIA DISCOURSES ON THE WEARING OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS

I. State must act to ban RS: ‘as a British Muslim woman, I abhor the practice and am calling on the Government here to follow the lead of the French proposal and ban the burka in Britain’. (Sun)

J. Muslim countries are intolerant: (in Pakistan) ‘women are often pressured into adopting Muslim headwear’. (Daily Telegraph)

K. Wearing RS has absurd consequences: ‘bride is bearded and cross-eyed behind veil’. (Daily Telegraph)

L. Britain has a tradition of tolerance: ‘France is an increasingly difficult place to live in. People should be more open-minded, the way they are in Britain’. (Sun)

M. Companies have the right to impose dress code: ‘BA should be free to ban the cross’. (Guardian)

N. Other EU countries (France, Belgium) are intolerant: ‘Sorry, but where is the equality, the égalité, in targeting a tiny group of Muslim women?’ (Sun)

10.4.2 Identification of framing elements
The following extracts illustrate the way in which frame elements were identified and categorized.

Sikh ‘ceremonial daggers’ should be allowed in schools, says judge
Sikh pupils should be allowed to carry ceremonial daggers, Britain’s first Asian judge has said, following a case in which a 14-year-old was excluded for insisting on bringing his Kirpan blade to school.

Sir Mota Singh QC defended the right of Sikhs to wear the five inch Kirpan blades in public amid a growing revolt against a perceived clampdown on religious freedom in schools.

Last year a boy was forced to leave his school in Barnet, north London because of a ban on the daggers, which must be carried by every Sikh after baptism. Sikh, Christian and Muslim teenagers have taken their schools to court in recent years for the right to wear jewellery and clothing that they claim is central to their faith.

Sir Mota, a Sikh who was born in Kenya but spent his entire life in Britain, said: ‘Not allowing someone who is baptised to wear the Kirpan is not right.’ (…)

Matthew Moore, Daily Telegraph, 8 February 2010

Extract 1.
This extract contains the statement ‘not allowing someone (...) to wear the Kirpan is not right’ and the repeated assertion ‘Sikh pupils should be allowed to carry ceremonial daggers’, which both present the idea that people have the right to wear religious symbols, while ‘a perceived clampdown on religious freedom’ and references to teenagers of different faiths ‘taking their schools to court’ express the notion that the authorities are restricting religious expression. For the purposes of the present study, this article was therefore classified as containing elements C and E. These elements were not quantified within articles, and so the fact that both C and E were stated more than once was not registered. Notably, this article makes no explicit reference to the potential danger of schoolchildren carrying daggers, so it was not classified as containing element A (religious symbols as a threat to safety). Although it is arguable that the very mention of children carrying daggers implies such a threat, it would seem to be reading too much into the article to classify it as containing this proposition.

**BA should be free to ban the cross**

By supporting Nadia Eweida’s right to wear a cross at work, Liberty is backing religious privilege over equality.

A Christian is prevented from wearing a cross at work, though her employer lets Muslim workers wear the hijab, and Sikhs the kara. Clear discrimination, surely? So says Nadia Eweida, who yesterday took her case against BA to the Court of Appeal. Liberty’s director Shami Chakrabarti supports her, arguing that BA’s policy was an intrusion into religious freedom. Eweida’s claim may indeed seem reasonable at first blush, but the principle she and Liberty argue for is wrong. I hope they fail. (....)

Carl Gardner, *Guardian*, 20 January 2010

**Extract 2.**

This extract contains element C (‘BA’s policy was an intrusion into religious freedom’), D (‘Christian is prevented from wearing a cross at work, though her employer lets Muslim workers wear the hijab, and Sikhs the kara’) and F (‘Liberty is backing religious privilege over equality’, ‘the principle she and Liberty argue for is wrong’).
Freedom, equality? Not for Muslims

France has declared the full Islamic face veil an affront to French values – presumably it is against the values of liberté, égalité and fraternité.

Sorry, but where is the equality, the égalité, in targeting a tiny group of Muslim women? Where is their liberty in not being able to choose what they want to wear?

France pretends it is a bastion of equality. This shows it is anything but.

To show it is not targeting poor Muslim women on sink estates, France exclaims it will also pick on the super-rich Muslim women who flock to designer shops.

Anila Baig, Sun, 12 May 2010

Extract 3.

Extract 3 appears to contain elements B (‘an affront to French values’), C (‘Where is the liberty in not being able to choose what they want to wear?’) and N (‘where is the equality, the égalité, in targeting a tiny group of Muslim women?’), since the text makes clear reference to France by using the word ‘égalité’.

10.4.3 Relative frequency of framing element

The rank order of these elements is shown below (N=number of articles in which each element occurred):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(people have the right to wear RS)</th>
<th>43</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>(RS pose a threat to (mainstream) values)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(other EU countries are intolerant)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>(RS constitute a problem for safety or security)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>(the state persecutes religious believers in general)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>(different religions are being treated differently)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distribution of these elements varied according to the religion in question, and the newspaper under scrutiny.
Table 10.2 shows the rank order of framing elements for each religious group in each newspaper. Only elements occurring three or more times in a particular newspaper are included. It is noticeable from this that element C (people have the right to wear religious symbols) is particularly prominent in the case of Sikhs and Christians, and less so in the case of Muslims. The issue of different religious groups being treated differently (D) occurs more frequently in the reporting of cases concerning Christians. In these cases, comparisons are often made between what seems to be lenience when enforcing dress codes on Muslims or Sikhs, and apparent strictness towards Christians. The point that a ban might cause tension (G) is only raised in the case of Muslims. Moreover, it is noticeable that A and B, the elements referring to religious symbols as constituting a threat to safety or contradicting values, are mentioned most frequently in the case of Muslims. Finally, the notion that a particular religious group is deliberately provoking a conflict (F) is prominent only in the Guardian’s reports concerning Christians.

10.5 Discussion
The results reported in the foregoing section suggest that a wide range of non-factual elements are frequently used when reporting news related to the wearing of religious symbols. However, the articles rarely include all the components of a fully functional frame; namely, a definition or full diagnosis of the problem, a moral evaluation and proposals for a solution (Entman 1993). This would appear to indicate that in the present case, the frames are not yet fully consolidated: instead, we are faced with contested discourses that circulate within an emergent issue culture. Nonetheless, when elements representing all the major components are present, they tend to occur in the following patterns, which can be said to form part of wider interpretive frames.
The first frame centres on the idea that wearing religious symbols poses a threat to public safety or values. This is sometimes, though not often, linked to the idea that some religious groups are intolerant. By way of a solution, some articles follow this frame through to the proposal that wearing religious symbols should be banned. However, this occurs in relatively few instances; in most cases, the idea that religious symbols might be a threat to safety or contradict specific values is simply mentioned in passing. So although the fully-fledged version of this frame is coherent, and reflects what is happening in other European countries, it appears not to be fully functional in the British press. It is particularly noticeable that although many articles mention problems associated with wearing religious symbols, very few actually proceed through to proposing a ban. Thus, the logical solution (prohibiting religious symbols) is rarely mentioned. Moreover, two different diagnoses of the problem are presented with almost equal frequency: many articles describe wearing religious symbols as posing a threat to mainstream values, while an almost equally large number diagnoses the problem as being that they constitute a safety or security problem. It therefore appears that this frame lacks probative value, in that there are two rather different diagnoses, and the most logical solution is evidently perceived as problematic.

The nucleus of the second frame is that people have a right to wear religious symbols. In this context, it is often asserted that tolerance is a British value, particularly when compared to continental intolerance. Other ideas that are sometimes linked to this are: the state persecutes believers in general; a ban will provoke tension and harm women; and tolerance should prevail across the board. This frame is proportionally more frequent in the context of Sikhs and Christians than in stories about Muslims, in all the newspapers except the _Sun_, where it is applied even-handedly to cases concerning all three religious groups. Although this frame might be felt to be simplistic, it could be said to offer two particular strengths: its relative clarity and its resonance with the key value of tolerance. Frame 2 offers both a diagnosis and solution (people have the right to wear religious symbols, and the state should lead the way by showing tolerance). Tolerance seems to be a salient value in the British media, crossing the whole political spectrum represented by these newspapers.

At this point, it is important to note that frames one and two are often set side by side, without reaching a solution. These two frames tend jointly to form the ideological background to news and opinion concerning
the wearing of religious symbols in the British press, heavily colouring constitute the emergent issue culture. In broad terms, these two frames reflect two different approaches to multicultural issues: an attitude which assumes that minority groups should conform to the mainstream culture of the day, and a focus based on tolerance and free expression of one’s own identity. In a wider intellectual context, these approaches can be situated on the contested borders between liberal individualist and ethnonationalist masterframes (Rojecki 2005). However, the intrinsic interest of the issue at stake is that the different points of view may fit into either masterframe, either as individual rights to self-expression versus an intolerant nation-state which imposes the values of its own culture, or as the rights of an ethnic group which are being infringed by state-imposed secular liberalism.

The third possible frame centres on the notion that different religions are being treated differently, which contradicts the principles of justice. In such contexts, the state should promote tolerance. At this point, an interesting divergence takes place. The Guardian frequently asserts that Muslims are being persecuted as a result of Islamophobia instigated by extreme right-wing groups, in the United Kingdom and the European Union. However, the other newspapers tend to take the line that Sikhs and/or Christians are being persecuted in Britain, while Muslims are receiving preferential treatment. This third frame thus adds a politically controversial twist to frame two, examining the problem in more detail, and picking up on perceived discriminatory treatment of different religions.

Finally, a fourth frame is also occasionally encountered, mainly in the Guardian, and specifically when discussing cases involving Christians. In this view, religious groups are provoking a conflict for their own ends. Since their behaviour is a deliberate provocation, it should be censured. This view is not found in the context of other religious groups. Frame four thus offers a clear diagnosis, and a policy remedy, but the fact that it is found in only one newspaper suggests that it is not particularly salient across broad sectors of the media in Britain.

It is also interesting to note the relationship between the frames that are applied to different religious groups. It has been noted that frames provide a way of seeing the world which can be transferred from one situation to another. This article starts out from the premise that wearing religious symbols is an issue, and that the wearing of burkas and turbans, say, can be discussed and compared. The articles in this corpus tend to bear out this as-
sumption, since many of them make comparisons between religious groups, their symbols, and the rights of the individuals who wear them. A substantial proportion of the articles mention more than one religious group, or comment on apparent differences in the treatment which their members receive. It would therefore seem that the media do tend to operate with general frames concerning the wearing of religious symbols as such, rather than with specific frames in the case of each group.

We may conclude that the framing of issues concerned with the wearing of religious symbols was not fully consolidated in the majors newspapers of the United Kingdom at the time when this sample was taken. Elements of frame one (religious symbols are a problem) and frame two (people have the right to wear religious symbols) are the commonest ones, and are often seen side by side. The framing elements associated with these frames tend to dominate the discourses on this issue, shaping the issue culture on wearing religious items of dress or jewellery in the United Kingdom. However, so far, the only frame with probative value and some degree of salience seems to be the second frame, which centres on the right to self-expression and public tolerance: people should be free to wear religious symbols, and the state should lead the way by promoting tolerance.

Finally, although the foregoing analysis was in no sense intended to provide a definitive profile of the British media representation of controversy surrounding the wearing of religious symbols, it might be regarded as useful in ‘taking the temperature’ of opinion on this topic. The media have an active role in the ongoing social debate on controversial issues, both reflecting and influencing public opinion. An understanding of the way this particular issue is represented in the press provides insights into public opinion on this subject in early 2010, at a time when the debate on banning the burka raged in France and Belgium. The attitude most frequently projected in the newspapers in this study concerning wearing religious symbols in general was found to be that of tolerance, while the view most often expressed in the specific case of the burka or niqab was the intolerance of other European countries seeking to ban these items of dress. If these four publications serve as an indicator of social thinking on this issue, it would seem that the prevailing attitude among the British public on both sides of the political divide mainly rejected prohibitions on particular items of dress worn for religious reasons. As we have seen, tolerance is perceived across all the newspapers to be a key British value. In this context, it is significant that on 17 July 2010, just after the texts for this corpus had
been gathered, the recently appointed Conservative Immigration Minister Damian Green made a public statement ruling out a ban on the burka, on the grounds that such a move would be ‘rather un-British’. The findings of the present study would seem to suggest that his decision probably reflected the general consensus on this issue at that particular time.

References


Women among Themselves.
A Discourse Analysis of Relationship Advice in Two Popular Flemish Women’s Magazines

MAAIKE VAN DE VOORDE AND MARTINA TEMMERMAN

1.1 Introduction
When considering rhetoric in media discourse, women’s magazines are a kind of media that deserve special attention. Women’s magazines are a particular genre of popular culture (Hyde 2000, p. 159). They have been variously described as a form of escapism for women and as a means of disarming challenges to social norms by vicariously satisfying women’s needs and desires (Allat 1996, p. 37). Adopting the view that ‘women’s magazines are sites for the negotiation of constructions of women’s bodies and social roles, in which women actively create and recreate their understandings of what it means to be a woman’ (Hyde 2000, p. 159), we can say that women’s magazines play an important rhetorical role in shaping and responding to changes that have an impact on women. More specifically, they contain ‘a set of values and practices which are used to instruct women what to think about themselves and how to conduct relationships with their parents, their male partners, their children, their bosses and other women; they are all about what women should be and how they should act’ (Wadia 1991, p. 261).

The aim of this chapter is to investigate these values and practices; more in particular, we want to examine how two popular Flemish (Dutch language) women’s magazines, Het Rijk der Vrouw and Flair, represent their ideas about women and their relationships with their partners. The research focus is diachronic: we will compare Het Rijk der Vrouw of 1958 with Flair of 2008, in order to investigate how the representation has evolved over fifty years.

The Belgian magazine Het Rijk der Vrouw (‘Women’s Realm’) came onto the market in 1933, both in a French (Femmes d’Aujourd’hui – ‘Women
of Today’) and a Dutch language edition (Goethals 1994, p. 47). As both the Dutch and the French names suggest, the magazine focused on fashion for housewives and girls, ideas for fancywork and interior design. It also included several readers’ letters, often with advice on married life and family life (Van Rokeghem, Vercheval-Vervoort & Aubenas 2006, p. 140). The Flemish title ceased to exist in 1990, when the magazine was merged with the magazine Libelle.

Flair was launched in 1980. Until then, the Flemish market only existed of women’s magazines for housewives or magazines for teenage girls. Flair wanted to fill that gap: it was intended for young, modern women between 18 and 34 years old¹. This magazine had to become ‘a friend with whom you can share all your doubts and troubles and who is ready to give good advice on the problems that are related to being a woman’ (Van den Bossche 1995, p. 31). It produced (as it still does) personal testimonies of women readers and information on the latest trends in the world of beauty, shopping and travelling.

Het Rijk der Vrouw and Flair have different target groups: the Flair reader tends to be younger than the reader of Het Rijk der Vrouw (which is aimed at readers between 25 and 54 years old). Moreover, whereas the Flair reader is a working woman, not necessarily in a relationship and not necessarily with children², family life was of core interest for the reader of Het Rijk der Vrouw.

In both magazines, we focus on relationship advice in the problem pages, since these pages are a perfect instance of synthetic sisterhood (Talbot 1995). This notion is based on Fairclough’s synthetic personalization, ‘a compensatory tendency to give the impression of treating each of the people ‘handled’ en masse as an individual’ (Fairclough 2001, p. 52). It involves the construction of an implied reader in an anonymous audience, which is addressed as thousands of identical yous, with attitudes, values, and preoccupations ascribed to them (Talbot 1995, pp. 147-148).

In women’s magazines, the targeted audience is addressed as a single community, based on its femaleness. The picture of the world presented is

¹ Medialogue, ‘Kwalitatieve info – Flair’, www.medialogue.be/nl/cba3e1c5-6641-4b43-95f5-b9c8b9561950?magazine=28 [consulted on 26/05/2009].
that the individual woman is a member not so much of society as a whole but of her society, the world of women (Ferguson 1983, p. 6). Presenting synthetic sisterhood as a frame can be regarded as a rhetorical, persuasive way of addressing the reader.

Of course, women readers do not take every message they read in a magazine for granted. Gauntlett (2002) states that the influence of women’s magazines was overrated by researchers in the seventies. But still, according to Gauntlett (2002, p. 205), these magazines offer a ‘confusing and contradictory set of ideas’. Their readers do not take everything they read seriously, but the influence the magazines have, should not be underestimated either. As we have not included a reception study, we will not be able to say anything in our analysis about the effect of the text on the readers. Instead, we will focus on the representation the text producers put forward, based on the linguistic instantiation of their communication.

11.2 Methodological framework

11.2.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

In order to investigate the ways in which relationships are represented in *Het Rijk der Vrouw* and *Flair*, we build on the tradition of Critical Discourse Analysis (cda) (Fairclough, 1999; van Dijk, 1993; Wodak & Meyer, 2001; Wodak & Chilton, 2005). cda has its roots in Critical Linguistics and has been elaborated by authors like Norman Fairclough (1999), Teun A. van Dijk (1993) and Ruth Wodak (Wodak & Meyer, 2001; Wodak & Chilton, 2005). The discourse analytic approach taken here is concerned with identifying the key representations, themes and discourses which constitute both magazines’ relationship advice (Gill 2009, p. 345).

The role of media in affecting knowledge, beliefs, values, social identities and social relations appears to be partly a matter of how language is used (Oktar 2001, p. 322). The ideological work of media language includes particular ways of representing the world, particular constructions of social identities and social relations. The focus is, then, upon how events, situations and people are represented in media texts (Oktar 2001, p. 322).

In the context of this chapter, Critical Discourse Analysis can be described as a means to uncover the ‘codes’ of social relations in women’s magazines. By paying attention to the priorities, categorizations and descriptions of the social and physical world in media discourses, insight can be gained...
into the ideas, values, notions, concepts and beliefs that are portrayed (Hyde 2000, p. 160).

11.2.2 Interpretative repertoire
One of the recurring themes in women’s magazines is that women’s existence is beset by problems for which magazines provide inspiration and creative solutions. Women are then represented as a unified group confronted by problematic others such as husbands and children (Hyde 2000, p. 159). In the analysis itself, we will categorize these different problems and, more in particular, the magazines’ responses to these problems by means of the notion ‘interpretative repertoire’ (Gill 2009). According to Gill, the interpretative repertoire can be seen as

a unit of analysis that allows scholars to go beyond individual or discrete expressions to begin to identify patterns across and between texts, and to connect these to wider contexts and social formations. The notion speaks to the same phenomena that other discursive traditions regards as ‘discourses’ (e.g. consumer discourse, legal discourse), but does so in a way that allows for dynamism and change (Gill 2009, p. 351).

The interpretative repertoire is an analytic category, which points to the patterning of particular constructions, organized around specific themes, terms and metaphors (Gill 2009, p. 361). Gill has applied the notion to the British women’s magazine *Glamour*. She has analyzed 36 editions of the magazine, more in particular the articles on sex and/or relationships and in this context she has found three different types of interpretative repertoires:

11.2.2.1 Intimate entrepreneurship
The ‘intimate entrepreneurship’ in connection with women and their relationships is based on the language of goals, plans and strategies. It rejects the idea of love striking unexpectedly; on the contrary, relationships are represented as work. Finding a partner and maintaining a relationship are depicted as ‘goals’ which require research, planning and strategy. Consequently, analogies with work are frequently used. Discourses of finance and consumerism are also evident, representing a man as if he were an item for sale. Furthermore, the repertoire builds on the idea of scientific management: women are advised to build detailed checklists of what they want in a part-
ner. That way, a relationship is represented as a set of quantifiable features, whose presence or absence can be ‘ticked off’ in encounters with potential partners (Gill 2009, p. 352).

In this repertoire, women are represented as knowing what they want, and then as using every strategy available to them, to get it. A sense of certainty, confidence and determination is pervasive (Gill 2009, p. 353). Women are constructed as active and autonomous and as ‘taking control’ of their intimate lives (Gill 2009, p. 353).

Although the focus is on intimate relationships, there is no space for emotions – particularly negative ones. Feelings of loneliness, disappointment, anxiety or hurt do not occur in this repertoire. Finding and building relationships is, on the contrary, represented as a professional, rational, quasi-scientific affair.

11.2.2.2 Men-ology: learning to understand, please and reassure men

The second repertoire concerning the relationships between women and men focuses on educating women to understand men, to learn to please them, and to take responsibility for the emotional management of relationships with them (Gill 2009, p. 354). In contrast with the intimate entrepreneurship repertoire, this repertoire represents them as somewhat uncertain and unworldly about sex and intimate relationships. Women seem to need guidance in how to meet men, how to talk to them and how to start a relationship (Gill 2009, p. 354).

As in the intimate entrepreneurship repertoire, ‘expert’ discourse plays a key role. Another similarity is the emphasis on relationships cast as work – in this case women’s work. However, the emphasis is not on women’s satisfaction but on men’s: the man must feel affirmed, understood, complimented and reassured that you find him attractive and would like to see him again (Gill 2009, p. 355). This ‘pleasing the man’ requires a lot of emotional labour, yet this labour is not evenly distributed. Women are called on to communicate and to pay attention to men’s needs. They must be able to read the signs so they can tell if he is genuinely satisfied, and do something about it if he is not (Gill 2009, p. 356). They are constructed as needing to ‘read men’s minds’ (and bodies), yet they should not expect this to be reciprocated (Gill 2009, p. 356). Thus, we can say that in this repertoire, the responsibility to manage any relational problems is attributed to women exclusively.
11.2.2.3 Transforming the self: Remaking sexual subjectivity

The third repertoire centres on transforming the self, and, specifically, making over one’s interior or psychic life (Gill 2009, p. 357). Four themes dominate this repertoire, the first of which is ‘loving your body’. This is presented as a key part of being attractive to men. What is crucial, it is asserted, is not what your body is actually like, but your feelings about your body (Gill 2009, p. 357-8). It is thus the psychological dimension that requires attention: women should worry about their attitude towards their body. Loving your body is presented as being necessary to please men, but also in order to please one self.

A second theme in this repertoire is self-confidence: women are encouraged to transform themselves into confident, secure, optimistic and happy subjects. This transformation is being effected for women themselves – and if, in the process, they win men’s admiration then that is a fortunate accident, but it was not the intention of this remodelling of selfhood (Gill 2009, p. 359).

The third aspect of the repertoire of transforming the self is to persuade women to make themselves over with a positive and open attitude to sex. This is framed in terms of a modified (modernized and upgraded) relationship to the self. Through psychological processes of confession, self-monitoring and neurolinguistic programming women are invited to move from a sexual subjecthood characterized by shame, secrecy and hang-ups to a newly made-over ‘open, healthy and uncomplicated sexual subjectivity’, in which one’s ‘sexual potential is unlocked’ (Gill 2009, p. 360).

Finally, there is the theme of sexual exploration. Maintaining the correct sexual attitude requires constant vigilance, and above all, an openness to adventure (Gill 2009, p. 360). The general advice is: do something new, spice up sex. This attitude is promoted as positive in its own right, not as much for the pleasure that it will bring, as for the intrinsic value of endlessly updating one’s sexual skills and knowledge, propounding variety and pushing at the boundaries of what is possible (Gill 2009, p. 360).

11.2.3 Naming analysis

Naming analysis examines the different names that are used to refer to (social) actors or events within a given (con)text (Trioen & Temmerman, 2009; Van de Voorde & Temmerman, forthcoming). When attributing names to concepts, there are always choices available. Partly, these choices are a mat-
ter of vocabulary: the vocabulary one is familiar with, provides sets of pre-constructed categories, and representation always involves deciding how to locate what is being represented within these sets of categories (Fairclough 1995, p. 109). So, it should be clear that every linguistic representation brings along a specific meaning, based on a specific viewpoint. From this, we can conclude that naming analysis is concerned with both form and meaning. One of the basic principles is that ‘meanings are necessarily realized in forms, and differences in meaning also entail differences in form. Conversely, it is a sensible working assumption that where forms are different, there will be some difference in meaning’ (Fairclough 1995, p. 57-58).

In this chapter, we will examine the names that are used to refer to men to find out which roles are attributed to them in their relationships with women.

1.2.4 Transitivity analysis
We will apply transitivity analysis to describe the processes in the representation of women and men in their relationships. The analysis is based on Halliday’s ideational framework from Systemic-Functional Grammar (e.g. 1994). According to this theory, ‘transitivity’ refers to how meaning is represented in the clause. It shows how language users encode in language their mental picture of reality and how they account for their experience of the world around them (Halliday 1994, p. 106). In this regard, transitivity is concerned with the transmission and representation of ideas, and hence is part of the ideational function of language (Oktar 2001, p. 323). The grammatical clause that represents these processes, consists of three basic components: the Process itself (i.e. the representation of a situation or action), the Participants in the process and the Circumstances that are related to the process. These concepts are semantic categories, which explain in the most general way how phenomena of the real world are represented as linguistic structures (Halliday 1994, p. 109).

The three main types of processes are: 1) material processes, expressing a concrete action (e.g. The lion caught the tourist); 2) mental processes, expressing feeling, thinking, experiencing (e.g. Mary liked the movie); and 3) relational processes, expressing relations between entities (e.g. Sarah owns a dog).

Halliday’s functional view of language, which focuses on studying the relationship between grammatical structures and their social contexts, pro-
vides the necessary grounds for Critical Discourse Analysis to systematically lay bare and interpret the underlying motivations, intentions and goals of language users along with the attitudes, perceptions and prejudices that manipulate them (Oktar 2001, p. 323).

11.3 Corpus
The corpus consists of twelve randomly chosen (by means of a randomizer3) issues of both Het Rijk der Vrouw and Flair. The issues of Het Rijk der Vrouw are from 1958, the issues of Flair from 2008, so that we can make a diachronic comparison of the problem pages of these magazines, with an interval of fifty years. From these pages, we have selected all the articles (questions-answers) that contain sex or relationship advice. Furthermore, we only investigate the answers that are given by the experts of the magazines, because these answers in particular contain some sort of advice. The full corpus contains 37 pieces of advice: 20 from Het Rijk der Vrouw and 17 from Flair.

11.4 Analysis of the data

11.4.1 Interpretative repertoire
First, we have applied the three types of interpretative repertoires found by Gill (2009) for the magazine Glamour to our corpus. We have found that the men-ology theme is the most frequent in Het Rijk der Vrouw (13 out of 20 instances), whereas it is completely absent from Flair. According to this repertoire, women need to learn to understand, please and reassure men. A relationship with a man is thus represented as women’s work.

In the following examples from 1958, women are literally advised to understand and please their husbands:

Ex. (1)4: You have to accept the fact that your husband, besides his love for you, also has another goal in life and you have to take into consideration the reality of life. Be wise, dear Madam, do your best to understand your husband, try to be interested in his activities and do not expect him to be occupied simply and solely with you. (RdV 704-7)

3 www.random.org.
4 We have translated all examples from Dutch to English. The original excerpts in Dutch can be found in Appendix 1.
Ex. (2): [...] when your husband is absent-minded or tired, do not expect him to be thinking about you; on the contrary, it is your job to give him peace and quiet and to give him the proof of your love and commitment. (RdV 669-4)

In examples (3) and (4), the men-ology repertoire is being related to the love between a woman and her partner. Here, truly loving her partner is represented as a condition that needs to be fulfilled before a woman can begin to please and understand her husband:

Ex. (3): If your fiancé is a sincere and honest guy who really loves you, can you forbid him to go swimming with his friends, only because his two sisters are joining them? [...] Allow him this recreation. (RdV 703-7)

Ex. (4): So, if you really love your fiancé, you have to do what he asks you and break off all contact with your friend. (RdV 704-4)

Fifty years later, at least in Flair magazine, trying to maintain a relationship by learning how to understand and please a male partner does not seem to be an issue at all. The theme that occurs most frequently in Flair (14 out of 17 instances) is that of the intimate entrepreneurship. In this repertoire, women are represented as active and autonomous, as in example (5):

Ex. (5): The advantage of thinking of a solution yourself is that you can expand your possibilities and that you do not depend on your boyfriend to spend your time in a pleasant way. (F 15-41)

Flair offers a huge amount of sex advice. In this advice too, women are depicted as taking control over their intimate lives. In examples (6) and (7), women are advised to take the initiative in their sexual relationship with their partner:

Ex. (6): Think about what you need. [...] What is your fantasy, what is your ideal way of petting? Share your thoughts with your boyfriend. (F 18-43)

Ex. (7): So, if you do not want to wait for ever, take some initiative. Tell him about your own sexual experiences. [...] Take the initiative to give him a French kiss or start to caress him in a more sensual or sexual way. (F 30-41)
The representation of women as active, autonomous people already occurred in *Het Rijk der Vrouw*, though it was not the most common representation (six out of 20 instances). In the following example, the reader is advised to do some serious research before she can start a relationship with the man she is in love with:

Ex. (8): [...] it is important to work out if you are suitable for each other with respect to character, heart and soul, if that boy has the necessary sensitivity to adapt himself in another milieu and if he is wise enough to work his way up culturally, so that he can put himself on the same level as you. (RdV 662-2)

It is clear that the effort to maintain the relationship in this case will have to be made by the male partner, and it is the woman who will decide if the man in question is suitable for her. Also in example (9), the woman is represented as active, autonomous and taking control over her relationship:

Ex. (9): Tell him that you absolutely do not agree with his view and that you do not wish to meet him without the knowledge of your parents. When his intentions are straight, there is no reason to not keep your and his parents informed about your relationship) (RdV 703-7)

These are some examples of intimate entrepreneurship in *Het Rijk der Vrouw*. However, explicit advice on taking the initiative in sexual relationships was completely absent from this magazine in 1958.

The third repertoire, in which women are advised to transform themselves, only appears once in *Het Rijk der Vrouw*. In the following example, this transformation of the self is taken quite literally, as the woman in question is advised to make herself over. At the same time, this physical transformation is also presented as a way to become self-confident:

Ex. (10): And because you are not ugly, you have to try to become good-looking by accentuating your type on the basis of the hair style and toilet that suit you best. [...] A woman gains so much self-confidence if she knows she is looking her best! (RdV 662-7)
In *Flair*, three out of 17 instances fit in with this transforming the self-repertoire. In example (11), the reader is advised to spice up sex, to try something new, to become a sexual adventurer:

Ex. (11): Since you enjoy penetration a lot, you can experiment with positions in which he thrusts against your g-spot. [...] A longer foreplay might help. Also train the muscles of your pelvic cavity. (F 38-42)

This is another illustration of the importance of sexual advice for this magazine, but for both magazines, transforming the self does not seem to be the main interpretative repertoire for representing the preferred womanly behaviour.

11.4.2 Naming analysis

In a second phase, we have carried out an analysis of the names that are used to refer to men in order to find out how the relationships of women with their partners are represented. Every single naming practice is a result of processes of selection and construction: by selecting a form out of a range of other possible forms, a particular way of representing the named referent is foregrounded (Trioen & Temmerman 2009, p. 185). It should be emphasized that, strictly speaking, ‘neutral names’ do not exist. Rather, the traced naming practices are to be considered under a range of possibilities, each having its own place on a horizontal axis. To situate each name on this axis, we will use Van de Voorde and Temmerman’s (forthcoming) scheme as represented in figure 11.1.

**FIGURE 11.1 VISUAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE DIFFERENT NAMING CATEGORIES FOR MEN WITH EXAMPLES FROM THE CORPUS**
The horizontal axis consists of three categories. ‘Neutral’ names do not provide evidence of a certain approach or an evaluation; they refer to the named referent in the most general way. The names in the categories ‘characteristic’ and ‘role/relationship’ approach the named referent from a particular point of view, i.e. they highlight one particular meaning of the named referent more than another (e.g. ‘the blonde man’ for ‘characteristic’, ‘my husband’ for ‘role/relationship’). It should be noted that, in many cases, the boundaries between these different groups are fuzzy.

However, the categorization on the horizontal axis is not sufficient. In order to cover the particularity of each naming practice, the names in the categories ‘characteristic’ and ‘role/relationship’ need to be specified further. For this reason, the horizontal axis intersects with a vertical axis which indicates a degree: the higher on the axis, the more evaluative a name is. Note that we have not discriminated between positive and negative evaluations: ‘+’ on the axis means ‘evaluative’ (either positive or negative), ‘-’ means ‘non-evaluative’.

In our corpus, we only consider three naming practices to be ‘neutral’: the personal pronoun hij (he), the proper name of the man and the name (de) man ((the) man). It should be noted that the name man (man) can also be categorized in the category ‘role/relationship’: when preceded by a possessive pronoun as jouw (your) or mijn (my), man (man) refers to the fact that the named man has a relationship with another referent.

In Het Rijk der Vrouw, we have counted a total of 338 instances of names for men, approximately 48 per cent of which is neutral. The most frequently occurring name is the personal pronoun hij (he), followed by the name een/de/die/deze man (a/the/this/that man). This name is sometimes accompanied by an adjective or a relative subordinate clause that gives a certain (evaluative) meaning to this neutral name. But at the same time, man is often used in a generic way: instead of referring to one specific man, it refers to ‘the man’ in general. The proper name of a man only appears once.

Most of the other names refer to a characteristic, role or relationship of the referent. Names that refer to the fact that the referent is married or about to be married are uw/jie man, echtgenoot (both meaning husband in these cases), verloofde (fiancé) and bruidegom (groom). Other instances in this category are jongen (boy), jongeman (young man), jongelieden (young men), vriend (friend) and vader (father).

Examples of naming practices that give an evaluation are buiten-
staander (outsider), eerste liefde (first love) and tiran (tyrant). Often the boundaries between the categories are fuzzy, but we consider ‘first love’ to be more evaluative than ‘fiancé’, as there is an emotional connotation to the first name, which is lacking from the second. The name goede en oprechte kameraden (good and sincere comrades) can also be considered as evaluative, due to the evaluative adjectives.

In Flair, there are less sections with Q&A relationship advice and the texts are shorter than in Het Rijk der Vrouw. We only found 166 instances of names for men, the majority of which is neutral (almost 67 per cent). Again, the most frequently occurring name is the personal pronoun hij (he), followed by the name een/de man (a/the man). Just like in Het Rijk der Vrouw, this name is often used in a generic way. Approximately 33 per cent of the names refers to a characteristic, role or relationship of the named man. Sometimes je man (your man) is used to refer to the married status of the man in question but the term echtgenoot (husband) is never used, as it is indeed becoming obsolete in everyday language use. The most frequently occurring name is vriend (friend). This name can refer to an ‘ordinary’ friend but mostly it refers to the boyfriend or partner of the woman in question, as does the name partner (partner). Vriend also appears in Het Rijk der Vrouw, but then it only refers to an ‘ordinary’ friendship. Therefore, we can conclude that this name in its meaning of ‘partner’, is quite new. Other names in Flair are bedpartner (bed partner), referring to the sexual character of the relationship between the man and woman in question and ex (ex), indicating that the relationship between both parties is over.

The variety of names is more restricted in Flair than in Het Rijk der Vrouw. As we did not encounter examples of evaluative names in Flair, it seems that this magazine approaches (relationships with) men in a more detached and analytic way. This is in line with the intimate entrepreneurship repertoire which prevails in Flair. Whereas Het Rijk der Vrouw evaluates men as tyrants or good comrades, and often refers to men as partners in marriage (fiancé, groom, husband), having an exclusive relationship with one woman, Flair focuses on the different relationships men and women can have, of which marriage is only one possibility. Flair also explicitly discusses men in their roles as bed partners, which corroborates our findings from the previous section, regarding the sexual advice the magazine provides.
11.4.3 Transitivity analysis

In the transitivity analysis, we only examine those clauses in which women and men are Participants and in which a relationship between the two is being expressed. When the woman is the main Participant in the Process, the direction of the Process is indicated as W (woman) → M (man). When the man gets the main role in the Process, the direction is indicated as M → W.

When writing about women and their relationships with men, Het Rijk der Vrouw favours representing them through actions and events: of 216 processes found in the corpus, 32 percent is material. The material processes that occur most frequently, are those referring to marriage: trouwen, in het huwelijksbootje stappen, de grote stap wagen and een huwelijk aangaan (in English, these expressions can all be translated as ‘to get married’). The direction is both W → M and M → W. Another frequently occurring verb is verlaten (to leave). In the examples we have encountered, the direction of these processes is always M → W.

The advice sometimes represents aspects of the inner world of women and men: of all the processes, 46 are mental. The verbs houden van and beminnen (to love) are by far the most frequent in this category (25/46), both with direction W → M as M → W. Other mental processes are begrijpen (to understand) and voelen (to feel).

Due to the smaller corpus size, the number of processes in Flair is fewer than in Het Rijk der Vrouw: in total, Flair contains 158 processes. The majority of these processes is material (more than 50 per cent). In general, the verbs used in these processes are very divergent, due to the diversity of topics that is treated in the answers on the readers’ letters. Examples from the corpus are presteren (to perform), werken (to work) (both with direction M → W) and verwennen (to treat) (W → M).

More than 22 per cent of the processes represent aspects of the inner world of women and men. Some frequently used verbs are voelen (to feel), denken (to think) (both W → M and M → W) and piekeren (to worry) (W → M).

Although focussing on the verbs in a given representation only offers a limited view on the relations between the actors which are represented, the transitivity analysis allows us to make some valuable observations. In the naming analysis, we had already established the focus of Het Rijk der Vrouw on marriage. This is corroborated by the frequent occurrence of verbs concerning marriage. The high frequency of ‘to leave’ in Het Rijk der Vrouw
(always with direction M → W) seems to suggest that women are instructed how to prevent their husbands from leaving them. In Flair, advice regarding marriage is completely absent. Flair does not offer advice on ‘marriages’, only on ‘relationships’. The diversity of material verbs is partly explained by the emphasis on sexual advice in this magazine, describing actions like ‘to treat (sexually)’. On the other hand, the verb ‘to love’ is far more prominent in Het Rijk der Vrouw than in Flair. So, over the years, the central concept in the problem pages seems to have moved from ‘love’ to ‘sex’.

11.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have approached the subject of rhetoric in media discourse through the discourse of women’s magazines. We have applied Critical Discourse Analysis in order to investigate how two popular Flemish women’s magazines, Het Rijk der Vrouw and Flair, represent their ideas about women and their relationships with their partners towards their readers. The research focus is diachronic: we have compared Het Rijk der Vrouw of the year 1958 with Flair of 2008, in order to investigate the evolution of the representation over fifty years. As we have not included a reception study, this analysis does not allow us to say anything about the rhetorical effect on the readers. However, we follow the numerous authors (e.g. Hyde 2000; Wadia 1991) who have pointed out the persuasive goals of women’s magazines and we believe the evolution of the representations over time to be in line with the rhetorical intentions behind the communication.

Our analyses from three different viewpoints have shown that Het Rijk der Vrouw and Flair rely on quite different frameworks with regard to women and their relationships with their partners. In a first phase, we have applied the notion ‘interpretative repertoire’ (Gill 2009) to identify patterns across and between texts, and to connect these to wider contexts and social formations.

Based on the analysis of the interpretative repertoires used in the answers to the readers’ letters of both magazines, we can say that, while women in the fifties were expected to become ‘men-ologists’, i.e. to learn to understand and please their husbands, out of a feeling of true love, women were encouraged to be ‘autonomous entrepreneurs’ in (sexual) relationships in 2008. The high amount of sex advice in Flair and the lack of such advice in Het Rijk der Vrouw indicate that sex is a subject of discussion nowadays, but still was a huge taboo in 1958.
An analysis of the names that are used to refer to men corroborates these findings. Whereas the absolute number of different names is higher in *Het Rijk der Vrouw*, *Flair* has more different names for indicating a man in his exclusive/sexual partner role. The name *echtgenoot* (husband) has disappeared and in 2008, *vriend* (friend) is the most frequently occurring name for indicating a woman’s partner. Marriage is not a distinctive feature for an exclusive relationship anymore, and moreover, exclusivity is not a prerequisite for a sexual relationship.

In the third part of this study we have applied the framework of systemic-functional transitivity analysis to describe the processes in the representation of women in their relationships with their partners. In *Het Rijk der Vrouw*, the material processes that occur most frequently are those referring to the act of marrying. The transitivity analysis thus confirms the conclusion we have drawn earlier; namely, that *Het Rijk der Vrouw* (1958) almost exclusively represents men and women as husbands and wives, and focuses on love and marriage. Moreover, while the mental processes in *Flair* are very diverse, the verbs *houden van* and *beminnen* (to love) are by far the most frequently used in *Het Rijk der Vrouw*. This use again fits in with the love and marriage framework we have found to be typical of this magazine and which seems to have been replaced by a preoccupation with sex in *Flair*.

The evolution in the use of names and the representation of processes reflects the changes in the language, but also in the prevailing standards about relationships that have taken place throughout the years: in the Fifties, women were expected to get married, bring up children and look after their families. Today, at least in our society, these standards are completely different. Women can have a relationship without being married and they have the option to remain childless or to separate when a relationship does not work. Our analysis of the rhetorical language of these two magazines, based on different theoretical viewpoints, has shown how immensely the representation of women and their relationships has changed over fifty years.

**Appendix: original excerpts in Dutch**

(1) U moet aannemen dat uw man, naast zijn liefde voor U, ook nog een ander levensdoel heeft en rekening houden moet met de werkelijkheid van het leven. Wees dus verstandig, geachte Mevrouw, doe uw best om uw man te begrijpen, tracht belang te stellen in zijn bezigheden en liefhebberijen en verg niet dat hij zich enkel en alleen met U bezighoudt.

[3] Zo je verloofde een oprechte en eerlijke jongen is die innig en diep van je houdt, mag je hem dan het genoegen ontzeggen met zijn vriend te gaan zwemmen, enkel en alleen omdat zijn twee zusters er bij zijn? […] Gun je verloofde dan deze ontpanning […]

[4] Indien je dus innig van je verloofde houdt, moet je doen wat hij je vraagt en alle omgang met je vriendin staken.

[5] Het voordeel aan zelf een oplossing bedenken, is dat je daarmee je mogelijkheden uitbreidt en niet afhankelijk bent van je vriend om je tijd op een aangename manier te besteden.


[8] […] het is van belang na te gaan of U voor elkander geschikt bent wat betreft karakter, hart en geest, of die jongen de nodige fijngevoeligheid bezit om zich aan te passen in een ander midden en of hij verstandig genoeg is om zich cultureel op te werken, opdat hij op hetzelfde plan zou komen te staan als U.

[9] Zeg hem gerust dat je het absoluut niet eens bent met zijn zienswijze, en dat je hem niet wenst te ontmoeten buiten het weten om van je ouders, zo zijn bedoelingen eerlijk zijn, bestaat er immers geen reden opdat, zowel jouw als zijn ouders niet op de hoogte zouden worden gesteld van jullie betrekkingen.

[10] En vermits u niet lelijk bent, moet u proberen mooi te worden door uw type te accentueren dank zij het kapsel en het toilet die u het best passen. […] En een vrouw heeft zoveel meer zelfvertrouwen als zij weet dat zij er op haar voordeligst uitziet!


References


12 Author-character as Rhetorical Strategy: Constructing the Ethos of the Newspaper Columnist

FERNANDO LÓPEZ PAN AND JAVIER SERRANO-PUCHE

12.1 Introduction
The newspaper column is an opinion genre that enjoys considerable freedom, and which news-writing handbooks commonly define in terms of two key external elements: signature and periodic publication. The purpose of this chapter is to show that the rhetorical strength of the column rests on the ethical proof or ethos that arises from the text precisely because of the freedom of which the columnist may avail.

In the first part of the chapter, we present a concept of ethos based on the Aristotelian approach (Aristotle; Ryan 1984; Lausberg 1975; Smith 2004; Woerther 2007) in conjunction with other, later contributions (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1989; Enos 1990), subsequently developed and applied by López Pan (1995, 1996, 2005, and 2011) as a way of carrying out a rhetorical analysis of journalistic columns1. In light of this progression in meaning, the idea of ethos may be regarded as threefold: the nuclear ethos, defined by topics, values and the principles of the speaker/writer; the formal ethos, which refers to stylistic features; and what Aristotle regards as the rhetorical use of the poetic ethos, when the speaker/writer himself becomes

1 Along with the article (its predecessor), the column is a genre that has a long and established tradition in Spanish journalism, and a wide range of academic research contributions have addressed the column from a theoretical perspective (León Gross 1996, 2005; Casals 2000, 2003, 2004, 2007; Gómez Calderón 2004, 2005, 2008; López Hidalgo 1996, 2005, 2012; Mancera, 2009; Sanmartí, 2007; Seoane 2005, 2008); however, such research does not draw on the idea of ethos as defined and deployed here. In contrast, the column has been the subject of relatively little academic inquiry in the English-speaking world, and the approach taken in what research does exist is markedly practical (Fink 2004).
a character in his own discourse/text. In the second part, we explain what a newspaper column is, and the relationship between that opinion genre and the rhetorical *ethos*, a notion that comprises a more in-depth account of the typical features of signature, regular recurrence, and thematic and expressive freedom. Against the backdrop of this theoretical context, the last section of the chapter addresses the rhetorical use of the *poetic ethos* by analyzing a collection of columns published by three Spanish columnists and writers (Arturo Pérez-Reverte, Juan Manuel de Prada and Antonio Muñoz Molina).

It should be noted that this contribution does not comprise a study of these authors as column writers; nor is it an account of how each one frames his particular *ethos* (a purpose that would require an exploration of all three dimensions: *nuclear, formal and poetic*); or an attempt to trace the outline of each column writer’s *poetic ethos*, an endeavour that would, in turn, require the inclusion of more texts by each author and a more detailed analysis of which characteristics feature in each text, which do not and why (not), etc. Rather, the overall objective here is to provide an integrated overview of the developed notion of *ethos* (as applied by López Pan to the column as a journalistic genre) for a non-Spanish academic readership, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, to show the analytical potential afforded by the idea of *poetic ethos* through close reading of the columns in which the authors listed above appear as characters. Moreover, how such characters are defined in terms of the three features of the honourable man listed by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* is also addressed: practical skills and wisdom (*phronesis*), virtue or goodness (*arete*) and goodwill towards the audience (*eunoia*).

### 12.2 Rhetorical *ethos* and its scope

Aristotle was the first to elevate *ethos* to the level of rhetorical proof – on the same level as *logos* and *pathos* – while defining it much more precisely and giving it a significance not ordinarily found in earlier authors:

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2 From a more wide-ranging point of view and following a different approach, De Urioste (2006) has studied the columns written by Arturo Pérez-Reverte; Martín García (2004) and Herzberger (2006), those by Antonio Muñoz Molina; and Vega Rodríguez (2006), the columns of Juan Manuel de Prada.

3 Roksvold (2006), in which one opinion article is analyzed in terms of *ethos*, is an exception in this regard, although the scope of the approach falls far short of what is set out here.

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Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others; this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses (1356a 5 ss).

For Aristotle, *ethos* is comprised of two characteristics:

a) It should be achieved ‘by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak’ (1356a 8-10). In this sense, a more contemporary expression of the idea would be to affirm that ‘the rhetorical situation renders the speaker an element of the discourse itself, no longer simply its origin (and thus consciousness standing outside the text) but rather a signifier standing inside an expanded text’ (Baumlin 1994, p. xvii).

b) It should act ‘in a subtle and hidden manner’. The question is ‘how the speaker might be able to build up an esteem for himself in the minds of his hearers, and to do it artistically’ (Ryan 1984, p. 174).

According to López Pan (1995, 1996), for Aristotle, this implicit and discursive *ethos* has two dimensions. The first dimension is the nuclear, which is expressed by means of values, moral and ideological preferences, etc., and which operates through the choice of words, maxims and sentences, through what presents itself as good, appropriate, etc. (or by contrast, the despicable, inappropriate, etc.). This *ethos* also generates itself through the *logos* – the values, ideas and preferences that follow from the premises of the enthymemes, necessarily shared by the audience – and the *pathos*. The nuclear *ethos* acts through the other two proofs, passing through them in some way. The second dimension is the formal, which encompasses stylistics, the pace of speech and the rhetorical figures.

Contrary to Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian considered self-reference or self-praise to be part of the *ethos*. To some extent, the system of classical rhetoric cited a third dimension of *ethos*, referred to here as the *rhetorical use of poetic ethos*. In more contemporary terms, this third dimension may be
described as the construction of ethos through the presence of the speaker as a character in his own speech.

This dimension of the ethos is explored in greater detail below; but first, a brief overview of contemporary rhetoric, which also applies to speeches where the audience is an abstraction because it is not physically present, may be of interest in this regard: namely, discourse through the media and written texts. In the context of this chapter, Theresa Enos’s position is especially pertinent. To Enos’s mind, the writer does not consider the audience in the initial stages of writing, but rather he ‘creates the audience out of potentially shared perceptions of reality’ (Enos 1990, p. 100) and, upon creating it, invents something that is already a part of himself. The ethos stems from what Enos calls the stylistic universe of the writer, which includes, together with ‘how a writer uses and arranges words and sentences’ (Enos 1990, p. 101), the issues addressed, how the writer/speaker presents himself and how writer/speaker presents the topic to the audience.

However, when the reader feels drawn to that ‘self’, when an empathy develops between the ego of the writer and the reader’s ego, it takes the same first step as any persuasion: ‘The writer has projected a self that invites the reader in, and, if readers identify with this self, they, in effect, become part of that ‘self’, become the audience, in the process of reading’ (Ibid., p. 102). Enos concludes that ‘ethos can never be separated from the writer and audience’ (Ibid., p. 111); every time the reader becomes the audience, he recreates and reinvents the ethos: ‘Ethos is the between’ (Ibid., p. 111), the meeting place and point of contact, the shared world of values, ideas and attitudes towards life, the ground shared by both poles of the rhetorical exchange, the intersection of two personal universes.

In light of this revised notion of ethos, and in advance of exploring how it operates in the particular case of the columnists selected for analysis, its relationship to the newspaper column should first be shown.

12.3 Newspaper column and ethos

From the perspective of the author’s presence, journalistic texts move between two extremes: the conventional story, in which the journalist ought to be subjected to professional standards, and the column, the maximum degree of personal journalism, in which the columnist chooses the topic, the point of view about the subject and the style. He enjoys considerable freedom with respect to the forms of expression – narration, argumentation
and representation – and all their possible combinations, while benefitting from a very flexible structure.

A sample of the extensive freedom of columnist is the very typology of the personal column. Standring (2007), for example, lists the following types: humour, lifestyle, metro, opinion and religion columns, to which he adds the niche or customized column, i.e. columns on issues in which the journalist is expert. In any case, this varied typology tends to fall into two broad categories: personal columns (Martínez Albertos 1989; León Gross 1996; Casals 2000; Gómez Calderón 2004), among which categories such as writers’ columns stand out (Grohmann 2005, 2006); and thematic or specialty columns, to use the term coined by Fink (2004), which deal with current affairs, economics, culture, sport, etc.

The most relevant point in this context is that such freedom in tone, register, style and content explains why the tendency has been to define the column in relation to the category known in literature as paratext or exergue (Grohmann 2006, p. 30), i.e. by pointing to the external characteristics of the text: the signature and fixed sections, regularity of publication and, to a lesser degree, typographical relevance and similarity in extension or length.

Beyond these extra-textual features, and clearly in line with the almost unrestricted freedom outlined above, Lopez Pan (1995, 1996, 2005, and 2011) has argued that the column is characterized by the strong presence of an ethos, which becomes the dominant rhetorical strategy. Obviously, this ethos does not have the same intensity in columns on specialized topics as in personal columns, where its full potential may unfold, enabling the columnist to create a personal image upon which the persuasive force of the column rests. Given the rhetorical context mediated, the ethos generates a mutual adaptation between the writer and readers in the column. The columnist knows who is to encounter and read the lines that he wrote the previous evening, which enables him or her to make strategic decisions about the text. For readers, this process is like discovering someone who thinks the same way as they do and whom they may trust. Ultimately, the readers share the same point of view about the world and about life as the columnist within the little universe of a text. A shared ethos emerges, one which prompts the trust of readers and lends credibility to the columnist. The reader discovers a person that speaks to him or her, a self that is present and sells itself in each, an ‘I’ that he or she feels comfortable with. This is the personal transaction of which Zinsser speaks (1994).
This overlap between the text and the ‘self’ leads readers to attribute to the columnist traits of honesty, credibility and competence, because readers tend to trust those with whom they usually agree and share values, and who react to events in a way similar to their own. These similarities make the reader feel comfortable with a columnist. Zinsser makes a similar point in relation to writing in general: ‘When we say we like the style of a writer, we mean that we like her personality as expressed on paper’ (Zinsser 1994, p. 276); and he concludes: ‘Ultimately, the product that any writer has to sell is not the topic he writes about, but himself’ (Zinsser 1994, p. 5).

The ethos serves as a foundation and provides an explanation for various, in some cases, intuitive insights into the column. This explains the advice of writers such as González Reyna, who among his recommendations for column writing recommended ‘producing in the reader the image of an attractive personality because the column depends upon it to be read’ (González Reyna 1991, p. 97). The same author acknowledges that the journalist should be familiar with his or her subject and, at the same time, possess the ‘ability to project a strong personality and appeal to the public, empathize with them and hold their attention’ (González Reyna 1991, p. 89).

As a matter of course, that personality is presented in the formal and nuclear dimensions of ethos and, in some cases, through the poetic ethos, when the columnist becomes a character within his or her own text, a common phenomenon in so-called personal columns, and especially in those that Grohmann refers to as writer’s columns.

To construct himself as a character (Bal 1987, pp. 87-100), an author (a columnist, in this case) may 1) make explicit statements about his or her own characteristics and traits; 2) pick up on or report what others say about him or her; and/or 3) accompany the action with an explicit statement of a character trait.

12.4 The unthemed poetic ethos in the columns of Pérez-Reverte, de Prada and Muñoz Molina

In the following analysis, we focus on three renowned Spanish writer-columnists: Arturo Pérez-Reverte, Juan Manuel de Prada and Antonio Muñoz Molina. The corpus selection comprises a total of 148 texts: the columns published by Arturo Pérez-Reverte in the Sunday Magazine ‘XL Semanal’ between 2005 and 2009, later collected in the book Cuando éramos honrados mercenarios (2009); the articles published by Juan Manuel de Prada in...
Arturo Pérez-Reverte, Juan Manuel de Prada and Antonio Muñoz Molina construct themselves as characters in their columns, not through self-praise or explicit claims about their qualities, but in an indirect way, showing themselves in action or through the words that others say about them. Hence, we are faced with an instance of what Dascal (1999) called unthemed ethos, which acts in a subtle and indirect way, since the audience deduces or infers the characteristics of the columnist from the references, scenes and stories that show the speaker in action. In other words, the action and what is said in the speech serves as a premise from which the reader may infer the speaker’s characteristics. Such traits will be at the service of what Aristotle pointed to as the three characteristics of the man worthy of praise in the *Rhetoric*: prudence (*phronësis*), virtue (*arête*) and benevolence (*eunoía*).

As will be seen, the features that are deduced from the columnist as a character do not connote ideas, values, or moral or ideological preferences, but rather to other formal features that heighten credibility. In particular, we will see how these authors show their prudence and their closeness to readers.

### 12.4.1 Prudence

This is the quality by which a person ‘is capable of deliberating, determining the benefits of each option and deciding’ (Woerther 2007, p. 223). The prudent person knows how to weigh pros and cons in deliberation, is competent, possessing a right, practical intelligence that includes reflection and awareness of reality, and asks of the ‘listener, reader or viewer, implicit trust as a guide’ (García-Noblejas 1982, p. 290). Features of the prudent person include intellectual skills, a level of cultural awareness, professional competence and life experience; such characteristics are especially significant when they are pointed out by others.

The three columnists confirm a level of cultural and professional competence that is reflected in their extensive knowledge of the world, either through direct observation or reading:

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Adicto a las enciclopedias, inevitablemente me dejo atrapar por la enciclopedia y la malla infinita de Internet \(\text{Addicted to encyclopedias, I invariably let myself get caught up in the encyclopedia and the Internet’s infinite mesh} \) (Muñoz Molina 2002, p. 38)\(^5\).

Lo bueno que tiene esto de la literatura, o sea, de leer libros, es que uno puede celebrar los aniversarios que le salgan de las narices, sin que el asunto dependa de los editores \(\text{The good thing about this thing called literature, that is, reading books, is that you can celebrate the anniversaries you damn well please, without the matter depending on editors} \) (Pérez-Reverte 2009, p. 157).

Or with regular references to their travels around the globe:

Cada uno tiene su París, naturalmente. El mío incluye algunos museos, restaurantes y cafés, los soportales del Palais Royal, la casa de Víctor Hugo en la plaza de los Vosgos, la estatua del mariscal Ney –bravo entre los bravos– junto a La Closerie des Lilas, el león junto al que pasaron los republicanos españoles de la División Leclerc, el Pont des Arts, la Rue Jacob –allí están mis editores gabachos–, algún anticuario al que soy fiel desde hace casi cuarenta años, una veintena de librerías y los buquinistas del Sena \(\text{Everyone has their own Paris, of course. Mine includes several museums, restaurants and cafes, the arcades of the Palais Royal, the house of Victor Hugo in the Place des Vosges, the statue of Marshal Ney, bravest of the brave, next to La Closerie des Lilas, the lion past which the Spanish Republicans who formed the Division Leclerc marched, the Pont des Arts, Rue Jacob, where my ‘Frenchy’ editors are to be found, an antiques shop to which I have been a faithful visitor for almost forty years, some twenty bookshops and the bouquinistes along the Seine} \) (Pérez-Reverte 2009, p. 307)

Visité Lisboa en vísperas de su Exposición Universal, hace ya muchos años, y me tropecé con una ciudad patas arriba \(\text{I visited Lisbon on the eve of the World Exhibition many years ago, and found a city that was turned upside down} \) (De Prada 2010, p. 246)

En Nueva York alquilo, a través de una agencia, el apartamento de alguien. Después del cansancio y el aturdimiento del viaje, aún nos espera otra segunda

\(^5\) The columns have not been translated before; for this reason, the original Spanish of the selected fragments is given here, followed by a loose translation into English. Such translation is especially difficult given the conversational tone of the texts, and the richness of the vocabulary they use, but these limitations do not affect the objective of the work: to show the writers as characters in their own columns.
llegada [In New York I rent someone’s apartment through an agency. After the fatigue and numbness of the trip, another second coming still awaits us] (Muñoz Molina 2002, p. 106).

Moreover, in the case of Pérez-Reverte, his knowledge is enriched by long experience as a war reporter:

Con esa corbata de punto marrón entrevisté a Gaddafi, a Sadam Hussein, a Assad, a Obiang, a Somoza, a Galtieri –que estaba, por cierto, con una tajada enorme– y a unos cuantos más. Era, como digo, mi corbata de protocolo; y cuando estaba muy vieja buscaba otra idéntica: siempre fui de piñón fijo. Solía comprarlas durante las escalas que hacía en Roma cuando iba o venía de Oriente Medio, en una camisería del Corso que todavía las vende, aunque ya no son las mismas [With that brown, spotted tie, I interviewed Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Assad, Obiang, Somoza, Galtieri (who was, incidentally, completely smashed) and a few others. It was, as I say, my protocol tie, and when it was very old-looking I went looking for another identical one. I’ve always been like a dog with a bone. I used to buy them on stopovers in Rome when I was coming or going from the Middle East, in a shirtmaker’s on the Corso that still sells them, though they’re not the same anymore] (Pérez-Reverte 2009, p. 103).

Such knowledge of the world, along with references to his professional past, point to Pérez-Reverte’s experience. At the same time, the texts analyzed show that the three writers constantly monitor the news, either on the radio:

Estoy escuchando una emisora seria, una emisora con solvencia informativa [I’m listening to a station, a station with credible news reporting] (Muñoz Molina 2002, p. 165).

On television:

Y en efecto: de vuelta al hotel en París, cuando encendí la tele, vi a unos soldados caminando por una calle junto a un vehículo [And indeed, back at the hotel in Paris, when I turned on the TV, I saw soldiers walking down a street next to a vehicle] (Pérez-Reverte 2009, p. 69).

Finally, of course, the writers follow the press closely:
Y entre esa malla de hábitos no puede faltar el de llegar al quiosco y elegir el periódico y mirar la primera o la última página antes de abrirlo, inspeccionándolo, como se palpa la corteza o se huele el pan que también necesitamos todos los días. [And in this tangle of habits a visit to the newspaper stand cannot be missed, to choose a paper, scan the front and back pages before opening it, inspecting it, just like we squeeze the fruit or smell the bread that we also need every day] (Muñoz Molina 2002, p. 16).

El otro día, mientras leía las crónicas que la prensa dedicaba a la exhibición que el canonizado cocinero realizó en un congreso culinario… [The other day, while I was reading the press reports about the cooking display the famous chef gave at a culinary congress…] (De Prada 2010, p. 214).

The professional qualifications of the authors are not limited to their monitoring the news; rather, each also exhibits a refined cultural awareness, in its various forms. Muñoz Molina, above all, pays closest attention to such details. Thus, there are references to classical music:

Hace unos meses, mientras escuchaba al prodigioso cuarteto de Alban Berg tocando uno de los últimos cuartetos de cuerda de Beethoven [A few months ago, while listening to the phenomenal Alban Berg Quartet playing one of Beethoven’s last string quartets] (Muñoz Molina 2002, p. 302).

And to art:

Ahora hay una exposición prodigiosa de Miquel Barceló en el Reina Sofía y mientras me paseaba por ella, maravillado y mareado de tal abundancia de trabajo (...) me acordaba de esa foto, de las manos manchadas de barro [Now there is a wonderful Miquel Barceló exhibition in the Reina Sofia [Museum in Madrid], and as I walked around it, amazed and dizzy at such a profusion of work (...) I remembered that photo, the one of the muddy hands] (Muñoz Molina 2002, p. 180).

Veo en Barcelona la exposición de Mark Rothko y me doy cuenta de que he necesitado media vida de afición apasionada por la pintura para aprender a mirar las serenas extensiones de color [I see the Mark Rothko exhibition in Barcelona and I realize that I needed half a life of a passionate love for painting to learn to look at the serene expanses of colour] (Muñoz Molina 2002, p. 263).

There are allusions to theatre and, of course, to literature:
Veía San Juan en el teatro, erigida por fin en el tiempo presente y en la realidad (...)

Pero lo que yo estaba viendo no era una función de teatro: usurpaba el porvenir de otro hombre, Max Aub, asistía al cumplimiento tardío y parcial de un sueño que era suyo [I saw ‘St. John’ in the theater, set at last in the present tense and in reality (...)

But what I was seeing was not a play: usurping the future of another man, Max Aub, I attended the delayed and partial fulfillment of a dream that had been his] (Muñoz Molina 2002, p. 59).

Leyendo en estos días un ensayo brillantísimo de Fabrice Hadjadj, La fe de los demonios [These days I have been reading a brilliant essay by Fabrice Hadjadj, The Faith of Demons] (De Prada 2010, p. 276).

The three writers allude to their publicly significant roles as lecturers and literary authors:

Mi favorita es cuando, tras una conferencia en la que dije que a veces era más reprobable moralmente el político infame que se beneficia del terrorismo que el terrorista propiamente dicho, ya que este último corría riesgos y el otro ninguno, un diario tituló, en primera página: ‘Pérez-Reverte prefiere un terrorista a un político’ [My favourite one is when, after a conference where I said that sometimes the loathsome politician who benefits from terrorism is more morally reprehensible than the terrorist himself, since the latter runs some risk and the former none at all, the following headline appeared on the front page of a newspaper: ‘Pérez-Reverte prefers terrorists to politicians’] (Pérez-Reverte 2009, p. 119).

Una vez, en el Salón del Libro de París, me vi sentado en una mesa de firmas junto a mi colega Arturo Pérez-Reverte, que era tan abrumadoramente visible para el público que los ejecutivos de la editorial tenían que poner orden en el tumulto de quienes buscaban una firma suya. Sentado junto a él, casi cododo con cododo, yo era invisible, y también lo era el cartel con mi nombre, y la pila de libros míos que nadie compraba] (Muñoz Molina 2002, p. 239).

Una querida lectora me envía una hojilla reciente del almanaque del Sagrado Corazón, en la que aparece, debajo de los números panzudos que registran el día, una cita extraída de alguno de mis libros o artículos [A dear reader sent me a page
from a recent issue of the Almanac of the Sacred Heart, in which a quote from one of my books or articles appears, underneath the paunchy numbers that indicate the day] (De Prada 2010, p. 226).

The personal prestige of the columnists is also reflected in the friendships they have with important figures in the fields of politics and culture:


De Prada: ‘A mi amigo Paul Naschy le dedicaron ayer una calle en Estepona...’. ‘Comí el otro día con Santiago Martín, el Viti, el gran torero de Vitigudino...’. ['They dedicated a street in Estepona to my friend Paul Naschy yesterday...'] (De Prada 2010, p. 161). 'I had lunch the other day with Santiago Martin, el Viti, the great bullfighter from Vitigudino...' (De Prada 2010, p. 153).

In the case of Pérez-Reverte, allusions to his friendships with ordinary people are also frequent, implying that his successful career has not cut him off from contact with popular sentiment:

Tengo un amigo que es picoleto de los de toda la vida. Guardia civil caminera, o como se diga ahora, si es que se dice (...) Mi amigo Iker –yo no los elijo, que conste– se apoya en la barra del bar de Lola, pide la caña ritual y expone su versión del asunto. [I have a friend who has been policeman all his life; a Civil Guard highway patrolman, or whatever they are called these days, if they are called anything at all... (Pérez-Reverte 2009, p. 310). My friend Iker, I don't choose them, let it be said, leans on Lola's bar, orders the ritual beer and explains his version of the affair... (Pérez-Reverte 2009, p. 340)].

12.4.2 Benevolence and virtue
Benevolence is good will towards one's audience, a positive attitude, a concern for one's readership or listenership. Benevolence is a defining feature of
one who portrays himself as a friend to the listener or reader, who, in turn, does not doubt the writer’s intentions. A common strategy used to establish this advantageous position is to offer to share secrets with one’s readers, revealing the details of personal habits and scenes of family life, as in the following examples:

Como saben los veteranos de esta página, el arriba firmante desayuna crispis con un vaso de leche –dejé el colacao hace un par de años– y hojeando revistas del corazón… [As long-time readers of this page know, the author has Rice Krispies and a glass of milk for breakfast – I gave up having chocolate milk a couple of years ago – while leafing through gossip magazines…] (Pérez-Reverte 2009, p. 557)

La primera palabra que pronunció mi hija no fue ‘papá’, ni ‘mamá’, sino ‘agua’. Lo hizo cuando apenas había echado a andar. [The first word my daughter ever said was not ‘Dada’ or ‘Mama’, but ‘water’. She did this when she had barely begun to walk.] (De Prada 2010, p. 238)

Con Miguel, que tiene dieciséis años, y Arturo, que acaba de cumplir quince, he ido una tarde de estas vacaciones a ver A hard day’s night, la primera película de los Beatles. [With Miguel, who is sixteen, and Arturo, who has just turned fifteen, I went one evening over the holidays to see ‘A Hard Day’s Night’, the Beatles’ first film] (Muñoz Molina 2002, p. 318).

The three authors are also lavish in sharing memories of their childhoods and youthful experiences. Pérez-Reverte remembers how his passion for the sea was forged from an early age:

Mi tío fue el primer héroe de mi infancia (...) He dicho que lo idolatraba. Al día siguiente de su atraque, muy temprano, iba a su casa y me metía en la cama entre él y mi tía, para que me contara aventuras del mar [My uncle was my first childhood hero (...)] I have said before that I idolized him. The day he docked, very early, I went to his house and I crawled into bed between him and my aunt so he could tell me of his adventures at sea] (Pérez-Reverte 2009, p. 59)

Colecciono combates navales desde niño, cuando mi abuelo y mi padre me contaban Salamina, Actium, Lepanto o Trafalgar (...) La del cabo Machichaco es mi historia naval española favorita del siglo XX [I have collected naval battles since childhood, when my grandfather and my father told me about Salamis, Actium, Lepanto and Trafalgar (...) Cape Machichaco is my favourite Spanish naval story of the twentieth century] (Pérez-Reverte 2009, p. 480).
As regards Muñoz Molina, his childhood memories reveal certain secrets about the poverty of his family. Thus, by revealing his humble background, he may garner the sympathy and empathy of readers:

Sentados en los escalones de las puertas o jugando sobre la tierra apisonada, los niños veíamos pasar el río cotidiano el mundo (...) Yo conocí en esas ocasiones un sentimiento agudo de pobreza y vergüenza ajena: por comparación con la gente que iba camino de la boda, con trajes nuevos y zapatos flamantes, nosotros los niños que jugábamos sobre la tierra de la plaza y las madres asomadas a las puertas, parecíamos mucho más pobres; y cuando veía a aquellas mujeres emocionarse tanto, mirar a la novia con los ojos llenos de lágrimas, incluso llamarla guapa en un arrebato de entusiasmo, me embargaba una impresión confusa, pero muy fuerte, de ridículo [Sitting on doorsteps or playing on the packed earth, we children saw the everyday changing world (...) On such occasions, I had an acute feeling of poverty and embarrassment: compared to people on their way to a wedding, in new suits and shiny shoes, we children playing on the hard ground of the square, our mothers leaning out of doorways, seemed much poorer; and when I saw those women so moved, looking at the bride, their eyes brimming with tears, even calling her beautiful in a fit of enthusiasm, I was filled with a confused, but very strong, sense of the ridiculous] (Muñoz Molina 2002, pp. 135-136)

De Prada’s most vivid childhood memories are strongly associated with his grandparents. For example, he says he remembers

aquellos pasajes de la infancia que son mi mejor tesoro, cuando paseaba de la mano de mi abuelo y juntos entablabamos diálogos divagatorios, o recolectábamos hierbas para sus tisanas, o cantábamos canciones antiquísimas que en sus labios se hacían salmodia [those stages of childhood that are my greatest treasure, walking hand in hand with my grandfather, sharing rambling dialogues or gathering herbs for his herbal teas, or singing ancient songs that from his lips sounded like psalms] (De Prada 2010, p. 231-232).

Moreover, both Pérez-Reverte and de Prada evince regular interaction with their readers, to whom they respond with suggestions and comments.

A menudo llegan cartas pidiendo que recomiende un libro para jóvenes. Algo que los anime a leer [I often receive letters from people asking me to recommend a book for
young people. Something that will encourage them to read] (Pérez Reverte 2009, p. 334).
Hay una clase de cartas, entre las que me escriben los lunes, cuya virulencia supera, incluso, la de las feministas [There is a kind of letter, among those who write to me on Mondays, whose virulence exceeds even that of the feminists] (Pérez-Reverte 2009, p. 337).

De Prada sometimes presents himself with a sense of humility inflected with a tone of irony:

Alguna de las tres o cuatro lectoras que todavía me soportan se ha dirigido a mí en solicitud de una recomendación libresca [One of the three or four readers who still put up with me have asked me for a bookish recommendation] (De Prada 2010, p. 182).

In a reversal of the order set out by Aristotle, virtue has been left to the end here. Virtue is a defining feature of those who are not afraid to face the consequences of their decisions and actions. The idea of virtue has been left until last because it so rarely appears in the columns analyzed for the purposes of this chapter. In fact, only a few examples cited from the work of Muñoz Molina may be given here, in which he argues that virtue is linked to non-conformity in a broad sense:

Yo recuerdo haber leído a los 20 años esas palabras de una carta de Lorca (…) Las copiaba en la primera página de mis cuadernos, me alentaban en la tristeza del desánimo y me azuzaban contra la tentación de la conformidad [I remember having read when I was twenty those words from one of Lorca’s letters (…) I copied them into the first page of my notebooks, they encouraged me in the sadness of despair and prompted me to resist the temptation of conformity] (Muñoz Molina 2002, p. 63).

Iba a marcharme de mi ciudad y del mundo protegido y agobiado de la familia y de la infancia: en aquella oficina donde me enteré de la muerte de Salvador Allende iba a tramitar mi matrícula universitaria, mi camino de ingreso hacia otra vida en la que la rebeldía personal y la sublevación política… [I was going to leave my city and the overprotected and overwhelmed world of family and childhood: in that office where I learned of the death of Salvador Allende I was to arrange my college tuition, my entry into another life in which personal rebellion and political uprising…] (Muñoz Molina 2002, p. 96).
The analysis carried out here discloses no obvious reason why virtue is the least common characteristic. Since the corpus of texts addressed is relatively limited, it cannot be concluded that such infrequency is a feature of the columns written by the three authors. Indeed, this characteristic may be discerned in other columns written by Pérez-Reverte, which were not included in the book studied for the purposes of this argument; two examples from another anthology of Pérez-Reverte’s work are given here.

En pocas ocasiones conocí tan de cerca el canguelo como cuando en África tuve enfrente a unos cuantos fulanos dando traspiés con el casco al revés, el blanco de los ojos amarillo, una botella de cerveza en una mano y un Kalashnikov en lastra, preguntándome qué se te ha perdido por aquí, blanco cabrón [Only a few times have I felt the kind of fear I felt in Africa, facing a group of guys stumbling around with their helmets on backwards, the white of their eyes all yellow, a bottle of beer in one hand and a Kalashnikov in the other, asking me what had got me lost around here, white bastard] (Pérez-Reverte 2001, p. 102).

Such an encounter with evil which, despite a feeling of fear, communicates a sense of courage – he was there – is also reflected in the passage below:

Uno se alegra de no tener que vivir ya entre dos aviones, cruzando fronteras a base de sobornar aduaneros, pisando cristales rotos en amaneceres grises, peleando por una conexión vía satélite, puesto contra una paredón un Kalashnikov apoyado en la espina dorsal [You feel happier not having to live between two airplanes, crossing borders by bribing custom officers, walking on broken glass through grey mornings, fighting for a satellite hook-up, pushed up against a wall with a Kalashnikov in your back] (Pérez-Reverte 2001, p. 234).

12.5 Conclusions
The threefold concept of ethos as revised by López Pan – nuclear (expressed by means of values, moral and ideological preferences), formal (stylistic dimension) and poetic – has been outlined. The relationship between ethos and the newspaper column has also been described. In the non-Spanish language academic context, this developed conceptualization of ethos and its relationship with the journalistic column is a novel notion and approach.

Among the means that the columnist may avail of in constructing his ethos is that of appearing as a character in his text (the poetic dimension).
When character qualities are mentioned explicitly – all-encompassing or direct description – a *themed ethos* is constructed. When such qualities are not explicitly stated but derived from the mode of action of the character, the *ethos* may be defined as *unthemed*.

Implicit self-characterization, the defining feature of the *unthemed ethos* and a common resource in personal or literary columns, fits with the requirement that Aristotle set for the ethical proof: namely, that it should operate in subtle ways, inviting deduction without explicitly indicating what one’s good qualities are.

The analysis of the columns published by the three Spanish writers shows that many of the actions of the columnist/character relate to their value as acknowledged by others that is, their close relationships with major figures in the social, political or cultural spheres, and their presence in public arenas. References are also made to minor personal details that disclose apparently irrelevant, pieces of private information.

All these traits are at the service of the three characteristics of the man worthy of praise as postulated by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric*: prudence (*phronesis*), virtue (*arete*) and benevolence (*eunoia*). Competence, honesty, sincerity, honesty, etc., complement the textual image of the columnist. In conjunction with the explicit ideological and moral preferences and values of the journalist, such features may succeed in creating a credible *ethos* to a particular kind of audience.

**References**


13 The Heuristic Function of Rhetoric in Journalistic Discourse: Doxopraxie and Polemic Schematization

VÉRONIQUE MAGAUD

13.1 Introduction

In order to comprehend the type of heuristic implemented by the institutional discourse of media, our analysis focuses on the term *hysteria* and its surroundings, and their role in information processing. It is based on excerpts from various types of articles of French national left wing newspapers from the eighties until today.

In order to grasp these phenomena, two notions are particularly relevant: the first is schematization and the other is the notion of doxopraxie. A schematization (Grize 1996) means that the information is given according to a certain representation of reality and of the audience. It represents thus a heuristic because it consists of processing and implementing knowledge by discursive and argumentative means. The notion also refers to the values shared with the audience. Our study will focus on the term *hysteria* and its surroundings to reveal the rhetoric of the journalistic discourse and how the information is processed. Indeed, the journalistic discourse is mostly based on polemic schematization in order to create a dynamic relationship with the readers. The term *hysteria* creates indignation among readers and thus simulates a ‘debate’ the audience is supposed to take part in.

Furthermore, the journalistic discourse hinges on the *doxai* of the institution, which represent the discursive aspects of the ideology of an institution according to Sarfati (2000). The *doxai* appear through *topoi* or *loci*. The *doxopraxie* refers to how the common sense is implemented. Our analysis focuses on the quantity *topos* that is prevalent in the journalistic discourse.

1 The newspapers concerned are: Le Monde, Le Monde Diplomatique, Libération et L’Humanité.
that refers to speeches or behaviours of identified groups. It also builds
closeness with the readers who are supposed to adhere to the quality *topos*.

Our analysis aims to show how the quantity *topoi* are actualized in
discourse and their role to bring discredit on the other discourses. Moreo-
ver, our study consists of exploring the role of the term *hysteria* and its sur-
roundings in each level of the polemic schematization, and hence its heuristic
function in the journalistic rhetoric. The schematization will be grasped
at three levels: the reasoning, the construction of ethos, and the likelihood
given to the speech.

The chapter will focus first on the term *hysteria* as a reported speech:
the verb phrases including the term *hysteria* like ‘to give in to anti Cauca-
sian hysteria’ sum up prior speeches. As a topic, the term testifies of prior
discourses known to the readers. We will grasp its role in the enthymematic
reasoning in these two cases. Secondly, we will examine its role as a noun
phrase which plays a part in *ethos* (e.g. ‘the hysteria of the oil companies’).
Finally, our study will analyze the term linked to quotations and its relation-
ship with evidence and likelihood.

The two introductory parts of this paper deal with the elucidation of
the notions of doxopraxie and polemical schematization and their link with
the term *hysteria*.

13.2 Doxopraxie and the quantity topos

The term doxopraxie comes from Sarfati’s contribution to a semantic the-
ory of common sense. The latter is defined as the symbolic representations
or the discursive aspects of the ideology which characterize an institution.
The common sense is made up with *doxai* which are actualized by *topoi*. Ac-
cording to the author, the norms which prevail in an institution come from
a previous system of thought (e.g. a philosophical thinking pattern) which
is transmuted in common sense through history. The notion of doxopraxie
corresponds to the implementation of these norms at a synchronic level.

Three reasons explain why this pattern is particularly relevant for anal-
ysis of the journalistic discourse. First, the aims and objectives of newspapers
are to be didactic and understandable to everybody. The expert analysis must
be ‘transmuted’ into common sense. Second, the recognition of this kind of
institution hinges on opinions which can reach a wide readership. The media
have to base their discourses on putative *topoi* shared by the readership. Fi-
ally, the journalistic discourse has to create interactive relationship with the
readers; to catch their attention and thus elicit emotions from the readership.

The term *hysteria* turned out to be a good observation basis to reveal the norms and implicit opinions on which the articles lay on and to grasp how the journalistic discourse involves the readership. The expert links the information to the supposed previous knowledge of the readership and brings the article within the latter's reach. The term *hysteria* participates in the doxopraxie of the journalistic discourse: it really speaks to everybody and carries /condenses prior discourses. Indeed, the term underlies implicit argumentation and the ideology the media reflects or rejects. Through the term *hysteria*, it is the exorbitant, irrational, mimetic and emotional behaviours which are reprehended. At the same time, the readership is assigned to be rational and autonomous. For instance, in the following expression ‘Significant in this regard is the downright refusal of Austria to succumb to the antiterrorist hysteria in fashion’, the *doxa* consists of bringing discredit on a mimetic and excessive behaviour. The readership is credited with an *ethos* of discernment and proper judgement.

Moreover, the term *hysteria* and its surroundings introduce reprehensible speeches or behaviours that are based on the quantity *topos*. The latter was defined as the following pattern: the majority is better than the minority (Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1992, p.115). As we have seen before, the term *hysteria* refers to mass excessiveness or mass outburst. It includes the common feature of majority by depriving the concerned national, political or economic groups of originality and individuality. It gives a negative picture of these ‘outsiders’ without developing their point of view or what motivates this kind of speeches or behaviour. It deprives them of any political weight and creates indignation among readers.

The ideological background underlying the journalistic discourse through the use of the term *hysteria* is enacted also by a rhetoric processing of the events. The notion of schematization ties the ideological dimension of the journalistic discourse to the information processing by argumentative and discursive operations through the different roles the term *hysteria* plays in the Aristotelian triad.

### 13.3 Polemic schematization and information processing

The term schematization derives from Grize’s theory, which proposes a pattern to grasp the natural logic on which common discourses are founded compared to formal logic, in particular the logic of the demonstration. The
logic of mathematics, for instance, is not persuasive and does not depend on the context or the author of the propositions because it hinges on valid principles. On the contrary, the informal discourse is built through social representations. According to Grize (1996, p. 50), a schematization is a discursive representation of a certain reality conceived or imagined by its author for an audience. It is the result of an informal logic that is based on discursive operations. It has an argumentative dimension because it is built for someone. The author of a schematization, then, creates his discourse from an image of himself, of his audience and of an image of the purpose. Each characteristic of this symbolic universe is expressed by discursive and linguistic phenomena.

If we examine the components of a schematization as defined by Grize, we can note it is based on three main characteristics which correspond to the Aristotle’s triangle. In Grize’s pattern, Aristotelian ethos is close to likelihood given to the speech; Aristotelian logos corresponds to reasoning and evidence, and Aristotelian pathos is replaced by values prevalent in society and related to prior discourses. Concerning this last point, each term of the language enacted by a schematization has a cultural dimension and crystallizes several features. The evocation of the term ‘rose’, for instance, can refer to the symbol of French socialist party as well as to passion or to the ephemeral youth; and an author will select the relevant features according to his purpose and his audience. Furthermore, the words are based on topos: they imply some implicit reasoning.

The term hysteria and its surroundings play a role in each part of a schematization and thus are particularly relevant to grasp the heuristic rhetoric of journalistic discourse. For instance, when it is used in a verb phrase like ‘to succumb to antiterrorist hysteria’, the term sums up a polemic reasoning. As a nominalization (e.g. in the following expression ‘a gas that causes the hysteria of oil companies’), it contributes to define the ethos of the concerned groups. Quotations and hypotyposis directly connected with the term hysteria give more likelihood to the discourse and bring discredit upon the authors of such discourses or behaviours.

Our purpose is to show that the term hysteria and its surroundings ‘innervate’ each level of the schematization indexed also on the quantity

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2 ‘[…] une représentation discursive orientée vers un destinataire de ce que son auteur conçoit ou imagine d’une certain réalité’.
topos. As the term carries reprehensible judgement, we have preferred the phrase ‘polemic schematization’. The latter corresponds to the Grize’s tripartite schema. However when *hysteria* evokes *ethos* of someone and introduces quotations or is involved in enthymematic reasoning, it implies ad hominem argument and it consists of bringing discredit upon an opponent or an ideology in front of an audience which is led to support the person who attacks.

First, our study will examine one of the components of a polemic information processing: the reasoning implemented by the journalistic discourse through the verb phrases and the topic including the term *hysteria*.

13.4 The term *hysteria* and enthymematic reasoning

*Hysteria* appears in some verb phrases which synthesize and sum up prior speeches. It also refers to prior behaviour in the verb phrase such as ‘to be beset by hysteria against X’. These verb phrases thus condense typical reported speeches or reported *gesta* and underlie enthymematic reasoning. The *doxa* on which the latter is based consists of blaming and censuring harshly the person who attacks a certain group.

These phrases consist of verbs like ‘s’abandonner à’ (to give way to), ‘céder à’, ‘donner dans’ (to succumb to, to give in to), ‘être en proie à’ (to be beset by), which are followed by the term *hysteria*. The latter is followed by a relational adjective composed of the prefix anti- (e.g. antiterroriste/antiterrorist). These verb phrases have the following features: + emotional state, + alienation/- rationality, - resistance, and also the feature of ‘mass’ because, associated with *hysteria*, they refer to contagious and typical behaviors and discourses devoid of individuality and originality as the following examples show:

24 heures après la tragédie, les Moscovites encore sous le choc ont facilement cédé à l’hystérie anticaucasienne. Même si aucun élément de l’enquête ne permet de prouver un lien entre l’attentat de mardi soir et le combat indépendantiste tchétchène, presque tout le monde croit à cette piste.4

24 hours after the tragedy, the Muscovites still in shock have easily succumbed to the

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3 The verb phrases like ‘to give way to hysteria’, to be beset by hysteria’ refer to prior speeches as well as prior behaviours.

anti-Caucasian hysteria. Even if there is no evidence of a link between the Tuesday evening attack and the Chechen separatist struggle, almost everyone believes the Chechen are responsible.⁵

[...] Les anciens adversaires de la guerre civile ont souvent été contraints de fraterniser dans les camps de concentration hitlériens. Cela les a incités à former par la suite des coalitions entre socialistes et conservateurs pendant des décennies, puis à négocier âprement autour du sacro-saint concept de la « concertation sociale ». La réforme judiciaire du ministre Broda fera date par son caractère irréversible. Significatif, à cet égard, est le refus catégorique de l’Autriche de s’abandonner à l’hystérie antiterroriste à la mode, quelles qu’aient pu être les pressions des Allemands ou des Israéliens.⁶

[...] The former civil war opponents were often forced to fraternize in the Nazi concentration camps. This prompted them later on to form during decades coalitions with Socialists and conservatives and negotiate fiercely on the sacrosanct concept of the ‘social dialogue’. The Minister Broda’s judicial reform will stand out by its irreversible character. In this regard the downright refusal of Austria to give way to the antiterrorist fashionable hysteria is significant, whatever may have been the pressure of the Germans or the Israelis.

In these examples, the utterances with the reported speech are founded on the following main topos: when we accuse a group without evidence, we give way to hysteria. It is also founded on the following quantity topos: the more a reaction is out of rational control, out of proportion and contagious, the more it is verging on hysteria.

These verb phrases discredit an ideology or the persons who support it according to the main topos: when we make a group the target of our attack it is their hysterical and non-rational behaviour that is blameworthy. The discredit also derives from the quantity topos that the term hysteria carries.

The doxa that prevails in these excerpts is not in itself objectionable. It reflects the doxai that are prevalent in society. However, the media behave in the same way by using these verb phrases composed of the term hysteria: they condemn a group without giving sufficient evidence to the contrary or without developing its own point of view.

By using the term as a topic, the reasoning also reprehends an ideolo-

⁵ I have translated the excerpts and I thank Nathalie Kayadjanian for correcting them
The polemic term *hysteria* denounces this ideology and gives the illusion of a debate by creating the advocates and the opponents for the purpose.

The term hysteria also represents the topic of the article and lays on an enthymematic reasoning, which adds a polemic orientation to the content of the article as we can see in the example below:

*L’hystérie black blanc beur* – l’illusion d’une France réconciliée grâce à son équipe de foot multiculturelle (Thuram et Desailly les Blacks, Zidane le Beur, Deschamps, Blanc, Barthez, les Blancs) et nourrie par une nuit de liesse sur les Champs-Elysées – connaîtra un revival un peu forcé. […] Douze ans plus tard, l’équipe de France est sortie du Mondial sud-africain dans les piteuses conditions que l’on sait. Au groupe parlementaire UMP, on traite ces Bleus-là de ‘racailles’, de ‘petits merdeux’ et le philosophe Alain Finkielkraut a micro ouvert un peu partout pour dénoncer ‘une bande de voyous’ qui souffre de ‘divisions ethniques religieuses’, vous avez dit black blanc beur?7

*Hystérie black blanc beur*–the illusion of France reconciled with its multiracial population, a France that is the mirror image of its multicultural soccer team (Thuram and Desailly all blacks, the Beur Zidane, Deschamps, Blanc, Barthez, whites) reinforced by a night of jubilation on the Champs-Elysees-will be a revival somewhat forced. […] As we know, twelve years later, the French team was defeated in the South African World cup after a pathetic elimination. The UMP parliamentary group then spoke of the team using words like ‘riffraff’, ‘shitty young’ and the philosopher Alain Finkielkraut widely broadcasted denounced ‘a gang of thugs’ who suffers from ‘religious ethnic divisions’. Did you say black blanc beur?

This shows the false enthusiasm for a multiracial French society which identifies with the French soccer team when successful and reverses its opinion when the same team failed. It is based on the following *topos*: a keen interest for a multiracial society solely founded on a successful event is something of a hysterical behavior.

The introductory term *hysteria* which carries the features *+ mass + irrational + out of all proportion* enlightens negatively the topic of the article. Indeed, the notion crystallizes a reasoning which blames hasty, contagious

7 Dfers, G. (2010). Grands bleus et ‘petits merdeux’. Libération, 26 juin
and out of rational control behaviours or discourses. It is also a modus indexed on a quantity *topos*. This discourse brings disrepute on other discourses and the persons who support them because of contagious and mass characteristics.

[...]Il s’agit notamment d’étendre le port du bracelet électronique, d’appliquer des peines incompressibles de trente ans pour les assassins de représentants de force de l’ordre, ainsi qu’une déchéance de la nationalité française des délinquants d’origine étrangère. Le député UMP Éric Ciotti, élu de Nice, a ajouté la responsabilisation pénale des parents de mineurs délinquants pouvant aller jusqu’à 30 000 euros d’amende et deux ans de prison.

Dans cette *hystérie répressive*, Brice Hortefeux s’est prononcé pour que la déchéance de la nationalité soit appliquée, en plus des polygames, aux personnes impliquées dans des affaires d’excision, de traite d’êtres humains ou coupables ‘d’actes de délinquance grave’.8

These include expanding the electronic bracelet, implementing sentences without remission of thirty years for the murderers of representatives of police force and a forfeiture of the French nationality for the offenders of foreign origin. The UMP Eric Ciotti, elected in Nice, added the penal responsibility of parents of juvenile offenders with a fine that can go up to 30 000 euro and two years in prison.

In *this repressive hysteria*, French Interior Minister Hortefeux has called for forfeiture of citizenship of persons who practice polygamy, persons involved in practice of excision, persons involved in human trafficking or persons guilty of ‘serious acts of delinquency’.

The article is about the Loppsi bill that the government wanted to submit to the Senate in 2010. This excerpt concerns the national security and according to the journalist these measures are a pretext to evade the question of the welfare state reform which creates popular discontent. The term *hysteresis* is anaphoric and refers to all the repressive measures in this bill. By this phrase, the topic is indexed on a quantity *topos* and irrational behaviour and excess.

These phrases based on the quantity *topos* and polemics prior to speeches lead the reader to subscribe to the point of view of the article. This strategy consists of putting the readership in the role of the opponent

by bringing discredit upon an ideology and its advocates. It is also enacted through the possessive phrases in which the term *hysteria* evokes the irrational *ethos* of targeted groups.

### 13.5 The term *hysteria* in noun phrases and its role in ethos

The term *hysteria* can also be used as a predicate that is changed into a noun phrase. It is always followed by identified groups and brings discredit on their ethos as the following example shows:

> L’intention politique est de calmer les ultraconservateurs dont l’hystérie va jusqu’à attaquer, dans les élections primaires, les Républicains, jugés trop mous. Obama répond par son habituel discours consensuel.9

The political intent is to calm the ultraconservatives during the primary elections for *their hysteria* towards the Republicans they accused of being too soft. Obama responds with his usual consensual discourse

This article is about the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq although Obama maintains private military firms there. It insists on Obama’s intention to satisfy the left wing as well as the ultraconservatives. The journalist speaks about ‘the hysteria of ultraconservatives’. By using this term the journalistic discourse takes any free will off the ultraconservatives and introduces them as alienated persons. This noun phrase is founded on the following predicate: the ultraconservatives are hysterical. It means that they are in the grip of irrational outbursts. Rationality means that one reflects by itself with its own reasoning and has reached a certain level of individuality. The journalistic discourse builds an irrational *ethos* of this group and takes any political weight off the group of ultraconservatives. At the same time, it constructs a rational *ethos* of the newspaper and the readers capable of having good judgement and to be moderate.

The excerpt below refers to a new discovery (a gas from schist), the keen interest of the oil companies and the environmentalists’ reasoning against the developing of this industry. It evokes ‘the hysteria’ of the oil companies and their greediness at the expense of environment. This phrase is founded on the following predicate: the oil companies are hysterical, which

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refers to stereotypical and typical behaviours without rational judgement and a holistic view.

Un gaz dont les sous-sols de la Terre regorgent, piégé dans les roches schisteuses, et que les progrès de la technologie rendent enfin accessible. Un gaz qui provoque l’hystérie des compagnies pétrolières, avides de forer tous azimuts en quête de cette énergie fossile inespérée, au mépris parfois de tout respect de l’environnement.¹⁰

A gas abundantly present underground, trapped in the shale rocks, now accessible thanks to advances in technology. A gas that provokes hysteria of the oil companies, eager to drill in all directions in search of this unexpected fossil energy, sometimes disregarding any considerations of respect for environment.

These articles do not really develop the reasoning of the groups they condemn. The noun phrases prompted the readership to adhere to the point of view of the newspaper by enacting negative ethos of the advocates of a condemned ideology or behaviour. The latter are discredited because of the ad hominem argument that underlies the noun phrases. As in a polemic face-to-face argument, the point is that the audience adheres to one point of view by disqualifying an opponent on the basis of an inadequacy between his discourse and his behaviour or of his defaults (e.g. irrationality, cupidity, etc…) or his incompetency.

This discredit emerges also through other components of the polemic schematization, the quotations and hypotyposis. These reported speeches are supposed to illustrate the vocal and verbal behaviours of the condemned groups and to give evidence to the reasoning. They are introduced as typical speeches deprived of originality, strengthening their rejection.

13.6 The term hysteria and its epicherema
When its immediate surrounding is a relational adjective (not composed of the prefix ‘anti’) or when it is a noun phrase, the term hysteria is followed by epicherema, which comes in the form of direct reported speech or hypotyposis. Epicherema is evidence that supports reasoning and appears with the major or the minor premises of the reasoning (Dupriez 1984). The hypotyposis figure consists of describing an event in a realistic way (Robrieux 1993).

In this way, the negative picture of groups or the ideology supported by groups gains more likelihood. Moreover, these epicherema are introduced as a prototype of all the speeches and behaviours that occurred. They thus deprive the authors of these attitudes of any independent thinking.

First, we will introduce the quotations linked to the term *hysteria*. As we shall see *infra*, these quotations are directly followed by *modi* such as modal particle (genre, ‘like’), modal verb (peut-on, ‘we can’), the abbreviation *etc.*, the iterative imperfect tense. These discursive phenomena based the reported speeches on the quantity *topos*. Indeed, the quotations are placed within a set of similar and mimetic behaviors or discourses.

The discredit comes also from the hypotyposis figures. The quantity *topos* that underlies the latter appears especially through the indefinite pronoun as we shall see in the second part of this heading.

### 13.6.1 Modus indexed on quantity topos

We call the modal comments that follow the quotations directly, ‘the *modi* indexed on the quantity *topos*’. Indeed, these discursive phenomena reveal the point of view of the author of the articles vis-à-vis the reported speeches. Moreover, they imply that the latter are not original and represent one example of many similar occurrences.

These modi prompted the readership to discredit the condemned attitudes as the latter reflect a mimetic and depersonalized *ethos*, as shown by the following excerpts.

> *La première guerre mondiale bat son plein, et les autres titres de la presse française donnent alors dans l’hystérie nationaliste (« les cadavres de Boches sentent plus mauvais que ceux des soldats français » peut-on notamment y lire).*

While the First World War is in full swing, other French newspapers give way to the nationalist hysteria (‘the corpses of Germans smell worse than those of French soldiers’ as *we can read* for instance).

In the previous excerpt, the modal ‘*peut-on lire*’ (we can read) reveals a selection among a set of similar occurrences. It implies that it is not necessary to give more quotations because they are cast in the mould.

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In the following example, the prepositional phrase ‘à la mode’ (popular/fashionable) shows that the fight against terrorism is a mimetic behavior devoid of originality:

Significatif, à cet égard, est le refus catégorique de l’Autriche de s’abandonner à l’hystérie antiterroriste à la mode […]12.

In this respect the downright refusal of Austria to succumb to the fashionable antiterrorist hysteria is significant.

The abbreviation ‘etc.’ in the excerpt below shows that this kind of discourse is an example of similar discourses. We can also note how the lengthening of the vowels strengthens the discredit upon the young generation.

[…] il y a les gâteaux à faire à J-1, les sodas à acheter, l’hystérie des petits à juguler, ‘mamaaaaan, elles sont où mes tongs jauuuuuuunnes?’ etc.13

[…] a day before, they have to make cakes, buy sodas, curb the hysteria of the children, ‘Muuuuum, where are my yeeeeeellow flip flops?’, etc.

The verb ‘déclarait’ (claimed) in the following excerpt also contains a modal value. The French iterative imperfect tense reveals a set of similar statements:

La virulence de la critique des lois dites ‘lois Aubry’ sur la réduction du temps de travail après le changement de majorité en 2002 a parfois frôlé l’hystérie. ‘La France ne doit pas être un parc de loisirs’ déclarait durant l’été 2003 J.-P Raffarin, alors premier ministre.14

The virulent criticisms of ‘Aubry laws’ at the origin of the reduction of working time process which occurred after the change of majority in 2002, sometimes touched hysteria. ‘France cannot be a leisure centre’ declared J.-P. Raffarin, then Prime Minister during summer 2003.

These quotations are also based on ad hominem refutations. Indeed, they reveal the excessiveness of the judgement (‘the corpses of Germans smell

12 See footnote number 5.
worse than those of French soldiers’), the confusion of two ideas (‘35 working hours a week’ is equivalent to ‘France as a leisure centre’).

As we can see, the refutation is not direct and the journalistic discourse leaves the readership to do the work by itself. The latter is supposed to take part in the same reasoning thanks to the hypotyposis phenomena.

13.6.2 The quantity topos and hypotyposis

The term hysteria is sometimes followed by hypotyposis phenomena which make the description livelier (Robrieux op.cit.) and appear through the use of the disjunctive indefinite pronoun ON (One), the change of verbal tense (from the preterit or the present perfect to the present), hyperboles and rhetorical anaphora. The disjunctive indefinite pronoun depersonalizes the concerned persons by allocating stereotypical behaviour. The journalistic discourse aims to consider the groups involved in the article in their drastic otherness through this indefinite pronoun ON (One), the following hyperboles (‘brûlante affection’ ardent affection, ‘se tordre de douleur’ to writhe in pain, ‘les manger’ eat them, ‘les bouffer’ gobble them up), the rhetorical anaphora ‘on’ (One), as the following excerpts show:

Plus qu’un chant de pleurs, on assiste à une scène d’hystérie collective. On se tord de douleurs, on lance à la regretée des messages de brûlante affection […].15

A sea of tears instead turned into a scene of mass hysteria. One writhes in pain, one sends messages of ardent affection to the late lamented girl […].

Après la défaite contre les Argentins en match d’ouverture, on pensait en avoir fini avec l’hystérie rugbystique. Hélas ! Les Bleus ont battu successivement la Namibie, l’Irlande et la Géorgie […]. Déjà les cris de guerre fusent de partout, […] on va les manger, on va bouffer du Black, on va tout donner.16

After being defeated by Argentina in the opening match, one could think that our defeat against Argentina would put an end to the rugby hysteria. Alas! The French team won three successive victories against Namibia, Ireland and Georgia […]. Immediately you could hear war cries coming from all sides, […] we will eat them, we will gobble up the Black, we will give everything to win.

The journalistic discourse is ironic and strengthens among readers a *doxa* which consists of giving up contagiousness of emotion and excessiveness.

### 13.7 Conclusions

The heuristic function of rhetoric in journalistic discourse consists of answering the following questions: How to get the readers play an active part? Which kind of images of the readers to give in order to persuade them? On which values must we base our discourse?

Our purpose was to reveal the norms implemented by the journalistic discourse and actualized through the notion of polemic schematization. It shows among other things the relationship between this institutional discourse and the Other ‘protagonist’ and the Other ‘reader’. Indeed, it creates a dynamics between readers, events and the people involved in the reported facts. At the same time, it builds a rational and ethical *ethos* of the readers who are credited with values like originality, individuality and moderation. This schematization is revealed through the term *hystéria* and it is based at each level on the quantity *topos*. The journalistic discourse does not give the argument of the people involved in the reported events who thus act as scarecrows. It gives a grotesque picture of them and also creates a picture of readers greedy for low blow and disparagement.

**References**


14.1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the roles of victims and offenders in crime news and, in particular, the way these roles can switch. The roles of victims and offenders are viewed as the result of a social construction process, achieved by rhetorical means. These rhetorical means – as components of verbal text, photographs and pictures – serve to persuade the news consumer of the guilt or innocence of the person in question and so give us anchor points in our perception of what good and evil looks like. But... by what rhetorical means are the victims and offenders portrayed in news media, and how are specific attributes used in constructing portrayals of victims and offenders to support the process of role switching?

14.1.1 News as construct
It is not uncommon in journalism studies to describe news as being a construct. This point of view implies that news facts are not seen as objective truths: as ‘the’ story of reality, but as ‘a’ story of reality. It also implies the presumption that news has the power to form our social reality. A justification for this perspective is usually found in news about phenomena that do not exist, such as satanic ritual abuse, for example (Richardson, Best & Bromley 1991; Victor 1998; DeYoung 1996), or UFOs (Best 2008, p. 45). Another justification can be found in news about social problems that appear statistically to be much more limited than they are represented as being in the news; for example, news about random violence or escaped prisoners (Brownstein 1991; Best 2008; Sacco 1995). Historical and geographical comparisons are also used to ‘prove’ that news can be seen more accurately as a construct, rather than as a report of reality: the same phenomena are recon-
structured in a different way at different moments in history; see for example, hysteria (Rodin 1992, or stalking (Lowney & Best 1995; Mullen, Pathé & Purcell 2001; Spitzberg & Cadiz 2002). These studies also illustrate how the same phenomena can be reconstructed in different ways in different places.

In fact – as Hacking (1999) shows – literally everything can be seen as having been socially constructed. He sketches a long list, from the A of Authorship to the Z of Zulu Nationalism; in between are Emotions, Gender, Nature, Quarks, Serial Homicide and Women Refugees. Hacking makes clear that it is not only events that can be seen as having been constructed, but categories of people too. In this chapter, these categories are the victims and offenders in crime news reporting who are characterized using the stereotypes and attributes of the ideal victim, see Christie (1986).

Besides the fact that many scholars do not agree with this perspective (Hacking 1999), an important argument against this constructionist’s point of view is raised by the journalists themselves: they consider it their job to write about ‘the-facts-and-nothing-but-the-facts’ (Ettema & Glasser 1987, 1988). Victims and offenders, and their features and attributes, are part of these facts: journalists simply write about who they are and portray them the way they ‘really’ look. But what if the same person is depicted as a victim and – later, (or simultaneously in another medium) – is portrayed as the offender? These role switches form the central topic of this chapter. The research question is: by what means do journalists construct the images of victims and offenders and how can this construction be illustrated by so-called role switches?

14.1.2 Role switches
There are many examples of role switches: the murderer who is released because new evidence shows he is innocent, or the victim of domestic violence who then shoots her husband. Research into these role switches is interesting from both methodological and practical perspectives. From a methodological viewpoint, studying role switches provides an excellent opportunity for keeping stable a crucial variable; namely, the person in question. There is a vast quantity of literature in Victimology about victim and offender characteristics and a large amount of literature in journalism studies about the way victims and offenders are portrayed in the news. But, as a researcher investigating and comparing the different features of victims and offenders in news articles, one has to deal with the problem that one crucial variable
does not remain stable: the person behind the role: the actor. The main reason that different features are ascribed to victims and offenders is very trivial: it is because they are different people. But when the roles switch in one person, it is the same person who is being described: and different characteristics are only connected to him or her because he or she has been constructed as another character in the story. The notion of ‘role switch’ might suggest that a person in the news can only play one role at a time. But one can also imagine characters playing a double role over a period of time or in different media.

From a more practical perspective, these types of switch can provide ‘proof’ of the fact that journalists really, actively construct these characters. The image of the journalist’s toolbox is illuminating in this regard; one can imagine a section for writing about people involved in crime which is divided into (at least) two compartments: one with the label ‘victim’ and the other with the label ‘offender’. Each compartment is filled with particular features and events; the journalist simply chooses one of the compartments.

14.1.3 Social construction at work
In this way, role switches show how journalists carry out their rhetorical work in choosing the means to convince their readers or viewers of the guilt or innocence of the depicted person. And this is an important issue, because it reveals what a society recognizes are signs of guilt or innocence, of good or evil. In studying these cases of criminal/victim role-switching we can see social construction at work.

Given the limited space, this chapter will highlight the most interesting findings from the research project: findings from both qualitative and quantitative content analyses, some from a text sample and others from a sample of images.

14.2 Theoretical background
Four theoretical fields are chosen to provide an integrated approach to the research question: social construction, ideal victim theory, framing theory

\footnote{For the purposes of this chapter, being innocent and a victim is seen as one compartment in the tool box. In fact, this distinction has to be refined further. A phenomenon such as ‘blaming the victim’, makes the victim more guilty, see Madriz, (1997); or Deitz, Littman and Bentley (1984); and Van Dijk (2009).}
and rhetoric. These four fields – they can better be called fields than theories – serve to fence our research object and focus on certain specific phenomena and to omit others.

The idea that crime news could be a vehicle for our concepts of good and evil was originally proposed in the late nineteenth century (1893) by Emile Durkheim. Grabe summarizes his ideas as follows:

Durkheim argued that the rituals of processing and punishing crime are functional in constructing a society’s morality, teaching its members to abide by certain rules, and promoting cohesion among members by making it public when individuals have violated shared moral values (Grabe 1999, p. 154).

Nowadays we make crime public via the news in newspapers, on television and on the internet. This idea offers a good explanation for our fascination for crime news. By sharing these news stories we let each other know where we stand, what we see as good and evil. And, in this way, these stories create social cohesion in society.

14.2.1 Social construction

In brief, social constructionism means that phenomena, concepts or practices are not seen as ‘real’, but as a result of thoughts or ideas constructed by people, usually a particular group of people. Berger and Luckman (1966) first presented this concept in their theory about the social construction of knowledge. It was later popularized by media researchers. Looking at crime news from a social constructionist’s perspective shapes our attitudes towards the news and how we look at the relationship between ‘reality’ and what is represented in the media (Best 2008). It means that we focus on the way images or portrayals are constructed and not on what actually happens in society.

A social constructionist’s view of news is opposed to an essentialist’s view. The social constructionist focuses on the process of news making, on the actors in society and on who is making the news; that is, on the process of transforming the news and how this can be identified in the media. Answering the (essentialist’s) question about what is actually or really going on in society, within this perspective, is seen as a futile exercise. One of social constructionism’s underlying goals is to uncover the ways in which individuals and groups participate in the construction of their perceived social reality.
This involves looking at the ways social phenomena are created, institutionalized, and made into tradition by humans.

Lipschultz and Hilt (2002) distinguish two levels in the social construction of reality in the news. On one level, we see producers constructing reality via the bureaucratic decisions that they make about which events to report and how they will report them. The second level concentrates on the news consumers themselves who construct their individual realities based on how they understand and interpret the news. Our focus in this chapter is on the first level.

There is another reason why, especially within the context of media studies, social construction proves to be a reasonable and fruitful perspective. This refers to the second level described by Lipschultz and Hilt: most news consumers have no personal experience of serious crime; what they know about it comes from media coverage. In fact, over 75 per cent of the public claim that they form their opinions about crime from what they see or read in the news; this is more than three times the number who say they obtain their primary information about crime from personal experience (22 per cent, Dorfman & Schiraldi 2001). Both language and visual media in news reports are critical in constructing the consumer’s reality and perception of crime.

14.2.2 Ideal victim theory

When examining our perceptions of the victim, the idea of the ideal victims, introduced by Christie offers clarity and is a widely used concept in criminology and media studies. Christie defines the ideal victim as ‘a person or a category of individuals who – when hit by crime – [is] most readily given the complete and legitimate status of being a victim’. (Christie 1986, p. 18). Christie’s ideal victim is a person who is weak, who is carrying out a respectable project when the crime occurs, and who could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be blamed for being where she or he was when the crime occurred. The ideal perpetrator, on the other hand, is big and bad, and should have no prior personal relationship with the victim.

Such an ideal model not only defines a standard with which to compare the victims and offenders we meet in news stories, it also provides a stereotype that explains why certain crimes and certain victims attract a high level of media attention and others do not. (Koetsenruijter & Vanderveen 2011; Smoleij 2010; Van Dijk 2009).
14.2.3 Framing theory
The way we look at victim and offender roles and how specific attributes are utilized in constructing their images, cannot be discussed without referring to framing theory. Among the various definitions of framing, the most widely circulated was formulated by Robert Entman:

Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. Typically frames diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe … (Entman 1993, p. 52).

From framing theory we borrow the concept that there is a process of selective influence being exercised over the individual’s perception of the meanings he or she attributes to words or phrases.

A second concept we take from framing theory is that the words, phrases and attributes with which our main characters are pictured, are not loose, unconnected elements, but are organized into coherent packages, called frames (Gamson & Modigliani 1989; Van Gorp 2007). One can distinguish overall, global, not case-specific victim and offender frames, which resemble the ideal model of Christie. But there are also case-specific frames, with features which are particular to that special victim or offender. These specific features are, however, always directly related to the overall frames of victim or offender.

Referring to the metaphor of the journalist’s toolbox mentioned earlier, the means that he or she employs to sketch the picture or story of guilt and innocence are not singular, or loose concepts, but are organized and grouped in frames. A frame defines how an element of rhetoric is packaged so that it encourages certain interpretations and discourages others (Gamson & Modigliani 1989; Van Gorp 2007). In the context of the present chapter, this particular interpretation is linked to guilt or innocence. And guilt and innocence are packaged in different compartments of the tool box.

14.2.4 Rhetoric
Although one cannot speak of an overall theory of rhetoric (Ritivoi 2008), the idea of a focus on persuasion and on the elements in news that are meant to convince readers of something, seems a useful and important choice in
studying crime news. The focus on rhetoric implies at least two things. It implies that news stories are seen as subjective, and as persuasive.

A focus on rhetorical elements dictates that news is seen initially as a means of convincing a reader or viewer of the reliability of the news source (ethos), of the seriousness of the crime (pathos) and of the truth of what is being stated in the news story (logos). Rhetorical theory, from this point of view, fits in perfectly with ideas about social construction and framing; in this perspective news is not in itself a portrayal of reality. And in the context of this chapter, the features we are examining can be seen as rhetorical elements that are intended to persuade the news consumer of the guilt or innocence of the individual depicted; they relate to the ethos of the persons concerned.

14.3 Method
To get a grip on our question we used a combination of qualitative and quantitative content analysis and we analyzed text as well as visuals. Since the advent of the Lexis Nexis database in the Eighties, more and more content analysis studies are restricted to newspapers, neglecting the idea that images are probably the most important factor in building our picture of the actors in news stories and in crime stories. What would Julian Assange look like in our minds if we had never seen a picture of him? How are our perceptions of offenders influenced by the fact that the perpetrators are wearing robes or habits? (Koetsenruijter & Nagtzaam 2012) One cannot look at these questions without considering the visual material that accompanies the written text. When we refer in this chapter to picturing, or the picture of the victim or offender, this includes the text used to depict or portray the actors, as well as the photographs and the pictures. The sample for each of the three cases was composed of articles and photographs from websites, newspapers and magazine articles and footage from news programmes on television. Samples for this qualitative analysis were collected from random material until a saturated collection was composed.

2 Julian Assange, the Australian Editor in Chief of WikiLeaks, was held responsible for the release of 251,000 American unclassified, confidential and secret diplomatic cables. To some people – the American government at least – he is an offender, to others he is the victim of a conspiracy and to others he is seen as a hero. (See the article by Burger and Lanjouw about criminals who become heroes.)
For this chapter we studied three cases to illustrate the rhetorical means that are used to portray victims and offenders in news media and the way specific attributes are utilized in constructing portrayals of victims and offenders: the nurse Lucia de Berk, the criminal Willem Endstra and the parents of Madeleine McCann. As mentioned previously, this chapter can only highlight the most relevant findings.3

14.4 Results

Lucia de Berk
Lucia de Berk was a Dutch-licenced paediatric nurse, who was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2003 for four murders and three attempted murders of patients in her care, so-called ‘mercy killings’. She was convicted, but her conviction was considered controversial, not only in the media but also amongst scientists. In October 2008 – five years later – the case was reopened by the Dutch Supreme Court, as new facts had been uncovered that completely undermined the previous verdicts. De Berk was set free in April 2010. A typical aspect of this role switch was that it was a sudden switch: in just one day she was transformed from a perpetrator to a victim of a failing justice system. Although her case had been in the news for quite some time and her guilt had been discussed in the media, the outcome of the trial was the key event which initiated the role switch (Kepplinger & Habermeier 1995).

From that day forward, journalists opened another compartment in their toolbox and chose different characteristics. The results of these choices can be seen in the visual material that was used to illustrate the news about the trial. We made a qualitative analysis of the way De Berk was portrayed in a sample of 627 news articles and 47 television programmes (Lucieer 2011).

3 This research project is part of a broader research project on victims and offenders in news media in cooperation between the Departments of Journalism & New Media and the Institute for Criminal Law & Criminology of Leiden University (see also for example Koetsenruijter & Vanderveen 2011; Burger & Koetsenruijter 2008; Kaal & Vanderveen 2008).
Figure 1 shows pictures of Lucia de Berk during the trial. We see an illustration of what Christie means when he says that the ideal offender is: ‘a distant being. The more foreign the better. The less human also the better’. (Christie 1986 p. 28). These characteristics fit perfectly with the way De Berk is portrayed at that time, especially in court drawings: she is pictured as a lonely individual, isolated from others. Not only in pictures, but also in articles about the case, she remains a stranger; someone we neither know nor could relate to. And she is certainly not pictured as attractive; she even has – to quote a number of news articles – a long ‘witch’s nose’. Indeed: the less human, the better. Details mentioned about her life that also conform to the parameters of the perpetrator frame are that her parents had a drinking problem, she had a ‘bad’ boyfriend who forced her into prostitution, she had married young and, to gain admittance to her nurse training, she had falsified her papers. All these features can be seen to form a coherent perpetrator frame that stems directly from the ideal perpetrator concept formulated by Christie; Nurse De Berk practically reeks of rottenness!
FIGURE 14.2a AND FIGURE 14.2b LUCIA DE BERK AS A VICTIM

Source: Maurice Boyer / ANP Foto
But her role changes when she is set free and she becomes an innocent victim of a failing justice system. Although her role was disputed for a much longer time, the dominant frame was that of a strange offender. The reopening of the case and the outcome of the trial immediately transformed her from offender to victim.

In this picture taken on the day she was found innocent, she is depicted with other people, making contact with them; she is more like one of us. It is also clear that she is not as unattractive as she had appeared in the drawings. Other facts that fit in with this victim frame are ‘decent activities’, such as the fact that she was a prom queen at high school, her marriage had lasted twenty years and she had worked as a nanny.

Much of our perception as to whether someone is a victim or an offender depends on whether we can identify with, or are very different from, the victim and/or offender (Koetsenruijter & Vanderveen 2011). Mentioning family matters enables us to identify with the victim; it makes her more human, and reduces the distance between ‘she’ and ‘we’. After Lucia de B was found innocent, the public was told more about her private life; her daughter, for example, came into the news for the first time.

We call this kind of role switch a simple switch. It happens once, and a clear key event accompanies the switch. We use ‘accompanies’, because one cannot point at a key event as being the only cause for the switch: in constructing another character in the crime, the media has to do its own construction work. A role switch is more than a debate ‘over whether alleged victims are as innocent as they appear and whether accused parties are as culpable as they seem’. (Chancer 2005, p. 15). A simple switch causes a second frame to become dominant in the news and the first frame to be superseded.

This simple switch can occur in two directions: from offender role to victim role and vice versa. The De Berk case is probably the most common example of switches made in the first direction: someone who is released from jail because new evidence shows that he or she is innocent. Other examples are criminals who appear to be victims of set-ups by their (former) companions. Victims of domestic violence who kill their husbands are a clear example of the switch made in the other direction. In all these cases a significant event causes one sudden role switch and that switch happens only once.
Willem Koetsenruijter

Endstra
An example of another kind of role switch is the case of Willem Endstra. Endstra, was a Dutch real estate entrepreneur whose role in the news began in 1992 when he was investigated for using his business for money laundering the profits of a criminal gang that dealt ecstasy. He was later associated with a number of murders that had taken place in the criminal circuit and was suggested by the media as being the next in line to be killed. As he had appeared in the news, questions were raised as to whether Endstra was (a more or less) innocent victim, who – against his will – had become involved in the Dutch criminal underworld, or whether he was a crook who was involved in murder and had strong connections with drug dealers. So – in contrast to the De Berk case – his role did not change at once, but there was a gradual evolution: sometimes it was said that he had been blackmailed and was a victim of the Amsterdam underworld; in other articles or on other occasions he was pictured as a vicious, vile crook.

In a quantitative framing analysis of the text content of news articles covering the years 2002-2007, we analyzed how the perpetrator frame and victim frame exchanged places and whether the two could exist side by side or whether they alternated. In Endstra’s case we limited our analysis to text as there was very little interesting visual material available. The perpetrator frame was built upon variables such as whether it was said that he was telling lies, or associated with murders or criminal activities, or whether his former business partners left him or whether he was depicted in an active role, or was called the banker of the underworld. To formulate the victim frame we included whether he was depicted in a passive role, whether the news media said he was threatened or forced to do things and whether it was reported that he had talked to the police.\(^4\)

In terms of ideal victim theory, Endstra is not an ideal victim: his reputation is questionable, and very little is known about his private life, so possibilities for identification are limited. On the other hand, there are definitely some features that characterize him as a victim. For example, vul-

\(^4\) Endstra had talked to the police about the role of another famous Dutch criminal, Willem Holleeder. These conversations were taped. The so-called Endstra tapes are recordings of the conversations that Endstra had with officials of the Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIE) in Amsterdam. The conversations took place in a police BMW, driving on the A10 and the tapes were presented as evidence in the lawsuit brought against Holleeder.
Vulnerability, as mentioned by Christie, is an important victim feature. It was said that Endstra was threatened, and forced to do things; this made him vulnerable and weak. More important in this case were the events to which his name could be attached, such as the murders committed by the offender and the interviews with the police in his role as the victim.

In a quantitative analysis of the frames used in 385 Dutch newspaper articles, we found that both frames were strong, and that when the case was in the news, the offender frame lost influence and the victim frame became stronger (Harmsen 2008).

This graph summarizes an analysis of the occurrence of the offender frame (dots) and the victim frame (line). The high peaks represent important media facts; key events when important new material was brought into play in the news. It is not only clear that the picture changes over time, but also that one frame pushes the other aside. The period in the middle of the graph, namely the first half of 2005, is the most interesting period: the media do not know what to make of it, but finally it appears that Endstra becomes a victim more than an offender. Not surprisingly, the line on the graph indi-
cating the victim frame rises sharply when Endstra was shot in May 2004, then it steadily rises until August. After new facts became known, Endstra increasingly becomes viewed as a victim of the Dutch underworld and the compartment in the toolbox containing the victim attributes is used more and more.

We call this a complex role switch. The two roles gradually switch over a longer period of time but then switch frequently when the news item is particularly active. Every day, new information leads to another perception of the central actor(s). The two roles change not only over time, but over different media, too. Some features stressed by one media outlet seem to persuade the public that the individual is a victim, but others that he or she is an offender. In these cases good and evil play a complex game, and for a long period of time it is uncertain who is who. Neither the public, nor the media seem to know what to make of it. There are events which take place in the development of the case that change the view of the roles, but there is not one central key event. A condition for a complex switch is that the news item endures for a longer period.

The parents of Madeleine McCann
Another example of a complex switch we investigated focuses on the parents of Madeleine McCann. This case has been studied frequently (see, for example, Machado & Santos 2009; Greer, Ferell & Jewkes 2008; Franklin & Cromby 2009; Goc 2009). In the Spring of 2007, a British couple on holiday left their three young children in an apartment in Portugal and went out for dinner in a restaurant nearby. When they came back, the youngest, Madeleine, or Maddie as she became known in the media, had disappeared. The case became huge in the media, not only because Madeline was such a prototypical victim, but because the Portuguese police suggested that the parents might themselves be responsible for her disappearance and probably guilty of her murder. This idea was rapidly taken up by Portuguese newspapers and later by the British tabloids.

In the beginning – shortly after the item appeared for the first time in the news – the victim frame was dominant. We see features attributed to the parents that are congruent with the ideal victim picture presented by Christie: they were respectable, middle-class people with decent jobs, nice children, well educated, both practising doctors; they expressed a lot of emotion, lived in a big house, et cetera. But after the police suggested they might
be guilty, the perpetrator frame was raised: it was said that they did not show any emotion, that they had acted irresponsibly, and that they drank too much. Some tabloids even suggested that they were involved in what is called ‘swinging’ or wife swapping. When the media coverage died down, the perpetrator frame was abandoned and the parents returned to being the victims of a tragedy (Evers 2009).5

14.5 Conclusions
What do these examples show? In the first place, they make it clear that role switches are made at different levels of complexity. Lucia de Berk, for example, illustrated what is called a simple switch: the role switches once and suddenly, because of one clear key event. On the other hand, there are complex switches: these involve more frequent changes from victim to offender and back, without a clear key event, although several events can be identified that made someone a victim or an offender. Complex switches always involve a longer period of time.6

Secondly, these examples show that, although role switches can be initiated by events, in reality, journalists have an active role in framing: they frame the same person in another role with different features. In the victim role, a person can be pictured as a devoted mother and, at the same time, in an offender role, the same woman can be described as a promiscuous person who drinks too much and is engaged in wife swapping.

In their toolbox, journalists use the victim or offender compartments as and when they are needed and they can change this device per medium, or per period. It is interesting that a complete frame can be activated by

5 A comparable complex case is the one of the Polish-French film director and producer Roman Polanski. He became involved as an offender in a sexual abuse case and pleaded guilty to the charge of unlawful sex with a minor. But others saw him as the victim of the justice system: a prosecutor acted illegally and was engaged in malfeasance in interfering with the operation of the trial. The case has been – with varying attention – in the news since 1988, when he was sued, up to the present day. A characteristic quote for the way people look at victims and offenders comes from an interview in The Independent in which Johnny Depp said, ‘Polanski is not a predator. He’s 75 or 76 years old. He has got two beautiful kids, he has got a wife that he has been with for a long, long time. He is not out on the street.’

6 A special kind of role switch is the subject of another chapter in this book: the switch from criminal to hero (see Burger & Lanjouw 2012).
mentioning just one or two of the framing features. A frame package ‘offers a number of different condensing symbols that suggest the core frame and positions in shorthand, making it possible to display the package as a whole with a deft metaphor, catch-phrase, or other symbolic device’. (Gamson & Modigliani 1989, p. 3). This makes them (from a rhetorical perspective) such a strong means of persuading the public of the guilt or innocence of the individual depicted. Merely mentioning that the subject is a doctor opens up a whole compartment and news consumers know exactly what is in that compartment: decent woman, well-off, looks nice, et cetera. On the other hand, mentioning that someone is black is sometimes enough to open the compartment that says guilty.

In the third place, these examples show that victim and offender features are closely related to stereotypes held by the public about victims and crime. Christie’s depictions of victims and offenders were not based on empirical research; the analyses in this paper are. And they show that Christie made a fairly reasonable analysis of these stereotypes. The examples discussed here, therefore, also made it clear that journalists’ toolboxes are not filled with original, authentic features, but with stereotypes: stereotypes used to persuade news consumers of the guilt or innocence of the person in question.

Rhetorical work is probably best done with clichés and stereotypes, but there are some disadvantages with these stereotypes. The most important is that they blinker consumers of crime news to large parts of reality: a reality where criminal offenders do not look like criminal offenders but, for example, look just like bank employees. Where offenders of rape are not strangers, but someone we know. And where victims do not deserve the help they require, because they are not behaving like vulnerable, weak people. And in this perspective, research into these ‘ideal’ victims and offenders can also be seen as an attempt to make journalists more aware and critical of the choices they make, and so contribute to better standards of journalism.

References


Criminals as Heroes: News Media
Rhetoric in the Heineken Kidnap Case

Janno Lanjouw and Peter Burger

15.1 Introduction
Aristotle distinguished three rhetorical genres: the political, the judicial, and the ceremonial. From a rhetorical perspective, crime news at first sight belongs to the genre of judicial oratory: the rhetoric of the court of law, where guilt and innocence are at stake. When we take a closer look, however, we find that this categorization is mistaken: although crime reporters and criminal lawyers share the broad subject matter of crime and punishment, their audiences and consequently their rhetorical aims diverge. Unlike lawyers, journalists are not concerned with the judicial niceties of applicable laws and admissible evidence, nor do they seek to convince a judge or jury. The news audience consists of spectators. A lawyer’s plea calls for a decision, a news report does not. By telling stories about topical events, news does more than convey information, it also promotes certain values: in this sense, it is a moralizing form of discourse.

This places crime news in the genre of ceremonial rhetoric, i.e. the oratory of praise and blame (Timmerman 1996). Originally conceived of as speeches for special occasions, such as funerals or inaugurations, the concept has also been applied to the rhetoric of news. We take our cue from Ettema and Glasser (1988:25), who argue that investigative journalism, although at first sight like political rhetoric, is more akin to ceremonial rhetoric, because it promotes righteous indignation rather than concrete policy choices.

Crime news, then, tells exemplary stories about victims and villains. Often, but not always, virtue is exemplified by victims and vice by criminals, when ideal, Little Red Riding Hood-like innocence meets stereotypical Big Bad Wolf-like brutality (Christie 1986; Koetsenruijter & Vanderveen 2011). But these are not the only flavours: from time to time, the media also construct that headline-grabbing hybrid character, the criminal hero.

Criminal heroes break the law, but reap admiration for their cunning,
guts and magnanimity. The archetypical outlaw hero, is, of course, Robin Hood. His story is made up of motifs – e.g. that he steals from the rich and gives to the poor, and only kills in self-defence – that feature in other criminal hero narratives, including those in present-day news reports.

In order to analyze the rhetoric news media use to construct the type of the criminal hero, we studied one of the most famous criminal cases in recent Dutch history: the kidnapping of beer brewer Alfred Heineken and his chauffeur Ab Doderer in 1983. At the time, police officials complained that the press had ‘glorified’ the kidnappers. In retrospect, their halo shines even brighter: recently dubbed ‘The Big Bang of Dutch Organized Crime’ (Kivits & Jaarsma 2010), the case is inscribed in Dutch cultural memory. In 2011, it was made into a movie, The Heineken Kidnap, starring Rutger Hauer as Freddy Heineken.

We sought to answer the following questions. By what means and to what extent did the news media represent the Heineken kidnap and its perpetrators as heroic? And, more specifically, to what extent does the media representation of the Heineken kidnappers match the standard Robin Hood narrative?

After a brief overview of our case, we will discuss theories dealing with criminal heroes, focusing on the rhetorical, mediated nature of these criminals rather than on their real-life exploits. Next, we will describe the set of methods we used to analyze the news coverage. Our results section focuses on the shifting roles assigned to the three main groups of protagonists: Freddy Heineken and his driver, the kidnap gang, and the law. Their ethos, as we will show, was shaped both by their acts and by rhetorical, discursive and narrative traditions that predate this particular crime story.

At this point, a word is in order about our understanding of ethos. In the Aristotelian sense, ethos refers to the qualities that make the orator credible in the audience’s perception: expertise, virtue, and goodwill. Since under Greek law defendants represented themselves, Aristotle did not need to distinguish between the defendant’s and the orator’s ethos. Cicero and Quintilian, on the other hand, practising rhetoric under a different legal system, where a patronus spoke on behalf of the defendant, do make that distinction (Calboli Montefusco 1994, pp. 71-73). The patron needs to establish his expertise, virtue, and goodwill towards the audience, the defendant merely

1 All translations from the Dutch are by the authors.
needs to come across as virtuous. It is this sense of good moral character that is central to our analysis, which focuses on the criminals’ ethos, not the journalists’.

15.2 The Heineken kidnap case
In late 1983, five men from Amsterdam kidnapped Alfred Heineken, at the time the owner of the Heineken brewery, and his driver Ab Doderer. In the three weeks that followed there was much public attention for the case, which culminated in the paying of an enormous ransom, and the freeing of both victims by the police. Soon after, police caught three of the five kidnappers and found a large part of the ransom. The remaining two kidnappers, Cor van Hout and Willem Holleeder, escaped to Paris. This turned out to be a brilliant move, since the extradition treaty between France and the Netherlands did not cover kidnap or extortion. So even after they were arrested in Paris, the kidnappers could not be extradited on these charges.

The judicial struggle to get them back in the Netherlands lasted two and a half years. Meanwhile, they were being hosted in hotels that were paid for by the French government, which could not legally extradite or imprison them. Eventually, the kidnappers were extradited under a new treaty, and sentenced to eleven years in prison.

15.3 Theorizing the criminal hero: Beyond Hobsbawn’s social bandits
The phenomenon of Robin Hood-like heroic outlaws had been known for some time (e.g. Klapp 1948), but remained under-theorized until British social historian Eric Hobsbawm kick-started the theory of criminal heroes by coining the concept of social banditry in his 1959 study *Primitive Rebels*. Elaborated in *Bandits* (1969), this category comprises ‘peasant outlaws whom the lord and state regard as criminals, but who remain within peasant society, and are considered by their people as heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and in any case as men to be admired, helped and supported’ (Hobsbawm 1972, p. 17). Voicing peasant discontent, these bandits functioned as a form of pre-political protest: in feudal times, without access to modern political institutions such as trade unions, political parties, let alone universal suffrage, bandits stood up for peasant rights.

Hobsbawm’s examples include the *haiduks* in the Balkans, the *dacoits* in India, and the outlaws of the Wild West – rural rebels in peasant socie-
ties. In his Marxist view, all of them, moreover, belong to the past, since the structural conditions that generated social banditry have long since disappeared (Ibid., p. 19). Now political awareness permeates to all but the most remote locations in the world, oppressed farmers have better means at their disposal to effect social change.

Although Hobsbawm’s social bandit theory opened up new perspectives on the history of crime and still inspires scholars in various disciplines, it has also engendered a great deal of controversy among historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and folklorists. Their criticism is threefold. First, historical social bandits were not as social as Hobsbawm preferred to see them: very few actually fit the model. Instead of championing the cause of the oppressed, bandits often teamed up with landlords and terrorized the peasantry. In fact, official protection was crucial to their success (Blok 1972; Sant Cassia 1993; Slatta 2004).

Second, and more important for our angle of inquiry, Hobsbawm has been taken to task for failing to distinguish clearly between bandits and stories about bandits, using folklore and elite fiction – often published many years after the alleged facts – as sources of information about the historic actions of bandits, instead of contemporary police and trial records. Evidence of social protest can indeed be found in popular accounts of banditry, but it can never be taken at face value (Balkelis 2008; Blok 1972; Slatta 2004; Wagner 2007). In order to understand the social bandit phenomenon, or the broader category of criminal heroes, the various representations themselves, and their relation to social reality, must be made the subject of analysis (Wagner 2007, p. 358).

England’s most famous highwayman, Dick Turpin, for example, is not remembered for killing the man who came to arrest him (which he actually did), but for riding from London to York overnight on his horse Black Bess, which he did not. Turpin did not possess a steed of that name; the famous ride derives from a novel published a hundred years after Turpin’s death, which cast the eighteenth-century highwayman in a nineteenth-century mould. His contemporaries did not regard him as a hero (Sharpe 2005, pp. 153-160).

In this way, mediated images of bandits are shaped and reshaped to serve current interests – as they still are: the third and final point of criticism of Hobsbawm’s theory is that stories about social bandit-like criminals still arise (Kooistra 1989, pp. 29-30, 160-176). Examples include 1930s gangsters like John Dillinger and Bonnie and Clyde (Beverly 2008), British me-
dia icons of the Sixties the Kray twins (Jenks & Lorentzen 1997; Pearson 2002), computer hackers (Brunvand 2000; Hollinger 1991; Seal 1996, pp. 194-197), Mexico’s narcotraffickers (Edberg 2001, 2004), and gangsta rappers (Roks & Staring 2008).

In the West, feudal societies belong to the remote past but criminal heroes are still with us. What explains their continuing appeal?

15.4 Audacity
The appeal of criminal heroes may be explained in part by the sort of structural economic conditions that Hobsbawm focused on. During the Depression, charismatic criminals like John Dillinger reaped admiration for robbing banks – symbols of capitalism (Kooistra 1989, pp. 119-132; cf. Nadkarni 2000).

These conditions explain why certain criminals become popular in specific periods, but it does not fully explain why these stories should appeal to an audience that is not afflicted by these conditions. Neither do these structural conditions explain why routine coverage of thefts and burglaries is a news staple. Pondering this last question, Katz (1987) and Dahlgren (1988) argued that crime stories appeal to ordinary law-abiding citizens not as an expression of political protest, but as a daily moral work-out, during which readers may identify with criminals. Read like this, crime news provides a means of vicarious transgression. Without approving the crime, readers may admire the criminal’s competence and daring. The key positive value, identified by both Katz and Dahlgren, is audacity:

Some acts and/or the means by which they are carried out appear to us as particularly rash, bold and daring. Others can be more brash, insolent and brazen. Both versions embody what I call audacity. While the morality of the act is never condoned, one can often detect an undercurrent of mild admiration for the audacious (Dahlgren 1988: 201; cf. Katz 1987: 50).

If mundane crime news holds these rewards, we may assume that long-running coverage of big-scale crime exerts an even stronger pull on the reader.

Katz and Dahlgren’s assessment of crime news chimes in with the media-wise branch of criminology known as cultural criminology, whose proponents stress the appeal of transgressive behaviour, both as act and as representation (e.g. Presdee 2000). In fact, one of cultural criminology’s central tenets is that in late modernity the boundary between act and representation
has become blurred: ‘real’ people and their acts cannot be distinguished from their media reflections, so criminals appear to us as mediated images in an infinite hall of mirrors (Ferrell 1999). Hence, cultural criminology urges us to be attuned ‘to image, symbol and meaning as dimensions that define and redefine transgression and social control’ (Ferrell, Hayward & Young 2008, p. 130). Consequently, what is needed if we want to study criminal heroes, is a more sophisticated understanding of the interweaving of criminal behaviour and media stories than is found in Hobsbawm’s work.

15.5 Establishing ethos through narrative
So far, we have mostly dealt with the why of criminal heroes. It is time to turn to the how (cf. Kooistra 1989, pp. 27-28): by what means did the news media define and redefine the transgressive acts of the Heineken kidnap gang?

Criminal heroes exist by virtue of the way their stories are told. Various actors shape these stories: law personnel, journalists, the general public, criminal subcultures, and the criminals themselves. The storytellers use folktale motifs, gangster movie clichés, news media stereotypes and other cultural resources. The narrative device that has received the most attention from scholars is the series of motifs that make up the Robin Hood narrative. First listed by Hobsbawm (1972, pp. 42-43) and amended by Seal (2009, pp. 74-75), the following twelve motifs are the building blocks from which criminal hero stories are constructed. The stories may not contain all motifs, but these are the recurrent elements found in the narrated lives of a hundred outlaw heroes from different time periods and various parts of the world (Seal 2009, pp. 68-70).

The hero does not choose to live outside the law, but is forced to by injustice (1). He (female outlaw heroes are quite rare) is supported by one or more oppressed social groups (2). He rights wrongs (3). He acts honourably: he only kills in self-defence or just revenge and does not harm women (4), he may be courteous to his victims (5), he steals from the rich and supports the poor and the weak (6). A master of disguise, he outsmarts the authorities, and once captured he proves himself an escape artist (7), frequently employing some form of magic (8). He is brave and strong (9). Only betrayal can bring him down (10) and he dies as he lives: bravely and defiantly (11). His demise may be disputed: he is said to have escaped and still be alive (12).

For criminals to be recognized as criminal heroes by the news audience, these motifs need not all be present. The criminal hero stereotype, we
surmise, functions like a frame (Gamson & Modigliani 1989; Van Gorp 2007). Frames typically consist of a core idea that may or may not be manifest (e.g. what is the nature of this issue? On what moral basis should we judge it?) and a number of discursive devices that are manifest, but need not be present in all texts containing the frame. One of these devices can be potent enough to ‘trigger’ the entire frame in the reader’s mind. As Gamson and Modigliani put it, a frame package ‘offers a number of different condensing symbols that suggest the core frame and positions in shorthand, making it possible to display the package as a whole with a deft metaphor, catchphrase, of other symbolic device’ (1989, p. 3).

Although stealing from the rich and supporting the poor is the most readily recognized motif, every individual motif expresses the core idea of a supremely skilled rebel of high moral character, rightfully resisting the powers that be. From a rhetorical perspective, most of these features serve to exonerate the criminal and at the same time incriminate his victims and the law: the standard criminal hero narrative reverses the ethos of the criminal and that of his victims and the law authorities in many ways.

Ethos, however, transcends the level of narrative: the characters’ ethos is shaped by more than their acts. Ethos pervades both discourse and visual rhetoric. Persuasive elements are found in the presentation as a whole, e.g. in the use of full quote versus paraphrasing, in qualifications like daring or brutal, in the importance signalled by headline size and page position, and in the use of pictures and maps. These, too, are part of the journalist’s rhetorical toolbox. In the end, social meaning is created by the ensemble of narration, image, and discourse.

Consequently, answering the questions how and to what extent the news media constructed the Heineken kidnappers as heroic, necessitated a combination of narrative, discourse and visual-rhetorical analysis.

15.6 Method
Given the sheer amount of news items concerning the Heineken kidnapping, we limited our sample to a little over three years worth of coverage, 10 November 1983, the day following the actual kidnapping, until the sentencing of kidnappers Cor van Hout and Willem Holleeder on 19 February 1987. The sample consists of the coverage in four major Dutch dailies (Trouw, de Volkskrant, Het Parool, and De Telegraaf), totalling 644 news items. These were photocopied from newspaper archives, enabling us to analyze both ver-
bal and visual elements of the original publications. Additionally, four journalistic book-length treatments of the case were analyzed (De Vries 1983, 1987; Van den Heuvel & Huisjes 2008; Kivits & Jaarsma 2010). Both news coverage and books were repeatedly worked through according to the principles of grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin 1998).

Although our angle on this case is criminals-as-heroes, our initial exploration of the research material focused on both positive and negative qualifications bearing on the ethos of all main groups of actors: the criminals, the victims, and the police. These qualifications could be clustered into ten traits. The criminals were variously described as audacious and clever, in control, humane or inhumane, and as victims of bureaucracy. The range of qualifications for the victims was much narrower: these were either pitiful or rich and powerful – and hence not to be pitied. (This, of course, only applies to Heineken, not to his chauffeur). The police and other law officials, finally, were powerless, or worse, bumbling, or they acted with dedication and force.

At times, these qualifications are explicitly stated, but more often respect and even admiration for the kidnappers, for example, shine through in apparently factual descriptions like: ‘The entire hijacking took less than ten minutes’, i.e. the crime was very well prepared. These qualifications were subsequently coded for in the entire sample.

15.7 Results: three phases
Although we set our sights on the criminals, they did not emerge as the main news characters during the entire period of the kidnapping and its aftermath, which can be divided into three phases, each starting with a landmark event: the abduction, the police raid, and the arrest of the two kidnappers still at large. In the Heineken kidnap coverage, attention for the criminals, the victims, and the law shifts from one to the other as the story unfolds, and so does the protagonists’ ethos. In fact, when the ethos of one party rises, the other’s falls. Thus work the scales of journalistic justice.

For each phase, we describe the ongoing construction of the protagonists’ ethos and we list the extent to which the twelve motifs that make up the Robin Hood narrative are in evidence.

15.7.1 Phase 1: The kidnap – pitiful victims
After the abduction of Heineken and Doderer the media focus their attention on the victims. They were, after all, the only known factor in the story:
'pending the investigation', the police did not release any more information than strictly necessary and the kidnappers were still faceless.

The first few days a number of articles, almost resembling obituaries, describe the life and deeds of Alfred Heineken and, to a lesser extent, his driver Ab Doderer. Although their victim status is foregrounded, other features are highlighted too. Heineken is fabulously wealthy and moves in high society circles; he is a personal friend of Queen Beatrix. Although his celebrity is stressed rather than his power, this makes him less of an ideal victim (Christie 1986).

The police were either described as doing their work, or as being outsmarted by the kidnappers. By referring to sensational kidnappings in the preceding decade, the swift and puzzling delivery of a letter with instructions and several indications that the kidnappers had prepared the assault thoroughly, the press suggests the kidnapping to be the work of organized, professional criminals. Although at this time still faceless they are portrayed as very much in control. Perhaps the strongest example of this were the personal ads the kidnappers used as means of communication. In these ads, the kidnappers referred to the police as ‘the hare’, naming themselves ‘the eagle’.

Although news coverage during this phase is a far cry from the full-fledged criminal hero narrative, echoes of this tradition can be discerned from day one. One example must suffice here. The day after the kidnapping, the front page of the Amsterdam daily Het Parool (10 November 1983) voices empathy with the plight of Heineken and Doderer, stresses the police’s powerlessness – and expresses tacit respect for the kidnappers’ audacity. Note, too, the suspense created by the historical present and, in the last sentence, the use of point-of-view – from the outset, the press situates the criminals in the realm of great stories:

The assailants and their prey, worth a ransom of millions, are flown. Everything has taken place in less than ten minutes. (…) Only now the entire police machinery starts to move. The Amsterdam police chief realizes that he is faced with perhaps the biggest kidnap case in the history of Dutch crime. (Het Parool, 10 nov. 1983)

These elements paint a picture of the kidnappers as ruthless professionals, the police as well-intentioned but slow and in awe of the criminals, and Heineken as a decent and very rich man (he is rather irreverently described as a ‘beer giant and multimillionaire’). From day one, the cards are dealt.
Of the twelve Robin Hood motifs, only a few are recognizable, and those only in part: the criminals have kidnapped one of the richest men in the country (#6), they outsmart the police (#7) and their actions demonstrate their bravery (#9). The element of supporting the poor is completely absent, but their choice of target, one of the country’s richest men, is in line with the criminal hero’s code. Still, during this phase, few narrative elements inspire sympathy for the criminals.

15.7.2 Phase 2: Denouement – the police triumphant
This phase started on 30 November 1983 when the police, having learned the kidnappers’ identity through an anonymous tip, raided their hiding place. After finding Heineken and Doderer in the cleverly hidden cells, the police proudly gave a press conference. They had found the victims unharmed, caught two of the criminals and were expecting to arrest the others shortly. Furthermore, within a month they found a large part of the ransom and one of the kidnappers still at large turned himself in. Correspondingly, the ethos of the police peaked and the kidnappers’ ethos plummeted.

Now, it was time for the actions of the police to be characterized as ‘resolute’ and ‘spectacular’. The Netherlands’ largest-circulation daily De Telegraaf complimented the police on their ‘first-rate achievement. Unbridled energy went hand in hand with apparently limitless resourcefulness’. (1 December 1983)

In tandem with the ethos of the police, the victims’ ethos rose when details became known about the ‘medieval conditions’ under which they had been kept prisoner, chained to the wall, on bare mattresses, and without medication for Heineken’s heart condition. However, apart from a quick press conference after their release and a short press statement, both men shunned the media. Consequently, the victim angle rapidly lost its appeal.

The remaining storylines being those of the kidnappers and police, and most of the police story already revealed, the focus of the press shifted to the chase of the two kidnappers still at large. The criminals were described as ‘gangsters’, belonging to a ‘mafia-like’ ‘clan’. De Telegraaf’s 1 December 1983 front page reads like a ‘wanted’ poster, announcing ‘HUNT FOR GANGSTERS’, and helpfully providing mug shots of the kidnappers still at large.

For all their brutality, the kidnappers also earn a grudging admiration from their adversaries:
[Chief inspector] Sietsma (...) expressed near-open admiration for the kidnappers’ thorough preparation and timing: ‘It was so well timed that in the initial phase establishing their exact escape route presented us with a mass of problems’ (*Het Parool*, 1 December 1983).

Of course, this admiration from the police could also be viewed as an attempt to explain why it took them so long to find the criminals.

All in all, in this phase the kidnappers come across as nasty and greedy, involved in shady dealings, as show-offs in shiny cars and as brash pub-crawlers. At the same time, they are characterized as cowboys (‘vrije jongens’) and working-class lads (‘jongens van de gestampte pot’), loud-mouthed but kind-hearted. News reports stress their loyalty and defiance. The publication of their pictures, names, and nicknames changes the kidnappers from a faceless group into a number of distinct individuals – and colourful individuals at that – whose story had still not reached its end. As we enter the third and longest phase of the Heineken kidnap coverage, the criminal hero theme builds up.

Of the twelve Robin Hood motifs, several are in evidence. Their cunning (#7) and audacity (#9) were widely recognized, even by the police, they had succeeded in bagging a rich ransom (#6), and they were betrayed by an anonymous informer (#10).

15.7.3 **Phase 3: Aftermath – outlaw heroes**

The third phase of the coverage started in early 1984, with the arrest of Willem Holleeder and Cor van Hout in Paris. Extradition is expected to bring a swift end to the case, but in an unexpected twist their lawyer discovers that the extradition treaty is outdated. Under the treaty the men could only be extradited to the Netherlands on secondary charges, not for kidnapping or extortion. In a counter-move, the Dutch Department of Justice withdrew its extradition request. The kidnappers were now illegal aliens in France, but they had not committed any crimes there and could not legally be extradited to any country. They were released from prison and consigned to house arrest in a hotel.

The Dutch Department of Justice was, in the eyes of the press, clearly annoyed:

Just how sour the release of the two [kidnappers] tastes to the Department of Justice, became apparent when a comment was sought: ‘We have duly
noted the decision. No more, no less’, a spokeswoman said. But surely you can comment on that decision? ‘No, that decision is not our business’, the woman snapped (Trouw, 9 December 1985).

The kidnappers had hoped to get away with a short prison sentence, so they were none too happy with the Department’s move either. They even accused the Department of Justice of ‘foul play’.\(^2\) And indeed it was hard to sell: the Netherlands’ most wanted criminals saying ‘arrest us’, and the Department dropping the charges. It looked like the kidnappers had just outsmarted the law. They were grinning for the cameras drinking Heinekens; outlaws in a literal sense, halfway across a legal Rio Grande separating them from freedom.

During the first phase, the press had focused almost exclusively on the victims. In the second phase the police were cast as the central characters. In the third phase, these actors became less prominent and their ethos declined. The police faced accusations of sloppy work and corruption. Their position in the news stories was taken up by the Dutch Department of Justice, a faceless institution that met with little sympathy from the press. ‘Department of Justice Cheats French over Kidnappers’ Extradition’, a Volkskrant-headline read (28 April 1984). ‘Heineken Kidnappers have nowhere to turn to; ‘Finding Refuge would still Spell Exile’, Het Parool (10 December 1985) sympathized.

The victims persisted in their media silence, but the fact that Heineken donated large sums of money to the Amsterdam police and had his private security force harass the kidnappers hurt both his ethos and that of the police. At the same time, it boosted the criminals’ ethos, who were now perceived to hold out against the law forces of two nations and the power of big money.

The third phase was clearly for the kidnappers. Willem Holleeder and Cor van Hout were now ‘famous criminals’ under ‘hotel arrest’ in France, untouchable by the furious Dutch Department of Justice. They spoke with the press about the kidnapping from their point of view, which changed the perception of the crime, the victims and the perpetrators. More and more they were typified as tough guys with a good heart who shared values like loyalty, friendship, common sense and perseverance. The notion gains currency that the kidnappers were ‘blood brothers’ (‘gezworen bloedgabbers’)

who wanted to hit the jackpot with a crazy scheme that almost worked and that was not intended to cause physical harm.

When, in a surprising twist, the French Justice Department tried to house the criminals on a French Caribbean island, and Van Hout and Holleeder find themselves chased from island to island by the inhabitants and pursued by reporters and Heineken’s private police, the press increasingly reports the news from the criminals’ perspective. ‘Gangsters’ and ‘Mafiosi’ no longer, they now see themselves described as the ‘alleged Heineken kidnappers’. A *Parool* headline reads: ‘Cor and Willem bounced between islands in the French West Indies’ (15 February 1986) – the press is now on a first-name basis with the kidnappers. In the end, the news media were rooting for the criminals.

Newspaper headlines suggest that their victory is complete: ‘Heineken Kidnappers Seem to have Evaded Department of Justice’ (*Trouw*, 14 February 1986); ‘Overjoyed about Guadeloupe Refuge’ (*Het Parool*, 13 February 1986, quoting Van Hout and Holleeder’s lawyer). Their adventures are the stuff of crime fiction:

George Simenon, the creator of Chief Inspector Maigret, could not have conceived of a more perfect scenario. Two Dutch kidnappers, millions of guilders in ransom money still missing, a French prison cell, neat little hotels, and finally, the tropical sun of Guadeloupe (*Trouw*, 14 February 1986).

Eventually, Cor van Hout and Willem Holleeder were returned to France and extradited to the Netherlands under a new treaty in November 1986. The 1987 trial and their sentencing and imprisonment seem to mark the end of the Heineken kidnap coverage and fatally damage their status as criminal heroes. As he was leaving the stage, however, Cor van Hout tossed a PR bombshell over his shoulder that effectively destroyed most of the efforts of the law authorities to win the ethos contest: a book-length account of the preparations, the kidnap and its aftermath, as told by Cor van Hout to crime reporter Peter R. de Vries.³

*De ontvoering van Alfred Heineken* (‘The Kidnap of Alfred Heineken’) drew an indignant reply from the Amsterdam police. A spokesperson mentioned the ‘danger […] that many will now look upon Cor van Hout

³ On Peter R. de Vries as a Dutch folk hero in his own right, see Reijnders 2005.
as a hero. Quite the contrary, he is and always will be a criminal who has to answer for detaining two persons against their will’. (Het Parool 14 april 1987) In spite of this criticism, the book proved a success, selling more than 300,000 copies to date, which is exceptional for Dutch standards (Van den Heuvel & Huisjes 2009). The book consolidated the public image of Hollleeder and Van Hout as exceptionally audacious criminals at the very moment when they disappeared behind bars for a number of years and nothing much was heard from them.

In this book, the criminal hero theme reaches a crescendo as it ties together the majority of the narrative motifs in one book-length story told from a sympathetic point of view. More than the newspaper coverage does, De ontvoering van Alfred Heineken shows the criminals operating – as folklorist Graham Seal so aptly puts it – ‘outside the law, but inside the lore’ (1996, pp. 197-201).

This sympathetic book-length portrait builds on the increasingly ‘heroic’ newspaper coverage, part of which flowed from the pen of Peter R. de Vries. His changing rhetorical construction of the protagonists’ ethos is indicative of the more general shift. After the police raid that freed the kidnap victims, De Vries published his first book about the case (1983), adopting the more traditional perspective of the police, strongly denouncing the kidnappers’ deeds. The 1987 book, written from the perspective of the perpetrators is the culmination of a process of media and public fascination. Following all publications chronologically it is clear that fascination grew gradually, culminating in the 1987 De Vries book. The cultural image of the criminals is solidified in subsequent books (Van den Heuvel & Huisjes 2006; Kivits & Jaarsma 2010).

The long drawn-out aftermath of the Heineken kidnap brought the Rob-in Hood narrative more to the fore than did the previous episodes. Newspapers dwelt on the unequal struggle between the criminal underdogs and the Dutch and French states, whereas the De Vries book sketched in the background details from a sympathetic perspective. Unlike Robin Hood, the Heineken kidnappers were not forced into a life of crime by cruel overlords (motif #1), but they did know hardship and poverty in their youth and news media expressed sympathy when they were persecuted by the law. Although not supported by an oppressed social group (#2), they spoke of themselves as belonging to the common people, and so did journalists (‘jongens van de
gestampte pot’: ‘working-class lads with their heart in the right place’). As for acting honourably (#4): they did not kill and in the De Vries book, Cor van Hout expressed dismay about the criminals who had kidnapped a woman and empathized with the plight of poor Ab Doderer.

As in the second phase, the criminals’ cunning in evading the police and their audacity (#7 and 9) featured most strongly. They did not go down bravely in a final shoot-out (#11), but Van Hout and Holleeder remained defiant until the end. The last motif (#12, the hero’s demise may be disputed: he is said to have escaped and still be alive) can be recognized in the escape of kidnapper Frans Meijer in 1985. He remained at large for well over a decade, until he was arrested in Paraguay in 1998.

15.8 Conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn from this exemplary story? First, although the Heineken kidnap coverage does not completely match the standard Robin Hood narrative, the majority of the twelve motifs can still be recognized. Although the kidnappers treated their victims brutally and did not distribute the loot among the poor and needy, their story prominently features a number of criminal hero motifs. The kidnappers turned to crime partly because of a poor childhood and they receive moral support from the community they belong to (motifs #1 and 2). Their adversaries – the law and Heineken’s private security force – are morally flawed (#2). Living by a certain moral code, they did not kill and targeted a rich and powerful man (#4). Their crime was executed with panache and for a time, they outsmarted the law (#7 and 9). Only betrayal brought them down and they went down fighting (#10 and 11). One of them, Frans Meijer, initially turned himself in, then escaped and remained at large until 1998 (#12).

In addition to these traditional narrative sequences, a variety of verbal and visual means are employed to paint the moral character of the criminal heroes. Positive qualifications like ‘daring’ and ‘spectacular’ stress their audacity, drawings of the hidden cells speak to their ingenuity. Pictures of Holleeder and Van Hout sticking it out in France and in the West Indies emphasize their defiant outlaw status.

Crime reporting, as we said at the outset, has more in common with ceremonial than with judicial rhetoric. It is a form of moralizing discourse that educates and inspires by telling exemplary stories. This crime story celebrates individual audacity of common people at the expense of state and
business power. The Heineken gang do not fit the criminal hero stereotype perfectly, but it can be argued that the individual narrative motifs may have been sufficient to evoke the entire criminal hero story.

The rhetorical perspective on criminal heroes avoids Hobsbawn’s conflation of story and historical fact, and broadens the scope from narrative analysis to a combination of narrative, discourse and rhetorical analysis. This is not to say that we do not need to look beyond the text. As our analysis shows, outside events and decisions by potential news sources influenced the extent to which the Heineken gang were represented as criminal heroes. The cards were dealt from day one – but they could have been played differently. The decision of Heineken and Doderer to remain silent, and particularly the decision of Cor van Hout to collaborate with crime reporter Peter R. de Vries both benefited the criminals’ heroic ethos.

The approach employed in this case study needs to be extended in several ways. Other cases offer scope for historical and cross-cultural comparison. As we write, ‘hacktivist’ Julian Assange of Wikileaks fame is variously described as a modern-day Robin Hood and as a cyber criminal. The Heineken case itself could be extended with a study of the criminals’ shifting fates in Dutch cultural memory (cf. Basu 2011 on Australia’s number one outlaw Ned Kelly), particularly in light of Holleeder’s later status as the Netherlands’ most notorious criminal (Smeeing et al. 2011). As this case study focuses on newspapers and books, other media – television, radio, magazines – should be taken into account too. Internet discussion boards and the comments sections on news sites offer opportunities to contrast the way audiences construct criminals as heroes with their representations in news coverage (Cavaglion 2007; Kalmre 2005; Schmitt 2012).

We expect that scholars of rhetoric, crime and journalism, too, will remain fascinated by these moral tales in which admirable qualities are exemplified by men who lead criminal lives.

References


CRIMINALS AS HEROES


PART IV

New Media
16 Netoric: An Approach to New Media Rhetoric

PETRA ACZÉL

16.1 Introduction

Any line of inquiry, any field of interest, any subject matter, then, can be taken as a rhetoric or as a set of rhetorics. That, I think, makes it possible to use the vocabulary of rhetoric to discuss any human interest (Corder 1993, p. 95).

From the turn of the twenty-first century rhetorical theory has been strongly challenged by the complex system and phenomena of new media. A communicative culture is being formulated that is characterized by permanent connection, publicity and participation. Communication itself has to be reinterpreted in terms of new media interactivity and hypermediacy. In this context, rhetoric also calls for redefinitions and rhetorical theories are urged to provide a framework in which new media communication can be elaborated. In this chapter, my purpose is to propose an interpretation of new media as ‘a rhetoric or as a set of rhetorics’. I endeavour to cast light on dimensions and capacities of rhetoric that have long been shadowed by the traditional and hegemonic paradigm of the discipline. According to this, rhetoric is conventionally defined as the art of persuasive speech or ornament of elite speech.

This widely recognized definition was originally worked out for the discursive practices of the public spaces of the polis where people met, shared ideas and strategically influenced each other in the traditional one-to-many relation. Rhetoric as the practice and theory of persuasive discourse entailed techniques and modes of articulating thoughts by aesthetically moving linguistic figures and persuasive modalities. The ideal of rhetoric used to be the ‘finished and polished’ speech, the formal act of discourse with which someone persuades many others by means of structure, common places, figures of speech, and argumentation. Formal oratory was a conservative force
preserving the moral and political values of the past, its function was to preserve things as they are, as Kennedy (1997) suggests. Traditional rhetoric prepared the rhetor for winning with words: winning the soul and will of the receiver. Offering the canon, rhetoric enabled the speaker to invent topics, arrange them hierarchically into structural units, to express them in language, remember texts and perform speeches (invention, disposition, elocution, memory, pronunciation) in order to grasp the audience’s attention. The rhetor-model of this tradition is that of the well-educated man who is trained to express in one speech the common wisdom of his society. Rhetoric, thus, used to be about the excellence of the speaker and about the formality of the situation and the speech.

However, new media have widened and replaced real public spaces and fluidized texts. The operation and usage of new media blurs the border between roles of the speaker and audience, constantly remediates discourse (visual and verbal) and accustoms users to the infiniteness of messages. This chapter introduces the neologism of netoric to label the alternative rhetoric emergent in this new media communication. Considering critical aspects of new media and non-traditional rhetorical theories the aim of the discussion is to outline characteristics of new media rhetoric; of netoric. Notwithstanding the hazard of a theoretical venture this essay endeavours to point to the different nature of netoric from traditional rhetoric.

I propose that the rhetorical situations that emerge within new media (internet, mobile phone, social media, etc.) and the rhetorical actions that are formed as answers to them are different in terms of formality, logic, structuring and ethos. I also claim that new media are rhetorical in the sense that it is heterotopical, hypertextual and interactive (inviting).

In order to account for these proposals I shall first consider what characteristics of new media and digital rhetoric have been identified. Secondly, rhetorical literacy will be revisited from a social-historical perspective and non-traditional views of rhetoric will be highlighted. Finally, drawing upon these, in lieu of conclusions, a comparative theoretical frame shall be provided to identify what netoric is or can be.

16.2 New media
In a broad sense, following Lister et al., new media refer to new textual experiences, new ways of representing the world, new relationships between subject and technology, new spaces, interfaces and modes of discourse and new
experiences of the relationship between identity and community (Lister et al. 2003, pp. 12-13). Their digital nature entails the dematerialization of media texts, the compressing of data into very small spaces, ready to be accessed at high speeds and in a non-linear way, and the possibility to manipulate the forms. New media cannot be narrowed down to technical features¹, they may also serve as an inherent logic to understand and articulate ourselves and the world, a syntax of thinking and organizing, a mode to participate in discourse. New media are generally considered to be new² in terms of scale, integration, open architecture, portability, interactivity and speed of change (Thornham, Bassett & Marris 2009, pp. 792-793).

These technological features do not, however, grasp the discursive nature that new media and cyberculture breed. Lev Manovich lists five elements by which we may get closer to that nature (2001, pp. 27-48): (1) numerical representation, (2) modularity, (3) automation, (4) variability and (5) transcoding. 1) Numerical representation allows the media object (e.g. text) to be described mathematically and be subject to algorithmic manipulation. Media objects originate in numerical forms and are created through digitization. Numerical representation refers to the fact that meaningful units on the surface are numerical values in the deep structure; ‘discrete units of modern media are usually not units of meaning (…)’. (p. 29). 2) Modularity means, on the one hand, the accessibility of every element on its own and a fractal nature of media-objects, on the other hand. As Manovich explains, media objects can be combined into larger units without losing their original independence. Everything in new media can be accessed individually and in assembled units. 3) Automation reflects the possibility to remove human intentionality from the creative process of media objects, while 4) variability tells about the existence of media objects in potentially infinite versions, in variables. New media systems invite users to creatively hyperlink, wire and navigate. 5) Transcoding, finally, refers to

¹ ‘New Media is therefore not just about the introduction of new technologies, or an up-and-coming practice, or emergent technique, style or material. Rather the term ‘New Media’ has a typological necessity – it creates a paradigm of texts, theories and processes that become a defining and interpretative process’ (Fuery 2009, p. 10).
² Fuery (2009, pp. 11-22) takes up ideas to be considered as crucial for the status of the new: newness as the previously unseen or unexperienced, the new as original, the new as polymorphic, the new as political investment.
the translating of ‘media into computer data’ (p. 45); the cultural layer to the digital, computerized one. Therefore, the computer layer affects the cultural one; operations of the former influence the contents and form of the latter. There is a clear translation of formats that does not leave the human-cultural layer untouched.

Miller (2011, pp. 14-39) sets up three key categories into which he organizes characteristics of new media. Under the heading ‘technical processes’, he orders automation, hypermediatization, interactivity and digitality. These are the features Manovich named by numerical representation, modularity and automation. The second category of Miller’s is about the cultural forms of new media such as context, variability and process. The third category names the experiences of new media that are immersive, virtual and simulated.

Most common key terms used in media-lingo to characterize new media are digital, interactive, hypertextual, networked, heterotopical (virtual) and heuretic. Continuously debated as a term and reference, interactivity is one of the key values added to new media, standing ‘for a more powerful sense of user engagement with media texts, a more independent relation to sources of knowledge, individualised media use, and greater user choice’ (Lister et al. 2003, p. 21). Unprecedented opportunities have emerged for making connections between all sorts of parties (individuals and organizations as well). Interactivity has also changed the attitude towards the interpretability of media texts, influencing navigation in the data-jungle. Interactivity on the other hand is more than the opportunity to become an active participant in the unfolding of a flow of actions. It can be used, Fuery assumes,

as a metaphor for a wide range of relationships and forms of exchange in terms of information, and play, as well as subjectivity. (…) Here we interpret interactivity as a metaphor for becoming an interactive subject and how we as interactive subjects within a new media culture come to be identified within groups that participate as a part of a new culture, such as online communities (Fuery 2009, p. 31).

Fuery identifies three types or levels of interactivity as contextual relations for the subject: ideological interactivity, illusory interactivity (metaphoricity or entropy) and resistant interactivity. ‘Each form explores’, as she suggests, ‘relations between new media technology, culture and subject through the issue that dominates our cultural sensibility of digitality’ (2009, p. 47).
With the term hypertextual we shall consider the non-sequential connections between all kinds of data and an associative cognitive activity that is trailed by the links of the hypertext. Conventional ways of thinking about texts (organized in page sequences linearly) have to be reshaped when applied to new media objects. This means that conventional and traditional ways of thinking about rhetoric should be questioned when applied to allegedly different modes of discourse.

In new media even the smallest building elements are networked. In networked media the multiplicity of messages and sources, the connectivity, selectivity and productivity of the audience have to be taken into account and a new economy of information recognized.

As for virtual reality qualities such as technological immersion, computer generated imagery and conceptions of embodiment are to be taken into consideration. Even though the term of cyberspace as another space to the real has become slightly outdated, the spatial experience of new media is of importance when rhetoric is intended. For the description of new media space Foucault’s impressively but vaguely defined heterotopia is applied here. As Foucault claims

> We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment. I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein (Foucault 2002, p. 229).

Heterotopias – as he names them – are counterparts of utopias and alternatives of real places. Their role is either to create a space of illusion that exposes every real space or create a space that is other, another real space: there are heterotopias of illusion and of compensation. A heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several places, sites that are otherwise incompatible. It is a rectangular stage or two dimensional screens on which the projection of a three dimensional space can be seen. Heterotopias begin to function at full capacity ‘when men arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional time’ (p. 234), in heterochronic dimensions. The experience of other spaces (cemeteries, museums, libraries, rites) is best modelled in the mirror image and the gaze through which the absence from real place can be recognized. New media and rhetoric are also heterotopic, the former in the
sense of virtuality, the latter in its capacity to create the communicative body of those realities that are missing from our lives.3

Heuretics is proposed for new media logic as a programme of experimentation, the logic of invention. Ulmer introduces the neologism to converge rhetorical invention with innovation in the specific domain of academic discourse. In order to bring academic discourse into the age of television, he stresses the importance of the shift from hermeneutics to heuretics highlighting the ‘inventive’ root in both. Originally worked out as the method of academic discourse, heuretics is also applicable to the general description of new media. ‘Working heuretically means using the method that is being invented while inventing it’, thus practising ‘hyperrhetoric’ (1994, 16). The heuretic process of creation means relating divergent elements to a given issue for research. In heuretics the arrangement is no longer based on persuasion as much as on discovery – as Ulmer emphasizes.

New media provide heterotopias and require heuretics for communication. Acknowledging new media as a set of rhetorics we can state that netoric possesses the discursive (technological and cultural) characters of new media and unfolds them in a heterotopic, heuretic way.

16.3 Digital rhetoric
Kathleen Welch argues that electric rhetoric is an emergent consciousness or mentalité within discourse communities, is the new merger of the written and the oral, both now newly empowered and reconstructed by electricity and both dependent on print literacy. Electronic technologies have led to electronic consciousness, an awareness or mentalité that now changes literacy but in no way diminishes it (Welch 1999, p. 104).

Screen generations of that consciousness are forming new codes of interactions, interfaces are marking new common ways of getting into contact. A new (virtual) subjectivity, intersubjectivity and interobjectivity4 is emerging. Rhetoric is gaining new characteristics that feature mediated text-producing and non-linear consuming.

First of all, there is no clear border between the rhetor and the au-

3 See also Nicolás Gómez Dávila 2006. Escolios a Un Texto Implicito: Obra Completa. Bogota: Villegas Editores
dience; the continuous exchanging of roles enables the person to be both
speaker and listener, both writer and reader, both communicator and receiv-
er concurrently, in the same rhetorical situation. Texts are not objects in the
public, they are themselves public, representing, talking, and constituting
relationships. This means not only that the rhetor is constantly acting as an
audience, but that the result of that simultaneous, multi-identical commu-
nication is the interaction within and with texts. Interactivity penetrated the
rhetorical situation, the role of the sender and the text that is open to modi-
fication, being un-finished, fluid and transmedial. Aarseth (1997, p. 22)
also makes the point that ‘(...) cybertext shifts the focus from the traditional
threesome of author/sender, text/message, and reader/receiver to the cyber-
netic intercourse between the various part(icipant)s in the textual machine’. Interactivity also implies informality, a characteristic that is not familiar
with traditional rhetorical practices. Formality as Judith T. Irvine’s (1979,
pp. 776-779) suggests is due to increased code structuring, the consistency
of choices, the invocation of positional, rather than personal, identities and
the emergence of a central situational focus. Formal speech and communi-
cation imposes special rules of style and delivery on the speaker, deals with
important activities and central figures in them (Kennedy 1997). The inter-
activity and permanence of new media communication, however, stir up the
situational borders of formality, lessen the importance of rules and positions
and boost the significance of personal identities and side involvements.

4 ‘Computer screen and television screen coexist as centers of familial activity. In this kind
of private space, the household member can delve into the computer screen by visiting
websites, by associatively surfing locations, by shopping, by entering a synchronous chat
room or MUD (a multi-user domain, in which the digitally literate person can assume
various personae), by reading and/or posting to an asynchronous list serve (or by reading
only, a move that has been named ‘lurking’), and by many other activities with CD-ROMs.
Many people have reported the experience in their digital households and HUTs (or their
offices or cyberhall cafes) of subjectively going elsewhere on the computer, of interacting
subjectively with the machine in a way that increases and/or complicates human
interaction with technology’ (Welch 1999, p. 156).

5 It can also be problematized culturally: there is no cultural (moral or value) difference
between the user and the consumer.

6 The users are invited to enter a text bringing with them knowledge of multi-medial
experiences.
Secondly, according to Gurak (2009, pp. 499-501), the key concepts ethos, pathos and logos have to be addressed from the aspect of the digital. In digital rhetoric, speed – combined with reach – has become the predominant feature having dramatic impact on the content and practice. A significant shift from invention to delivery (distribution) can be detected in digital practice. Speed enhances the need to distribute on the rhetor’s side and the desire to find on the consumer’s side. The register has become blended, communication more repetitive and redundant. The intention to persuade specific audiences is now less important than the ability to reach many audiences. The traditional one-to-many configuration has been modified into a many-to-many relation in accordance with the changes to enable users with a democratic reach. Multiple identities formed by the possibilities and spaces of digital environment de/reform the ethos\(^7\) of the digital rhetor. Anonymity evokes tendencies like masking, flaming and contingency in communication.

The logic (and arrangement) of texts is also different from that of the traditional canon and of the culture of print. In hypermedia the cause-effect logic has been replaced by an associational one. As parallel processing substitutes serial processing, linear-indexical thinking changes to network-associational. In electric rhetoric, the process replaces the product, so the rhetor creates an information environment in which the user chooses the line or path through. According to Delany and Landow (1991, p. 9) ‘Hypertext linking, reader control, and continual restructuring not only militate against modes of argumentation to which we have become accustomed, but they have other effects. The reader now is faced by a kind of textual randomness’.

Changes reshape the role of techniques and canons of traditional rhetoric, and result in a digitally reformed functional-descriptive system. Digital rhetoric should not be alienated from the classical tradition as it can be relevant in the description of the interactive practices, events and contexts. Digital rhetoric is the rhetoric of symptomatic difference and functional similar-

\(^7\) Ethos is the character as it emerges in language. It is a verbal, symbolic construction of the self-image in speech, a favourable self presenting of the speaker that enhances the effectiveness of the discourse. Ethos reflects the ‘human’ in speech and represents the consciousness of self. Deeply rooted in the psychological, sociocultural and moral assumptions of the audiences it has had several meanings throughout the history of rhetoric.
ity: it is the classical system adapted to new communicative experiences. It is to be regarded as new in its scope not in its mode of investigation. With the idea of netoric I presume that there is an alternative to digital rhetoric that is based on non-mainstream assumptions of the rhetorical literacy.

16.4 Impossibility and possibility of rhetoric

In antiquity, classical rhetoric used to serve as the universal science of the public sphere in which right acting and right speaking were considered one. Although broadly defined as the art of persuasion, it has always striven to outgrow its exclusive concern with persuasive public speaking, in order to either prove that persuasion is not the robbing of human autonomy or to de-legitimize rhetoric to work in the public sphere. Its genuine communicative and strategic characteristics, the philosophical concerns, the pragmatic capacities, its references to both the public and the personal have made rhetoric an interdisciplinary field of intrapersonal, interpersonal, organizational and public discourse. Rhetoric is ‘the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion’ as Aristotle (1355b) put it. Debated as a science it has been defined to be either a faculty or a virtue. The tendency to reduce it to the techniques of elocution has resulted in a generally pejorative use of the term rhetoric. Modern and postmodern rhetorical theory has been seeking for new horizons to interpret rhetoric in a more integrative way, legitimizing it to function as a dimension of communication and its meta-representations.

A discipline with a European history of 2500 years has to overcome several existentially critical phases. However, there were two eras of rejection that turned out to be almost fatal, causing the death of rhetoric. According to the founding article of Bender and Wellbery (1990) this rejection of rhetoric was caused by both Enlightenment and Romanticism. In the enlightened mode of discourse, transparency and neutrality became the determining merits. From this perspective, rhetoric seemed empty, blurred and diffuse. Public discourse had to be freed of its individual interests, deprived of rhetorical ambiguity, magniloquence and passion. As for romanticism, rhetoric had become a craft rather than the faculty of the genius, a way of producing

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8 The idea that persuasion is a dominant practice that robs people of their independence and inhibits audience’s autonomy is a key feature of Kantian rationalist contention toward traditional rhetoric.
rather than creating. It blamed rhetoric for what the Enlightenment could only accept from it. Combined these two sets of attacks resulted in the rejection of the classical tradition of rhetoric for the following reasons: ascendant scientific objectivity with values of transparency and neutrality, a new emphasis on individual originality and authorship, liberalism’s displacement of republicanism in political theory, the dominance of literacy over orality and the rise of the vernacular language nation state.

With the recession of this rejection, rhetoric has regained its significance. This shift has been caused by those phenomena that characterize modern, postmodern scientific thinking and global communicative culture. With the advent of new media technologies a lingua franca of influential communication was needed. New, virtual spaces of democratic debating called for a global language through which epistemological pluralism and individual voices were manifested. Rhetoric has regained its relevance in relieving scientific and moral paradoxes of postmodern societies, performing playfulness in communication, fulfilling global communicative exigencies and objectives. By the need for subjectivity, agonistic speech and participation, rhetoric returns to the scientific cultural landscape of the twentieth-twenty-first century.

The prediction that rhetoric would die has not been fulfilled. However, in the danse macabre of possibility and impossibility within the context of changing public and personal communicative environments, rhetorical tradition has learnt to be flexible enough to be interpreted in new ways. With the introduction of new interpretations of rhetoric, scholars managed to display its spaciousness. These new ways are all pointing at a different basis of categorization. They represent a rhetorical tradition that is focused on becoming participants, interactants in a mutual effort of understanding rather than on fulfilled telos (aims). Hence, they oppose rhetoric as the art of persuasive speech and form a definition of rhetoric as being relation-oriented and non-sequential. Invitation, bridging, dialogue and gift appear in rhetorical theories emphasizing that rhetoric is the form of communicative existence rather than a technique of speech formulation. Netoric is a type of rhetoric that draws upon classifications that utilize this other view of rhetoric; a view constantly present though apparently missing from the very early ages of rhetoric. I address three typologies working with that view in the following paragraphs. All three are meant to function as intellectual resources, analogies for netoric. One of them is of the critical feminist scholarship, the
other is of political rhetorical theory and the third, the most original is of rhetorical philosophy.

16.5 Invitational rhetoric
Based on the feminist theory Foss and Griffin in their widely cited article (1995) outlined four types of rhetoric: conquest, conversion, advisory and invitational of which only the last lacks the intent to persuade.

In invitational rhetoric the main point is not to fix adherence to the advocate position but to open the space for the other to enter. Invitational rhetoric, thus, involves the offering of the rhetor’s perspective and the creation of an atmosphere in which audience members’ perspectives also can be offered. It is an offering that employs the narrative to articulate a viewpoint, but not to increase adherence to that viewpoint. The cause and effect line is swept away, offerings are ends in themselves. In this way invitational rhetoric involves the creation of a milieu that enables those that enter to persuade themselves, or to listen, or to learn. Three conditions must be present to originate this milieu. First, members of the audience should feel safe believing they will be treated with respect and care. Secondly, they are to feel that they are valued to have immanent worth. Thirdly they must experience the sense of freedom, a freedom to bring any subject matter into the interaction for consideration in which all presupposition can be dealt with and challenged (Foss & Griffin 1995, p. 10-12). The intent of the rhetor in this context is to enable transformation, not to impose it on the others. This is based upon the process of giving. The telos of invitational rhetoric is understanding not persuasion (Jasinski 2001, p. 332).

16.6 Bridging rhetoric
Dryzek, dwelling upon the scholarly outlawing and democratic suspicion of rhetoric in political theories identifies two sorts of rhetoric: bonding and bridging. Bonding, (the term is taken from Robert Putnam), means asso-

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9 Invitation as a term used to coin the rhetorical is not alien from existentialist rhetorical theory either. Jim Corder in his Argument as Emergence describes rhetorical argumentation as an invitation: ‘In argument, the arguer must with no assurance, go out inviting the other to enter a world that the arguer tries to make commodious, inviting the other to emerge as well, but with no assurance of kind or even thoughtful response’ (1985, p. 26).
ciating with people who are similar in social background, while bridging entails associating with people with different social characteristics. Bonding rhetoric is the sort of discourse liberal democrats fear, as it can also be a divisive force in situations of conflict with out-groups. It works at its best within groups of like-minded members and so it can cause them to move to extremes by easily mobilized and homogenized passions.

As for bridging rhetoric, it takes the difference between the speaker and the audience seriously. The idea here is to ‘represent a discourse on one’s own side that has some compatibility with a discourse on the other side’. (Dryzek 2010, p. 328). Bridging rhetoric is the one in which deliberation can be represented and practised, it is a form that tolerates differences and thus facilitates discussion among those far from each other either in their opinion or cultural context. As the idea of deliberative democracy is best modelled by opportunities provided by new media, the idea of bridging rhetoric is functionally the closest to netoric in general.

16.7 Giving rhetoric
Marilee Mifsud proposes not just a different type, or a functional alternative but a genuinely different form of rhetoric forgotten and not elaborated after the economy of polis over-dominated Western culture. As she says, in the Western tradition polis is the familiar economy. This familiarity arises because of the marketplace and state structure of the polis, so familiar still in modern capitalism. This familiarity arises from the historical claim that the polis invented rhetoric as an idea and practice of serving its needs. Even though the polis economy has become normalized and makes itself visible as the economy and not just one particular form of economy there is a ‘more archaic past where gifts not markets, and people not entities regulate cultural economy, including rhetoric’ (Mifsud 2007, p. 92).

Mifsud takes the Homeric gift economy as her starting point for theorizing rhetoric. This economy is situated in the home, the oikos; oikos is

10 Even though bridging rhetoric dissolves divisions Dryzek does not claim that it is always more desirable than bonding rhetoric. Solidarity is better built with bonding rhetoric and sometimes group polarization may be also desirable. Bridging rhetoric, Dryzek states, can also be undesirable ‘when deployed by dominant actors to co-opt and neutralize potential troublemakers’ (2010, p. 331). He emphasizes the limitedness of the bonding bridging distinction in view of the larger deliberate system, however.
the root practically for all economy. Hospitality is of great significance in the
dynamism between home and the disposition of a people. Hospitality rituals
depicted by Homer are symbolic representations of relation reinforcements
and improvement. These rituals portray a competitive generosity that directs
the Homeric gift economy. The elaboration rituals of hospitality display
honour and generosity that transcend the moment as great stories of them
will be told (by Odysseus).

Generosity is the primary means by which characters acquire and sustain honour as
well as create a network of obligations to each other that can carry this honour into
the future, and to many different peoples. (…) This network of obligations creates
solidarity both within and between cultures, and this solidarity engenders trust.

The consciousness of the Homeric rhetoric is a consciousness of aggregation,
not division. Archaic aggregation is a product of archaic paratactic conscious-
ness and speech. ‘Parataxis is a style of thought and speech that holds multi-
ple related and divergent things in mind simultaneously, not »as one unified
entity« but »as ones in the aggregate«’. The absence of subordination as well
as style displays a simultaneity operating in archaic rhetoric, where many and
multiple ideas can be strung together, to proliferate meaning and connection.
In this parataxis intimacy emerges: ‘we experience a connection and connect-
edness and both particular and general awareness of our situation’. (2007, p.
95). Mifsud later suggests that ‘Rhetoric as giving enacts a rhetorical hospi-
tality, a sumptuous expenditure of surplus meaning (…). Such hospitality
requires an aggregative consciousness of multiplicity’ (2007, p. 105).

Mifsud’s invigorating distinction between polis and Homeric econo-
my, market and gift rhetoric is a framework by which rhetoric and netoric
could be differentiated. The former is traditionally meant to mechanize the
competition of ideas and persuasion while the latter is a mode of sharing
ideas and participation. The blending of the private with public, the holding
of multiple, divergent things together, the presence in the aggregate rather
than an entity, the chance to enter a fluid of paratactic discourse with surplus
meaning are unique experiences of new media: Homeric gift economy is in
a way familiar with the digital information economy.

Invitational, bridging and giving rhetoric are highlighting the same
characteristics of an alternative rhetoric. It is a rhetoric that facilitates dis-
courses of the heteroglossic world, a rhetoric that is interactive, hypertextual, networked and heterotopic.

16.8 Netoric: Conclusions

Coming to the end of this chapter, let me attempt to give here, by way of a brief concluding summary, a formulation of my main point. New media as generally outlined and depicted above create a new information(al) economy, a generically distinct mode of discursive procedures and a cultural other-space in which interactants get multi-linked. This challenges the tradition of rhetoric and makes theorists to draw comparisons and risk reformulations. However, to see new media rhetoric as an evolutionary step in the classical paradigm – as another ‘new rhetoric’ – shall here be avoided. Netoric is offered rather as an alternative of the traditionally meant rhetorical phenomena and thus can be interpreted in terms of interaction (invitational rhetoric), hypertext (bridging rhetoric) and networked heterotopia (giving rhetoric).

What netoric may indicate is a change prevalent in other theoretical fields and practices of communication. For example new wave marketing by Hermawan Kartajaya marks a shift from the traditional marketing mix of product, price, place, promotion to co-creation, currency, communal activation and conversation. New approaches to political culture and marketing emphasize a turn from the definition of the politician as a product to the politician as a communicative performer constantly interacting in multi-faceted dialogues (Street 2006; Dahlgren 2006).

Rhetoric within new media shall tell more about communicative procedures than about products: hence, netoric offers a perspective for new media communication procedures and processes. Netoric can be considered the rhetoric for permanent, multi-voiced communication that is manifest in non-finished fluid, multi-media texts. Netoric shall be viewed to be a rhetoric of co-created, informal communicative artefacts, such as pieces of news appearing on news sites and the comments following them, Facebook posts and likes as communal indicators of influence. Netoric may call for the reinterpretation of argumentation and persuasion in the heterogeneous context of visual-verbal-aural codes. Netoric comprehends ethos as the textual character of a real or virtual persona rather than the personal character of a text. Credibility of the rhetor/author in netoric is not only based on inner personal and structural features anymore, but also on the number of links and likes. Invention and disposition of the traditional rhetorical canon shall be
construed in the associational web of the hypertext. The chronological-linear logic of organizing sentences into conclusions will probably be replaced by the spatial-architectural logic of netoric. The whole ‘toolbar’ of classical rhetoric is there to be translated to the terms of new media communicative capacities. Even though traditional rhetoric offers the lens, netoric means alternative optics and views onto new textual experiences.

Thus, the digital turn may require the working out of the fundamentals of rhetoric in a new key, either paradigmatically, historically or functionally. Netoric, assigned in this new key stands for a new media rhetoric that is inherently embedded in new media discursive practices. It diverges from the traditional paradigm in terms of structuration (paratactic/hypertextual rather than hierarchic), formality, logic (heuristic not persuasive), and ethos and converges with new media characteristics.

While classical rhetoric teaches how the hierarchy of arrangement, the structuration of ideas and the causal sequence of premises make a speech and exert influence on the audience, netoric shows how divergent elements are joined by an associational logic in a paratactic connection and carry meaning. While rhetoric in the traditional view was a conserver of the culture, netoric can be considered as a displayer of constant change. While rhetoric could be regarded by Kennedy as a mental energy sparked by an emotional reaction to a situation in which an individual feels threatened (1997, p. 14), netoric in turn can be thought of as a digital capacity that is operationalized in situations when the individual wants to feel connected in meaningful interactions.

Netoric is another rhetoric to which non-traditional theoretical and critical approaches (see invitational or giving rhetoric) can be seminal contributions, calling for a different attitude, a different mentality towards public space and communication in it. Nevertheless, netoric may remain only a phrase without further elaboration on what it conceives of as a speech, on its media-specific and cultural aspects (e.g. what rhetoric does social media entail as opposed to non-mediatized deliberation, how do cultural differences object to or facilitate common and interactive text formulating). Introducing the term here and outlining what may serve as a theoretical framework could be the starting point to the inquiry.

References


‘OMG. You ready?’: Rhetorical Argumentation in Celebrity Gossip Blogs

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17.1 Introduction
Weblogs have become a fundamental part of new media culture. Blog genre has been characterized as a new genre of computer mediated communication and, among its features, we find dated entries displayed in reverse chronological sequence and sidebars containing links and calendars, a culturally-recognized name, and the general purpose of sharing content with others through the Web (Herring & Paolillo 2006, pp. 442-443). It usually comprises two categories: diary (personal journal) and filter. This distinction is linked to its general purpose: whereas the diary category reports on the author’s own life, the filter comments on events external to the author (Herring & Paolillo 2006, p. 445). Celebrity gossip blogs belong to the filter category because they report on other people’s affairs while inviting readers to answer back.

They make up argumentative pieces of discourse insofar as bloggers try to influence their audience with the sometimes nasty opinions they utter. In particular, they portray ‘celebs’ recurring on many occasions in an array of sources whose information they make sure everyone knows. With this practice, bloggers expect readers to be persuaded to, at least, provide an answer. This transmission of exchanged views, with the intention of delving into celebrities’ vices and virtues, can be studied through the analysis of rhetorical argumentation. This type of procedure emphasizes argument as process, paying attention to the communication between arguer and audience (Tindale 2004, p. 5). This chapter seeks to explore those rhetorical arguments

1 This chapter is part of the research project ‘Evidentiality in a multidisciplinary corpus of research papers in English’, grant FFI2009-10801 (FEDER, Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation). This grant is hereby gratefully acknowledged.
present in the arguer’s repertoire of topics, with the intention of inviting the audience to come to conclusions and present their own views.

I first highlight the interaction between a person and his/her acts and the fact that the writer uses the relationship between a celeb and his/her manifestations in order to modify our conception of that individual. In the celebrity gossip blog, the author remarks on some news dealing with a well-known character. Everything that we may know about that person is justified by the blogger’s portrayal of a particular behaviour, so that we end up confirming our devotion or changing our mind about a given name. Secondly, the blogger presents gossip by combining narratives with his/her own ideas in a clever way. This way of peppering a narration with personal observations turns into proper argumentation, engaging readers into the needed reflection before their response. Indeed, by inserting vivacious narratives and opinions, readers feel helpless before the invasion of others’ private lives. Finally, I also include several techniques of verbal communion. The language of blogs often contains subversive and playful elements. It also shows inventiveness as a feature that is sometimes identified in spoken registers (West-Brown 2008, p. 220). Therefore, I stress the use of acronyms also used in informal conversation. In addition, I consider rhetorical questions and the enallage of person as figures that try to attract readers and favour their empathy with the writer.

17.2 Data and methodology
The data for the analysis consists of fifty posts belonging to high-traffic celebrity gossip blogs, during May and July 2010. The sites are: Perez Hilton, Ted Casablanca’s The Awful Truth, Lainey Gossip, Pink is the New Blog, Just Jared, Allie is Wired, I’m not obsessed! Gossip… without the guilt, The Superficial, Dlisted, and Radaronline.com. Posts were selected randomly, though trying not to repeat more than twice the same topic or reference to the same celebrity. This is due to some bloggers’ predilection for the same theme or figures, offering practically the same information over and over again. The final corpus amounts to 13,411 words.

The methodological approach for this study is mainly qualitative. It is a text-driven approach, based on the manual search of small-scale text corpora. I examined and tagged those examples representing the most defining rhetorical elements in this argumentative discourse, abounding with controversial views.
17.3 Analysis of arguments and figures

17.3.1 Interaction of act and person
The interaction of act and person is included in the arguments based on the structure of reality. This notion entails the audience’s conception of reality as the basis for their argumentation. Starting from this conception, people try to build a solidarity between judgements already established and others that someone wishes to promote (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, p. 261). This type of reasoning is an important device in the discourse I am considering, for bloggers make use of ‘sources’ as providers of new judgements that constitute the starting point of a post. The writer usually seeks to shift responsibility for his/her report to some external source and, therefore, it is necessary to establish who is being presented as the source of that report (Martin & White 2005, p. 135). A further distinction should be made between attribution and averral. Hunston (2000, p. 178) explains, in this respect, that ‘[if] a piece of language […] is attributed, it is presented as deriving from someone other than the writer. If a piece of language is averred, the writer him/herself speaks’. She adds that this distinction is essential for the study of evaluation, since the reader will attach more or less credence to, in this case, the blog he/she is enjoying.

On many occasions, these informants are nameless or anonymous, and the material that they offer becomes the pretext for a new entry.

1. After 14 years of marriage, sources are speculating that NeNe Leakes of The Real Housewives of Atlanta fame is splitting from her husband, Greg Leakes.

This example is the beginning of a post in which further details about the relationship of these people represent the real grid of this piece of discourse. The blogger uses the new data to sometimes review previous gossip and either hold up or retort his/her present views. In any case, our reaction to this news is modified not just by the act itself, but by the blogger’s influential opinions. With this argumentative technique, we witness the blogger’s likes and dislikes, and learn his/her preferences for certain famous people whom he/she defends or attacks.

Perelman (1982, p. 90) explains that people interpret a person’s man-
ifestations in terms of the ideas people obtain from that person. Since the person and his/her acts are in constant interaction, it would be difficult to state which element precedes the other. In the case of celebrities, people first formed their opinions when reading newspapers and magazines. Today, we owe the quick and widespread flow of news that may alter our previous conceptions to the internet. Even if the blogger recognizes the gossip as dubious, his/her interest in the story influences the reader to the extent that he/she believes that such behaviour may be attributed to stars. Therefore, the gossip blogger becomes a star manipulator, and makes sure that people consider Hollywood also capable of manipulating any image to please the public (Petersen 2007). In this line, gossip bloggers can damage the ‘perfected’ image that the entertainment industry tries so hard to maintain. By using sarcastic and vicious speech, a celebrity’s behaviour, way of life and appearance are debated. Besides, the immediacy of information complicates the cultural, spatial and temporal relationship between celebrity and audience. As a result, celebrities are perceived as characters that we can criticize and ridicule, and are no longer desired figures (Fairclough 2008, p. 3).

In the instance above, the blogger does not usually reveal his/her sources and we do not know about their reliability. To this respect, we should distinguish between sources and bases of propositions: source of proposition refers to who is responsible for the content of the news (the blogger or ‘other’); in contrast, basis of proposition is related to the basis or evidence for the source’s knowledge; that is, how the writer acquires information (Bednarek 2006, pp. 639-640). In celebrity gossip blogs, the main bases of the source’s knowledge contain hearsay verbs like ‘tell’, ‘say’, and ‘claim’. Furthermore, the employ of these sources as main suppliers of information can be considered as arguments from authority. In Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s treatise (1969, pp. 305-307), this reasoning uses the acts or opinions of a person or group of persons as means of proof in support of a thesis. Arguments from authority are influenced by prestige. However, that condition does not apply to this blogging practice, for the blogger turns to doubtful consultants if the news is succulent enough, and does not seem to worry about the possible repercussions, just about readers’ numerous participation.

I first focus on hearsay verbs attributed to unidentified sources that reinforce the blogger’s subsequent views. The following are some examples:
Sources are suggesting that NBC is feeling so confident about its upcoming line-up of new shows that they are considering NOT bringing back the series Heroes for one final superpowered season. Nothing official has been announced yet, but the suits are seriously looking into giving the show the ax.


The studio ‘insider’ claims that it’s not Kristen Stewart – in fact she’s been the most laid-back out of the bunch: ‘She actually has been the easiest out of everyone in her demands’, a source whispered to us.


As seen in these extracts, the information attributed to these unidentified contributors is either reported by the blogger or quoted in direct speech. In example (2), the blogger presents some sources’ negative report about a known TV series, which he obviously supports; example (3) brings out actress Kristen Stewart and her easy-going manners on set. Starting from these comments, bloggers offer further details and juicy explanations in order to defend or to play the ‘bitch’ persona with the celebrity under debate. The term ‘bitch’ applied to the gossip blog is not meant to celebrate women who are confident, as intended by the original concept reflected in works like The Bitch in the House and Skinny Bitch, but rather to defame them. Bloggers who adopt this role are often plain-spoken, rude and prejudiced (Fairclough 2008, p. 10).

A second type of hearsay example refers to sources whose informants are other gossip sites and tabloids. The blogger includes their information candidly, hoping to either amuse or shock an audience eager to know celebs’ dirty laundry:

Bronson Pinchot was put on L. Ron Hubbard’s hit list after he said Tommy Girl was an awkward homo-hater on the set of Risky Business. Bronson said that Tommy would spew ridiculous words of poetry like: ‘You want some ice cream, in case there are no gay people there?’ Well, an unnamed source tells the National Enquirer (I know, I know) that Tommy not only doesn’t like gay people with his ice cream, but he also hates salsa music in his movies.

Khloe Kardashian and Lamar Odom are reportedly expecting their first child together, according to Radar Online.

‘Khloe was inspired by Kourtney having a baby’, a source close to the family tells RadarOnline.com. ‘Lamar is happy and ecstatic’ about having a baby with Khloe.


In example (4), the blogger admits that the National Enquirer is not the best provider of accurate news; however, he does include its source’s words about actor Tom Cruise’s inclinations. Ironically, his ‘I know, I know’ does not prevent him from further malicious comments. Example (5) uses a source close to Khloe Kardashian’s family to ‘dish’ about this reality show star’s feelings. On this occasion, the source has turned to the gossip site RadarOnline.

The last type of hearsay example contains other tabloids and gossip sites as sources themselves, feeding each other according to their needs. In (6), the blogger utilizes US Weekly information to speak about the Pitt/Jolie couple:

I asked about them when I was in Cannes. With local freelancers and European reporters permanently assigned to the couple in Italy and France. They’re happy. It’s all fine. There’s nothing remotely scandalous to go on. Us Weekly claims in fact that the two were quite affectionate and loving at the party. And the thing is – these people, they would love to find something to go on, some crack in the Brange union.


In example (7), the writer uses RadarOnline gossip site to sustain the veracity of this disturbing news about TV presenter Tila Tequila:

According to RadarOnline, Tila posted a video showing her arm bloodied and indicating a ‘suicide attempt’. She even claimed to have multiple personalities and said that ‘Jane’ is the one who did the damage to her arm. Several people who read her website called 911 and the LAPD sent an ambulance to get her to the local hospital.

http://www.imnotobsessed.com/2010/06/07/tila-tequila-fakes-suicide-attempt-or-was-it-real (accessed 7 June 2010).
This argumentative technique also makes use of mindsay verbs as main bases of knowledge. In this case, bloggers do not rely on ‘external’ sources’ thoughts about celebrities. They prefer to assess their comments rather than reproduce others’ judgement. In their evaluation, they either hold up or retort a given opinion. They build up posts in such appealing ways that readers feel obliged to enter the virtual conversation. The most repeated verbs are ‘think’, ‘know’, ‘guess’, and ‘be sure’. In (8), for example, the writer criticizes actress Mischa Barton’s appearance while she was partying. She uses several mindsay verbs to stress her censure, and finishes her post by inviting readers to give their own judgement:

8. Yeah, this outfit makes no sense to me but … as long as the girl is sober, I guess I can forgive her hideous sense of fashion. I’m not sure why Mischa had to party with her friends at a pub if she’s newly sober but … I guess Hollywood ‘It’ Girls will be Hollywood ‘It’ Girls. So … this outfit … what do YOU think? http://www.pinkisthenewblog.com/2010/07/newly-sober-mischa-barton-tries-out-a-new-look (accessed 29 July 2010).

Finally, the interaction of a person and his/her acts also includes perception verbs uttered by the writer. In this discourse, the blogger becomes an experiencer of others’ mental and physical states (Bednarek 2006, p. 644). Within the perception category, ‘mental’ or ‘inference perception’ is the most frequent, with verbs like ‘seem’, ‘appear’, ‘look’, and ‘sound’. In (9), the writer plays with the meaning of the acronym ‘BFF’, ‘best friend forever’, and jokes about its temporary meaning when referring to actresses Jennifer Aniston and Nicole Kidman. His tentative estimation is reinforced by other terms like ‘apparently’, ‘assuming’ and ‘probably’.


17.3.2 Narratives
Apart from offering a varied account of questionable authorities, bloggers also offer their own accounts in the form of narratives to sustain or discredit the
information they possess. Rhetorical tradition dictates that narration should serve as a brief tale that enlightens the basis of argumentation. The classical conception of narratio consisted in the presentation of the circumstances in which some facts have occurred (Arenas-Cruz 1997, pp. 222-224). These show the cause that is to be defended, debated, and praised. Its function is to frame the starting point of argumentation, for it is essential that the author knows the happenings in order to reflect upon them. Its semantic content points at two main scopes: events, which could be realistic (argumentum), non-realistic (fable), and true (history); and people. In this discourse, narration is usually blended with the blogger’s commentaries. They present, as a result, a narrative contaminated by subjectivity. This narration combined with personal assessments has been traditionally called narratio partita, since the tale is interrupted by digressions, commentaries, and judgements (Arenas-Cruz 1997, p. 226). This type of commentary reinforces the ethos of the addresser, who persuades of his/her position not only through arguments more or less justified, but on his/her personality and disposition. In this way, the blogger selects, qualifies and interprets data according to his/her interests, and narration becomes implicit argumentation. The blogger attributes qualifications to those matters that he/she presents within his/her scale of values, and views them as positive or negative with regard to his/her persuasive intents. In the example below, I can point out a pessimistic vision of the celebrity in question:

10. As shoes go they aren’t the most flattering pair around. Lindsay Lohan wore an ugly pair of gladiator style boots for a shopping trip today, with the front part missing. She chose the footwear in order to hide her SCRAM alcohol monitoring anklet, which the courts have ordered she wear. Although ugly, at least the shoes were a change from the cream coloured boots she has worn for the last few days. http://www.pinkisthenewblog.com/2010/06/lindsay-lohan-finds-another-fun-way-to-hide-her-scram-bracelet (accessed 5 June 2010).

The author resorts to disregard when describing actress Lindsay Lohan’s footwear. And this is the excuse to reveal that she must wear a monitoring anklet due to her alcohol dependence. The particular selection and interpretation of data appears as a means of discussing and leading the addressee into a specific direction which, in this particular case, does not favour Lohan. In this other example, the writer speculates about Robbie Williams’ current affairs, and tells her audience about the artist’s next moves.
11. Robbie lives in LA now with Field and is currently selling his country estate at a loss, not only because he’s never there, but also because he can’t afford to maintain it anymore. Chances are he will be spending World Cup month in England though and he’s hosting Soccer Aid on June 6th at Old Trafford in support of UNICEF.


17.3.3 Verbal techniques of communion
The last part of this outline identifies some figures of communion as devices that bloggers introduce to increase the audience’s adherence to reasoning. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, pp. 177-178), the figures that relate to communion are those which are used to try and create or increase communion with the audience. It is often achieved through references to a common culture, tradition or past. These figures can ease argumentation and become part of an argument since they offer the link between premise material and a claim (Tindale 2004, p. 69). Furthermore, the dialogical relationship existing in blogs favours the use of communion with figures that seek to get the audience’s participation in the blogger’s commentary on celebrities. Indeed, communion shows its importance in all genres of rhetoric, be it as product or requirement for argumentation (Graff & Winn 2006, p. 50). In this study, figures are to be analyzed as discourse strategies; that is, as an authentic constituent of a theory of argumentative discourse (Plantin 2009, p. 336). The blogger transmits some data in the hope of creating a dialogic relationship with his/her public. Besides, this public needs to feel encouraged enough to keep that dialogue alive.

I first mention the acronym as a figure associated with our cultural background. By using some repetitive structures that recall the oral language, readers feel familiar and are more eager to participate in the posts. I then bring up those devices that can make the audience take part more actively in the blogger’s debate, namely, the rhetorical question and the enallege of person.

17.3.1.1 Acronyms
The first technique encompasses terms associated with a particular cultural milieu (Graff & Winn 2006, p. 54). I include here acronyms like ‘LOL’, ‘OMG’ and ‘BFF’ as written conventions that may occasionally appear in spoken registers (West-Brown 2008, p. 321). For example, in (12), the
blogger mocks *Twilight* films fans when confronted with the replacement of some actors for money reasons. The expression ‘LOLZ’, meaning ‘laughing out loud’ or ‘lots of laughter’, reinforces the mockery:

12. Sorry, Twi-Hards! We know how hard it is for you when all the behind the scenes dramz compromises the integrity (ha!) of the films! lolz

In (13), the blogger is also making fun of one celebrity’s attempt of suicide. Her inclusion of ‘Omg’, which stands for ‘Oh my God!’ suggests her enjoyment and, at the same time, her lack of concern for people who try to get attention from the media as a pastime.

13. When she got back home, she was angry with those who called authorities and took her ‘stunt’ seriously! Omg. You know what they say about the boy who cried wolf. Something is seriously going to happen to her and then NOBODY is going to believe it because of all the incidents like this. I can’t believe they released her so quickly!
http://www.imnotobsessed.com/2010/06/07/tila-tequila-fakes-suicide-attempt-or-was-it-real (accessed 7 June 2010).

In example (14), the blogger refers to actress and singer Taylor Momsen and her controversial statement about her vibrator being her ‘BFF’; that is, her ‘best friend forever’:

14. In a recent interview, Taylor referenced her personal life, saying that her BFF is her vibrator. Perez Hilton felt the need to jump on the bandwagon, tweeting this: ‘@taylormomsen Instead of a vibrator, what you need is THIS. http://twitpic.com/27bwo4’.

17.3.1.2 Rhetorical questions
Other techniques of communion request the audience’s active participation. I first analyze the use of interrogative mood or rhetorical questions. I distinguish between those questions that entail direct appeals for the reader to participate and enliven a prospective debate, and the oratorical question that
does not require a proper answer. Both types usually appear in the concluding sections of the post. Martin and White (2005, p. 110) regard the first questions as ‘pseudo’ questions, where the addressee is positioned to supply a particular answer.

This is the case of example (15). It presents an extract referring to the possible end of the *Sex and The City* TV franchise. The blogger does not really want it to end, and so introduces a final tag as if to reconcile herself with that idea:

15. I’m not ready to mourn the death of the franchise until we hear something official … but, it is possible that there may be a grain of truth to this report. I know a lot of people were disappointed with *SaTC 2* but I am hopeful they’ll make one more, great movie. They have to … don’t they?  

In (16), likewise, the blogger is apparently shocked because Sarah Palin is not opposed to the use of marijuana, and ends his post inviting readers to share their opinion:

16. We would DIE if we saw Sexy Sarah lighting up a spliff after a long day or spewing her bullshiz all over the country!  
LOLz!  
What do U think?? Do U agree with her stance on pot??  

Apart from these interrogative structures requiring a natural answer, other questions are posed in such ways that they do not demand a real response. However, readers are expected to reflect on their content in their perusal of a certain topic. It then creates a relationship of concurrence, by which the blogger assumes that no answers are needed for his/her particular queries. In these type of questions, where the answer is quite obvious, addresser and addressee are presented in alignment, ‘and the proposition at issue is so ‘commonsensical’, that agreement can be taken for granted’ (Martin & White 2005, p. 123). These concurring formulations are dialogistic constructed since the writer is presented ‘in dialogue’ with the text’s audience.
In (17), for instance, the blogger objects to teenagers getting Botox, and assumes that her audience agrees with her disapproval:

17. What’s next? Babies getting work done right out of the womb? Seriously, she’s only 18. What is this world coming to when a young teenage girl is pressured to get Botox for an appearance on a TV show? It’s just sad, really.

Similarly, in (18) the blogger wonders whether she is allowed to comment about an underage girl who pretends to be older:

18. This so-called minor is being watched by millions on an international broadcast. Is it my responsibility not to look there, or is it her responsibility to give me something to look at that won’t get me in trouble? Am I allowed to say she has a nice ass when she’s shaking it in my face? Am I allowed to compliment her cute body when I can see almost all of it unclothed at the busiest intersection in Toronto, while she expertly gyrates it for hundreds of cameras surrounding the venue? If I do, am I the asshole blogger?

17.3.1.3 Enallage of person
Within techniques of communion, I also underline the enallage of person from ‘I’ to ‘we’ (Graff & Winn 2006, p. 57) as another type of invitation for the audience to enter the discussion. In this figure, a change in the number of people occurs, as a result of which blogger and reader are joined in a collective ‘we’. Readers feel supported by their inclusion into a virtual dialogue that is followed by their impending contribution to the blogger’s posts.

I relate the use of this figure with the notion of intersubjectivity, by which the author shares his/her knowledge with his/her audience. In the blog, readers feel compelled to participate in a virtual debate that poses opinions, not objective truths, which they can judge and interpret. Nuyts (2001, p. 393) explains, in this respect, that the speaker may offer his/her evidence to a larger group of people who share the same conclusion. The author proposes two options: (1) the speaker alone has access to the evidence and draws his/her own conclusions; (2) the speaker indicates that the evidence is known
to a larger group of people who share the same conclusion. In the second alternative, the speaker assumes ‘a shared responsibility among those people who have access to the evidence and accept the conclusions from it (including him/herself)’. In the study of this notion, I point out an explicit shared responsibility (Marín-Arrese 2007, 2009), by which the blogger presents the evaluation as explicitly shared with his/her readers. Here the use of ‘inclusive we’ is predominant. By including this pronoun, the addresser seems to recognize the existence of a plural subject ‘I’ + ‘others’. It constitutes, apparently, a group linked by a tie that shares beliefs, attitudes and values.

For example, in (19), the author includes his readers to partake of his disapproval of actor Charlie Sheen’s behaviour towards his ex-wife:

19. During all of this bad-blood domestic crap, we felt like we were the only ones wondering what the hell is happening to Brooke and Charlie’s kids. And we may have found the answer in Richards...
We know that Sheen surrendered legal custody of the children he had with Denise – Sam and Lola – to his ex-wife earlier this week. http://uk.eonline.com/uberblog/b179886_Denise_Richards_to_the_Rescue__Come_Again_.html (accessed 7 May 2010).

Similarly, in (20), the writer gives his opinion about a famous couple while incorporating his attentive audience:

20. So what is the damn deal with Bar and Leo? Can never figure those two out. Seems more like an open-relaysh type thing which, if you ask us—probably gives them the best shot at getting serious in the future. Both hotties have their careers going on right now, so it’s smart not to settle down, ‘cause we def don’t see this hunk putting a ring on it anytime soon.

At the same time, the explicit reference to the addressee is usual in this piece of discourse, especially when the writer prompts readers to have a say in his/her posts. Therefore, the presence of ‘you’ signals the dialogical nature of this discourse. In (21), for instance, the blogger begins her topic by calling her audience’s attention to the celebrity in question, with the inclusion of the second personal pronoun:

‘omg. you ready?’

The author ends the same post with another ‘you’ mention that asks for her audience’s agreement with her reproving views:

Fame whoring lowlifes, both of them. How much do you want to be they are in this together?

17.4 Conclusions
With this study of excerpts taken from celebrity gossip blogs, I have sought to define the main rhetorical arguments of this argumentative discourse. As seen in the analysis of different examples, it is difficult to establish whether the proliferation of celebs is due to the constant exposure to their manifestations, or whether the continuous display of their acts needs a weekly and sometimes daily share. The importance is to recognize the permanent interaction between celebs and their acts as an argumentative technique, now more possible than ever thanks to the unavoidable presence of the internet. For the illustration of this essential procedure, I have classified the instances into those containing hearsay, mindsay and perception verbs. Within hearsay verbs, I have made a triple distinction as to how bloggers receive the information, and I have considered the following authorities: anonymous sources, nameless sources that inform other tabloids and gossip sites, and tabloids and gossip sites as main sources.

I have also focused on narration as part of the argumentative process. In this piece of discourse, narratives do not occur as starting points for the subsequent reasoning, but they get merged with the blogger’s own impressions and thus become proper arguments. The last element of this study refers to the identification of some verbal techniques of communion; that is to say, the use of acronyms that brings to mind everyday language; the inclusion of rhetorical and non-rhetorical questions as a direct invitation to readers to answer; and the enallage of person, with the use of the ‘we’ personal pronoun to concur with readers. I have also assessed an intersubjective reading, which is concerned with the shared knowledge between addressee and addressee. All these devices are intended to entertain and attract reader-
ship into the knowledge of celebs’ vices and virtues. Yet they are also intended to persuade the addressee to answer and give his/her own estimations.

The depiction of these rhetorical elements is no doubt linked with a particular conception of the audience that is capable of having a say in the content offered. For this reason, argumentative devices such as figures of communion are a fundamental aspect of this new media discourse. The blogger becomes the voice of gossip but must also be sure that his/her words are going to have an immediate effect in the form of commentaries from the readership. At the same time, the proper lack of separation between information and entertainment relates this piece of discourse with other supposedly ‘more serious’ practices like tabloid journalism and gossip magazines. Even if popular journalists also make use of narratives and illustrate celebs’ behaviour by means of the act-person interaction, they do not feel the pressure of immediacy that is an inherent part of the blogging practice. Their interest lies more in the evaluation of weekly sales that is sometimes contrary to the editorial content of the magazine. It would be interesting, therefore, to establish a comparison between rhetorical devices specific for each of these discursive practices. Other suggestions for research may include the similitudes and differences found among blog types dealing with politics, pop culture, technology and other popular topics. The intersubjective positioning of this argumentative practice, which favours dialogistic effects between writers and readers, constitutes one more area of prospective study.

References


Blog websites


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‘OMG, YOU READY?’

5. *Just Jared.*

6. *Allie is Wired.*

7. *I’m not obsessed! Gossip… without the guilt.*


9. *Dlisted.*

18 Rhetorical Strategies on User-contributory Sites

ANNA TERESZKIEWICZ

18.1 Introduction
As Lister et al. (2009) claim, new internet culture is the culture of participation. Recent changes in web technologies, the development of new media, and the creation of web 2.0 systems have put emphasis on the users’ activity online. Systems have been created allowing for active user-participation in the creation and contribution of content to web pages. As Bruns (2008) emphasized, the development of participatory culture and digital tools have given the audience means to become an active part of the media sphere. Due to technological affordances, users are able to record events and post them online. This resulted not only in the development of novel forms of publishing and production, but above all in the development of new forms of expression. The users exploit the means, as Burgess and Green (2009) observe, ‘to narrate and communicate their own cultural experiences, including their experiences as “citizen consumers”’ (2009, p. 48). In this way, new media technologies have considerably changed the relations between producers and consumers of media content. As Jenkins (2002) observes, the web has facilitated access of amateurs to the media; amateurs, who have so far been recipients of content.

Websites focusing on user-generated content such as youtube, flickr, or myspace, which embody the transformations enhanced by the development of the new media, are becoming increasingly popular. What is more, many sectors of media industry open for new users and extend user-participation in the creation of content. To name a few examples, the BBC introduced the ‘Have Your Say’ section where users may present their stories and pictures. Fox News has introduced the ‘Ureport’ site, designed for users who wish to present local news and individual commentaries. These sites make use of the news and content provided by the users, include the content in their own projects and broadcasts. In this way, these publishers, as Howe (2006) observes, encourage the users to become more active and attentive
observers of reality. As the scholar claims, these affordances allow the users to feel that they may truly participate in the creation and dissemination of media broadcasts.

18.2 Materials for analysis and methods

The following study concentrates on the content of the iReport section of the CNN web site with the aim of analyzing the language of iReporters and their approach towards the presentation of the messages. The goal was to find out whether the contributors resort to the use of any specific rhetorical strategies, whether their descriptions are more factual and informative or rather more personal or opinionated. The previous analysis devoted to this issue (Tereszkiewicz 2011) demonstrated a number of interesting properties of the language of iReporters. Among others, they were found to resort to the use of figurative and vivid language, the use of cultural symbols and heroes in graphic cartoons. The previous analysis has not yet provided a full description of the phenomenon in question, as there remain further aspects of the language of iReporters to be described and discussed. The following study is designed as a follow-up study presenting additional properties of iReporters’ contributions.

The iReport CNN site has been chosen for analysis due to its considerable popularity among users, frequency of contribution of new content and the possibility of contributing varied materials, including textual commentaries, audio and video messages. Each message posted on the site includes information about the contributor and the date of uploading the post. Chosen messages are vetted by CNN and used in official CNN broadcasts. The material collected for the following analysis involved 126 textual messages, 78 videos, and 46 graphic posts. Due to such heterogeneity of the material, different methods had to be applied for examination. The analysis focused on discourse, syntax and lexical properties of the messages, with particular consideration of rhetorical strategies employed by users in the presentation of their opinions. The types of messages are presented separately, but the properties discussed can be found in all formats of the posts.

18.3 iReport – Textual content and images

The first type of content produced by the contributors comprises photographs accompanied by textual messages. The study of these materials was designed to investigate if any discourse properties are particularly strong and dominate
across the messages. The analysis, covering 126 messages, showed that to the most conspicuous discourse properties belong its rhetorical nature, widespread use of strategies of involvement and affective devices. The messages can be seen to exhibit such features as personalization, expressivity and persuasion.

18.3.1 Personalization
Personalization refers here to reference to the self, to the author's own experiences and to concentration on individual perceptions. Personalization has been identified in the previous research as a property of video messages (Tereszkiewicz 2011). The following analysis has proved the feature to be typical of textual posts as well. Personalized, self-referring discourse was identified in 68.25% of the messages. This feature can be exemplified in the following comments:

Total Lunar Eclipse as seen from Sarasota, Florida. Perfectly clear skies made for wonderful pictures. Woke up my 11 year old granddaughter to see this great event. Last total winter eclipse on winter solstice was 372 years ago and won't happen again until 2094. Pretty awesome!

In the garden my german shepherds playing in the snow, they enjoy it. But on the streets near to the capitol drivers try to hold the balance in uncleaned roads. Snow is still falling, the winter wants to win.

As we can see, the authors concentrate on their activities, attitudes and feelings associated with the events portrayed, present information about their family, about pets, and provide, though not always, only a few factual details or a general commentary. Personalization is strengthened by the overwhelming use of first person pronouns ('I', 'my'), whose main role in discourse is to mark personal focus and involvement with the self (Biber 1988, p. 255). Subjectivity and focus on the self is as well emphasized by the use of emotive adjectives and adverbs ('wonderful', 'great', 'pretty', 'awesome').

As Georgakopoulou and Goutsos (1997, p. 129) underline, the functions of a particular stretch of discourse are expressed not only by linguistic means, but also by the overall structure of the message. This may be clearly observed in the messages of iReporters. Personalization and self-reference, is reflected in the language devices used but also in the structure of the posts. In many posts (26.98%), the users first present personal information – we may say they establish themselves as persons with some expertise in the field
– and only then proceed to a commentary, criticism or appraisal of a given phenomenon. For example:

I used to fly quite frequently. It used to be enjoyable and hassle free. I traveled for business and pleasure around the world. Well, my last flight was in September to Myrtle Beach. It was a good flight and one of the better ones I’ve had recently. I decided to hang up my wings and will drive from now on until things change. It is a combination of events and overall dissatisfaction with the direction we’re heading. My first beef is the ridiculous charges added to the airline ticket. Security taxes, airport use taxes, baggage fees, seat upcharges, and the list goes on. No longer do you get a meal on most flights and blankets are rare. The flights are overbooked and finding cabin space for the carry on baggage is getting hard to find.

I used to be an activist with a blog. I used my subject expert and insider status to voice educated and high-level criticism of an academic field I believed was doing harm to its mission, consumers, and those aspiring to work in it. There was a legitimate grievance and a legitimate cause. WikiLeaks has no legitimate grievance or cause. Its insistence on leaking damaging information about anything and everything -- governments, corporations, even a lay NYC resident -- has no purpose or target. It is simply an agent of anarchy.

The messages point to a further feature, which is typical of iReport messages and strongly associated with personalization, that is exemplification, which was identified in 53.17% of the messages. The authors who resorted to this strategy, quoted examples of situations from their own lives, and pointed to real events associated with the topics discussed, which can be observed in the messages cited above. Such an approach to structuring the posts may be interpreted as a means to raise trustworthiness and to sound more convincing to other viewers.

18.3.2 Expressivity
In addition to personalization, the messages exhibit a high degree of expressivity and affectivity. The desire to express one’s feelings is associated with deep emotiveness visible in the posts. The analyzed material shows that the purpose of posting a message is frequently to give vent to emotions or frustrations which the authors feel.

This property of the discourse is visible in a frequent use of expressive devices. Expressive devices, also referred to as affective devices, intensity markers or intensifiers (Georgakopoulou & Goutsos 1997, p. 135), com-
prise the linguistic means which serve the function of expressing a speaker’s attitudes and emotions. Linguistic means which can serve these purposes include emphasizers, amplifiers, downtowners, as well as adverbials and verbs expressing emotions and moods (Quirk 1985, pp. 437-59). The emphasis on affectivity may be for instance observed in the message below:

I’m tired of the bickering and fighting on cnn. Can man never learn to live with fellow man and accept the differences between us? Can Jew not accept the Muslim? Can the weak not accept strength that feeds them? Can the right not forgive those who are wrong? Has anyone learned anything over the past 10,000 years of murder and incest and sodomy and tragedy? Year 2010 fast forward. vs. year 2500 BC. Has anything really changed? NO. Not man. Not a bloody bit. All of us have our minds and bodies in the gutter. Only some of us are gazing at the stars. I am one of them. What about forgiveness, redemption, faith and hope and living in harmony with one and other? Does Christmas mean anything to anyone? Christmas is all about moving forward and healing and fixing this mess we’re in. I’d like to see more of that Spirit on ireport posts.

The message reflects a high emotive load and is deeply rhetorical in character. The message takes the form of a stream of questions and statements associated with the current situation in the world. The affective and rhetorical nature of the message is emphasized by the rhetorical questions of different types used as a means to express feelings and to appeal to other users’ perception of the problems mentioned. Moreover, the author refers to universal moral principles and abstract concepts such as faith, hope and harmony – which also enhances the emotive value of the message, which is devoid of rational argumentation.

The above-quoted message reflects a frequent stylistic device used by iReporters, that is the use of anaphora. Anaphoric repetitions occur mainly in rhetorical questions, where they are used to strengthen the message and amplify the significance of their arguments, or the expression of their feelings. For example:

Is it any surprise that the free and democratic nation of Russia believes that Julian Assange should be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize?

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Is it any surprise that this aligns the Russians squarely with the Berkeley City Council and many liberals on this forum?

I will miss Larry King so much, I used to watch him daily, I am crying now.

The frequency of anaphoric repetitions (12.69%) proves that it is treated by the authors as an effective and powerful emphatic tool to express their views and feelings. Repetition, as Georgakopoulou and Goutsos (1997, p. 119) emphasize, may help increase the intelligibility of the message, but more importantly the intensification of the author’s view. As Tannen (1987, p. 581) notices, repetition may help enhance efficiency and fluency of discourse. More significantly, as the scholar underlines, repetition helps foreground and intensify both elements of the sentence – the part which is reiterated and the new information (Tannen 1987, p. 583). It is this emphatic and persuasive function of repetition that seems to play the most important role in the discourse of iReporters.

The look at the aforementioned messages allows us to say that the site serves primarily as a platform for the expression of one’s feelings and opinions. Yet, the rhetorical nature of the messages is noticeably associated also with a persuasive function of the posts. It is clear that the authors not only give vent to their emotions, but also try to influence other users. This can be further exemplified by the post below:

How dare you? It’s one thing to protest the war. If that’s all you were doing, I would back up your right 100%. This constant protesting at the funerals of fallen servicemen and women, and your planned protest at Elizabeth Edward’s funeral is beyond the pale. You bring discredit on all people of good faith. While you may feel this is exercising your right of free speech, I would state that common decency and respect toward a fellow human being would preclude anyone from protesting at funerals. Since you consider this your right, then I plan on exercising my right to counter-protest your protests at every chance I get. I urge my fellow Americans regardless of their religious or political beliefs to do the same at every chance they get, to protect the families from your vicious, hate-filled, venom spewing protests. My fervent belief is what goes around, comes around. I have no doubt that you will get your just reward...in Hell. I pray that your children are eventually opened to the true meaning of Christianity and the belief in the love, mercy, and forgiveness of Jesus Christ. Until then, the Bible said it best: Jesus wept... and He continues to do so every time you open your mouths.
As the country mourns the death of Elizabeth Edwards another group of people are gearing up for a protest. I hope people ignore the Westboro Baptist Church Protest, ignore these cult members as they teach their children hate and disrespect. I have No Respect for a group of people that seem to hate America. If they don’t like it—LEAVE!!

To see these cartoons, knowing that people are thinking and talking about child abuse. Makes a difference. People NEED to see what we go through. They need to see that it CAN happen when you least expect it. Fight Child Abuse by NOT allowing your Children to have FaceBook or MySpace Accts. You have the power.

The messages have the form of accusations and criticism directed at other people, which is emphasized by frequent references to the addressee (‘you bring discredit’, ‘your vicious protests’, ‘you will get a reward’, etc.). The speeches are clearly designed to raise emotions and to agitate to perform some action (‘I urge’, ‘you have the power’). Amplification of the messages is achieved by references to patriotism, to Christian values and by invocation to the Bible and to Jesus. Persuasion and expressivity are expressed as well by the use of imperative forms (‘Leave’, ‘Fight child abuse’), various modality markers, both implicit and explicit modality (‘need’, ‘must’), and rhetorical questions, as well as exclamations.

Expressivity and affectivity are given more explicit forms in the posts as well, which can be observed in the following examples:

My friend just sent me this photo. Brrrrrrrr.........This is Winter in Russia. I am like, what???? This is unfathomable to me. I live in Houston, Texas........and in THIS INSTANCE........I will say........

THERE IS NO PLACE LIKE HOME........

Are you snowbound? I am as snug as a bug in a rug right here in H-Town under my electric blanket on the couch and can come and go as I please....WOO HOO........now.....that’s the way I like it, how bout YOU?!

JUST ANOTHER MANIC MONDAY! ENOUGH IS ENOUGH!

Don’t LIE- Tell the Children the TRUTH!!
Expressiveness and rhetorical nature of these messages are reflected in an accumulation of exclamatory expressions (in 30.15% of the posts) and spoken-like interjections (‘I am like’, ‘what??’) (13.49%), as well as in an emphatic use of capital letters (34.12%) and onomatopoeic words (‘brr’, ‘woo hoo’) (9.52%), by means of which the authors make up for the lack of non-verbal cues in computer-mediated communication (Crystal 2006). The messages are imitative of spoken language, with a loose, unordered structure, where a stream of thoughts associated with the photograph commented upon is expressed, yet not organized into a coherent message (Biber & Conrad 2009; Crystal 2006).

18.3.3 Involvement with the audience
A further feature enhancing the rhetorical nature of the messages is their dialogical character. The involvement with the audience visible in the posts takes two major forms: interaction with other users (21.42%) and with specific persons (14.28%).

In the first type of involvement, the authors of iReport messages invite other users into a dialogue and ask them to express their opinions. Involvement with the audience is reflected in direct questions to other users and in a frequent use of 1st and 2nd person plural pronouns (‘you/we/us’), which serves as an identification both with all the people and with the community of iReporters, and helps to emphasize a specific relationship between the speaker and the audience (cf. Tereszkiewicz 2011).

Do you lie to your Children every year about Santa or do you tell them the Truth? If you tell lie to them, I have to ask you WHY?? What happened in your childhood that was so bad?
Do you dress your pet, or get them in the Holiday groove as well by getting them groomed and all decked out for their Holiday as well? Would love to hear your Holiday Pet stories!!:)

Such means help the authors to express their own feelings as well. As can be seen in the first example, by turning to other users with a direct and emphatic question, the author not only wants them to answer those questions, but above all wishes to criticize the attitude and behaviour of other people.

iReporters treat the site as a platform enabling invocation to specific personas, such as politicians, celebrities or journalists. For example:
Hi Nick! I saw a show when you were spending time with your brother and your Dad! How is your Dad doing? He seemed like a beautiful man, and I see where you get your beautiful soul from as well!!! I Love you Nick, I wish you happiness! I hope your Dad is doing well!!!

Hi Mr. Alec,

I love you and adore you ..That is all ..;) You were my teenage dream when i was 17 .And after many years you are my dream still ... now my middle age dream...

You are ".genius man, intelligent person and good father." You are my sunshine...

The authors of these posts direct their messages to Nick Lachey and Alec Baldwin, a musician and an actor, respectively. The messages create an illusion of a one-to-one intimate interaction and an impression of equality between the participants. Yet, their authors are aware of the fact that the messages may be read by the whole community of internet users. This fact proves that the major function of such messages is the expression of one’s feelings and attraction of attention of other users, which additionally confirms the above-described feature of the messages, that is their expressiveness.

The discourse of iReporters can be seen to perform two primary functions: self-expression and involvement with the audience. The subjective component in the messages is particularly conspicuous. The expression of feelings, judgements, and thoughts visibly dominate the discourse. The messages express personal attitudes of the authors, often intimate and strongly individualistic. The high degree of involvement underlines the need the authors feel to interact with others, to share and exchange feelings and opinions, to be a part of the community of iReporters. The two most conspicuous discourse properties may be seen to reflect two primary uses of the platform – self-expression and interpersonal communication.

18.4 iReport – audiovisuals

The second group of the analyzed materials comprises video content. Since audiovisual materials are very popular on the analyzed website, it is equally important to examine the tendencies used in the composition of the videos and investigate if the users resort to any specific means or techniques in the construction of such content.

User-created videos have become a significant means of expression online, especially on user-generated content platforms. Among common
trends observed in the construction of audiovisual user-created content, Burgess and Green (2009, p. 52) highlight experimentation with the video form and creativity in the use of the audiovisual channel. The scholars underline that it is the focus on the production of an immediate and spontaneous live performance as well as its inherently conversational and interactive nature that distinguish user-created content from traditional forms of participation in the media culture (2009, p. 54). These properties make the videos an interesting and innovative form of expression in the media landscape.

The analyzed material of 78 videos revealed a widespread diversity in the topic, manner of presentation and quality of the videos. As far as the language is concerned, the videos also reflect the properties ascribed to textual messages, i.e. personalization, involvement, and expressiveness. Still, video messages give the users more possibilities of expression, as more channels of communication are available – not only textual and pictorial, but also visual and acoustic. In this way, video messages allow for a fuller expression of the author’s personality. That the authors take advantage of this opportunity can be seen in the manner they stylize their online appearance.

18.4.1 Stylization

Stylization refers to a creation of an original online identity, which allows users to stand out as individualities. Stylization encompasses appearance, behaviour, and scene or background in which the video is filmed.

One of the concepts frequently applied in the analysis of images and the above-mentioned elements of visual representation is the concept of modality (Kress & van Leeuwen 1996). Modality was defined as a resource which may help investigate the manner of visual representation offered to the viewers, its overt and hidden meanings. Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) developed a set of the so-called modality markers, i.e. scales and degrees of articulation of specific elements of visual representation, such as degrees of the articulation of detail, elements of the background, tone (degrees of tonal gradation), and colour modulation and saturation. What is particularly significant in the presentation of people in visual communication is the gaze (i.e. how people look at the viewers), distance (i.e. size of frame), and angle of interaction (i.e. front or profile presentation, vertical or horizontal angle) (Machin 2010, p. 117).

The materials created by the users reveal a range of techniques and means used in the construction of the videos. In the majority of the videos (62.82%), the actors were positioned along the horizontal plane, looking di-
rectly at the viewers, in a relatively close shot. Such depiction of people helps to create a symbolic, direct contact with the audience (Machin 2010, p. 110). This technique may help the authors achieve the impression and effect of speaking directly to a specific viewer. Another significant aspect and advantage of such positioning is that it places the actors at the same level with the viewers, which implies equality between them (Machin 2010, p. 115). These two properties clearly reflect the attitude of the authors to their audience – their wish to establish interaction resembling a face-to-face encounter, based on a direct, straightforward contact and equal relationship between the participants.

A number of other techniques applied in the videos can also be noticed. The techniques employed by the authors can be seen to serve the purpose of creating an original identity and making an impression on the audience. For example, a user called bronx2566 always films his videos in a black-and-white format, dressed in a leather jacket, wearing sun-glasses:

**FIGURE 18.1**

The use of a black-and-white format of the video has been observed to connote seriousness (Machin 2010, p. 56), which in this case may express the au-
thor’s wish to underline the significance of the messages and the gravity of the issues discussed. The use of such tone and colour scheme, lack of articulation of other details, may also serve as additional means to focus the users’ attention on the message itself. Moreover, such stylization may as well be a means to preserve anonymity, as the user avoids direct eye-contact with the audience. Still, it can also be seen as a technique of identity creation – the development of a recognizable, unique pattern of composition and style of expression.

A different approach to composition can be seen in the following example:

**Figure 18.2**

In this case, more emphasis on the articulation of detail and background can be observed. The user, named DaElmer, films his videos against an American flag placed in the background. Since the user focuses predominantly on political problems and social issues in the US, the use of such background considerably enhances the meaning potential of his message. The flag, in particular, can be observed to symbolize patriotism, liberty and democracy.
The use of this symbol in the background may as well help underline the importance of the issues discussed and their relevance to the people of America (Wojcieszak 2009, p. 476). In this way, such stylization of the videos serves as a means to underline the user’s American identity and bring forward patriotic feelings.

The user named Liberty1955, in contrast, chooses a different approach, which we may term minimalist, due to minimalism in the articulation of detail, background and colour scheme:

**Figure 18.3**

In this case, we may observe a slight change in the size of frame and distance between the actor and the viewer. The user, as can be seen above, applies a closer shot in the videos so that his face nearly completely fills the frame. Such an approach may be designed to achieve a particular effect. An increased closeness can be associated with individualization and intimacy (Machin 2010, p. 116) – a closer shot, thus, suggests intimacy and decrease of distance. Low articulation of detail is visible in the user’s appearance and
the setting of the video as well. The user always wears the same jacket and the background in which he films the video is kept to the minimum. Still, though different from others, it is also a way of constructing the self, and accustoming other users to a specific online identity.

Another property of the messages, associated with stylization, which also serves to enhance the value of the posts, their meaning potential and persuasive effect, is evocativeness. The users resort to different techniques and communicative means to enhance the evocative potential of their message, the interactional dynamics and the effect of their performance. To achieve this aim, the users construct animated forms of presentation with the use of props and/or costumes (23.07% of the videos). This can be seen in the following video, posted by the Dimmit:

**Figure 18.4**

The author refers to the threats of burning the Qu’ran on 11 September issued by groups of anti-Islam activists. The author predicts that this would lead to a similar action on the part of Muslims, who would start burning
Bibles. To make his message more evocative, and to support his verbal message, he holds the Bible and a lighter in his hands. These means help to communicate the message vividly, as they may engage the viewers and help them evoke a specific scene.

To enhance evocativeness, the users also dress up in costumes associated with famous characters. The message posted by Tron Guy exemplifies this approach:

**FIGURE 18.5**

![Image of a video poster]

Such behaviour is typical of fans of a specific phenomenon, who in this way express their enthusiasm for and involvement in it. It also reflects the users’ creativity, their wish to stand out and express their individuality. The use of a costume undoubtedly enhances the attractiveness of the video, may help the authors catch the attention of more viewers, and thus gain more popularity.

All the techniques of composition and approaches to stylizations help the authors emphasize their uniqueness and become recognizable among thousands of other users. Naturally, they also enhance the appeal and attractiveness of the messages and may draw more viewers to the video. By the use
of the above-mentioned means, additional resources, the messages acquire the form of a show, an evocative discussion of the issue in question. The application of these techniques proves the users’ engagement in the message and involvement with the audience (Georgakopoulou & Goutsos 1997, p. 140). The form of the audiovisuals, the approach to composition, the application of the aforementioned strategies by the users clearly confirm Burgess and Green’s view (2009, p. 25) that authorial videos exemplify the use of such technology primarily for play, identity formation and interpersonal communication.

18.5 Graphic files
In addition to textual and video messages, the users contribute graphic files to the website, among which cartoons are the most frequent. The previous study of iReport graphic files highlighted a considerable frequency of references to cultural symbols and popular heroes (Tereszkiewicz 2011) in such posts. The following study of user-created cartoons was designed to investigate their form as well as potential references to other thematic areas.

Cartoons represent a relatively popular genre applied across different media. They belong to the broader category of genres of humour, which also includes comic strips, verbal jokes, or animations (Mazid 2008, p. 434). The research devoted to the analysis of cartoons reflects a range of views on the meaning potential of this genre. Some scholars emphasize its simplicity, cross-cultural intelligibility resulting from the use of widely-known symbols and metaphors, while other scholars perceive cartoons as considerably multi-faceted structures, underlining the complexity of cognitive processes involved in the interpretation of this text type. As El Refaie (2009, p. 199) proves, the interpretation of cartoons requires not only vast knowledge of cultural symbols, genre conventions, but also considerable linguistic awareness.

Cartoons have also been observed to perform a range of functions. As Gilmartin and Brunn (1998) observe, they can carry ‘subtle, complex, multi-layered messages about people and events in the details of how they are drawn – messages that would be difficult or impossible to express verbally’ (1998, p. 536), or to present ‘politically incorrect’, ‘extreme’ views. With respect to their form, cartoons represent instances of intersemiotic genres, since they may rely on different channels of expression – verbal and pictorial (Mazid 2008, p. 435). As far as the content and subject-matter of cartoons is concerned, they usually contain a critical or humorous commentary on political and social events, trends, issues, and/or personalities. To achieve a humorous
or satirical effect different mechanisms are usually employed in cartoons. To the strategies used most frequently belong exaggeration and distortion, incongruity, e.g. between the serious and unserious (Mazid 2008, p. 436).

The user-created cartoons have been found to exhibit many of the properties typical of the genre, as defined above. The analysis of 46 graphic files showed that the cartoons employ both the visual and the verbal – the majority of the cartoons contain a verbal part in the form of a commentary complementing the visual message. With respect to their subject-matter, the cartoons refer predominantly to current affairs, specifically in the United States, as well as to cultural phenomena. The cartoons reflect acuteness and authors’ insightfulness in commenting reality. The following analysis proved that in addition to references to popular heroes and symbols described in the previous research (Tereszkiewicz 2011), references to political symbols are particularly frequent. Within the analyzed collection, 52.17% of the cartoons represented an image of a politician, while 23.91% contained political and national symbols and/or notions. For example:

**FIGURE 18.6**

![Tax-Cut Deal: Surrender, Compromise or Victory](image)
Commenting on the political life in the USA, the authors of graphic files frequently play on animal symbols of the Democrats and the Republicans, which can be seen in the cartoon above. Thus, the Democratic Donkey and the Republican Elephant are used in cartoons to present the views or policies of the respective parties.

Among the politicians most frequently appearing in the cartoons, we find Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, or Hilary Clinton. For instance:

**FIGURE 18.7**

In the cartoon above, Barack Obama is portrayed in reference to the BP oil leak affair. The message may be interpreted in different ways. It may be seen to refer to the idiom ‘to oil someone’s palm’, with the meaning ‘to bribe someone’. This reading of the cartoon may be explained not only by the direct representation of the idiom, but also by Obama’s smile which stands in contrast to his words, and thus may signify the opposite intentions behind his actions.

The inventiveness of iReporters is reflected also in authorial cartoons which they put on the site (15.21%). In such cases, the authors not only present a graphic comment in the form of caricatures or play on a popular
symbol, but create their own graphic series and cartoons in which characters, created specifically for that purpose, appear in picture stories commenting on current affairs. The authors of these cartoons have managed to work out an individual, recognizable style. Frequently, wishing to underline this fact, they refer to them in original ways, e.g. Frizzi Toons – cartoons authored by Frizzi.

18.6 Conclusions
Summarizing, the messages of iReporters reflect considerable idiosyncrasy. The form of the posts shows that the users eagerly explore the possibility, which user-contributory sites give, to distinguish oneself. Even if the users comment on the same event, the messages differ, as they present different perspectives and approaches to the same problem. The users try to stand out against others, draw attention to their footage by the individualization of messages, by working out their own style of broadcasting. iReporters do not aim at factuality or objectivism – their messages are intimate, individualized and subjective, which is clearly reflected in the language of the reports. It is clear from the messages that the users above all wish to present the events they witnessed from their own perspective. Thus, instead of stylizing into the behaviour of professional journalists, and repeating factual information found in other media, the contributors express their own feelings about specific events. What is more, as the examples show, user-contributory messages concentrate on situations which do not have much relation to the issues debated on a wider scale. The collection of the messages shows that the users try to find significance and meaning in everyday trivial situations, events which would never be covered in other media.

It seems that what is the most important for the authors is a sense of participation in media production, a chance to be heard on a global level and reach a wider audience. This is in line with Bentley’s (2008) suggestion that the users do not report stories, but rather share them. The analyzed material also confirms Shirky’s (2002) observation that this sense of participation is more significant for the users than the actual quality of the content. In the abundance of the videos we may find high quality, elaborate presentations but also many simple, accidental, we may say even unplanned and unedited messages. As we could see, participation assumes different forms, and the users resort to various rhetorical strategies to mark their presence in cyberspace.
References
Rhetorical strategies on user-contributory sites

A Multimodal Rhetoric of Unity and Persuasion for Global Citizenship: Teaching Students to Be Critical Prosumers of Cultural Artefacts

SUE A. KUYKENDALL AND MATTHEW KIM

19.1 Introduction: New media and public discourse
In early 2011, while democracy revolutions are sweeping North Africa and the Middle East, assisted by astute but often risky use of new media tools of distribution, public rhetoric in the United States is spinning out of control, propelled on its drive to the meaningless by those same new media in collaboration with older forms of message delivery. With radio shock-jocks calling for assassination of political figures, political figures posting willful lies and deliberate misinterpretations on Facebook, and ordinary citizens stoking the fires of rage on personal blogs and in online discussion groups, rhetoric in US society appears to be taking place in a vast echo chamber where the testimony of experts – elected and self-appointed – reverberates through cyberspace and across the airwaves without critical thought, authentic dialogue, or anything approximating true persuasion. It is simply a shouting match: in words, images, sound bites, music, videos, all the modes of communication now available in virtual public space.

When everyone in the speaking classes has access to portable electronic devices of multimodal communication, any one of them can make his or her voice heard at any moment of inspiration (frustration, anger, euphoria). But when speakers speak only to hear (see) their own voices and listeners (readers) have abdicated their active, critical role in public discourse, the project of public meaning-making is carried on in the absence of meaningful remediation by those engaged in the shouting match, let alone those who are not privileged by access to new media.

Meanings are being made as fast as memes can circulate the web. As
pointed out by Patrick Reinsborough and Doyle Canning (2010b), activist and creative strategist at smartMeme Strategy and Training Project, the ‘webs of narratives’ that function as ‘control mythologies, which shape a shared sense of political reality, normalize the status quo, and obscure alternative options or visions . . . are rapidly fertilized and cross-pollinated in today’s 24/7 multimedia environment’ by ‘contagious’ memes that spread across the internet instantaneously. These ‘self-replicating units of cultural information that spread virally’ (Reinsborough & Canning 2010a, pp. 34-35) are the locus (shifting) of a growing number of world citizens’ understanding of and meaningful interactions with their lived experiences.

The Aristotelian canons of Invention-Arrangement-Style-Memory-Delivery may no longer be sufficient for intervention in a rhetoric where communication has been transformed into consumer activity. Messages, memes, utterances are offered as packaged wholes, often impervious to intercession except by a 140-character Tweet or a Facebook ‘Like’ (possibly ‘Unliked’ later) or a rapid-fire exchange of solipsistic posts typed in text-message shorthand – all enfolded in the ads that keep the internet running and all apparently sharing those ads’ im- or explicit message of passive consumption. It is this context of ‘multimedia, consumer spectacles, and other sophisticated forms of advertising’ (Reinsborough & Canning 2010a, p. 29) that contains civic rhetoric now. Public discourse in this post-industrial consumer-capitalist economy of meaning calls for a revision of the classical canons in order to move toward unity among factions and toward persuasion grounded in the lived experience of rhetors, taking into account the means by which messages are disseminated to the public. We answer this call by reconstructing rhetoric pedagogy at the college/university level with a remapping of those canons, aimed at critical prosumption – production and consumption both – of social texts for active, meaningful participation in public discourse.

As we now live in a global media society with few or no borders separating conversations in virtual public space, we take our remapping of the canons beyond the boundaries of US civic rhetoric and into the territory of worldwide communication, aiming for a wider scope of literate activity to achieve unity through persuasion for global citizenship.

19.2 Background: Rhetoric and composition in US higher education
All college and university students in the US, with the exception of those at a very few Ivy League institutions, are required to take two semesters of
composition/rhetoric, called variously ‘rhetoric’, ‘college writing’, or simply ‘freshman comp’ but almost universally recognized by the course designations ‘English 101’ and ‘English 102’. The first of these two courses typically requires students to write from four to six formal essays of five to six pages each (typed, double spaced, one-inch margins) in order to practice the skills of topic focus and articulation of an argumentative position in a concise thesis statement, analysis of the position into various sub-points, organization of the discussion into logical paragraphs each with a concise topic sentence, and development of the argument through discussion, examples, and reference to others’ ideas. English prose style may or may not be directly addressed during the class. However, awareness of an audience’s needs, interests, knowledge, and biases in order to make decisions about style and development is considered essential, and the impact of writing purpose on style and form is generally included in the curriculum. Topics are usually related to current events assumed to be of interest to students or of interest to faculty – at universities, this being graduate students as tenured faculty rarely deign to teach the mandatory but despised ‘English 101’. Practice in these rhetorical skills is accompanied by opportunities to engage in the cognitive activities that make up the composing process, shorthanded as prewriting, writing, and rewriting. This process is facilitated by reading, research, class discussion of topics, assistance in invention from the classical Common Topics (usually simplified as comparison, contrast, cause, effect, classification, narration, and example), various ‘brainstorming’ exercises, peer review, teacher intervention, class workshopping of essay drafts (usually in computer classrooms), and formal revision. Proper document formatting – margins, spacing, font style and size, etc. – is considered necessary for success.

The second semester of freshman composition is often simply referred to as ‘the research paper class’: a review of the above skills with the added component of intensive instruction in library and online research toward completion of a formal documented essay of twelve to fifteen pages. A very large part of this course is devoted to making sure that students can properly present their sources in a given ‘style’, preferably MLA or APA, with every comma, full-stop, and upper-case letter in its correct place, italics used when called for, and all pieces of information about a source (author, title, publisher, date, and so on) in their proper order on a perfectly typed bibliography. Avoidance of plagiarism is a major feature of both courses, increasingly so
since the Internet has muddied the concept of ‘common knowledge’ and made cut-and-paste an attractive option for completing writing assignments. In both courses, individual faculty may place greater emphasis on either the production of students’ own texts or the critical reception/interpretation of published texts, but students’ work is typically limited to production of academic-style argumentative essays.

Although visual rhetoric – understanding of how the use of font, colour, white space, and arrangement of graphic elements can affect audience response – may be included in both courses, only recently is real attention being given to multimodality as an option in text production or as a factor in the making of meaning. Some few universities have designed ‘writing’ programmes that include the production of PowerPoint presentations, videos, audio files, and blended documents containing more than one modality, but these are considered radical and possibly dangerous by the mainstream – a threat to the profession, a disservice to students who will need to write academic essays in other classes, a degeneration of Writing. A notable exception is the Writing Across Media (wam) advanced composition course at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (uiuc), in which

[wam is based on scholarly work that ‘argues for the expansion of writing courses to include composing practices occurring not just through print text, but through other modes as well’ because notions of literacy have expanded to include visual and other means of communication in a variety of modes, both digital and nondigital (‘Background’, n.d.). However, wam is only a single course, and it is an elective course limited to students minoring in the Informatics program at uiuc. Students in the us are using social media and interacting with non-verbal texts in their classes (professors may require Twitter posts, for example, as class participation and use websites and online interfaces as teaching tools), but they are not being taught in any systematic fashion how to analyze the reproduction of meaning and make their]
own coherent meaning in non-traditional texts. Indeed, efforts by one of us (Kuykendall) to revolutionize the writing programme at the community college that shares a town as well as some faculty members with UIUC have been met largely with resistance, ridicule, and suspicion.

However, public rhetoric at this moment in history is no longer conducted in formal texts; the public meaning-making project is not limited to words; and documentation of sources in civic interaction does not follow academic guidelines. Its form has, for better or worse, morphed into a multitude of as-yet-indeterminate genres; it is a mosaic of all the modes of communication made possible by conventional means and electronic devices; and it may be a mashup of ‘texts’ accessed online, on the air, or in the community without what has long been seen as proper acknowledgement of ‘sources’ of ideas or information and without clear boundaries between voices. Students who do not learn to negotiate this new rhetorical territory are disadvantaged as voters, citizens, professionals, revolutionaries, builders of society – and as scholars.

19.3 Theory: Remapping the canons for negotiation of multimodal genres

In this global electronic context, we assert that rhetoric needs to view literacy as acts of social remediation achieved through multiple modalities of semiotic media. Thus, starting from Paul Prior et al.’s (2007) cultural-historical remapping of rhetorical activity, we move from the Aristotelian canons of Invention-Arrangement-Style-Memory-Delivery to Literate Activity in Functional Systems in Laminated Chronotopes. Prior et al. (2007, p. 19) chart this revised conceptualization of rhetorical activity as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Literate Activity} \\
\text{Production} \\
\text{Representation} \\
\text{Distribution} \\
\text{Reception} \\
\text{Socialization} \\
\text{Activity} \\
\text{Ecology}
\end{align*}
\]
The seven new ‘canons’ of literate activity should not be seen as representing a linear process; rather, they function as a multidimensional model to negotiate situated and material harmony, conflict, and tension in co-authorship of progressive social texts. They may be described thus:

- **Production**: may be compared to ‘invention’ but encompasses both individual and collective generation of ideas; when considering production, we notice the tools, practices, and contexts that go into making a text, as mediated by technologies and discourse practices.
- **Representation**: includes both ‘style’ and ‘arrangement’ but focuses attention on all the semiotic means and media found in representational artifacts; it is how discourse becomes text.
- **Distribution**: refers to the dissemination of texts in networks of social practices via particular media and technologies; it is ‘delivery’ but with consideration of how/what networks, media, and technologies signify in a society.
- **Reception**: is the making of meaning through reading, hearing, viewing of texts; looking at reception, we see both the intellectual and the social features of rhetoric and the impact of audiences’ goals on meaning-making.
- **Socialization**: refers to the production and reproduction of a society and its members in concrete history; here, we are alerted to how so-
society is transmitted through generations (some very short) and transformed by literate activity.

- **Activity**: is ‘the more or less durable, goal-oriented, motivated projects that lead people to cooperation, indifference, and conflict’ (Prior et al., 2007, p. 21) – essays, websites, newspaper articles, audio files, videos, performances, government reports, speeches, and so on.

- **Ecology**: encourages us to become aware of how the natural world impacts all of the other semiotic functions.

Mediation and remediation of meaning, and the mediated agency of ‘writers’ and ‘readers’, are assumed to be present in all seven of the literate activities in their functional systems occurring in laminated chronotopes (Prior et al., 2007).

In short, the remapping of the canons does not suggest that those classical divisions of rhetoric have no value, but rather stretches their boundaries to describe civic discourse as it actually occurs now in a world where digital media bring rhetors into new and contentious relationships. This adaptation of the canons to current circumstances breaks down barriers between classical divisions, bringing into productive conversation logos, ethos, pathos; kairos, audience, decorum; judicial, deliberative, epideictic discourse in the interests of greater opportunities for unity and persuasion in a global media society.

In order to refine a theory of multimodal rhetoric for the purposes of global unity and persuasion, we link the remapping of the canons to Genre Studies, which provides a means of placing texts in material, historical contexts. This linking allows examination of how particular rhetorical activities (genres of ‘texts’) function within genre sets that circulate within genre systems making up activity systems or community lifeworlds. Genre theory, deriving from Vygotskian activity theory, allows an understanding of how ‘systems of speech acts’ and their particular discursive tools are used to interact with ‘social practices . . . of schools, families, peers, disciplines, professions, political movements, unions, corporations, and so on’ (Russell, 1997). Understanding texts in terms of their place(s) within genre sets and systems and then within larger activity systems directs attention to the elements of literate activity mapped out above and the ways in which they come together to produce meaning in society.

Genre theory identifies literate activities such as blogs, public fliers, musical events, impromptu conversation, political speeches, health educa-
tion lectures – whatever forms/genres make meaning in relation to other literate activities. It is the relation here that is important: Study of genres resists perception of civic discourse as loose collections of rhetorical artifacts in isolation, instead stressing the impact on social meaning of texts’ circulation within defined semiotic spaces where the significance of any given text (Literate Activity) is shaped by the Functional Systems (people, artefacts, practices, institutions, communities, ecologies) that contain it and its neighbouring texts and that are active in the mutually imbricated and implicated spatial-temporal networks (Laminated Chronotopes) that embody those texts.

We furthermore, and obviously, find it necessary to consider the multimodality of rhetorical activities in activity systems: all the means that are available now to produce meaning among participants in rhetorical events. Ignoring the many modes of production, representation, and distribution of literate activity ignores the reality of communication in a world far different from the one that Aristotle inhabited. Neither unity, nor persuasion can occur on any scale, and certainly not on a global one, if theories of rhetoric do not admit of – and pay attention to, analyze, critique – the meaning-making potential and the impact on meaning making of semiotic codes in new media as well as older media.

In short, this rhetoric concerns itself with culturally and historically grounded literate activities of persuasion to negotiate conflict and achieve unity in a continual feedback loop that includes culturally, historically situated readers as active and invested agents in the composing process of various genres of texts in various modalities of representation. Thus, we propose for composition pedagogy a theory of rhetoric that recognizes text, context, and countertext all as simultaneous activities represented by multiple tools of socialization in multiple and contested ways, with both writers and readers acting as prosumers (simultaneously both producers and consumers) of meaningful rhetorical artefacts – as occurs in actual public discourse in the current contentious environment of global meaning production.

19.4 Pedagogy: Semiotic remediations through the genre of community action

Our students now come to us with a great deal of new-media experience. Russell Dalton (2008), a scholar of citizenship education, cites a growing number of students who enter the classroom with some sense of civic responsibility based on their online experience. They have, almost all of them,
participated in online activities that contribute with more or less weight to public discourse. They know how to post opinions on a BBS; they have signed online petitions; they belong to digital organizations that allow them to promote their views and share their lived experiences with interested others; they may be active in spreading information about social injustice through videos and still images on Facebook or its Korean and Chinese counterparts, Cyworld and Renren (in the last case, subject to state approval). In short, they have public voices. And they believe that they already possess the necessary skills to be part of the global digital conversation and to use their voices to change the world, or at least their small part of it; they do not need their rhetoric professors’ advice and guidance. After all, they are probably more tech-savvy than many of those professors – and the documents that the professors are asking them to produce bear little resemblance to the kind of writing that they are doing online.

We would argue, however, that writing classes have a lot to teach students about ‘writing’ in the new media and that writing classes are precisely the environment in which people may gain the skills they need for empowered participation in public, civic discourse. Our students are actively engaged in online rhetorical behaviour, but they lack a critical awareness of how meaning is produced and received in the multiple modalities of new-media communication. For its part, writing education has not fully accepted online writing as writing; the field is largely attempting to ignore, or marginalize, changes in what it means to be literate.

If rhetoric and composition education is to remain meaningful in a post-paper-text world, it must discover the root rhetorical concepts that literate people need to understand now. Notions about ‘good’ communication practices have always been impacted by new technologies, from written language itself (which Plato believed would destroy memory and therefore rhetorical skill) to the printing press (which created readers among the masses) to the pencil eraser (which allowed previously abhorred revision) and spell-check (which might produce a population of poor spellers). The concepts underlying rhetorical production and reception as they have been perceived for the last several centuries cannot be untouched by recent media developments that change relationships among interlocutors: authority, the temporal and spatial and ideational boundaries of a text, intellectual property rights, the privacy of readers, the locus of knowledge and the processes of knowledge production. The academic essay, classical argumentation,
thesis statements, topic sentences, ‘logical’ paragraphing, ‘properly’ cited sources (why not embedded hot links?) – these are merely the last few generations’ manifestation of basic rhetorical skills, not the skills themselves. Our classroom practices – our syllabi, our assignments, our expectations of students, even our position in the classroom – need to be rejuvenated by an examination of how new media lead to (demand) new understandings of ‘reader’- ‘writer’ relationships in the world. Prior et al.’s (2007) remapping of the classical canons, by analyzing literate activity in its current social and technological context, provides a starting point for a pedagogy of community action as semiotic remediation in multiple modalities. However, Jennifer Tupper (2006), a critic of the way in which civic education is currently being taught, argues that the current view of citizenship

simply addresses that as citizens we have individual rights, but not that as individual citizens we disagree or that we have common social problems that can only be addressed together, such as hunger, poverty, and healthcare (Tupper 2006, p. 46).

There are, then, two points of entry into current pedagogical practice in composition: rhetoric per se, and the idea of civic action through rhetorical activity.

In Composition Studies, several successful teacher-scholars use the composition classroom as a place where students can develop into civically engaged community members. For example, Cheryl Duffy (2003) and Angelique Davi, Michelle Dunlap, and Ann E. Green (2007) discuss the development of service-learning composition classrooms as places to discuss difference. Duffy names four guiding principles for designing such spaces: integration of a syllabus that allows for reflection, mutuality/reciprocity for both faculty and students, critical pedagogy and academic rigour in the use of outside readings to complete projects, and diversity of discourses to challenge students with multiple modalities for multiple writing purposes. Davi, Dunlap, and Green discuss the development of service-learning pedagogy in the classroom that advocates a safe space for students to talk to one another about race, class, and gender, asserting that a teacher’s role is to help negotiate the divisions that arise. Some of the projects the authors cite as working well are tutoring, journal writing, and robust but respectful discussions of differences among participating students. The ideas and projects these teach-
er-scholars write about are important, but composition itself—let alone rhetoric—is not present in a lot of service-learning projects past the reflection paper. Students begin exciting engagement projects but end those projects with, simply, a formal essay reflecting on their experiences.

A bridge between rhetoric and civic engagement may be built on the foundation of actual problems in the world. Robin D. Crabtree and David Alan Sapp (2010), in arguing that students can be moved from apathy to action by asking them to make connections between professional communication and global awareness, define civic engagement as any number of activities from voting, participating in civic organizations, promoting awareness of issues, and building responsibility to neighborhoods and communities to direct involvement in politics through candidacy. Important at every level of civic engagement is the ability to understand as well as construct meaning orally, in writing, and in multi-media formats. The ability to send and receive messages and to engage in dialogue across differences of opinion is central . . . (Crabtree & Sapp 2010, p. 13; emphasis added).

Rhetoric and civic action come together here, aligned along the axis of multimodal formats of sending and receiving—remediating—messages of meaningful, conflictual social content.

To achieve the goal of bringing writing education into the arena of multimedia discourse with a view toward semiotic remediation of the memes and narratives that shape lives, we propose a triangulation of related composition theories: Activity Theory, Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT), and Semiotic Remediation in genre-based projects for students to connect with their communities and become involved in community action.

Activity theory is not new to an examination of the practices of civic engagement; however, CHAT and semiotic remediation allow us to bring into the composition classroom genre-based projects that focus on community action. This triangulation can energize students to productively intervene in the texts that shape their communities, instead of simply reciting existing texts, or producing closed texts that operate within the ideational boundaries of individual authorship and the temporal-spatial boundaries of a final draft printed on eight-and-a-half-by-eleven sheets of white paper. The work of Paul Prior (2004), Prior et al. (2007), and Prior and Hengst (2010) emphasizes aspects of CHAT and semiotic remediation such as reception, distri-
bution, and socialization as part of a text’s trajectory through public spaces. Lorraine Higgins, Elenore Long, and Linda Flower (2006) write that ‘activity theory acknowledges the situatedness and materiality of literate practices... locating practices in particular communities who have particular histories and who draw on particular resources to do their work’ (p. 171). Russell (1997) describes activity theory as allowing its users to ‘trace the interactions among people and the inscriptions called texts without separating either from collective ongoing directed action over time’; activity theory examines activity systems, which are on-going and tool-mediated interactions that operate in life worlds such as school, work, and home. It is, says Russell (1997), ‘through this circulation of genres in systems, these regularized shared expectations for tool use within and among systems of purposeful interaction, that macro-social structure is (re)created’. In his more recent work, Russell (2010) writes about the tensions and contradictions of participants in multiple activity systems and genres using Yrjo Engeström, Ritva Engeström, and Merja Karkkainen’s (1995) concept of polycontextuality in social activities and Carolyn Miller’s (1985) theory of genre as social action. These theories allow consideration of how people move between and among different texts, contexts, and relationships. The idea of polycontextuality – ‘complementary but also conflicting cognitive tools, rules, and patterns of social interaction’ (Engeström, Engeström & Karkkainen, 1995, p. 319) – is important for teaching civic engagement because when students are composing in their communities, they confront multiple and critical tensions and contradictions between/among students and genres of community action, students and citizens, students and the technologies they use to compose in and for their communities.

That leaves, then, the issue of multimodality in rhetoric: the text beyond the printed page in 12-point Times New Roman with one-inch margins and a carefully typed bibliography. Prior et al. (2007) argue for a re-envisioning of Cultural Historical Activity Theory as a whole-communication theory that integrates communication, learning, and social formation, seeing them not as separate categories, but as simultaneous, constant dimensions of any moment of life. This perspective tunes our attention to multimodality, not as a question of which mode a message might be placed in, but as a question of how multiple modes operate together in a single rhetorical act and of how extended chains of modal transformations may be linked in a rhetorical trajectory (Prior et al. 2007, p. 23).
This theory highlights how multiple modes operate in a single rhetorical act and looks closely at the relationships among multiple literate activities: production, representation, distribution, reception, socialization, activity, and ecology. This theory of communication — one that is based in classical rhetoric and composition and that ‘opens up consideration of how rhetors and audiences are socialized, how means are made and black-boxed, and how situations are built and altered’ (p. 24) — is integral to a pedagogy of literate civic engagement because it leads to a practice that engages students in understanding how people shape the tools, relationships, history, and multiple distributions available to them as well as the ways in which people can and will repurpose the texts around them to champion causes and create barriers to and boundaries on that championing.

Knowing how to post opinions on a BBS or upload to Facebook a shocking image of state-sponsored murder in Syria is a start, but it is insufficient to active, participatory literacy in the new-media environment of global public discourse. Rather, students — all of us — need to know how to craft multi/transmedia messages that can enter civic discourse with all the strength of skilled rhetorical action. Associate Professor of Literature and Director of Comparative Media Studies at MIT Henry Jenkins (2006), in *Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide*, defines the transmedia story (substitute ‘meaningful message’) as one that unfolds across multiple media platforms with each new text making a distinctive and valuable contribution to the whole. In the ideal form of transmedia storytelling, each medium does what it does best — so that a story might be introduced in a film, expanded through television, novels, and comics; its world might be explored through game play or experienced as an amusement park attraction (Jenkins 2006, p. 95).

This collision of media is the space in which public voices now meet each other, and it is the space that rhetoric and composition students need guidance in navigating. It includes but is not limited to academic essays. Jenkins (2006) describes three key concepts of his critique of new media: *media convergence*, *participatory culture*, and *collective intelligence*. *Convergence* is ‘the flow of content across multiple media platforms’ (p. 2); *participatory culture* contrasts with old-media spectatorship such that media producers and consumers no longer occupy separate roles but are ‘participants who are
expected to interact with each other according to a new set of rules that none of us fully understands’ (p. 3) – i.e. are prosumers in this new media environment; and collective intelligence (the term borrowed from Pierre Lévy) is the collective process of consumption in which ‘we can put the pieces together if we pool our resources and combine our skills. Collective intelligence can be seen as an alternative source of media power’ (p. 4). Rhetoric and composition education has, despite the attendant discomforts and threats, a responsibility to integrate the convergent, participatory, collective nature of new-media communication into the curriculum.

The entire concept of transmedia violates the core elements of rhetoric and composition as presented in the traditional classroom. In describing fan fiction, for example, Jenkins (2006) points out that

> Fans reject the idea of a definitive version [of a story] produced, authorized, and regulated by some media conglomerate. Instead, fans envision a world where all of us can participate in the creation and circulation of central cultural myths. Fans also reject the . . . assumption that intellectual property is a ‘limited good’, to be tightly controlled lest it reduce its value. Instead, they embrace an understanding of intellectual property as ‘shareware’, something that accrues value as it moves across different contexts, gets retold in various ways, attracts multiple audiences, and opens itself up to a proliferation of alternative meanings. (Jenkins 2006, p. 256).

Open margins, absence of authority, disintegration of the individual voice, collective property rights, shifting value – that is what new media make possible and what our students are experiencing outside of class. Reposts, mashups, collages, composites, fractals (pre-existing sources used to create derivative work – no longer a term a derision). Crowd sourcing, open-source innovation, DIY technology (DIYbiology, biohackers conducting laboratory experiments in their homes without institutional funding). Hacker spaces, Make spaces, radical new forms of education (collaborative learning without teachers; Stanford’s most popular computer science courses, online, for free) (see Diamandis & Kotler 2012).

If we refuse to acknowledge the discourse environment in which students circulate meaning about movies, music, and other forms of popular culture, we abandon the opportunity to assist them in developing powerful voices in the weightier conversations that will shape their lives. As Jenkins (2006) says, ‘Convergence does not occur through media appliances – how-
ever sophisticated they may become. Convergence occurs within the brains of individual consumers’ (p. 3). Our students may be experts at using their smart phones to access information and post opinions, but their expertise lacks systematic analysis and critical awareness of how meaning is reproduced in non-traditional texts. And crucially, ‘[n]ot all participants are created equal. Corporations – and even individuals within corporate media – still exert greater power than any individual consumer or even the aggregate of consumers’ (Jenkins 2006, p. 3). Our role as writing teachers is to make as great an effort toward theorizing rhetoric in new media and developing a pedagogy of new-media rhetorical skills as our predecessors did for the academic essay. ‘Paragraphs’ will still exist as a signification of logical divisions of thought, but they may take the form of colored bubbles in a Prezi creation, panned and zoomed alongside imported media, the whole produced in collaboration ‘in real-time, across the room or across time zones’ (Prezi, 2012). The point, as the Prezi ‘Manual’ author says, is that ‘it helps to have a main narrative in your prezi. With the Path tool, you can present your prezi in the path you set just by clicking Next’ (Somlai-Fischer 2012). Instead of teaching students where to hit ‘tab’ to create a new paragraph, we may need to help them decide where to click ‘next’.

19.5 Curriculum: chat in and out of the classroom
To recap, we are interested in how writing classes, through a remapping of the classical canons of rhetoric and an inclusion of multiple modalities of composition of various genres, can prepare students for engagement in civic activism toward positive social change. We assert that writing classes in higher education can and should teach more than how to write academic essays; we want to guide students in negotiating the dynamic territory of global rhetoric in all its various modes for empowerment in their societies. The colleges and universities at which we have taught include in their mission statements the teaching of responsible citizenship and global awareness, as a part of all courses whether in the sciences or the humanities or the arts or the trades. But those missions will not be achieved merely by assigning relevant topics – diversity sensitivity in a sociology class, water pollution in a biology class, WTO protests in an economics class, almost anything in a composition class. The effort needs to go beyond the subjects of global citizenship. To that end, we assign our composition/rhetoric students activities that elicit their ability to:
• engage in the seven rhetorical activities/canons;
• identify the genre set of community action;
• identify current texts in the genre set;
• demonstrate understanding of texts’ (non-linear, interactive) trajectory through a process of ongoing re-mediation;
• identify and respond to current exigencies in the community; and
• describe and create multimodal texts in the genre set of community action.

A remapping of the classical canons forms the theoretical basis of our pedagogy; Cultural Historical Activity Theory, or chat (Russell 2010), drives our assignments. Assignments to achieve the above goals include:

• chat maps to help students understand the rhetorical dynamics of contested social meaning (Literate Activities in Functional Systems in Laminated Chronotopes, requiring students to visualize semiotic links among genres within genre sets within genre systems within activity systems;
• critical visual and verbal analyses of multimodal genres (websites, images, videos, published articles in various forums, etc.) to help students understand how tools of production and representation are manipulated to produce invested meanings in cultural/rhetorical artefacts;
• rhetorical activities of conventional and nonconventional genres (from essays to podcasts to semiotic remediations of public discourse in multiple modalities) for students to practice production and representation of artefacts;
• cooperative and confrontational classroom presentations/remediations of students’ texts (on paper, online, vocally, on LCD projectors) to simulate distribution and reception of semiotic artefacts; and
• multimodal remediation activities that shape subsequent activities to replicate socialization in the microcosm of the classroom.

Class activities are of necessity organized around particular topics (genre systems) of community interest, for example environmental degradation, health, human rights, gender relations, the decline of the American empire, or a particular local community problem. They are, though, grounded in the ecology of the students’ lifeworlds, adapted to particular class popula-
tions (at a community college, especially, students bring a mix of small-town, urban, international, immigrant, teenaged, middle-aged, retired, and multiracial experiences to the classroom). And we evaluate students’ ability to actively engage in critical prosumption of rhetorical artefacts (including reading and research, writing, speaking, graphic design) that speak and speak to their social exigencies.

We of course recognize the necessity of preparing students to succeed in their academic work as well as in their civic lives by mastering the conventions of scholarly discourse. To this end, many of the assignments named above may be used as production activities (‘invention’) in the process of completing a traditional academic essay or as post-writing activities. Chat in the classroom furthermore does not preclude rigorous expectations in terms of ‘style’ and ‘arrangement’ or manipulation of semiotic systems; but it includes visual, aural, and verbal standards of rhetorical interaction in addition to the usual grammar, syntax, academic essay form, and source acknowledgement.

Our students have produced, represented, distributed, and gained reception of a variety of rhetorical activities – digital, paper, visual, verbal, aural, kinetic – for problem solving (socialization) on a global front. They have done so both in class and outside of class. One of us (Kim) has led students in the prosumption of culturally interactive pod casts at an outdoors Illinois farmers’ market on the student-chosen topic of women’s experiences of abuse. Students from various countries who were participating in a State Department-sponsored study abroad programme crafted their own performances on the issue, took those performances to the market, and engaged passersby in productive remediations of the problem through recording pod casts of conversations at the market. Going far beyond the boundaries of a typical closed text (polished, printed essay) in a typical composition class, these literate activities contributed to the ongoing socialization (production and reproduction) of the students’ society in concrete history and involved the market’s guests in making new globalized narratives about abused women’s pain and triumphs. Paul D. Miller a.k.a. DJ Spooky That Subliminal Kid (2008) asserts that ‘any sound can be you’ and argues for the importance of acknowledging that ‘sound is information’, that ‘music is floating signifiers’, and that words and sound form structures in our brains – and those structures in our brains can be remixed to create new structures and new thoughts. The use of sound as the distribution and reception mode of the
students’ texts provided both the students and their respondents at the farmers’ market an opportunity to remix their experiences there with other aural and visual living texts that they might interact with elsewhere: community meetings, social organizations, and public forums run by local, state, national, and/or international governments. When the participants in the project interacted with living texts and then remixed those experiences with other living texts, they were interpreting their communities in new, vibrant ways that they might not have been able to do with static texts; the opportunity to hear the language people use to form relationships with one another for the goals of community development or collective gains allowed them to be active, remediating prosumers of collective intelligence.

The other of us (Kuykendall) helped prepare a student, Mamie Simba Phongo, to establish after the class ended an NGO titled Speak Out AID(S) (Parlons sida) in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, using among other tools spontaneous conversation, prepared lectures, organized dance and song, church meetings, and graphic banners to educate communities about the disease and persuade interlocutors to be tested on the spot. The various media of distribution, with careful thought given to the signification of the meaningful networks in which the messages operated, were critical to the success of the project. Speak Out AID(S) now also exists in digital form as a website and a Facebook page, inviting ongoing feedback from active, invested reading and writing agents who will continue the socialization (production, reproduction, transformation) of AIDS’ meaning (life impact) in DRC and around the world.

Another student (Kuykendall’s) has used his wide-ranging literacy skills (production, representation, distribution of a literate activity for reception in the ecology of his home country) outside of class to learn and use the formal (including legal) genre conventions of NGOs; he has written a formal charter for and founded his own NGO, Peace and Development for All, operating both in the US and in DRC through awareness activities for youth (theatre, sport, music); individual and institutional contact to promote peace and development; conferences/debates; and reflection on the part of members. As this student, Sylvain Kande, writes in the Preamble to the Charter:

Peace and development, two inseparable concepts that constitute a fundamental ideal to attain humanity’s well-being, are a reality in certain regions of the world thanks to the work, to the will, to the determination and the selflessness of men and women who day after day give their efforts to achieve an acceptable level of
life for all. Nevertheless, they are still a utopia, an impracticable dream elsewhere, because innocent weak people suffer from atrocities caused by armed conflicts and their consequences, on one hand, and on another hand from natural disasters.

The NGO’s slogan is ‘A little of you to give again hope of life to the next one’. It is our hope that many more such student rhetorical activities will enter the negotiation – mediation and remediation – of global meaning, assisted by classroom learning experiences beyond the writing of formal academic essays with perfect (closed) margins and citations of (authoritative) sources.

19.6 Conclusion: The challenges of the future
The margins are enticingly and perhaps frighteningly open. At the time of writing, none of us can predict what will come of the democracy revolutions in Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, Tunisia, Syria, or how the current malignant tendency of US public discourse will resolve itself. But we do believe that it is ‘[b]y noticing and analyzing control mythologies [that] we can reeducate ourselves and re-imagine our world’ (Reinsborough & Canning 2010a, p. 24) – in other words, actively participate in the public discourses that will drive the outcomes. If we are not afraid to challenge the traditions that have governed rhetoric and composition theory and pedagogy for the last several generations, we as writing teachers can take on the theorizing and teaching of a rhetoric of unity and persuasion that will give students the necessary multimodal tools for global citizenship in our new-media environment. There is much more work to be done, and it may be our students who teach us what we most need to know in order for our field to maintain a meaningful place in higher education and for us to hold a credible position in the classroom. We can be reremediated if we are willing to listen, not merely echo our own teachers.

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A MULTIMODAL RHETORIC OF UNITY AND PERSUASION FOR GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP

AlterNet, http://www.alternet.org/books/149306/vision--how_you_can_use%27smartmemes%27_to_win_campaigns,_build_movements,_and_change_the_world_/?page=1.


PART V

Visual Rhetoric
20 Memoria; in documentary film: How spectators remember sequences and actualize public memory

CHRISTOPH SAUER

20.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to reconsider the concept of voice as it might be applied to documentary films in their visual as well as in their verbal track. Documentaries may have a visual voice; accordingly, their meaning cannot be reduced to the words uttered by different actors such as experts and interviewees in the film or an invisible voice-over commentator. Their visual voice expressed in the film pictures needs at least to be linked to their verbal voice. Together, they form the audience design that is aimed at the film viewers’ understanding. The concept of audience design, however, is rather underdeveloped and often restricted to the verbal track in films. This chapter proposes some steps in the direction of multimodal analysis, by elaborating on the visual film design and conceptualizing it as ‘overseer’ design.

The (multimodal) voice of a documentary belongs to the rhetorical tradition, as does the voice of an orator who performs with multimodal means (voice quality, body language, performance-related appearance, etc.). From this perspective, one issue of the rhetorical knowledge is worked out, memoria. It is reactualized in a situation we call a ‘rhetorical’ one, thus also in film. Due to its sheer length, a documentary film is always based on active remembering by its viewers during the screening. Film viewers need to know where they are on a certain moment, and where they come from. They need support in their retrospection activities by getting ‘cues’ in order to focus their remembering. Without remembering no filmic content will remain, neither during the screening, nor afterwards.

This constellation resembles the one of an orator in classical antiquity. Therefore, memoria is a key concept, too, in the information processing of documentaries. It is not the filmmaker who falls back on his memory when
he makes and edits the film, rather it is the viewer who uses memory cues in order to activate his remembering or realize retrospection. This activation affects the public memory of historical events and collective traumata or highlights. Documentaries have to deal with these constellations.

The chapter begins by considering the relationship between documentary and rhetorical tradition, and discusses the concept of voice, especially in the light of multimodal forms. It goes on to apply the concept of audience design to the visual and verbal track and to consider memoria cues part of the audience design. A corpus analysis of ten documentaries elaborates on forms of memoria cues and proposes finally a mix of potential approaches.

20.2 Voice of a documentary

In this section, we consider the analogy between the orator’s voice in classical antiquity and the voice of a documentary. This entails that we do not restrict the voice’s impact to the field of verbal communication as far as it can be transmitted in film, like, for example, in conversations, expert interviews, or vox populi statement shots. We know already as film viewers that the verbal track constantly is combined with the visual track, and that the verbal track’s content is of immense influence on what we see in the visual track – as we are guided by the visual track in what we experience in the verbal track. Montgomery (2007, pp. 97-107) elaborated on these interrelations as ‘principles of intelligibility’. Therefore, if we would take solely the verbal track in documentary films into account, even if its source is sometimes visible in talking heads shots, then we would exclude what may be called the filmic (or documentary) reality, which is an audio-visual one. We need to include at least the pictures shown. This entails the talking people’s context and their filmed actions become meaningful.

There is another reason why voice of a documentary cannot be restricted to a human voice audible in the verbal track, although this reason concerns a widespread filmic element: voice-over commentary. At face value, a voice-over commentary in documentary films contributes to the expectation that we may hear the filmmaker’s voice, and thus a voice that stands for the documentary’s voice. However, because film pictures are screened during voice-over commentary, we have to weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of the interactions between the verbal and the visual track; thus, we need to consider how the pictures might frame the verbal text and the verbal text may mitigate or stress the visual content of the pictures. Accordingly,
we do not concentrate on voice-over commentary as the main source of the documentary’s voice. Instead, we try to include all filmic means in our treatment of it. We imply also the way the sequences are designed and edited, and look for text-image relations that may support the film viewers’ processing of the voice’s meaning.

In focusing on the documentary’s voice we adopt the assumption that is offered by the documentary film theorist Bill Nichols repeatedly (1991, 2001, 2010); that film rhetoric – which always includes visual rhetoric – and verbal rhetoric coincide. Nichols is concerned with developments in modern film making which ‘remains indebted to the rhetorical tradition’. A documentary filmmaker resembles an orator in that he addresses ‘issues or problems that call for social consensus or solution’ (Nichols 2010, pp. xvi-xvii). If we base our understanding of filmic communication on the foundational rhetorical point of departure developed by Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Ad Herennium, etc. then the ‘call for social consensus or solution’ may be ascribed to all rhetorical genres: deliberative speech (genus deliberativum), epideictic speech (genus demonstrativum), and judicial speech (genus iudiciale), in vast variations (Quintilian III.4. pp.15-16; Braet 2007; Reisigl 2008). In fact, documentary films may address forensic questions (e.g. after lawsuits that were found problematic), realize ceremonial purposes (like praise or blame of public figures) as well as intervene in public debates (about nearly all issues). Consequently, the rhetorical tradition enters into a documentary’s voice. However, as already mentioned above, we must take into account that this voice is always multimodally realized (see below).

Documentary films invite us to participate in representations of our time, culture, and community, to assess claims, and to share convictions. Ethos, pathos, and logos likewise participate in the documentary film discourse (Nichols 2010). Comparable with feature films, the full range of filmic means (semiotic resources, in terms of van Leeuwen 2005) is used to attract audiences and to provide them with information necessary for understanding – sometimes even more than is bearable in feature films. For instance, Fahrenheit 9/11 (Michael Moore 2004) and the series Auschwitz: The Nazis and the Final Solution (Laurence Rees 2005) combine many divergent sources, archive footage, newsreels, interviews (both films), as well as re-enactments, different kinds of voice-over, computer-generated images (Auschwitz), cartoons (Fahrenheit 9/11), etc. This richness of realization means is aimed at rhetoric in our world rather than at evoking a fictitious
world. The maker of a documentary normally addresses and represents those aspects of the world that are subject to debate. Topics and issues in a documentary are essentially disputable; thus, they do not lend themselves to scientific proof (as could be done in scientific films); rather, they need a rhetorical approach that is aimed at persuasion and, at the same time, reflects the audience’s information processing:

As issues of understanding and interpretation, value and judgment about the world we already occupy, they require a way of speaking that is fundamentally different from logic or story telling. The rhetorical tradition provides a foundation for this way of speaking. It can embrace reason and narrative, evocation and poetry, but does so for the purpose of inspiring belief or instilling conviction about the merit of a particular viewpoint on a contentious issue (Nichols 2001, p. 49).

The ‘way of speaking’ consists of all semiotic means. Since documentaries are characteristic examples of multimodal communication, their four key modes are language, image, sound, and music (Van Leeuwen 2005; Sauer 2009, 2012). In all four modes and their respective sub-modes the voice of a documentary is expressed. Rhetoric, then, is no longer limited to words that may be heard, such as people on the screen in interviews or conversations, presenters, experts, or witnesses, and someone unseen (which is produced by the voice-over constellation; Kozloff 1988; Nijdam 2010). A viewpoint and an issue in a public debate may also be expressed by images: of people speaking and behaving, of the context a presenter is shown in, of images related to the content of ongoing verbal discourse, e.g. archival footage, or historical photographs, or of completely autonomous images; thus, without any verbal anchoring at all. In addition to verbal and visual filmic discourses, sound and music have to be regarded as rhetorical realizations, too (Sauer 2012). But due to this paper’s limited length sound and music are not (yet) addressed here.

20.3 Audience design as overhearer and ‘overseer’ design
Rhetorical means represented verbally and visually need, like other semiotic means, what may be called the ‘guidance’ of the audience. This works in a double sense. First, if the audience is expected to understand what is said and what is shown, and to draw inferences from words and pictures, then this business of inferring has to be well-structured and supported by adequate ways of word and picture combinations. It has to be designed for the
film public’s understanding. It is in this section that we discuss the support of understanding under the heading of overbearer and ‘overseer’ design. Second, in order to be convincing rhetorically, a documentary has to stimulate fundamental forms of remembering of what the audience already has seen and making a connection with what is now present. Without the viewers’ remembering of certain sequences and integrating them in the process of information gathering, a documentary cannot come across as an orderly argument. We will deal with these aspects of memoria in the following section.

**FIGURE 20.1 LISTENING TO DIALOGUE**

When we see documentary film or TV documentary, normally we are aware of the verbal text that is produced by voice-over commentators, interviewers, interviewees, witnesses, presenters, other people speaking (Figure 20.1, above). However, we are less aware of the editing that has been done to make the verbal content available. Furthermore, we are accustomed to historical footage, shots of cities or landscapes, photographs, images of documents, etc. In short, we are aware of contextual information. It fits our experience
concerning documentaries: voices heard belonging to people shown and from time to time also some visual content connected with the verbal content. Since the editing is done for the audience, in order to enable film viewers to understand what is going on, audience design has to be the centre of our investigation.

Audience design belongs to the notion of recipient design (Goodwin & Heritage 1990) and is used as a basic concept in mass media communication, too (Bell 1991, 2001). We have to deal with oral discourse and visual discourse as well.

**FIGURE 20.2** FILM VIEWER C OVERHEARING A FILMED CONVERSATION BETWEEN A AND B

A and B seen and heard talking with each other

![Diagram](attachment:image.png)

Film theorists consider film actors’ dialogue as a key source to enable recipients to understand film narration (Kozloff 2000; Bordwell & Thompson 2004). Hence, the film viewer may be compared with a person C who overhears two other persons A and B speaking with each other, or who eavesdrops on them (Bubel 2008). However, without some access to the common ground of A’s and B’s conversation (the overlapping areas in the circles; Clark 1996), this overhearing might be defective and incomplete (Figure 20.2, above). Common ground means that A and B do not need to make all elements of their shared knowledge explicit when talking with each other. Accordingly, natural communication is economically organized by using what is already known to A and B as well as by automatically referring to contextual and world knowledge, instead of by making these elements verbally explicit.
The shared knowledge – the common ground – makes the communication smooth and easy and less wordy.

The third party C is either overhearer, or eavesdropper and can only make conjectures by trying to understand the communication between A and B (Clark and Schaefer 1992). However, what C misses is access to their common ground and thus to their shared knowledge. C cannot be sure of understanding the interaction in full, except if A and B support this overhearing explicitly.

Film viewers listening to film characters in interaction are in the situation of overhearers or eavesdroppers, from now on overhears (Figure 20.3, below). Yet, the film reception situation differs from naturally occurring overhearing situations, in that the film crew already takes care of a general access to the common ground of A and B and provides information cues in the verbal communication (and in the visual communication likewise). Therefore, film actors talk unnaturally, more explicitly, overabundantly:

Utterances are designed with overhearers in mind, on the basis of an estimate of the spectators’ world knowledge and on the knowledge the participants have gleaned from interactions that the spectators have observed (Bubel 2008, p. 66).

Their overabundance is scripted, thus caused by a scriptwriter, and it is arranged concerning camera shots and other editing procedures (Haan 2009; Kooistra 2009; Sauer 2009).

**FIGURE 20.2 ACCESS TO COMMON GROUND IN (DOCUMENTARY) FILM**

A and B seen and heard talking with each other

[Diagram of common ground made accessible for film audiences (A+B)+C]
This kind of overhearer support requires similar measures in documentaries. However, if a speaker’s text cannot be scripted in advance, so as when people spontaneously are reacting in an interview situation, then either the interviewer during the interview may ask more and other questions (Clayman 2007; Haan 2009) or in the editing process questions and ‘wrong’ answers are cut out and sometimes a voice-over commentator is added (Kozloff 1988; Nijdam 2010).

To recapitulate, overhearers – whether in front of a TV screen or in everyday situations – are ‘unratified participants’ in a conversation, concerning the ‘participation framework’ that takes complex speech events into account (Goffman 1979; Clark 1996). This has consequences for the process of understanding insofar as overhearers draw inferences, based on the limited amount of common ground they share with the actors or other people on
the screen (Figure 20.4). *Audience design* is the necessary amount of filmic measures in order to widen the common ground and to make it accessible for overhearers.

The audience-centred model of (documentary) film discourse shows that it is the film crew that provides adequate *verbal* and *visual cues* for the public (Montgomery 2007) to support its understanding, in line with the logical string of ongoing dialogue, narration, commentary, voice-over text, etc.

In documentaries, verbal discourse is more differentiated than in feature film. Apart from invisible commentary produced in ‘voice-of-God’ style (Nichols 2001, 2010; Nijdam 2010), many other voices occur. Presenters and interviewers design their conversation for the overhearing audience. That is, they make adequate cues available so that film recipients have no problems to understand the ongoing communication (Clayman 2007; Montgomery 2007; Kooistra 2009). One of these cues in documentaries is the direct address to camera so that interviewers or interviewees like experts, politicians, artists, etc. seem to speak directly to the public. This form of addressing is a variation of the necessity of making explicit information available for the audience. So it is politicians (e.g. McNamara in *The Fog of War*, Errol Morris 2003), experts (e.g. two mountaineers [Joe Simpson and Simon Yates reflecting their nearly fatal climb in the Peruvian Andes in 1985] in *Touching the Void*, Kevin Macdonald 2003), or filmmakers themselves (e.g. Michael Moore in *Fahrenheit 9/11* 2004; Morgan Spurlock in *Super Size Me* 2004) that perform this work of direct addressing. Furthermore, it may connote a certain dynamic, create involvement, or demonstrate emotional vulnerability.

In Figure 20.5 (below), we see a sequence that consists of shots of the filmmaker, landscape shots, the interviewee, and contextual shots that adjust the interview information. The second scene (from episode 1) of the series *In Europa* (2007) provides the audience with *verbal cues* that give access to the common ground between IN (invisible interviewer) and LN (Lord Neidpath, the interviewee), and with *visual cues* that accentuate and concretize the ongoing information. Therefore, we may assume that both the interview itself, namely the degree of preparedness that shows in the audible questions and the answers as well, and its editing are aimed at overhearing and ‘over-seeing’ audiences.
(After a general introduction into the series, some footage about the beginning of the century. Then GM’s voice to the UK) English subtitles

5.18 - GM: I began in London in 1901, with the death of Queen Victoria.

GM: Back then, no one suspected that in the coming century nothing would remain the same.

GM: The supreme British Empire would get competition from new rivals like Germany, the US and Japan.

GM: The casualness with which nobles had exerted power for centuries would end.

IN: (invisible): Um do you prefer that people call you Lord?

LN: Um, I do, yes, yeah.

LN: I mean, people I don't know particularly well. LN: ( ... ) not ( ... ) my wife to call me Lord, d'you mean.
LN: But uh, uh, it's it's what I normally hear.

LN: it's a family group, um, um perhaps from nineteen hundred

LN: Nearly all the things which made it a way - all have past away.

LN: Like the House of Lords, the tendency to dominate the military or ...

LN: tendency of - people from the governing class to provide all the mp's, you know, doesn't happening any more

(Following sequence introduced by gm as voice-over.) It would be the century of the masses. Kings would no longer rule subjects but would have to vie for popularity with pop stars and soccer pro's - 6.32


[ 403 ]
The fact that Lord Neidpath in his latter utterances explains in more detail what he first stated, namely, that the traditional influence of nobles has passed away, is a clear example of overherar design done by a person apparently exercised in doing so. What is said is said so for an overhearing audience – neither for the interviewer, nor the film crew. Correspondingly, because the overhearer is also treated as an ‘overseer’, part of the influence the nobles had around 1900 is plainly demonstrated in pictures that show their richness – manor, garden, cloths, room interior, even the family photograph. Thus, an ‘overseer’ may glean more insight from the sequence’s content than an overhearer of the interview alone. On top of this is the fact that the voice-over commentator (the well-known writer and historian Geert Mak) focuses the viewer on the general topic that ‘no one suspected that in the coming century nothing would remain the same’ alluding to existing knowledge about the history of Europe in the last century, which is also shown in the buildings.

To sum up, no one needs to say that nobles were rich and influential, since the pictures unobtrusively demonstrate it – and thus serve to support the ongoing information processing. Treated as overhearer by getting access to the common ground between interviewer and lord, the viewer is also supported as ‘overseer’ who ‘oversees’ pictures that are content-related. In Figure 20.6 (below), the ideal typical situation in documentaries is considered, which summarizes the argumentation until here.

**FIGURE 20.6 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN OVERHEARER AND ‘OVERSEER’ DESIGN IN DOCUMENTARIES**
20.4 *Memoria* cues in oratory and documentary film

The next step in our explanation concerns the rhetorical category of *memoria*. It seems to be the case in particular when verbal texts in documentaries are accompanied by visual information, rather than showing talking heads alone. Because verbal texts are more ‘memorable’ when pictures accentuate and underline them, the coreference between the verbal and visual track
(Montgomery 2007) must, at least, comprise some cues that stimulate the audience’s memory. This criterion of memorability is the filmic application of what in classical antiquity is related to knowing by heart. There might be some difference though, since it is not only the orator himself who needs to know his text by heart, but also his audience, which is dedicated to keeping some relevant information in mind (e.g. Quintilian VI.1.1-2; Ad Herennium II.147). Consequently, because the public has to be enabled to recollect the speech afterwards and to react to the orator’s words on their way it has to do some memoria work too.

Hence, memoria is a key concept in the rhetorical realization of multimodal documentary discourse. It adopts the perspective that the design of utterances, pictures and other modes are consequently and necessarily audience-centred. Therefore, the key scene of rhetoric is not the orator surrounded by his audience like in classical antiquity; on the contrary, it is a bard (a minstrel) who sings and narrates ballads and, at the same time, shows pictures and points to them during his performance. He does so to stimulate the public’s understanding and its involvement in the sad or sensational content (Figure 20.7, below). We assume that performances in words and pictures – as well as in music (not dealt with here) – are the real source of documentary discourse, as it holds for the primal situation in rhetoric.

An orator and a street singer likewise not only inform, educate, persuade, or move the public, but entertain it at the same time by means that are characteristic of performances. Therefore, they both realize a specific form of performativity, which turns out to be of immense influence on what people may remember afterwards but also during the performance itself (see also Bruzzi 2006 for documentaries’ tendency of realizing performativity).

According to Nichols, the way a documentary filmmaker proceeds can be compared with the ‘tasks’ a classical orator is achieving while talking – and throughout his talking. The voice of a documentary, then, although it is obviously multimodal, might be seen in analogy with the orator’s five tasks: inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, actio (Cicero 1967; Figure 20.8).
**Figure 20.8** Five tasks of the orator according to classical rhetoric

- **Inventio**: concerns finding what one wants to say, discovering the best available means of persuasion.
- **Dispositio**: or arrangement, concerns how one orders speech or writing.
- **Elocution**: or style, if inventio addresses what is to be said, style addresses how this will be said (with maximal attention to linguistic form).
- **Memoria**: not only learning how to memorize an already composed speech, but also considering how the audience will retain things in mind.
- **Action**: or delivery, performing a speech by “acting”, vocal training and by using appropriate gestures.

Almost always however, *memoria* and *actio* are considered exclusively related to oratory in particular and oral culture in general. In many textbooks on rhetoric, this provenance muddles the full display of these achievements, as if the first three ‘tasks’ are more substantial than the second two ones that are regarded as belonging to more technical skills. In accordance with this view, people suppose the technical ‘tasks’ to be taken over by modern technical means without any communicative effects. Nowadays, artificial memories like script, photography, film, internet, digital memories (Van Dijck 2004, 2007; Sauer 2005; Assmann 2007) seem to make the memory work of classical antiquity unnecessary. Especially the ‘memory theatre’ that is considered a way to remember what was to be said (by the orator) and to support the recipients’ future recall disappears little by little from scientific discourses. Also *actio* is no longer seen as necessary since live performances are rehearsed and recorded and can frequently be viewed. Nevertheless, what is excluded from this argumentation, but can still be found in introductory textbooks, is the way a speech needs *active remembering by the audience* during the speaking event itself. It was this activation assumption that Quintilian brought up repeatedly in his basic work on the institutes of oratory, as did the writer of *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. The remainder of this section, then, focuses on *memoria*.

A documentary film needs active remembering by the audience during the film viewing itself. The filmic dynamic operates with multimodal cues (Montgomery 2007) that support the audience in remembering what it has processed already and relating it to what it will process now:
Memory enters into the various ways by which viewers draw on what they have already seen to interpret what they presently see. The act of retrospection, of remembering what has already been shown and making a connection with what is now being shown, can prove crucial, just as memory can prove crucial to the construction of coherent argument (Nichols 2010, pp. 91-92).

The acts of retrospection are multimodal in nature, not only carried out in words but also in pictures, sound, and music. They work in a double way: short range and large range.

They have a short range when viewers identify earlier meanings from already shown sequences and relate them to the actual meaning making. Typical short range retrospections are interviewees’ and experts’ names and their professional whereabouts that are shown on the screen also in script (applied in nearly all documentaries of our corpus). Also sound and music may be designed to serve the short range retrospection. In fact, if a specific context is related to a specific piece of music then the one can trigger the other (Sonnenschein 2001). This retrospection processing by music is consequently applied, e.g. in Touching the Void (Macdonald 2003) and Auschwitz (Rees 2005).

Large range retrospections arise when spectators are encouraged to mobilize knowledge from outside the film (‘world knowledge’, Bubel 2008). The latter concerns the way TV news footage, diagrams, older interviews, cartoons, and photographs occur in documentaries. So we see, for example, obesity diagrams in Super Size Me (Spurlock 2004), TV news reports in Fahrenheit 9/11 (Moore 2004), CCTV pictures from surveillance cameras in Bowling for Columbine (Moore 2002), glaciers before and after the global warming in An Inconvenient Truth (Guggenheim 2006), and maps in Touching the Void (Macdonald 2003) and Auschwitz (Rees 2005). In historical documentaries, we are in particular treated to archival footage and photographs, e.g. black-and-white footage of anti-Jewish raids in Warsaw in Auschwitz (Rees 2005). In these cases the retrospection is, so to speak, stabilized. The viewers may relate their information processing to the (visual) memory that is established during a series of sequences. It operates by means of content-related pictures that are often accompanied by appropriate sound and music. An example is to hear military orders and to see them print during atomic bombing of Japan in The Fog of War (Morris 2003).

Next to both instances of active remembering as retrospection, the
role of memory in documentary film information processing enters in another way:

Film itself provides a tangible ‘memory theater’ of its own. It is an external, visual representation of what was said and done. Like writing, film eases the burden to commit sequence and detail to memory. Film often becomes a source of ‘popular memory’, giving us a vivid sense of how something happened in a particular time and place (Nichols 2010, p. 91).

The ‘memory theatre’ alludes to the mnemonics in rhetoric, the location-in-mind way how orators are trained to remember parts of their speech during its delivery (Yates 1966; Carruthers 1990). However, as already Ad Herennium and Quintilian have discussed, a ‘memory theater’ suits the hearers likewise in that they may build up a better recollection of the content of the speech text (Sauer 2005). In documentaries, the ‘memory theatre’ is not only the location one can perceive in the series of sequences – and, as such, a ‘place’ to find or refine filmic content – but also a ‘tangible’ theatre that makes the memorizing as concrete as possible.

Because a documentary consists of many (dynamic) picture sequences, its ‘tangibility’ depends on how these pictures are linked to each other. Every picture (sequence) tells a story of its own, as did a room in a building or another location in classical mnemonics, in combination with the other modes a filmmaker provides us with. Consequently, the filmmaker has his ‘memory theatre’ literally caught in pictures, texts, sounds, and music of the film. The viewers experience this ‘memory theatre’, so they ‘see’ the location where the filmmaker’s thoughts are situated. They may trust that these thoughts in the film’s sequences are well organized and show no loose ends, for loose ends would undermine the effects of the ‘memory theatre’.

Structure is a main issue in documentaries’ ‘memory theatre’. For example, The Fog of War (Morris 2003) provides us with eleven clearly structured ‘lessons’ and Super Size Me (Spurlock 2004) develops into thirty days as ‘chapters’, including scientific statements by experts and their typical use of diagrams. Structure prevails over the film set as ‘memory theatre’ in that spectators may get input for their searching of knowledge particles that are necessary for understanding-as-remembering. An extreme kind of ‘memory theatre’ is Our Daily Bread (Geyrhalter 2005) that looks – without commenting, without even a single word, without music – into bizarre places and surreal
landscapes where on an industrial scale food is produced in Europe. Audiences are reminded of locations that are characteristic of how animals nowadays are kept, fed, slaughtered, and transported. These locations are very tangible memory entries through which audiences are stimulated to ‘walk’.

In addition, the fourth memoria category is that film is often a source of ‘popular memory’, as Nichols diagnoses, or ‘public memory’, according to Moyer (2007). Film messages and corresponding pictures may occupy an area in the audience’s memory, as a source of how something has happened in a certain place and at a certain moment, and this memory site will have an existence on its own afterwards. What we see in film, in particular in footage fragments that are integrated into documentaries in a multitude of ways, has happened once and has been in existence, and it is our seeing of it that gives us the feeling to be a ‘witness’ (Moyer 2007).

An Inconvenient Truth (Guggenheim 2006), for instance, demonstrates the crumbling away of glaciers and thus contributes to the claim that we witness climate change that becomes a part of our public memory. In Fahrenheit 9/11 (Moore 2004), time and again President Bush is shown in TV news footage that contributes to and profits at the same time from a general political image of his presidency. These sequences evoke and rely on a political memory. The effect of Fahrenheit 9/11 presumably does not influence the collective memory of Americans, which, however, Bowling for Columbine (Moore 2002) seems to do – by endlessly referring to America’s self-defence myth ‘free men with free guns’. The narration of one specific gun misuse, albeit a serious massacre, becomes an ingredient of the never-ending story of ‘the’ gun alluding to freedom. Bowling for Columbine supports a (negative) experience of gun behaviour as a way of life and therefore meets shared knowledge by the audience that is materialized in domains of the collective memory. As does In Europa (Van Broeckhoven & Mak 2007, see also Figure 20.5, above), which uses beautiful sites of English gardens and manors in order to enable the viewers to activate their memory of 1900.

Mainly however, it is well-known fragments from the same sources (photographs, archive footage, etc.) in different films that respond to the collective memory (Halbwachs 1992; Plantinga 1997; Moyer 2007; Van Dijck 2004, 2007; Sikkema 2011). We see (anew) what we already know as a constituent of the collective memory, and by knowing-seeing it we confirm that memory. Documentaries handle many archival film fragments to show the past and to make viewers draw a specific meaning out of it. The specta-
tors’ information processing is triggered by these evocations of the collective memory. If spectators see the same fragments in different documentaries and feel supported by shared knowledge they invoke, then they may accept the documentary’s claim.

As we have demonstrated in several documentaries of our corpus, the role of memoria can be related to active viewing and the support of the viewers’ information processing by retrospection and public remembering. To sum up, memoria (Figure 20.9, below) has four fields of making the information provided by documentary film sequences memorable.

**FIGURE 20.9** FOUR CATEGORIES OF MEMORIA IN DOCUMENTARY FILM

Memoria in documentary film

- **Inventio**
- **Dispositio**
- **Elocutio**
- **Memoria**
- **Actio**

Making the information memorable

Film as memory theater

Film as public memory

Retrospection, short

Retrospection, large

**20.5 Memoria cues and audience design**

We regard memoria cues as part of the general audience design of a documentary film that enables viewers to understand the film content in full (Hicketier 2003; Sauer 2009; Haan 2009; Sikkema 2011). Audience design is the way speakers take into account how addressees and other participants may understand the speech and may react to it; therefore, audience design concerns stylistic variations a speaker realizes in accordance with situation, auditors, institutional roles, etc. (Bell 1991, 2001). But there is more, since speaking is related to different actors who have different ‘participation statuses’ and form together a ‘participation framework’ (Goffman 1979, 2001). Correspondingly, a speaker connects his formulations (including the explicitness of the shared ‘common ground’) to his hearers’ roles and their different accesses to knowledge and decides about the support of overhearers (Clark 1996; Clark & Schaefer 1992). Concerning their participation's
character, film viewers are treated as overhearers (Bubel 2008; Kozloff 2000) and ‘overseers’ (Van Leeuwen 2005; Haan 2009; Sauer 2009; Nichols 2010: ‘overlookers’). Moreover, the visual representation is expected to be in conformity with the verbal texts. On the one hand, when pictures are available then a verbal description, explanation, etc. is unnecessary, with the result that the information brought about represents a specific combination of words and pictures (and of sounds and music, too). On the other hand, many pictures have a broad meaning potential and need therefore verbal anchoring and focus (Kress & Van Leeuwen 1996; Van Leeuwen 2005; Sauer 2009) to make the meaning making pointedly specific for the filmic moment in a certain sequence.

Specific verbal and visual elements in documentary film discourse belong to the realm of rhetoric and contribute to the documentary’s voice. As such, they need to be made memorable during the course of the documentary so that viewers may realize acts of retrospection on the one hand, and remembering, on the other hand (Sikkema 2011). Retrospection has a short range when spectators get support by repetition, summaries, text on screen, etc. It has a large range when knowledge from outside the film is invoked. Photographs, archive footage, archive sound is used to make the experience of a certain place at a certain moment vivid and to combine information from inside the film with knowledge from outside so that viewers may draw inferences from the integrated discourse that elaborates on more general topics.

Remembering goes by ways of ‘memory theatre’ and by referring to a public memory that is often a part of the collective memory. Through a ‘memory theatre’, the spectator can ‘walk’ (in conformity with the classical mnemonics). He may be supported by a structure that is clearly organized, by a matching design (colour, lighting, etc.), and by locations that represent the filmmakers situated thoughts. It depends also on the dynamics of the editing of a film how ‘walkable’ its underpinning of remembering is. As far as the public memory is concerned, frequently documentary films use well-known historical footage evoking culturally shared knowledge; they link film sequences to historical events, places, and actors, and they reflect the general tendency of visualizing time and again historical knowledge. Recently, the visual content of the collective memory has been the subject of many research activities so that more specific approaches soon may be expected.
20.6 Conclusions

Consequently, *memoria* cues in documentary films need a combination of different approaches for analysis, as is shown in Figure 20.10 (below).

**FIGURE 20.10  FOUR APPROACHES OF MEMORIA CUES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Film as ‘memory theater’:</th>
<th>Retrospection, short (activation of remembering):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• schematic structure</td>
<td>text ↔ pictures ↔ sound ↔ music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• design</td>
<td>repetitions, summaries, text in picture, re-enacts etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• filmmaker’s claim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reconstruction of how a viewer ‘walks’ through the ‘memory theater’

**Film as public theater:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Retrospection, large (knowledge from outside the film):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>text ↔ pictures ↔ sound ↔ music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>archive photographs, footage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>archive sound, music</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discovery of cross-references to other sources of collective memory

Discourse analysis of references to involved knowledge

Documentary film seen as ‘memory theatre’ needs a *reconstruction* approach that is inspired by findings from the classical mnemonics (Yates 1960; Carruthers 1990). The goal of this approach is to establish a framework of *memoria* cues that are related to structure, design, and argumentation.

Concerning the use of ‘public memory’ elements, a *discovery* approach might be appropriate, as proposed, e.g. by *Social Semiotics* (Kress & Van Leeuwen 1996; Van Leeuwen 2005) and *Functional Pragmatics* (Sau er 2005, 2007), but cross-references to other instances and sources of the

Retrospection as a short range issue can be analyzed along the lines of sequential analysis, which is part of the corpus analysis of film transcriptions or film protocols (Hickethier 2003; Bordwell & Thompson 2004; Haan 2009; Sauer 2009; Nijdam 2010; Sikkema 2011).

Retrospection as a large range issue calls for a discourse analysis that integrates the different modes and semiotic resources, avoids explicitly an ‘addition’ format, and looks for integrated instances of multimodal discourse (Van Leeuwen 2005; Kooistra 2009). In such a way, memoria cues in documentary films may be analyzed in apt combination with a discourse-analytical approach of overhearer and ‘ overseer’ design (Bubel 2008; Sauer 2012).

20.7 Discussion
The documentary Helvetica (Hustwit 2007) is dedicated to the Helvetica typeface. It shows the proliferation of this specific typeface as part of an unbroken reflection about the modernity of visual culture and graphic design. The reflection itself is represented first by many sequences that show Helvetica typeface realizations in a great amount of urban spaces. Second, it is specified in interviews with graphic designers who explain their way of thinking and designing. It starts – after the proper introduction – with a short sequence about New York City Signage that was designed by Massimo Vignelli 1966 (Helvetica 3:36 – 3:49). Before an interview commences, Vignelli looks in close-up directly into the camera. After a short while he starts:

Now should I talk? Should I not talk? You want me to say something? Say something, say nothing (laughing).

In this short scene, the voice of the documentary comes to the fore. It is a voice that says ‘Say something, say nothing’, a voice of a graphic designer who acts uncomfortably, a voice that tries to contribute to the future memoria cues, a laughing voice. This was the sequence that happened in the beginning of the film, so what is it we may remember? How are we triggered to combine visual and verbal rhetoric with filmic means? At least, we see that the rhetoric of memoria in documentary film also involves actio cues. So maybe actio as the ultimate moment of film viewing is more than ‘delivery’ (its term in rhetoric). The ‘delivery’ of the film needs an active viewer who experiences
his moment of reception. And this experience will be supported by memoria cues. However, we do not yet know how the interrelations between memoria cues and actio cues are realized in documentary films. An examination of a corpus, as is done in this chapter, is not satisfying. We need access to the real film viewers and have to involve them in our investigation of rhetorical issues that touch their viewing experiences.

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**Documentary films**


The use of allusions to literary and cultural sources in argumentation in political cartoons

Eveline Feteris

21.1 Introduction

Political cartoons can be considered as an attempt by the cartoonist to convince the reader to share his critical view on a particular political situation. Often the cartoon conveys not only a critical standpoint towards a particular politician, but also contains certain information about the reasons why the behaviour of the politician should be evaluated negatively. The cartoonist assumes that there are certain standards for the behaviour of politicians that are shared by him and his audience on the basis of which the criticism can be justified. Based on this assumption, the cartoonist selects a particular image from the common cultural heritage that can be used to depict the politician in such a way that the audience understands which aspects of his behaviour are referred to, what the criticism implies and what standards of behaviour are taken as the basis for the negative evaluation.¹

To express this critique in an indirect way, cartoonists often use images of a fictitious or mythical character that are allusions to literary or cultural sources such as legends, folklore, literature or media that the general public is familiar with.²

In this contribution I will concentrate on political cartoons that contain not only a critical standpoint but also a justification of this critique in the form of an allusion to the behaviour of a fictitious or mythical character. I will consider such political cartoons as a contribution to a critical discussion in which the behaviour of the politician is submitted to a critical test in

¹ In this contribution I concentrate on political cartoons that criticize a politician, since this is the most common form of political cartoon.
light of certain shared standards of evaluation. I will analyze the justification of the critique as argumentation that refers to certain shared standards of acceptability for the behaviour of politicians and public officials.

With this approach of considering political cartoons as an argumentative activity, I am in line with authors such as Blair (1996), Groarke (2002), Medhurst and De Sousa (1981), Schilperoord and Maes (2009) who consider political cartoons as a persuasive activity consisting of an attempt to convince the audience of a particular critical standpoint by means of argumentation consisting of a visual metaphor, often in combination with text. The standpoint and the argumentation are not advanced in an explicit way by verbal means but rather by visual means.

Although the authors mentioned claim that visual metaphors as used in political cartoons can be considered as a form of argumentation, they have not explained in a satisfactory way how the argumentation underlying the cartoon can be reconstructed in an adequate way. They have not addressed

2 According to Medhurst and Desousa (1981, p. 201) the function of images in the form of allusions to literary or cultural sources is that the meaning of the cartoon can be derived from the interaction of the political commonplace with an allusion to an identifiable fiction. To decode the cartoon, the reader must be familiar with the literary or cultural source to which the cartoon refers. Here allusions are considered as figures of speech that represent in a direct or indirect way to a person, place or event by using an image from a literary or other cultural source where it is left to the reader to make a connection between the image and the literary or cultural source referred to. Other forms of ‘common starting points’ that are used in cartoons to convey a critical message are scenarios, proverbs, etc.

3 See also Medhurst and Desousa (1981, pp. 232-233) who contend that the cartoonist participates in the ethos attributed to the part of the newspaper reserved for serious discussion of public policy. In their view the aim of the cartoonist is to be effective as a graphic reinforcer, clarifier and debater of public policy. For a further description of other forms of political discussion in which the behaviour of politicians is tested for its acceptability see Andone (2010) and Mohammed (2008).

4 Often the cartoon also contains verbal elements that serve as a ‘clue’ to enable the reader to identify the political situation or public policy. However, the critique with respect to the behaviour of the politicians and public officials is indirectly conveyed by visual means.
the question how the argumentative commitments of a cartoonist can be reconstructed on the basis of the visual metaphor, in combination with the text. The central question I want to answer in this contribution is how, from the perspective of a contribution to a critical discussion, the standpoint and the argumentation should be reconstructed in order to be able to give an evaluation of the acceptability of the standpoint. In order to establish what the critical standpoint and the argumentation consist of I will proceed as follows. First, in 2, I will develop a reconstruction model that can be used in reconstructing the argumentative commitments of the cartoonist. Then, in 3, I will present an exemplary analysis of a cartoon in which the cartoonist uses an allusion to a cultural source and I explain how the argumentative commitments can be reconstructed on the basis of the model.

21.2 Reconstructing the argumentation in political cartoons

When establishing exactly what the critical message of a cartoonist using a visual metaphor that contains an allusion to a literary or cultural source consists of, it must be determined how the standpoint and the argumentation can be reconstructed on the basis of the way the cartoonist has ‘formulated’ his message. This reconstruction of the argumentation underlying the cartoon must make clear what the commitments of the cartoonist are from the perspective of a critical discussion. In order to test the acceptability of the standpoint, in a critical discussion it must be tested whether the standpoint can be defended by means of arguments that are acceptable in light of relevant forms of rational critique. When analyzing a cartoon as a contribution to a critical discussion, different interpretative and analytical decisions are necessary.

Groarke (2002) formulates some starting points for interpreting visual arguments. Groarke (2002, pp. 245 ff.) considers cartoons as indirect speech acts that function as visual arguments. In interpreting and assessing visual arguments, in his view, the principles of communication as formulated by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) apply. According to the first principle, visual arguments are, if taken literally, absurd or contradictory and should be interpreted in a non-literal way, for it is only in this way that they can constitute a comprehensible contribution to a discussion. According to the second principle, argumentative images should be interpreted in a way that makes sense of the major visual and verbal elements they contain. According to the third principle, we must interpret argumentative images in a way that
makes sense from the perspective of the social, critical, political and aesthetic discourse in which the image is located.

The argumentation in political cartoons is based on a complex argumentation that can be reconstructed in its basic form as consisting of symptomatic argumentation on the level of the main argumentation. This argumentation, in its turn, is supported by argumentation that is expressed by means of a visual metaphor in which the certain characteristics of the behaviour of a particular politician that constitute the ‘target’ of the metaphor (X) are viewed in terms of or compared with (aspects of) the ‘source’ of the metaphor (Z). In diagram 21.1 I give a schematic representation of the complex argumentation:

**DIAGRAM 21.1**

1. The behaviour of politician/public official p (X) must be evaluated negatively
   1.1a The behaviour of politician/public official p (X) has characteristics Y1, Y2, etc.
      1.1a.1a The behaviour of politician p (X) is like a Z
      1.1a.1b Z has characteristics Y1, Y2, etc.
   1.1b The characteristics Y1, Y2, etc. of the behaviour of politician/public official p (X) must be evaluated negatively
      1.1b.1a Characteristics Y1, Y2, etc. conflict with value (V)
      1.1b.1a Value (V) is an accepted common value

The argumentation in italics printed is the argument conveyed indirectly by the cartoon as a support for argument 1.1a, and must be made explicit in order to be able to give an adequate reconstruction of the main argumentation consisting of argument 1.1a and argument 1.1b. Often a cartoonist not only wants to convey that the behaviour of a particular politician must be evaluated negatively, but also that this behaviour must be evaluated negatively because it conflicts with a particular common value (V). This common value

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6 Depending on the context, the qualification ‘negatively’ may be formulated more specific (see the discussion of the example in section 3).
forms the basis for the critique conveyed by the cartoonist. To reconstruct the commitments of the cartoonist, this argumentation in support of argument 1.1b must also be made explicit to be able to assess the acceptability of the argumentation. On the basis of the ‘constraints’ of the genre the general commitments of the cartoonist of the standpoint 1 and the argument 1.1a and 1.1b can be reconstructed. For the specific cartoon, on the basis of the analysis of the visual metaphor the commitments with respect to the content of X, Y and Z of the cartoonist can be established so that the underlying complex argumentation can be determined.7

For our purposes the reconstruction of the argumentation underlying the cartoons serves as a basis for explaining which choices the cartoonist has made when selecting an image that forms an allusion to a literary or cultural source to indirectly convey his critical message. For the analysis of the selection of the specific visual metaphor I investigate which image the cartoonist has chosen to represent the ‘source’ of the metaphor Z and the way in which he represents certain characteristics Y1, Y2, etc. of Z as negative characteristics that are transferred to the ‘target’ X.

In reconstructing the argumentation underlying the political cartoon I will explain in a systematic and theoretically motivated way how we can reconstruct the argumentation as ‘ideal readers’ who have the necessary information about the political situation and the literary or cultural source referred to, the ‘puzzle’ that the cartoonist wants his audience to solve. The basis of the puzzle are the elements X and Z, the target and the source of the metaphor. Often it is not that difficult to identify the target X, since the cartoonist will take care that we recognize the person(s) he wants to criticize. Often we find an indication in the text accompanying the cartoon that gives us a clue. Cartoonists may also give a clue by using a conventional means of referring to a particular politician by exaggerating in the representation of a particular characteristic of that politician (the nose and head of Richard

7 With respect to the exact formulation of the arguments that the cartoonist can be held committed there will often be different alternative possibilities of how the metaphor can be interpreted. As various authors, such as Searle (1979, p. 112), have explained, one of the ‘rhetorical advantages’ of the use of a metaphor is that the interpretation of the content of the metaphor is left to the reader/listener. However, as Searle also stresses, there is always a ‘limited’ domain of possible interpretations.
Nixon, the ears of Barack Obama, the hair of Geert Wilders, etc.). In most cases, it is not too difficult to also identify the ‘source’ domain $Z$ of the metaphor that the cartoonist uses as a basis for the formulation of the critique.

However, the most difficult part of the reconstruction of the cartoon is created by the identification of characteristics $Y_1$, $Y_2$, etc. that are criticized by the cartoonist. The strategy of the cartoonist is aimed at presenting this critique in an indirect way by means of a visual metaphor containing certain clues as to the negative evaluation. However, it is the task of the
reader to solve the puzzle of reconstructing this critique. The aim of the cartoonist is to transfer the negative evaluation of certain elements of the source domain Z as negative characteristics that are transferred to the target X. For this reason, we must establish to which criticism in terms of Y with regard to the target X in argument 1.1a the cartoonist can be held committed.

21.3 Exemplary analysis of the use of cultural images as a means of indirectly presenting argumentation in political cartoons

In what follows, I shall give an exemplary analysis of the way in which a cartoonist can use an image that refers to a cultural source in a political cartoon. The aim of this analysis is to explain how it can be established which choices the cartoonist has made to represent certain aspects of the behaviour and the policy of a particular political movement. As an illustration, I have selected an example that clearly illustrates the way in which the cartoonist uses an image taken from a cultural source that is known and appreciated by the intended audience. By using an image from a cultural source, a cartoonist profits from critical potential the image carries in transferring a negative evaluation of certain aspects of the behaviour of the object of the image of the ‘source domain’ to the political movement that is the ‘target domain’. In this way, a cartoonist can manoeuvre strategically by expressing in an indirect way a negative evaluation of the behaviour of the representatives of the political movement.8

The cartoon is made by Sir John Tenniel (who is the famous illustrator of Aesop’s fables and Alice in Wonderland), published in Punch magazine circa 1884.9 The flag on the bugle indicates that the cartoon is a comment on the War Party, a popular movement that advocated a bellicose attitude

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8 For a discussion of the pragma-dialectical theory of strategic maneuvering with argumentation see van Eemeren (2010).
9 In 1865 Sir John Tenniel (1820-1914) illustrated the first edition of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. In 1948 he illustrated Aesop’s Fables, 100 drawings. After Tenniel, on November 7, 1874 Thomas Nast also used the fable of the Ass in the Lion’s skin in Harper’s Magazine in a political cartoon. Nast used the fable to criticize the behaviour of the New York Herald in the discussion about the continuation of the presidency of general Grant.
towards Russia and other powers at the end of the nineteenth century. As the reference at the bottom of the illustration underscores, Tenniel dismisses the War Party by casting them in the role of the ass in a traditional Aesop’s fable called ‘The Ass in the Lion’s Skin’.

According to the fable, an ass frightened the other animals by putting on a lion’s skin and pretending he was to be a lion. This worked until he came across the fox, who heard him braying and said ‘You seemed to be a lion until you opened your mouth. As soon as I heard you braying, it was obvious you were an ass’. Visually, Tenniel’s cartoon declares that the War Party is not the grand or frightening political movement it pretends to be. The donkey intent on braying, the bugle, and the hot air bellowing from the ass’ mouth suggest that the War Party is nothing more than noise and hot air, not a significant source of real strength and power.

The image of the lion is a traditional means of portraying Great Britain. In this case, the image of the ass in the lion’s skin is a metaphor for the War Party (as indicated in the banner of the bugle). By using this image Sir John Tenniel tries to convince the readers of Punch (a readership consisting of higher educated readers in general, also consisting of politicians and decision makers) not to take the behaviour of the British War Party seriously because Great Britain is no longer the greatest empire in the world, as it pretended to be.

The cartoon appeared during the ‘Great Game’, the period 1813 to 1907 with tensions between Britain and Russia. Russia wanted to expand to the south to obtain warm water ports in the Indian Ocean. This led to conflicts between Russia and Britain over Afghanistan and Persia. Britain wanted to prevent the expansion of Russia. The cartoon appeared in the period of the crisis surrounding the Panjdeh incident when the two powers were on the brink of war. In 1885 the British had to give in.

When we apply the principles of communication formulated by Groarke for the interpretation of a political cartoon as an argumentative message in a critical discussion, in combination with the model I have developed, we can interpret the cartoon as an attempt to convince the audience by the argumentation described in diagram 21.2.
Diagram 21.2 Reconstruction of the Argumentation Underlying the Cartoon of the Ass in Lion’s Skin

1. The behaviour of Great Britain in scaring Russia (X) as promoted by the War Party (P) in the ‘Great Game’ (S) should not be taken seriously

1.1a The behaviour of Great Britain (X) as promoted by the War Party (P) who erroneously envisions Great Britain still as a power of importance and frightens other countries but does not take into consideration that Great Britain cannot materialize its threats against Russia (Y)

1.1a.1a The behaviour of Great Britain as promoted by the War Party (P) that consists of frightening someone else (x1) while it is not capable of materializing its threats (x2) is like the behaviour of the ass in the fable ‘The Ass in Lion’s Skin’ of Aesop (Z)

1.1a.1b The Ass in the Lion’s Skin (Z) frightens other animals by pretending that he is a Lion (Y1), but does not have the necessary qualities of a Lion so that he betrays himself when he is required to perform the behaviour that he is pretending to be capable of (Y2)

1.1b The behaviour of Great Britain (X) as promoted by the War Party (P) in the Great War (S) who erroneously envisions Great Britain still as a power of importance and frightens other countries but does not take into consideration that Great Britain cannot materialize its threats against Russia (Y) should not be taken seriously

1.1b.1 Characteristic Y (Yn) conflicts with common starting points. A political party may be expected to be realistic on the (im) possibilities of the nation (and should not make a fool of itself)

Applying the first principle of communication, the cartoon, if taken literally, would constitute an incomprehensible contribution to a critical discussion so that we decide that it must be interpreted in a non-literal way taking into account the conventions of political cartoons. According to the second principle, we must try to make sense of the major visual and verbal elements of the cartoon to interpret the argumentative message. On the basis of an interpretation of the metaphor of the ‘Ass in the lion’s skin’ from the fable, we can make sense of the different visual and textual elements of the cartoon as the ‘source’ in terms of the ‘target’ of the metaphor that serves as the critique that must be reconstructed as the predicate ‘Y’ in argument 1.1a, as well as the support for this critique in terms of the value ‘V’ in argument 1.1b.1. And, on the basis of the third principle, we must interpret the cartoon in a way that
makes sense from the perspective of the social, critical, political and aesthetic discourse in which the image is located. In our case, this implies that, as ‘ideal readers’, we must use all available information about the author, the magazine Punch, the readership of Punch, the historical situation regarding the discussion in which the War Party participated, the cultural source (the fable of Aesop), etc. to make explicit the arguments that are presented indirectly.

This reconstruction of the argumentation underlying the cartoon makes clear what the commitments of the cartoonist are from the perspective of a critical discussion. In order to explain how Tenniel operates strategically in his attempt to convince the readers of Punch in an effective way, we must now establish which choices he has made to present the arguments as specified in the model.

The strategic manoeuvring in this example consists of a particular choice from the topical potential: the choice of attacking the standpoint of the ‘War Party’ by characterizing this party as a participant to the discussion who should not be taken serious because its contributions to the discussion are not realistic in light of the real power of the British Empire. Tenniel chooses not to express his standpoint and the supporting argumentation in an explicit and direct way. To amuse and convince his audience, as an allusion he chooses the metaphor of the Ass in the Lion’s Skin from Aesop’s fable to characterize and stress those aspects of the behaviour of the War Party that serve his rhetorical goal to criticize this behaviour in an effective way.

This metaphor allows him to concentrate on a negative evaluation of certain characteristics of the behaviour (Y1 and Y2) that are easy to criticize and to abstract from certain characteristics of the behaviour that are less easy to criticize. Furthermore the metaphor allows him to convey his arguments in an indirect way so that the critique becomes less overt as a personal attack. Finally, the visual expression of the metaphor allows him to show his skills in amusing the audience by giving them a ‘puzzle’ that they can solve by reconstructing the intended message on the basis of the verbal and visual hints provided by the cartoon. The selection of the metaphor taken from Aesop’s fable serves his rhetorical aim because he knows that his readers are familiar with the content and message of the fable and will understand the critique conveyed by the comparison. Furthermore, the selection of the visual form serves his rhetorical aims of both pleasing the audience and confirming his own ethos because his audience will recognize the picture and will know that he is the illustrator of Aesop’s fables and Alice in Wonderland.
The strategic manoeuvring implies that Tenniel chooses to leave the main argumentation implicit and presents only the subordinative argumentation in an indirect way (and therefore also in an implicit way) by means of the visual metaphor. The choice of the topical potential of the fable and the stylistic means of representing the elements of this fable are adapted to the audience demand of the readers of Punch who are well-educated and well-informed readers who do not agree with the views of the War Party. They may be expected to be capable of reconstructing the indirect meaning conveyed by the image taken from the fable because they are familiar with the symbols used by the cartoonist.

21.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have explained that in argumentation and rhetorical theory political cartoons are considered as a contribution to a discussion consisting of a standpoint and supporting argumentation, but that it has not been investigated how the standpoint and the argumentation can be interpreted and analyzed as such a contribution. I have shown how political cartoons can be analyzed as argumentative means to convince the intended audience of a critical standpoint with respect to the behaviour of a politician or public official. I have explained how the message conveyed by the cartoonist can be analyzed in terms of a complex argumentation and how the different elements of the cartoon can be reconstructed as elements of the argumentation. In the model for the reconstruction, I have specified the way in which the metaphor can be reconstructed as an indirect form of argumentation and how the commitments of the cartoonist conveyed by visual means can be made explicit. On the basis of an exemplary analysis of an political cartoon in which the cartoonist uses the fable of Aesop as a cultural source from which he has taken certain elements to phrase his critique, I have explained how the strategic manoeuvring of a cartoonist by means of a cultural source can be analyzed in terms of a particular choice of argumentative means to convey his critique in an indirect way. This exemplary analysis functions as a demonstration of the general mechanism of the way in which the commitments of a cartoonist can be reconstructed so that they can be submitted to rational critique. For other cartoons that form an allusion to a literal or cultural source to convey critique it must be established how the interpretative and analytical tools can be implemented further.
References


22.1 Introduction

It is by means of political or editorial cartoons that a cartoonist takes part in social and political discourse. In these cartoons, he may, in an indirect way, bring forward both a critical standpoint as well as arguments that support his point of view. From the perspective of the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, political cartoons are considered as a form of indirect, visual argumentation. The visual images cartoons consist of are envisaged as indirect speech acts that function as visual arguments in defence of a critical standpoint (Groarke 2002).

In order to reconstruct the argumentation expressed in a cartoon, Feteris and Plug developed a general model. The model functions as a framework that is of help in reconstructing the intended meaning of the cartoon. The reconstruction of the argumentation to which the cartoonist is committed, serves as a starting point for the analysis of strategic manoeuvring within the political cartoon with respect to the topical potential, stylistic devices and audience demand. In this analysis it is specified which strategic choices the cartoonist has made when he selected a particular image from a body of common cultural or scientific sources to be used as a visual metaphor to convey his critical message.

In view of the critical aim of political cartoons, the choice of the source of the visual metaphor plays an important role. Possible negative aspects of

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1 Other authors who consider political or editorial cartoons as an argumentative or persuasive activity are, for example, Blair (1996), Groarke (2002), Medhurst and De Sousa (1981) and Schilperoord and Maes (2009).

2 See van Eemeren (2010).
the source that the visual metaphor refers to are transferred to the topic under discussion. It is, therefore, to be expected that the cartoonist selects a source that is already charged negatively. Visual metaphors that refer to sources such as the fable *The Ass in the Lion’s Skin*, or the story of Pinocchio, for example, are inherently negatively evaluated; they have negative connotations (i.e. pretence and lying), independent of their (new) context. These negative connotations facilitate the transference of the (negative) evaluation of aspects of the visual image of the source, to the (negative) evaluation of (elements in) the standpoint. However, visual metaphors that are used by the cartoonist may also refer to images or stories that are neutral or positively evaluated. It is clear that a reference to a literary source such as *Gulliver’s Travels, Voyage to Lilliput*, or a visual arts source such as Michelangelo’s *Creation of Adam*, for example, will not, necessarily, be evaluated negatively. In order to make use of this type of source in support of a critical stance, its visualization should be adapted.

In this chapter, I will present an exemplary analysis of the use of visual metaphors that refer to a visualization of a source that is not charged with a strictly negative connotation. I will demonstrate how presentational devices may be deployed in order to substantiate a negative standpoint on public policies in political cartoons.

### 22.2 Reconstructing critique on public policy

The visual metaphor that the meaning of a political cartoon may depend on can refer to any fable, story, theory, or idea that can be depicted visually. It can, however, also refer to a visualization of a cultural or scientific source that is even better known than details of the source itself. A good example that can illustrate this phenomenon is ‘The March of Progress’, a famous, and subsequently infamous, depiction of the evolution of man that compressed 25 million years of human evolution into a series of 15 human figures marching in a parade from left to right. The illustration, originally called ‘The Road to Homo Sapiens’, was drawn by Rudolph Zallinger, who was commissioned to produce it for a popular Time-Life Book entitled *Early Man* (1965). Figure 22.1 is a condensed, simplified version of the illustration of the evolution from monkey to man. As the image gained popularity,

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3 The same goes, in principle, for the use of scenario’s that may be used as a source for visual metaphors, such as a sport or a cooking scenario (Schilperoord & Maes 2009).
it acquired the name ‘March of Progress’, in view of its implicit suggestion that this evolutionary chain was a chain of progress stretching from more primitive species to those that are wiser, more capable and advanced.

**FIGURE 22.1 THE MARCH OF PROGRESS**

The popularity of this image has served as an inspiration for political cartoonists, who exploit visual metaphors to make the points they want to make. The example below is a cartoon by Andrew Toos which functions as a comment on the structure of professorial employment in the university. ‘Part-time,’ ‘associate’ and ‘tenured’ status are thus presented as different species, suggesting that there is, in academic employment, a ‘march of progress’ as one moves from the one to the other. In the United States, the United Kingdom and many other countries, universities have tried to balance their books and deal with the financial crisis by drastically increasing their reliance on part-time professors. The Toos cartoon obviously advocates a negative evaluation of this policy; it raises questions about a very stratified system of employment which is characterized by large differences in status and pay.

The cartoonist’s critical standpoint, reconstructed on the basis of the visual metaphor of his choice, may be directed at the behaviour of a politician or a public official. The criticism may, however, also concern public policy or a political situation. When a cartoonist defends his point of view on a public policy or a political situation (P) by means of a metaphor in which he refers to certain characteristics (Y1, Y2, etc.) of the policy or political situation, the

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4 In Feteris (this volume), the main standpoint concerns the behaviour of a politician.
complex argumentation in support of his standpoint can be reconstructed as symptomatic argumentation on the first level of the argumentation. On the second level, analogy argumentation constitutes the subordinate argumentation supporting the negative evaluation of the characteristics (Y₁, Y₂, etc). A general structure of the argumentation in defence of a critical stance towards a policy could be represented as follows:

**DIAGRAM 22.1**

1. Public policy or political situation p, (X), must be evaluated negatively
   1.1a Public policy p, (X), has characteristics Y₁, Y₂, etc.
      1.1a.1a Public policy p, (X), is like Z
      1.1a.1b Z has characteristics Y₁, Y₂, etc.
   1.1b Characteristics Y₁, Y₂, etc. of public policy p, (X) must be evaluated negatively
      1.1b.1 Characteristics Y₁, Y₂ conflict with common starting point or value (V)
When applying this general scheme to the Toos cartoon, the argumentation structure, in which the relation between the indirect standpoint and the indirect complex argumentation is reconstructed, can be schematized as follows:

**DIAGRAM 22.1**

1. The policy regarding the structure of professorial employment in the university (X) must be evaluated negatively
   
   1.1a. The policy regarding the structure of professorial employment in the university (X) should be characterized as being not up to standard (or primitive) (Y).
   
   1.1a.1a. With regard to the development of payment and status of part-timers and associates in the university the policy (X) is like the very first stages in the March of progress (Z).
   
   1.1a.1b. The very first stages in the March of progress (Z) can be characterized as a primitive stage in the evolution (Y).

1.1b. A structure of professorial employment in the university (X) that is not up to standard or primitive (Y) must be evaluated negatively
   
   1.1b.1. The situation with regard to the structure of professorial employment in the university should not be lagging behind the structure of employment in other sectors (V)

If the protagonist, Andrew Toos, had only had the ambition to provide a dialectically adequate contribution to a discussion on the structure of employment in universities, standpoint 1 and the arguments 1.1a and 1.1b would, in principle, have sufficed. However, in order to convince and amuse his audience and to live up to the conventionalized communicative practice of political cartooning, he makes use of a visual metaphor. In this case, the protagonist does not employ a visual metaphor that has directly been derived from *topoi*, such as stories, theories, proverbs, etc. that can be considered as being part of the common cultural background, but he makes use of an existing visual representation of a metaphor that is well known.

**22.3 Transformations of visual metaphors**

When the cartoonist uses a well-known visualization of a metaphor, it may be expected that he alters the original image in order to be able to manoeuvre strategically. Since the known visual metaphor already has a conventional-
ized meaning that may be ‘neutral’, the representation of it in the cartoon at hand should be adapted to the actual situation in order to express a critical stance towards the actual situation. Although the known visualization of the metaphor may be transformed in different ways, the original still needs to be recognizable in order to be able to take advantage of its conventionalized meaning.

In altering a standard metaphor, the cartoonist may employ the following transformations: addition, deletion, substitution and permutation. When making use of addition, the known visualization of the metaphor is supplemented with elements that are relevant to the standpoint that is defended in the cartoon. If the original metaphor is transformed by making use of deletion, elements of the visualization of the original metaphor that are not in line with the standpoint that is defended are omitted. In a transformation that exploits substitution, elements from the original visual metaphor are replaced (redesigned) with elements that express (in an attractive way) the argumentative function the metaphor has in the justification of the standpoint regarding the topic that is under discussion. In permutation, elements of the original visual metaphor are rearranged or ordered differently (relocated); by expressing a distortion of the ‘normal’ or ‘regular’ order and elucidating their argumentative function.

In figure 22.2, the cartoonist, Andrew Toos, transformed the original visualization of a metaphor by means of substitution: the figures in the original image that express the earlier stages of evolution in the ‘March of Progress’ have been replaced by figures, a part-timer and an associate, that have characteristics of figures of the earlier stages (inferior species) as well as of the final stage (human beings) in the March of progress. The strategic manoeuvring that takes place manifests itself in the topical choice: the devi- ation of the known ‘March of Progress’ indicates that the cartoonist is of the opinion that something is wrong with regard to the normal (and preferred) course of (social) progress. The presentational devices to depict the two types of employees that do not (yet) have a position as ‘full professor’ are carefully chosen: the part-timers are the most inferior species, which is visualized by the fact that they do not have the appearance of a ‘normal’ human being: they do not walk upright and they do not wear shoes or clothes, let alone a suit. Nor are the associates entirely human: although they do wear clothes, they do not wear shoes. Both are contrasted by a ‘full professor’, who is depicted as a human being.
The cartoon in figure 22.3 provides us with an example of the way in which the cartoonist may manoeuvre strategically by employing a transformation of the original visualization of the ‘March of Progress’ that depends on addition. The example is a political cartoon from Chicago Tribune (March 16, 2010, p. 11A) which exploits the commitment to science and progress implicit in the original ‘March of Progress’. It is a comment on an attempt by the Texas Board of Education to change state textbooks so that evolution is not presented as established fact, but as one of two competing theories of our origins, the other being creationism, the notion that human beings did not evolve from other animals, but were created by an intelligent entity or God.

In this cartoon, the cartoonist, Scott Stantis, presents the ‘March of Progress’ as a march out of primordial waters to increasingly complex forms of life that culminate in someone who looks like a teacher carrying a book. With regard to the series (sequence) of figures that represent the different stages in progress, it may be noticed that a figure that represents the Texas Board of Education, is added. The Texas Board of Education is presented as
a step backwards to a more primitive, more violent proto-human. Here, the key point is made by a double entendre; the Board’s ‘Halt!’ halting two things at once: the attempt to teach with evolutionary textbooks and, coincidentally, the march of progress that accompanies it. This produces an argumentation that might be summarized as: The Texas Board of Education is wrong to halt the use of textbooks that present evolution as fact (standpoint), for the attempt to stop such teaching is a retrograde attempt to stop progress.

The transformation in the cartoon in figure 22.4 may be seen as an example of *permutation*, i.e. a cartoon in which the elements of the original visual metaphor have been reordered. This cartoon, by the Dutch cartoonist Joep Bertrams, was published in November 2010. The occasion for its publication was a protest demonstration in the Netherlands denouncing government plans to raise VAT on theatre and concert tickets while, at the same time, cutting back on the Ministry of Culture’s budget by 200 million Euros. Protesters were called on to, literally, ‘scream, for culture’. The cartoon’s capture ‘from bad to worse’ makes it abundantly clear that its author adheres to the protesters’ standpoint. We may, however, reconstruct his point of view and underlying argumentation more specifically on the basis of the precise transformation of the all too familiar ‘March of Progress’. Whereas the figures in the original ‘March of Progress’ ‘evolve’ from an ape to a man twice its size, Bertrams’s characters seem to travel the opposite path. By altering the order of the figures, Bertrams expresses the opinion that man’s cultural development seems to have been reversed. The ape at the end of this reversed sequence unmistakably resembles Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte. The cartoonist’s standpoint could, therefore, be reconstructed as: this government’s budget with respect to culture is detrimental, but will not be reversed as long as Prime Minister Rutte is in power, in spite of (screaming) protests.

The final example, figure 22.5, demonstrates a transformation of the visualization of the ‘March of Progress’ by means of *deletion* and can be found in a cartoon that was analyzed by Shelly (2001). This cartoon by Mike Peters was published in 1980 in the *Dayton Daily News* and criticises the position of women in modern society. In the cartoon the known visualization of the ‘March of Progress’ is presented in the upper panel of the cartoon by means of a parallel row of cleaning ladies in the lower panel of the cartoon. The women in the lower panel do not change and remain on all fours throughout. Apart from Shelly’s thorough analysis of details in the cartoon (2001, p. 92), it may be observed that the deletion of the known
stages (and the repetition of a picture of just one of the stages) indicate that there is no progress whatsoever. This contrast with the explicit depicted ‘regular’ order of progress underpins the critical stance towards the position of women; by means of deletion of elements of the original visualization the cartoonist substantiates the standpoint ‘the position of woman should be evaluated negatively’.

5 It should be noticed that only in this example, the known visualisation of the metaphor has to be included in the cartoon, in order to be able to understand the visualization that is transformed by means of deletion.
22.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have demonstrated that a pragma-dialectical analysis of strategic manoeuvring in political cartoons may serve as a tool to establish how cartoonists operate argumentatively when conveying their critical stance towards public policy or political situations. The cartoons I assessed show how cartoonists may make use of a particular visualisation of a common cultural heritage as the ‘source’ domain of the visual metaphor that is borrowed for the cartoon. Strategic manoeuvring implies that if certain characteristics of this source domain are to be evaluated negatively, this negative evaluation will, indirectly, be transferred to the characteristics of the ‘target’ domain of the metaphor, the characteristics of the policy that is criticized by the cartoonist. However, this process cannot be effective when the source that is used does not imply a negative evaluation of characteristics. In order to repair this ineffectiveness, the cartoonist has to transform the visualization of the source domain. By means of an analysis of four cartoons that refer to the visualization of the same source, I illustrated four distinct transforma-
tions. Although the analysis of every cartoon focuses on one type of transformation, a cartoon could in principle very well contain more than one transformation.

References
23 Involvement, immersion and intervention: Rhetorical recruitment of readers in social marketing message design

SUSAN HOGBEN

23.1 Introduction

Newhagen’s (2002, p. 737) underdiscussed assertion that ‘the more immersive a presentation is the more persuasive it will be’ is the premise underscoring the arguments in this chapter. To rephrase the claim, it seems that an understanding of persuasive endeavours requires analyses and theoretical considerations of how best to recruit a reader to align herself with the aims of the persuasive text. The proposition also suggests that persuasive efforts require that a reader should somehow be enticed to these ends by distraction, conviction or some otherwise enveloping rhetorical techniques.

Newhagen was predominantly interested in how technologies can help to produce these effective presentations and concomitant persuasive effects, but his emphasis should not overshadow the matter that message design in and of itself is still of paramount importance to accomplishing persuasive aims. Importantly, too, it should not overlook that message design cannot be detached from an appreciation of the role of the reader and how and to what extent she may become immersed. Key to this discussion, then, will be a consideration of recent academic interest generated to explain text-reader relationships, and to developments in communication technologies (Murray 1997; Jewitt 2004). Yet, in line with a commitment to message design per se, the focus will be on the range of all the possible immersive activities any text may offer or deny a reader.

There are three interdependent areas that will be addressed to unpack the relationship between the immersive and the persuasive. Obviously, the first concerns how immersion is to be identified and, secondly, how the claimed corollary of its persuasive potential is to be assessed. As a fulcrum, the third matter concerns what different forms or levels of readerly action
are available as responses to a text and how this provides insights to the immersive-persuasive relationship. That is to say, the aim in this chapter is to use ideas of readerly activity to help identify the possible degrees and forms of immersion and, how, once anticipated, this immersive potential might influence readerly action beyond the text; that is in realizing a text’s persuasive potential.

To explore this argument, illustrative data are drawn from a corpus of over 250 social marketing campaigns (2000-2010). The focus on social marketing material is especially relevant here as it is a multidisciplinary field keen to emphasize its focus on using ‘the systematic application of interactive marketing principles and techniques that harness audience participation’ (Bernhardt, Mays & Hall 2012, p.133). Key to social marketing is its focus on generating interaction and participation so it seems wholly sensible to examine evidence of this in relation to the immersive-persuasive relationship and readerly activity mentioned above.

The chapter begins by reviewing previous literature, which provides a summary of the multidimensional insights and different approaches to the notion of immersion. It then moves on to review how immersion can be informed by exploring potential reader roles. A summary of the five different forms of potential readerly activity provides the framework in which to identify degrees of immersion. Then, using illustrative data from five different campaigns I examine each reader position to explain possible readerly immersion in a text, the possible influence a reader may have on a text and how these activities can inform readerly behaviour beyond a text.

23.2 Locating the immersive
At a commonplace level, the persuasive potential of any text relies on attracting a reader and, through some mechanism or series of rhetorical strategies, identifying how the resulting text can successfully recruit that reader to reach some alignment with the rhetor’s persuasive aims. This is often explained by

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1 The majority of the campaign materials were extracted from an online advertising archive ‘public service announcement’ as a filter (see www.advertolog.com). Additionally, marketing ephemera used in this chapter are taken from the author’s personal collection.

2 It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider how social marketing techniques may be derived from or build on commercial advertising. See Andreasen (1995), Kotler and Lee (2008) and Rice and Atkin (2012).
identifying a text’s capacity to constrain meaning making in order to generate those desirable, preferred or fitting reader responses. Alongside these constraints, any rhetorical effort inevitably and almost contradictorily, should allow space for debate and discussion; above all, a willingly constrainable and recruitable reader must have or, at least, feel that she has some degree of choice and free will (Cialdini 2003; Perloff 2010). Such freedom relates to an assessment of a text’s personal relevance and in the ways in which she can decide upon her own reaction to the possible meanings therein. In terms of possible persuasive effects, this also extends to the reader’s voluntary decision-making activities beyond the text.

The challenge is to identify immersion, which seems, in everyday parlance to accommodate both (benign) constraint and the opportunity for voluntary submission. The nature of an immersive message, presentation or text seems to assume and invite something more than a marginal or superficial reader response. Indeed, related approaches have addressed the topic both directly and obliquely. This has been in terms of involvement and engagement often relying on the role of narrative, tailored messages based on personalization and identification and the influence of realism. I discuss each in turn.

Early influential reader-involvement frameworks that attend to persuasive message design simultaneously offer a characterization of possible reader immersion by considering two key cognitive routes: the central and the peripheral (Petty & Cacioppo 1986). The central or core route explores messages that are designed to encourage readers to scrutinize personalized, issue-relevant arguments actively and closely. The more peripheral or superficial route relies on apparently less essential or more marginal features such as rhetor credibility or emotional responses. Common to both routes is that the message should somehow be relevant in terms of potential reader personalization and active engagement (de Graaf, Hoeken, Sanders & Beentjes 2012).

Personalization is strongly associated with fictional narrative as a form of persuasive message design. To this end, Green and Brock (2000) suggest narrative should be crafted to encourage the reader to be ‘helplessly transported’ into the story world where she may develop affective concern for, and identification with, characters (Burke 1950) or consequences; a process termed ‘absorption’ or ‘vicariously experiencing the characters’ emotions and personality’ (Slater & Rouner 2002, p. 178). Encouraging this form of activity often involves incomplete or partial texts in which the reader fills the
gaps with regards to plot, characterization and where possible interpretations are left meaningfully open by the author (Iser 1978; Porter-Abbot 2002; Oatley 2002). As readers are forced to take action and interpret the gaps, the reader, arguable, becomes implicated in the story. Personal engagement, absorption and the freedom to inhabit and interpret the story world may result in ‘cognitive transformation’ (Oatley 2002, p. 54) or other modifications of the reader’s real-life beliefs (Miall & Kuiken 2002). Here, it seems that the degree of involvement, engagement, absorption available to a reader is a possible index of how she may be influenced to act beyond the text. Other factors seem to contribute to a text’s immersive potential and these may be dependent on the text’s perceived realism (Green 2004) or its relative vividness (Hill 2003).

In this vein, Fogg (2004) emphasizes how technology and new media can be used to create vivid environments that can encourage immersion and harness persuasive potential. Just as conventional texts can simulate reality to encourage transformation, digital texts can be ‘designed to provide users with new surroundings’ (Fogg 2004, p. 164) and alternative realities in which to try out experiences, practice responses, assess existing attitudes and play with behaviours. The nature of new media is, not unsurprisingly, praised for being ‘inherently playful and dramatic because of its interactivity and immersive quality’ (Danet 2001, p. 100, my emphasis).

Additionally, new media are lauded for offering unpredictable ‘possible trajectories, or traversals’ where even the extent of the digital text becomes ‘unknowable because it lacks clear boundaries’ (Snyder 1998, p. 127). This reminds us, again, that persuasion, dependent as it is on choice, relies on allowing readerly freedom about how, when and by whom meanings are made (Hall 1980).

In this sense, contemporary investigations do not break radically with those of the ancients.³ It is useful, nevertheless, to consider these developments and how online environments can complicate the roles of reader, forms of interpretative readings and textual navigation. (Landow 1997; Lemke 2002; Warnick 2007). Indeed, the so-called ‘architecture of participation’ (O’Reilly 2004) that forms the foundation of much online activity,

³ For Plato anyone who ‘endeavours to effect persuasion’ should enquire scientifically into the nature of the soul noting ‘in what part it is active, and upon what it acts; in what part passive, and by what it is acted upon’ (Billig 1996, p. 84).
wilfully encourages user generated content and the open co-production of information.

It seems that this increased agency and freedom to act leads us to a working characterization of immersion. Rather than supposing a passive reader, a text must invite voluntary immersion. An immersive text needs to be open for participation, allow for the creation of meanings and permit the generation or liberation of reader’s beliefs in the text and also hold the potential to be transformative in the real-world. Murray (1997, p.110), whilst examining digital gaming, provides a neat definition when she describes immersion as a process where a reader is implicated in the ‘active creation of belief’.

It seems a text’s immersive potential may guide or control interpretative practices. This leads us to consider in more detail possible reader positions in relation to immersion and a text’s persuasive potential. Following Fish (1980, p.89), such potential is ‘not some property of some timeless formalism but something acquired in the context of an activity’. That is, as well as bearing in mind a text’s relative open or closedness, we need to consider just how a reader may be recruited to participate in or on a text. The next section examines in more detail the five possible readerly activities which seem to rely on a text’s participatory potential. That is, we know turn our attention to what a reader can do with a text and how a text can recruit different levels of readerly activity.

23.3 Readerly activity and participatory potential

Goodman (2006, pp. 310-311) proposes five potential ways readers can be positioned to work with a text. Put otherwise, texts and technologies can invite or limit degrees of readerly participation. The five readerly scenarios relate to the ways in or through which a reader is encouraged to act in or on a text. For Goodman (2006) a reader can be: ‘active’, ‘interactive’, ‘agentive or selective’, ‘interventive or transformative’, or become a ‘designer or producer’. As with many typologies, the relationship between these positions is neither discrete, nor fixed but, for this argument, it is also imperative to appreciate how texts open up the potential for these differing degrees of activity. I shall discuss each in turn.

Firstly, active readers are invited to engage in reading that involves physical and mental action by negotiating meanings and interpretations. What is of importance here is that active reading operates on the surface of the text which itself remains unchanged.
A second position is available where a text can invite interactive readings. One might think of CD-ROMs, DVDs or ‘red button’ television, which can be engineered with a built-in opportunity to allow the reader to decide on how to use a text. She may make decisions about what to read in what order but is restricted to choosing elements from the available material.

A third possibility offers an additional level of participation. A text can offer the potential for more agentive or selective readerly actions. In this role, a reader has greater control about how a text is navigated. Here, we might think of websites where possible hyperlink routes may be inexhaustible. Alternatively, a text may offer flexible pathways to invite decision making without fully prescribing readerly choices. The readerly freedom afforded by this kind of possibility whilst not wholly free, nevertheless offers scope for generating alternative narratives and increased levels of personalization.

Increasing degrees of participation is not restricted to the enhanced freedom to choose how to organize or navigate a text. Rather, a fourth alternative leads to what Goodman suggests is interventive activity. That is to say, a reader may actually transform a text. This activity is far more than, say, adding marginalia where an original text becomes annotated but not in itself altered. Texts can be purposively engineered to encourage intervention to the degree that the original text is somehow transformed.

There remains a final readerly practice. That is, any reader is free to generate (new) texts. Beyond the production of meaning, this fifth possibility sees the reader become the producer of her own text. As Goodman (2006) concludes, the reader moves from processes of interpretation to motivated design.

These different levels of readerly activities provide the framework through which immersion is assessed. The degree of freedom a reader has to affect a text will be treated as an indication of its immersive potential. So, as I analyze the readerly activities that the data invite, I will also assess each text’s immersive- and persuasive-potential. To do this, I use seven illustrative examples from five social marketing campaigns. There are two campaigns

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4 ‘Procedural rhetoric’ such as this, is as Bogost (2007, p. ix) describes ‘the art of persuasion through rule-based representations and interactions’. It is beyond this paper to explore the use of the term ‘interaction’ (see also Murray 1997 for a discussion of interaction, agency and immersion). My argument, adapting Goodman, is that ‘procedural rhetoric’ is more than interaction; it is a ‘selective’ and ‘agentive’ practice.
highlighting the loss of biodiversity, one example from a charity for the blind seeking donations and two campaigns addressing anti-social behaviour.

23.4 Recruiting readers: identifying immersion

It is uncontentious to treat all readers as conventionally active in generating meaning-making connections using any of the available signs in the text. Yet, it is still the case that a merely active reader (in Goodman’s terms) seeks to create meaning alone. That is, the persuasive potential of a text may be limited by recruiting only that level of readerly activity, limiting immersive potential and thus persuasive effect.

The first examples are from a World Wildlife Fund for Nature (wwf 2008) award-winning poster campaign entitled *Population by pixel* circulated in Japan (http://tiny.cc/f41msw). By using representations of a fox, eagle, panda and monkey, the campaign’s aim is to highlight loss of biodiversity. I will use just the latter two topics as discussion points.

As the title of the campaign suggests, the images are made up using pixels with a single pixel representing a single animal of the existing popula-
tion. A black and white WWF logo is positioned at the top left of the poster. At the bottom left of each image is a number, and the phrase, ‘is not enough’. For example, the number 1600 is printed below the representation of the panda. The image is correspondingly produced from what a reader can infer to be 1600 pixels. Likewise, the number 325 is printed beneath a more pixellated image to represent a monkey. Reducing the necessary elements of visual information that would maintain realistic and naturalistic detail means that the reader encounters a text that is designed to encourage active interpretation to produce a recognisably meaningful image from the collage of pixels, the charity logo, the numbers and the strap line.

The textual invitation for physical and mental activity makes the cognitive processing palpable. Yet, it seems this level of participation remains only at an interpretative or surface level, so to speak. Moreover, the strapline ‘is not enough’ is also a closed statement that does not offer an opportunity to act. It seems that a reader is invited to participate in the text through active interpretation alone but there is little explicit scope for readerly activity on the text and so the possibility for action beyond the text is as limited.

Let us develop the immersion-persuasion relationship further by using a second campaign which seems to offer the reader greater participatory potential. A life without books (RNIB 2009) is a direct and unsolicited mailing from a UK charity for the visually impaired. The mailing consists of a manila envelope with the message ‘this is the story- the long and true story of one ocean, two ships and about a hundred and fifty men’. Once opened, the envelope contains what appears to be a removable paper dust jacket usually associated with a hardback book. The typewritten text on the inner leaves of the cover presents explicit invitations for the reader to ‘picture a world’ not only without readily accessible reading materials (‘imagine a world without books’) but also to envisage herself with impaired sight (‘imagine, if you don’t already know the frustration of being blind’). In the centre of the dust cover is a central apparently handwritten exhortation for action: ‘fill this space’.

This campaign message seems to invite an active interpretative reading of the order introduced above. It also exploits a more overtly narrative form encouraging the reader to project herself into a near future in which she has been personally transformed. It seems that personalizing the narrative in this way aims to influence and implicate the reader in such a ways as to satisfy the request and donate resources. If the reader has already imagined herself visually impaired her potential identification with imagined others is also likely
to be enriched. Just as successful narrative leaves out details (Porter-Abbot 2002) or exploits visual gaps (McCloud 1993) the material absence of the book, literally and metaphorically, also wilfully cajoles the reader to bridge or fill the gaps. It seems that the additional exploitation of narrative to produce imagined selves and other worlds including other people, may indeed develop the strong feelings required to bring about behavioural change; or at least personalized immersion of this order could lead to attitudinal alignment with the aims of the campaign. Of course, it is unclear as to whether this degree of immersion is adequate to ensure that the reader is transported beyond a critical engagement with the message. Arguably, such effects require more frequent elaboration (Appel & Richter 2007). However, if we focus on the exhortation to act in a specific fashion (‘fill the gap’) we can argue that if a reader is given more guidance about what to do with the information in the text, for example, by being given ways of contacting the organization and offering donations, she may indeed act accordingly. It may be that we can treat such increasing immersive combinations (imagined personalized scenarios and direct requests) as opening up greater possibility for readerly action beyond the text.

Moving away from printed material, the next three examples are from two online UK campaigns aimed at addressing anti-social behaviour. The online environments use different strategies to produce vividness and to create simulated realities which offer greater scope for participation and where readers are invited to play a more agentive role.

The next two examples are taken from a UK NGO supported website (www.talktofrank.com) which offers information and advice about illegal drug use. The third comes from a UK Metropolitan Police-sponsored weapon reduction campaign (www.droptheweapons.org).

The Talk to Frank site offers information on ‘the highs, the lows and everything in between’. A reader can select information from an ‘A-Z’ of drugs. For our example, the reader has chosen to explore material about cocaine and the website directs her into the so-called ‘cocaine basement’ (http://www.talktofrank.com/cocaine-basement). Once in the basement, there are further choices to examine ‘how cocaine affects you’ including the topics of ‘addiction’, ‘heart’, ‘impurities’, ‘nose’, ‘personality’ and ‘law’. Selecting the option ‘nose’, for example, loads a video that graphically shows a young man, ostensibly in a mirror, experiencing a vividly realised uncontrollable nosebleed. Whilst systematic reception analyses have not been conducted,
showing the material in learning environments and at conferences suggests that the relative realism of the video affects viewers. The representation of the sheer quantity of a seemingly unstoppable stream of blood and the character’s look of surprise or shock seems to generate reactions along the lines of revulsion, disgust, distaste and the like.5

What is relevant here is that, in this context, a reader has more freedom to act in the text; she is more agentive and can choose which aspects of which drug to explore in which order. These choices are, however, limited and restricted to navigating within the text. That is, the text itself remains unchanged; there is no possibility for readerly action on it. As we shall see, greater participation that allows more readerly activity that can act on a text is considered to be both more immersive and more persuasive. Let us see how this persuasive potential may or may not be realized by seeing this in practice with an example of a text that allows at least some readerly activity on the text. In this online environment, we should also consider the role of vividness and simulated realism. The next example comes following a reader’s decision to choose another option about the effects of cocaine by clicking on the hyperlink ‘heart’.

5 Readers who wish to examine their own reaction can visit http://tiny.cc/zptggw
In figure 23.3 a (human) heart is visible beating in a domestic, glass preserving jar. To the left is a glass saucer labelled ‘cocaine’. The glass jar is attached to a small monitor indicating the heart rate. Readers are encouraged to add cocaine by clicking a button on the small machine. Cocaine is transported to the heart and readers can observe the impact; the addition of cocaine audibly increases the heart rate. As more cocaine is added the heart beat increases rapidly until a flat line signal is heard, indicating the heart has died.

There are two factors that may influence an understanding of the immersive and persuasive potential of this example. Representing a living heart in a household preserving jar, along with the somewhat ‘Heath Robinsonian’ machinery both seem far from realistic. Whilst the reader can act on the text; that is, the text is altered through the addition of cocaine, the possibilities to act are restricted. There is, of course, the choice to act or not but there is in fact no option to stop. Indeed, even without reader activity cocaine is gradually added to the ‘heart’. In this respect, despite increased agency, the possibilities available to the reader are limited through the already existing narrative closure in the text and, this along with the unrealistic representation of real world consequences seems to reduce possible actions beyond the text. Indeed, it could be argued that there is only one way to test out this simulated reality and that is to take cocaine in excess.⁶

The third of these online examples is the video, Choose a different ending, produced for the London Metropolitan Police, is available on a web-

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⁶ Space does not permit a consideration of further consequences of persuasion and gaming. See Bogost (2007) and Smith and Just (2009) for critical surveys.
site (www.droptheweapons.org) and was uploaded onto the public video platform YouTube in 2009. It is presented in 30-second takes from the reader’s perspective. The video offers the reader a series of narrative choices based on alternative vignettes. Each decision produces another set of alternative actions (see figure 23.4).

The narrative opens with readers being asked to consider whether to take a kitchen knife or not. Depending on the choice the narrative unfolds with the reader needing to decide to go with friends to a party or go with a group to ride in a stolen car. If the ‘take the knife’ or ‘go with the group to ride in the car’ pathway is followed, after a series of more choices, the narrative concludes with someone being stabbed, the police arriving and arresting the protagonist. The choices in the video narrative are restricted to demonstrating that carrying a knife or possibly being associated with someone carrying a knife will have inevitably detrimental consequences.

In this text, the reader is agentive and free to choose, albeit from a limited set of options, how to navigate a route through the text to create a personalized narrative (Snyder 1998) and, through this, simulate possible real world scenarios (Fogg 2004). Yet, this readerly activity is still operating in a closed text; the meanings and possible interpretations are restricted to those of the text’s designers. Again, it seems that whilst the reader has scope to act in the text, she can only act on the text itself and shape its meaning within the closed framework of the narrative’s persuasive goals (Smith & Just 2009). However, because of the video’s availability through YouTube, which encourages user generated content, we have the opportunity to investigate the persuasive potential afforded by this use of technology and examine actual reader responses.

The participatory environment where readers can create a personalized narrative and/or simulate consequences of actions may indeed generate thoughtful consideration or otherwise modify the reader’s real-life beliefs (Miall & Kuiken 2002). The first contributor, in these examples, asks ‘so what do we learn from this’. Yet, presumably counter to the aims of the video’s internal narrative, these external responses are predominantly critical of the police conduct as potentially racist (username: ASKaPHYSICIST) or the law as excessively harsh towards a bystander (username: OoOTOMOoO). This seems to be based on evidence from other contributors (usernames simsun2 and ratcrum 2) who both appear to have tried out alternative pathways and question the fairness of police responses. Readerly freedom to speculate
on alternative conclusions, to generate opinion in an arena of free-will is, indisputably, at the heart of persuasive potential. Yet, here the closed reading offered by the original video is reinforced. Contributions that challenge the aims of the campaign, or are otherwise frivolous, receive conventional counter responses by the campaign group itself (see figure 23.6).

The restricted choice in the video material is also echoed in the response to some online contributions. Indeed, as the contributors point out, there is not a possibility to ‘choose a different ending’. That choice is constrained. It seems that even in this participatory and potentially open environment, where contributors explicitly negotiate the text, the campaign despite its title does not allow for readers to choose freely.
There is an important immersive and persuasive relationship between the availability of both actual freedom of choice and agentive decision-making. This leads us to the fourth readerly practice where a reader is free to intervene on a text.

Returning to print media, the next text is taken from a World Wildlife Fund for Nature (2009) campaign entitled *It’s your turn* circulated in Singapore. This campaign aims to raise awareness about human use of natural resources. The campaign uses the familiar game of noughts and crosses as its theme but replaces the conventional signs with line-drawn images that represent competing player decisions to choose which side should ‘win’.

The competition in this game is between a shark and a steaming bowl of shark fin soup. Other themes include games between a crocodile and a handbag, a cow and a boot, and a tree and a stack of paper (http://tiny.cc/dfxggw).

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7 Other themes include games between a crocodile and a handbag, a cow and a boot, and a tree and a stack of paper (http://tiny.cc/dfxggw).
potential to win in the next move. The strapline ‘it’s your turn’ explicitly invites the reader to participate by choosing which side to play, if at all. By choosing to play the reader must intervene on the text. The interventive reader will transform the inconclusive text and produce a winning conclusion. To mark the text the reader is likely to have also gone through a decision making process, have engaged in some internal discussion or public debate, identified and addressed the argument and considered and rejected alternative arguments. Inscribing a decision in favour of the shark or in favour of the soup means, too, that the reader is demonstrating a personal commitment for a preferred outcome. As Cialdini (1993) has long maintained, an important principle of influence is to encourage readers to commit to some action that, then, becomes predictive of future behaviour. As he suggests, people are more prepared to undertake an activity if they see it as congruent with what they have already done (Cialdini 2003; Martin, Bassi & Dunbar-Rees 2012). Were a reader to have favoured the shark’s victory, to maintain consistency of thought and action she would be more inclined to reject shark fin soup if she was offered this at some later date. Similarly, a reader who favoured the soup will also have deployed a series of arguments or personal evidence to sustain that position. One might speculate how she may maintain that ‘it’s okay to eat fish because they don’t have feelings’ (Cobain 1991) or otherwise appeal to the longevity of, and her commitment to, local traditions.

An important aspect about the possible responses in this example is that the text is open; it is open to possible meanings and open to action. The reader can actually choose from two real world alternatives. Moreover, the possibility for an interventive reading that really allows a reader to transform a text seems to offer up the potential for reader transformation. This is because, it seems, the immersive potential of the text is realised cumulatively across multiple dimensions. It is deeply related to cognitive involvement where the reader needs to engage with issue-relevant arguments of some personal import. There are real alternatives or equally viable choices with real world consequences. The text allows for the production of a narrative with the possible imagining of alternative scenarios and consequences if particular decisions are taken or not. More importantly, there is an explicit challenge to the reader to intervene on the text (‘it’s your turn’). The reader is being encouraged to act, to intervene on the text and so to transform the text’s meaning and to extend that transformation beyond the text. In Murray’s (1997, p110) terms, this form of immersion and agency demonstrably produces the ‘active creation of belief’.
The argument so far sees increased levels of readerly participation as an indication of immersive potential in and on a text alongside persuasive potential beyond the text. One aspect of readerly activity remains: the turn from readerly interpretation to design. For the final illustrative example, we return to the drug awareness website Talk to Frank which, as is common with much online communication, is increasingly less unidirectional but provides multi-platform avenues for participation. Readers are invited to send links to other users and share content, contact the organisation and, thirdly, as the site termed it in 2011, to ‘join in’. This third option encourages readers to share stories about experiences of drug use or alternatively to ‘upload a picture’ and tell how drugs have affected them. This final example is one reader’s or rather one designer’s own text. She has produced a ‘postcard’ featuring a montage of images that indicate some of the consequences of drug use. There are images of young women seemingly passed out on the floor, vomiting, alongside images of bullying and distress. She has even used a still image from the ‘nosebleed’ video from the website’s own material cited earlier. The message across in the montage, in large, iridescent green capitals reads: ‘it looks like so much fun, right?’

Whatever motivated this actual reader to move to text generation or indeed influenced the text’s content is not immediately pertinent to this chapter. What does seem relevant is that this is evidence of readerly activity beyond the original images used in the montage.

It is possible, as Kress and van Leeuwen (2001) suggest, that one source of this readerly potential is the general erosion of elitism in design and text production. Where once technologies and materials were prohibitively expensive, the availability and democratization of emerging technologies permits this reader to design and produce her own text. To this end, this text seems to locate this reader as already persuaded and, with the challenging question, seems to open up chains of persuasive possibilities for future discussion and debate.8

8 It seems to that, in contrast to campaigns that close down debate, the drug awareness website (June 2012) features a comment from a contributor stating ‘don’t know if this will actually be put up on the site being ‘pro-weed’ but yeah i hope people get to read it and understand’. This suggests that allowing the possibility for counter arguments encourages participation.
23.5 Concluding comments and future considerations
To address the opening premise that the more immersive is the more persuasive, this chapter has examined how texts may recruit readers to act. Goodman’s (2006) typology seems to offer a practical framework through which to identify a text’s immersive potential. To this end, the chapter has argued that degrees of immersion can be identified by considering the possibilities for readerly activity in the text and, importantly, readerly action on the text. It has suggested that the possibility for action on a text might be a useful mechanism to indicate possible action beyond the text.

Of course, the immersive potential still needs to be considered as necessarily multidimensional and often requires a consideration of the acknowledged roles of personalisation, narrative, realism and combinations thereof. Yet, above all, it should be remembered, following Newhagen, that the reader needs to be immersed. This, it seems, can be accomplished by developing texts that increase the participatory potential and remain open to both interpretation and action. The examples explored in this paper have predominantly considered an individual reader’s potential relationship with a text. Furthermore, they are illustrative and the analysis qualitative. Yet, the findings presented here point to the need for more empirical investigation.

Indeed, the assertion that the more immersive a text is the more persuasive, now, more than ever requires further robust scrutiny. This is necessary to accommodate and account for emerging technologies whose explicit aim is one of integrated participation and active user contributions. Where reader/writer boundaries are blurred, there is the possibility for displays of commitment. Moreover, it is important to note that these texts are drawn from social marketing campaigns with, as mentioned earlier, the stated aims to apply ‘interactive marketing principles and techniques that harness audience participation’ (Bernhardt, Mays & Hall 2012, p.133). The process of recruiting readers to act is vital; never more so than at a time where global insecurity, environmental vulnerability and other social fragilities proliferate, and their amelioration or avoidance requires personal and collective action. There cannot be a more important moment to test out how social marketing messages can be designed to encourage not only participation but how they can also engender a reader’s transformative commitment to bring about positive change for pro-environmental goals and improved social goods.
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24 Formulas of prize-winning press photos

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24.1 Introduction
Every year, organizations such as World Press Photo, The Pulitzer Prize or Picture of the Year choose between hundreds – even thousands – of submitted pictures in order to award the best press photographs of the year. This chapter examines one of these categories; namely, the best news shot. The main concern is the question of what makes a prize-winner. Are there any common traits of winning photographs? What qualities do juries reward?

In order to answer these questions, I study the winners of ‘World Press Photo of the Year’ from 1955 to 2011. This prize is awarded by the World Press Photo (wpp). My analysis explains both what the winning pictures show and how they show it – I refer to these two aspects, respectively, as content topoi and presentational topoi. Because my interest is the visual qualities of winners in general, independent of situation, I do not analyze the background of the pictures or their captions.

The study covers 57 years, however since there were no contest in 1959, 1961 and 1970 the total number of photographs examined are 54. By studying the – rather limited – literature on prize winning photos and the winners of the three major competitions mentioned above, I have established coding categories for content topoi and presentational topoi. The content topoi consisted of 1) subject/theme, 2) country, 3) region, 4) children, 5) pain/death/dying, 6) number of people presented. The presentational topoi consisted of: 1) shot-type/framing, 2) central composition, 3) colour/value (contrast/hue/saturation), 4) juxtaposition, 5) compositional synecdoche, 6) face/body expressing pain/grief. Each photograph was also examined in order to establish its aesthetic style and whether or not it could be considered a kairotic moment. I will explain these categories in more detail below.

The results of the content analysis, I should emphasize, is not meant to be representatively valid for all similar prize competitions – even though I am sure that we would get more or less the same results if we did examine these. Primarily the content analysis is meant to establish a sense of dom-
inant traits of the wpp-winners and to prepare and support the qualitative analysis of selected images, which illustrate the general trends that can be deducted from the quantitative part.

Because press photos do not have titles in the way we know from, for instance, artworks, I will refer to each photo by using the year they won and the name of the photographer. Full credits can be found at the end of the chapter.

Part 2 of this chapter presents previous research, part three discusses the relation between conventionalization and novelty in winning photographs, and part four introduces the topological analysis, which is carried out in part 5. Part 6 then focuses on the power of the synecdoche and the changing aesthetic of realism.

24.2 What makes a prize-winner?
In the book Moments: Pulitzer Prize-winning photographs from 1999, author and photography director (Associated Press) Hal Buell speculates about what makes a Pulitzer Prize picture. Is history and historic moments a consideration? Pictorial drama? Journalistic experience? While Buell looks for quality in the pictures, David Perlmutter points out that

fame arises largely through publicity and by the approval of cognoscenti. Certain people have the power … to bestow labels of importance on images or events.
These are the photos that win Pulitzer prizes. … They become items of political importance and are reverentially treated as objets d’art (Perlmutter 1998, p. 12)

Seen this way, the winning traits – or quality traits – are not so much inherent in the individual pictures as in the positions and power of certain people deciding what is good or bad.

The definitive answer to what makes a winner remains elusive, says Buell. However, I think we can establish some traits that seem to be common – or at least dominant. One such trait is the representation of pain and misfortune. As Buell expresses it, the microseconds of history that win Pulitzers are often violent ‘because history is more likely to be written in blood than beauty’ (Buell 2002, p. 8). When looking at winners, you are likely to encounter a great deal of violence and war, executions and assassinations. We are presented with an abundance of conflict and suffering.

Research supports this assumption. One study of the Pulitzer Prize-Win-
ning Photographs from 1942 to 2002 concludes that ‘the major visual themes of the prize-winning photographs depicting international news were predominantly about war and coups’ (Kim & Smith 2005, p. 307). ‘War and coups d’état account for two thirds (68.3 percent) of the 41 international Pulitzer winners, followed by just five winners depicting poverty/social problems’ (Ibid., p. 311). The winning photos taken in ‘the US reveal more diverse themes and subjects, although they, too, tend to concentrate on bad news, like crime and terrorism, social problems, racism and poverty’ (Ibid., p. 307).

So, it seems that photographers might have a significantly higher chance of winning with pictures showing war, conflict and suffering, because these kinds of pictures create a greater emotional impact. We know from cognitive psychology that humans are more affected by the negative than by the positive. And research in foreign news teaches us that relevance and deviance are the traits which most often determine which articles and photos are printed in our newspapers (Greenwood & Smith 2007, p. 83; Galtung & Ruge 1965).

Most of the winning pictures – dominated by images of violence and conflict – are taken in Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America – in this order. In the Pulitzer and the Picture of the Year competitions, for instance, approximately one-third of all the winning photographs are shot in Africa. As indicated by several studies, international news appears ‘narrowly framed for audiences through photographs that depict a limited number of visual themes and represent only a few geographical areas. Audiences are presented with a view of the world as a violent, conflict-ridden place where news only happens in a few areas’ (Greenwood & Smith 2007, p. 94). Seen through the lenses of award-winning photographers, Africa is a place of famine, fighting, and suffering.

In general, there seems to be is a high degree of conventionalization among winners of such competitions – and in photojournalism in general. Dianne Hagaman, for instance, argues that photographers adopt conventions forcing them to make ‘photographs from a repertoire of already known images that illustrate already known stories’ (Hagaman 1993, p. 11).

It is no surprise, then, that most studies agree that there is a rather limited range of themes in award-winning photographs (cf. Greenwood & Smith 2007, p. 85), suggesting that ‘news photographers employ a limited range of thematic devices to communicate stories’ (Greenwood & Smith 2009, p. 142; Hagaman 1993).
The importance of novelty, the necessity of recognition
If the variety and range of content is limited, the distinctive character and unique quality of prize-winners must be something else – if indeed they are unique. Winning photos must do more than show people in pain, killing each other or even showing dead children.

Former New York Times managing editor and Pulitzer administrator Seymour Topping says the quality of the photograph is the only criterion when it comes to selecting a winner (Greenwood & Smith 2007, p. 86). However, this still leaves us with the question, what kind of quality?

Andrew Mendelson suggests that even ‘more than the content, it is the composition of news pictures that makes them recognizable’ (Mendelson 1999, p. 8). He argues that ‘most news photography is repetitive both in content and composition’. Photographers rely on a formula aesthetic, which is a ‘highly conventionalized system for structuring cultural products’ (Ibid., p. 8; cf. Rosenblum 1978). When we look at winning press photos, they often exhibit similar formats. Comparing the WPP winners from 1980 and 2005 illustrates the point vividly: In both instances the hand of a starved child is at the centre of the photo functioning as a synecdochal sign of the famine. The 1980 winner shows the hand of a starving boy in the palm of a white missionary (picture 1, 1980 M. Wells). The 2005 winner, from an emergency centre during the drought in Niger, shows a close up of the face of a mother with the small, thin hand of her child placed across her mouth (picture 2, 2005, F. O’Reily).

We find another example of such a conventionalization when comparing the 2007 WPP winner (picture 3, 2007 O. Balilty), to the 1987 Pulitzer-
er winner (picture 4, 1987, A. Suau). Both pictures show a person pressed against the shield of armed forces, creating the same kind of symbolic representation of the individual trying in vain to fend off a superior power.

The main argument of Mendelson is that ‘photos that do not break with conventionality will not be looked at for long by the judges and thus will not win POY awards’ (Mendelson 1999, pp. 8-9). A judge from the POY competition, for instance, felt he had seen so many close-up pictures of faces with terrible emotions that they had become a cliché, and thus were neither worthy of attention nor prizes.

Prize-winning photos, then, must contain some sort of novelty. However, even though Mendelson is undoubtedly right in assuming that novelty is a demand, winning pictures must always allow some sort of compositional recognition. In the four pictures described above, the contrast itself (firstly between hand and hand, secondly between individual and armed forces) is a formal convention, and such conventions are not only necessary for us to make sense of the pictures, but they also contribute significantly to the rhetorical power of the picture. They do so precisely because we can recognize a general theme or structural pattern organizing the theme and content of the picture. The rhetorical appeal might be based on variations on genres of composition or it might be allusions to general pictorial themes or common places (topoi) evoking a cultural memory of shared narratives or myths.

The WPP winner in 1997 (figure 24.1) illustrates the point. It depicts a crying woman outside the Zmirli Hospital in Algeria where the dead and wounded were taken after a massacre in the village of Bentalha. As viewers, we may be directly affected by the woman’s obvious grief expressed in her facial expression and body language (actio) and underscored by the news stories telling us that she is mourning the death of family members. The rhetorical and aesthetic appeal of the picture, however, offers an extra dimension of appeal by alluding to the Biblical narrative of the Virgin Mary and the loss of her son. It is no coincidence that this photograph became known as The Madonna of Bentalha. So, at the same time winning pictures both draw upon certain general themes, narratives and pictorial conventions, and contain some sort of novelty. A lack of novelty appears when the general patterns are so similar to previous photographs that they appear more as a repetition than as a variation on a theme or a structure.
If the winners – as well as the other contestants, and the photographs we encounter every day – tend to present the same thematic and conventionalized content, then novelty must primarily come into effect through the rhetorical style, form and expression of the photographs. We should not, therefore, underestimate the importance of composition, form and aesthetics in the choosing of winners in these photo competitions. Despite the apparent importance of novelty in composition, form and aesthetics, there seems to be a lack of studies about these issues. The very few studies on prize-winning photographs all deal with the content of the pictures, and almost none with the formal aspects.

24.4 Studying photographs through rhetorical topoi

So, how can we study the rhetorical form and expression of prize-winning photographs? One way is to look for rhetorical topoi in press photography.

The concept of topoi is prominent and omnipresent in the rhetorical tradition from the ancients to the present. Still, as every rhetorician will
know, it is notoriously difficult to pin down a uniform and consistent definition of topoi that covers all meanings of the term. In the following, I use the term to mean ‘an intellectual source or region harbouring a proof that could be inserted into any discourse where appropriate’ and as ‘formal or structural inventive strategies like definition, division, or classification’ (Crowley & Hawhee 1999, p. 75; cf. Kjeldsen 2008; 2006, pp. 151-169).

Different topoi thus represent different manifestations of a sensus communis, the common sense that a community shares. The persuasive power of rhetorical topoi lies in their expressing shared thoughts, opinions, assumptions or values. Visual topoi, then, are common ways of presenting and looking at the world, groups of representations communicating in the same way, trying to bring about certain rational and emotional responses.

When studying a piece of oratory, a critic has to examine both what is said and how it is said. The same applies to the study of visual rhetoric. The rhetorical critic should pay attention to what is shown – I refer to this as content topoi. But the critic should be equally attentive to how something is shown – I refer to this as presentational topoi. In each photograph, content and presentational topoi will jointly constitute the kind of rhetorical appeal being made and reveal the ideology behind it.

The choice between showing a politician or an ordinary citizen (the ‘what’), for example, is a choice between two different rhetorical strategies. In the same way, a person may be shown from a frontal or an oblique angle or from a high or a low angle; he may gaze directly at the viewer or look at something outside of the frame (the ‘how’).

So, visual content topoi are the depicted elements, such as objects, events, people and phenomena. Even though they normally consist of concrete representations showing something particular, such as a person or an object, their appeals are general, such as when nature, fruit or vegetables are used to signify good health or ecological awareness.

Visual presentational topoi, on the other hand, concern style, form and expression. They firstly involve form of expression. Choosing a photo, a drawing or a caricature enables different types of rhetorical appeals. Secondly, visual presentational topoi pertain to the actio of the persons presented – their facial expressions and body language.

Thirdly, they concern the choice between different types of visual design, grammar and composition, such as the use of colours, angles and perspectives, which contain different semiotic and rhetorical resources (cf. Kress
This approach also includes the use of visual tropes and figures such as those described in both traditional rhetoric and in marketing research on commercial advertising. In contemporary commercial advertising, visual tropes such as metaphor, hyperbole, irony and antithesis are widely employed (cf. McQuarrie & Mick 1999a, 1999b; McQuarrie & Mick 2003; Kjeldsen 2011; Forceville 1996; Quarrie & Philips 2007). As I have myself argued in several texts (Kjeldsen 2002, 2000), we cannot out of hand translate all the verbal tropes and figures to visual expressions. However, using them as a contributing perspective allows us to find certain salient structures in prize-winning press photos.

The advantage of a visual tropological approach is that tropes and figures are in a sense empty – or rather, they are open for different kinds of content, but offer structural demarcation. A contrast or an antithesis, for instance, does not manifest itself in just one way, or deal with just one kind of content. There are many different forms of visual antitheses; however, they all share a certain view of the things they represent.

24.5 Visual topoi in prize-winning press photographs

Content topoi: As already mentioned, prize-winning photographs are dominated by certain content topoi: war, violence, pain and suffering. As also mentioned, previous studies have shown most winning pictures are taken in Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America. This geographical bias, however, may be changing. In the last 22 competitions, since 1991, five winners of the World Press Photo have been from the Middle East (Iran 2009, 2002; Iraq 2003, 1991; Lebanon 2006; Gaza 1993) and five have been from the Greater Middle East (Afghanistan 2010, 2007, Pakistan 2001, Algeria 1997). The main point, however, remains the same: Looking at prize-winning press photos gives us a skewed view of the world.

Every single winning picture from WPP presents people. Most of them depict individuals as victims of forces outside themselves. We see people who have been injured, wounded or killed by natural disasters or human conflict; or we see the bereaved – the relatives or friends of such victims.

With only three exceptions (1958, 1967, 1969) every picture since 1955 has explicitly depicted some kind of violence, abuse, pain or suffering. Furthermore, two of these three exceptions are pictures relating to armed conflict, showing a US commander of an MA48 tankgunner in the Vietnam War (1967) and a gas-masked boy after street fighting in Northern Ireland.
(1969). Out of a total of 58 winning pictures from 1955-2011, 13 depict dying or dead persons, four of which are of dead children (1983, 1984, 1992, 2001). In general, more than 36 per cent of the winners (21 pictures) show children that are either in painful circumstances or dead.

If we consider priests (1962), monks (1963), and police (1971), as well as military and rebel forces as ordinary people, then every picture except three since the beginning in 1955 has depicted ordinary people. Only three times have winners shown national or international leaders or representatives of parliaments: the 1960 winner shows a right-wing student assassinating Japan’s Socialist Party Chairman Inejiro Asanuma during a speech in Tokyo; the 1973 winner shows President Salvador Allende ushered out of the Moneda Presidential Palace in Chile, allegedly moments before his death in the military coup; and the winner in 1981 shows Lt. Col. Antonio Tejero Molina and members of the Guardia Civil and the military police holding the Spanish Parliament hostage.

Besides these three pictures, there are no winners showing prime ministers or presidents, politicians or leaders. Thus, the shortest formula for content topoi in the winning photographs seems to be pictures taken outside the US and Europe showing the pain and suffering of ordinary people in extraordinary circumstances.

Presentational topoi: As in verbal rhetoric, it is not always easy to separate content and form in visual rhetoric. However, as an analytical tool, this distinction secures an awareness of style, expression and form, which is often neglected – especially in the few existing studies of recent prize-winning photographs.

While it is fairly easy to determine the content topoi of the WPP photographs, the presentational topoi are not equally obvious. The most predominant traits, however, are two different shot types (types of framing) – the long shot (also referred to as the wide shot) and the close-up. Among the winners both these shot types are constructed with only moderate depth. While this terminology is most common in film studies, it adequately captures the most common formal modes of representation. The long shot (wide shot) shows the entire scene where the depicted action takes place. It is normally taken at a distance, and frames a small group of people (approximately 2-9) showing their whole bodies, the activity they are engaged in and the scene surrounding them. In the terminology of Kenneth Burke’s theory of dramatism (Burke 1968, 1969), these winning photographs present an
agent-scene ratio: the persons are the most important element in the drama, but they are to be understood within a specific scene.

Of all the winners, at least 36 (67%) photographs can be said to be either long shots or medium-long shots. Ten pictures can be said to be either close-ups or medium close-ups. These two kinds of framings are best at showing humans action (ls/mls) and human emotions (cu/mcu). Long shots present us with a scene, allowing us to observe human interaction, while close-ups allow us to see the eyes, facial expressions and gestures of individuals very clearly.

The framing and types of shots we do not encounter in the wpp competition are the extreme close-up and the extreme long shot. Winners thus confine themselves to the mid-range type of shots showing people either in full figure, from the waist and up, or just face and shoulder. Put another way, most winners are group and scene shots or portrait shots, while there are no landscape shots. There are no pictures, for example, of the grandeur of nature, presenting humans as insignificant, or as depicted in the romantic paintings of Casper David Friedrich, in the aerial photographs of Yann Arthus-Bertrand, or the many extreme long shots from 9/11, showing the attack and devastation from afar, either without people in the frame or shown only as very small figures. People are important in every single picture.

Apart from the use of mid-range shots, there are no overall predominant formal features. However, some formal traits do stand out. The majority of the winning photographs exhibit one or several of the following formal traits: 1) a clean and simple composition with few elements and/or persons; 2) a central composition balanced around the vertical axis with one or more central persons in centre – or a little off centre; 3) a kairotic photographic moment; 4) a juxtaposition, e.g. a contrast or antithesis; 5) a conspicuous synecdochal relationship.

I have already mentioned the clean and simple composition in Madonna of Bentalha (picture 5, 1997, H. Zaourar, reproduced as figure 24.1), where two persons are balanced around the vertical centre. The 2005 winner has placed the face of the photographed woman and the hand of the child exactly down the vertical axis (Picture 2, 2005, Finbarr O’Reilly). In the same way, pictures showing groups of mourners always depict the principally affected in the centre vertical axis, as we encounter in the winning entries in 1964 (picture 8, 1964, D. McCullin), 1990 (picture 7, 1990, G. Merillon, reproduced as figure 24.2) and 1998 (picture 6, 1998, D. Smith).
These three pictures also exemplify the use of grey scale and colours in the winning photographs, which in general is moderate. There are no conspicuous contrasts and we rarely see clear distinctions between different colours. Only in a few instances do we find bright and saturated colours – but they never dominate. Clean, crisp and completely sharp images are a rarity. Mostly saturation is low, and tone and hue is restrained within a limited spectrum. The inconspicuous colour aesthetic supports the documentary aspect of press photography that signals the capture of real life moments.

Drawing upon the ancient rhetorical concept for the right moment to speak, I use the term *kairotic photographic moment* to refer to something similar to Henri Cartier-Bresson’s term *the decisive moment* as he describes it in his 1951 book *Images à la sauvette*, of which the original French expression was ‘*moment décisif*’. The English 1952 edition was called *The Decisive moment*, referring to the simultaneous recognition, in a fraction of a second, of the significance of an event as well as a precise organization of forms which give the event proper expression.

The decisive moments of Cartier-Bresson, Harold Evans (1982, 106 ff.) explains, are actually very rare. Not only must the photograph capture
the content in the fraction of a second it is there, it must also have a strong, unique composition presenting an organic coordination of shapes, lines and values. Evans argues that too many photographs are labelled as decisive moments. But instead of being a well-organized visual climax, they are really only a dramatic story.

Evans thus proposes to use the term news moments for pictures that have visual monopoly on some unrepeatable news event. He uses the term visual moment for pictures that do not present important news, but succeed for visual reasons. These are pictures in which the precise moment of photography is crucial, presenting patterns that vanish on hesitation. A symbolic moment is ‘a moment decisive in itself or its symbolism, but where the pure visual pattern is not significant enough alone to sustain the picture. We have to be told something extra, in words, and believe it’ (Evans 1982, p. 112). A kairotic photographic moment would be any of these three, and sometimes even a decisive moment in the sense Evans describes Cartier-Bresson’s term.

Many of the winning pictures hold kairotic moments (some even qualify as decisive moments). Most of the kairotic moments would best be characterized as news moments, and they are mainly from the 1960s. A prime example of this would be Eddie Adams’ picture of the execution of a suspected Viet Cong member (1968), showing the exact moment of the bullet’s penetration of the brain. The impact of the picture lies primarily in capturing a certain news event in a fraction a second. Even though the stabbing of Asanuma (1960) is actually shot a fraction of a second after the first mortal sword thrust when officials are trying to stop the second attack, it still gives the sense of being a determining news moment. The same applies to the picture capturing a mother and her daughter in a five-storey free fall after being hurled off a collapsing fire escape (1975). Both provide an impelling sense of an urgent now unfolding a decisive event. For Evans, a truly decisive moment is the picture of a Turkish woman at the moment she learns that her husband has been killed (picture 8, 1964, D. McCullin). But it only becomes a decisive photographic moment because it is well organized: the woman is place slightly left of centre. Two other mourning women are standing on each side, while holding her. She cries while looking forward, holding her arms folded under her chin. The decisive moment though, is created because: ‘her son reaches up as much it seems, to comfort her as seek solace himself. It is this moment that makes the photograph. Our eyes travel back and forth along the line’ (Evans 1982, p. 118). In this
way it epitomizes, Evans writes, the tragedy of the Greek-Turkish conflict in Cyprus.

The closer we get to our own decade, the fewer pictures we see of news moments representing an urgent now, unfolding decisive events. Instead we see more feature-like photographs synecdochically capturing—not a moment, but a general situation, such as the picture of the fingers of the malnourished one-year-old child pressed against the lips of his mother, signifying the victims of the drought in Niger (picture 2, 2005, O’Reilly)

24.6 The power of synecdoche, the changing aesthetic of realism
The last two formal traits—juxtaposition and a conspicuous synecdochal relation—often function together in a clean and simple composition. Actually, this seems to be one of the most powerful presentational formats in news photography, and it is a dominant form of the winning photographs in the WPP competition. Take for instance Charlie Cole’s Tiananmen Square picture, which won in 1989. This image of a Chinese man standing his ground in front of four military tanks is one of the most published pictures in the world (picture 9, 1989, C. Cole).

Much can be said about this picture, as previous studies have done (e.g. Hariman & Lucaites 2007; Perlmutter 1998). However, it seems obvious that the basic rhetorical power and appeal of this image is constructed through the combination of a clean composition, a contrast and a synecdochal representation.

The clear composition with only a few elements makes an interpretation easily accessible and controlled. The juxtaposition between the man with jacket and bag in his hands and the military tanks facing him invites an agonistic understanding of the meeting. The man synecdochally represents the individual. In a double synecdochal move, the tanks represents the military and hence the state. Herein lies the main rhetorical appeal: the juxtaposition simultaneously constrains and opens the possible interpretations. We may see—or read in—different things, but always in a contrastive relation: small versus big, human versus machine, individual versus state.

2 Actually, there are three almost similar photographs of this event. Besides Charlie Cole (upi), Jeffrey Widener (ap) and Stuart Franklin (Magnum) also captured the same moment. More thorough analysis of the picture(s) are found in Hariman & Lucaites (2007, 208 ff.) and in Perlmutter (1998).
We find the same kind of representation in many other World Press Photo winners. The 1980 winner with the white adult hand holding the small hand of black child may synecdochally represent a juxtaposition between the wealth of the west and the poverty of Africa (picture 1, 1980, M. Wells). Like the Tiananmen Square photo, the 1987 winner (picture 4, 1987, A. Suau) represents the vulnerable individual against superior forces. Also the 2004 winner (picture 10, 2004, A. Datta), portraying a woman mourning a relative after the Asian tsunami of December 2003, is constructed around a juxtaposition, this time between the dead, synecdochally represented by only an arm in the left of the frame, and the bereaved, represented by a woman lying face down on the sand in the right part of the frame. The 2005 winner (picture 2, 2005, F. O’Reilley) formally juxtaposes mother and child, and the 2006 winner (picture 11, 2006, S. Platt) juxtaposes devastation and prosperity around a horizontal axis dividing the picture into two worlds. The top part shows the ruined buildings of a bombed Beirut neighbourhood. The bottom part shows apparently wealthy young men and women in a red convertible car.

Whereas commercial photography often uses visual tropes such as irony, hyperbole or metaphor, these presentational topoi appear – I claim – too artistic for news photography. They have a tendency to bring too much attention to the presence of the photographer, to frame the photo as symbolic or aesthetic communication, more than an unstructured representation of reality.

Symbolic representation through synecdoche, however, appears as a more appropriate and important visual figure in news photography, because it is supposed to be about the real world and real events – mirrored through the objective lens of the camera. The cognitive synecdochal move from part to whole – I suggest – does not attract the same kind of attention to the communicative act as the metaphoric move based on similarity. Therefore this form of representation is better at combining the two-part demand of prize-winning news photographs; namely, uniting documentary qualities and artistic qualities.

When we look at World Press Photo we see that several of the winners – as most submissions – in this century presents artistically aesthetic and stylistically elaborate visual rhetoric. This trend dominated the beginning of this century from 2000-2004. The 2001 winner (picture 12, 2001, E. Refner, reproduced as figure 24.3) portrays how the body of a one-year-old boy who died of dehydration is being prepared for burial at Jalozai refugee camp in Pakistan.
FIGURE 24.3 WWP WINNER 2001

Erik Refner
It is a very rare incident of a picture being taken in a full bird’s eye perspective, directly from above. Even though the 2004 winner (picture 10, 2001, A. Datta) has a somewhat similar perspective, no other WPP winner employs quite the same angle. The picture is dominated by the white colour of the draping sheets, covering the body of the little boy, so we only see the left side of his face. The boy seems at peace, and the picture exudes calmness, giving it an almost ethereal dimension. Combined with the angle of the arms draping the sheets, the picture is more an aesthetic moment than it is a news moment. While this picture probably is the most obvious aesthetic of WPP winners, the photograph from the tsunami in Asia (picture 10, 2004, A. Datta) and the drought in Nigeria (picture 2, 2005, O’Reilly) presents similar aesthetic qualities, inviting the viewer to perceive each picture less as a capturing of an objective news moment, but more as an artful expression of the general human condition.

This kind of evident aesthetic tendency, however, is a trend that may be changing. Looking at the winners from 2006 to 2009, we find a much more distinct documentary style and less obvious artistically composed pictures: a red car driving through devastated areas of Beirut after Israeli bombardment (picture 11, 2006, S. Platt); a US soldier sinks onto an embankment in a bunker in Afghanistan (picture 13, 2007, T. Hetherington, reproduced as figure 24.4); a policeman entering a home in Cleveland, USA, in order to check that the owners have vacated the premises, and that no weapons have been left lying around (picture 14, 2008, A. Suau); and women shouting their dissent from a Tehran rooftop, following Iran’s disputed presidential election (picture 15, 2009, P. Masturzo, reproduced as figure 24.5).

The aesthetic tendency exhibited by these pictures is a kind of movie realism. They give the impression of the fictional realism we encounter at the cinema. While the beginning of the decade presents photographs that have their main rhetorical appeal in the compositional and aesthetic organization, the photographs from the latter part of the decade appeal more through story making. The first invite the viewer inside the frame, encouraging exploration of the elements in the visual moment, captivating the viewer through visual design. The second invite the viewer outside the frame, encouraging participation in the construction of a narrative, engaging in speculations of what has and what will happen.
FIGURE 24.4 WWP WINNER 2007

Tim Hetherington

FIGURE 24.2 WWP WINNER 2009

Pietro Masturzo
24.7 Conclusion

It is clear from the above that it is difficult to proffer a single formula for the presentational topoi of WPP prize-winners. However, if we were to look beyond the differences and exceptions, one possible formula would be: Pictures taken in long shots showing a general scene or in close-ups of one or two persons. Presentations of people are always the most important, which is why they are normally placed in the centre of the picture, quite often displaying an expressive face and emotional body language. In general, most compositions are clean and simple, presenting few elements or persons, often organized in juxtaposition and semiotically representing through a conspicuous synecdochal relationship. Many winners are kairotic photographs capturing a visual, a symbolic or a news moment.

Styles and photographic trends change; however, some mental categories and forms of representation never change. As a mode of representation, photography is inherently synecdochal. It is the nature of the photographic art to communicate through *pars pro toto*. Any photo will only show a part of the whole. Even inside the picture frame, representation is synecdochal: a hand represents a starving child, a victim of a tsunami, or the wealthy west. A man with a bag and a jacket represents the individual – and thus a kind of liberalism. Four tanks represent the military – and thus the authoritarian state.

Metaphoric representations do occur, as we see in *The Madonna of Bentalha*, but the metaphoric references to certain pictorial conventions, historical events and cultural values are primarily made rhetorically effective through the indexical and synecdochal nature of photography.

References


**Credits for photographs mentioned and reproduced in the text**

Caption for the images and information about them are taken from the World Press Photo website. Only the five photographs that I have received permission to print have been reproduced (picture 5, 7, 12, 13, and 15). To see the other images, please follow the link to World Press Photo at http://www.worldpressphoto.org. Go to years and click the year in question.

**Picture 1:**

*WPP winner 1980*
Photographer: Mike Wells
Nationality: United Kingdom
Organization/Publication:
Date: April 1980
Country: Uganda
Place: Karamoja district
Caption: A starving boy and a missionary.

**Picture 2:**

*WPP winner 2005*
Photographer: Finbarr O’Reilly
Nationality: Canada
Organization/Publication: Reuters
Date: 01-08-2005
Country: Niger
Place: Tahoua
Caption: The fingers of malnourished Alassa Galisou (1) are pressed against the lips of his mother Fatou Ousseini at an emergency feeding center.
FORMULAS OF PRIZE-WINNING PRESS PHOTOS

Picture 3:
Pulitzer winner 2007
Photographer: Oded Balilty
Nationality: USA
Organization/Publication: Associated Press
Date: 01-02-2005
Country: Palestine
Place: Amona, Ramallah.
Caption: A lone Jewish settler challenges Israeli security officers during clashes that erupted as authorities cleared the West Bank settlement of Amona, east of the Palestinian town of Ramallah.

Picture 4:
wwp winner 1987
Photographer: Anthony Suau
Nationality: USA
Organization/Publication: Black Star
Date: 18-12-1987
Country: South Korea
Place: Kuro
Caption: A mother clings to a riot policeman’s shield at a polling station. Her son was one of thousands of demonstrators arrested because they tried to prove that the presidential election on December 15, which was won by the government candidate, had been rigged.

Picture 5:
wwp winner 1997
Photographer: Hocine Zaourar
Nationality: Algeria
Organization/Publication: Agence France-Presse
Date: 23-09-1997
Country: Algeria
Place: Algiers
Caption: A woman cries outside the Zmirli Hospital, where the dead and wounded were taken after a massacre in Bentalha. Mass killings and bomb blasts dominated life since the army annulled the results of the 1992 elections, in which it appeared the Muslim fundamentalist party, FIS, would win. The conflict had claimed more than 60,000 lives in five years.

Reproduced with kind permission from the photographer
**Picture 6:**
WWF winner 1998
Photographer: Dayna Smith
Nationality: USA
Organization/Publication: The Washington Post
Date: 06-11-1998
Country: Yugoslavia
Place: Izbica, Kosovo
Caption: A woman is comforted by relatives and friends at the funeral of her husband. The man was a soldier with the ethnic Albanian rebels of the Kosovo Liberation Army, fighting for independence from Serbia. He had been shot the previous day while on patrol.

**Picture 7:**
WWF winner 1990
Photographer: Georges Merillon
Nationality: France
Organization/Publication: Gamma
Date: 28-01-1990
Country: Yugoslavia
Place: Nogovac, Kosovo
Caption: Family and neighbors mourn the death of Elshani Nashim (27), killed during a protest against the Yugoslavian government’s decision to abolish the autonomy of Kosovo. Reproduced with kind permission from the photographer

**Picture 8:**
WWF winner 1964
Photographer: Don McCullin
Nationality: United Kingdom
Organization/Publication: The Observer/Quick/Life
Date: April 1964
Country: Cyprus
Place: Ghaziveram
Caption: A Turkish woman mourns her dead husband, a victim of the Greek-Turkish civil war.
FORMULAS OF PRIZE-WINNING PRESS PHOTOS

Picture 9:

winner 1989
Photographer: Charlie Cole
Nationality: USA
Organization/Publication: Newsweek
Date: 04-06-1989
Country: China
Place: Tiananmen Square, Beijing
Caption: A demonstrator confronts a line of People’s Liberation Army tanks during protests for democratic reform.

Picture 10:

winner 2004
Photographer: Arko Datta
Nationality: India
Organization/Publication: Reuters
Date: 28-12-2004
Country: India
Place: Cuddalore, Tamil Nadu
Caption: A woman mourns a relative killed in the tsunami. On December 26, a 9.3 magnitude earthquake off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia, triggered a series of deadly waves that traveled across the Indian Ocean, wreaking havoc in nine Asian countries, and causing fatalities as far away as Somalia and Tanzania.

Picture 11:

winner 2006
Photographer: Spencer Platt
Nationality: USA
Organization/Publication: Getty Images
Date: 15-08-2006
Country: Lebanon
Place: Beirut
Caption: Young Lebanese drive down a street in Haret Hreik, a bombed neighborhood in southern Beirut.
Picture 12:
WWP winner 2001
Photographer: Erik Refner
Nationality: Denmark
Organization/Publication: Berlingske Tidende
Date: 07-06-2001
Country: Pakistan
Caption: The body of a one-year-old boy who died of dehydration is prepared for burial at Jalozai refugee camp.
Reproduced with kind permission from the photographer

Picture 13:
WWP winner 2007
Photographer: Tim Hetherington
Nationality: United Kingdom
Organization/Publication: Vanity Fair
Date: 16-09-2007
Country: Afghanistan
Place: Korengal Valley
Caption: A soldier of Second Platoon, Battle Company of the Second Battalion of the US 503rd Infantry Regiment sinks onto an embankment in the Restrepo bunker at the end of the day.
Reproduced with kind permission from Magnum

Picture 14:
WWP winner 2008
Photographer: Anthony Suau
Nationality: USA
Organization/Publication: Time
Date: 26-03-2008
Country: USA
Place: Cleveland, Ohio
Caption: Detective Robert Kole of the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Office enters a home, following mortgage foreclosure and eviction. He needs to check that the owners have vacated the premises, and that no weapons have been left lying around.
Picture 15:

WWF winner 2009
Photographer: Pietro Masturzo
Nationality: Italy
Date: 24-06-2009
Country: Iran
Place: Tehran

Caption: Women shout their dissent from a Tehran rooftop on 24 June, following Iran’s disputed presidential election.
Reproduced with kind permission from the photographer
25 A nice clip to get the judge favourably disposed?

PAUL VAN DEN HOVEN

25.1 Introduction
 Douglas, Lyon and Ogloff (1997) investigate the impact that photographs of the victim have on judgements about the suspect’s guilt. In their experiment, members of a mock jury are placed in a realistic setting. A fictitious transcript of a criminal case is presented to them. A man is suspected of having murdered his ex-girlfriend. The transcript makes it clear that the suspect had an opportunity and a motive, but it does not contain decisive information proving that he was at the site of the crime when the murder was committed, nor does it contain any information proving that he was not there.

All in all, the jurors receive 30 pages of testimonies, statements of the prosecutor, of the defence, jury instructions, relevant legal rules and so on. The transcript contains the testimony of the pathologist describing in detail the body of the victim. In addition, there are files A, B and C containing photos of the apartment of the victim, of the entrance door showing no visible traces of burglary, a knife similar to the knife the suspect bought a while before, and a graduation photo of the victim. This is what all the jurors get.

File D is the experimental variable. This file holds two close-ups of the seriously mutilated face and shoulders of the victim. A third photo shows the body with the stab wounds. One group receives file D in black and white prints, another receives them in full colour. The control group does not receive file D at all. They merely receive a description (‘The photographs merely depicted visually what was described invariantly in the transcripts across conditions’).

The members of the jury that have received file D more often pronounce the suspect guilty than the control group. Whether they got the black-and-white photos or the full-colour ones does not make a difference. The data prove that pictures do indeed influence a legal judgement. The study was published as: ‘The impact of graphic photographic evidence on
mock jurors’ decisions in a murder trial: probative or prejudicial?’ Douglas, Lyon and Ogloff conclude that the impact is clearly prejudicial, not probative and therefore irrational and undesirable.

This study is an example of (a rather limited amount of) empirical research that deals with the question what the impact is of (predominantly) pictorial texts on legal decision making. Recently an overview was given by Neal Feigenson (2010). Most interpretations of the experimental outcomes confirm the intuitions of many that additional pictorial materials tend to have dominantly prejudicial effect. The outcomes nourish the feelings of discomfort reflected in the headline of an article in a Dutch quality newspaper: *A nice clip to get the judge favourably disposed?* The use of a nice clip to get a judge favourably disposed might seem a long way removed from gruesome photos being shown to an ill-disposed lay jury member, but both concern the undesirable influence of non-verbal, non propositionally formatted ‘texts’, (other than pure evidence) on the decision-making process.

In this chapter, we want to challenge the interpretation of the research data. To this end, we will take a closer look at the Douglas, Lyon and Ogloff experiment. We will challenge two assumptions that would appear to be typical of this line of research; namely 1) that this category of pictorial materials ‘merely depict visually what was described invariantly across conditions’; and 2) that the information that these materials may add cannot be reconstructed as rational arguments that have a logical relation to the case.

From a pragma-linguistic, or rather a pragma-semiotic point of view, the first assumption is suspect: it is implausible to assume that two different texts should convey the same information to an audience (Van den Hoven 2010). In section 2, we present a plausible alternative to this first assumption; the pictures may present information that has not been verbally described yet, at least not to the jurors.

The second assumption links up with an argument-theoretical position that exclusively propositionally formatted, verbal discourse can convey argumentation. This is a position that is often assumed in lay contexts but it is also defended from the perspective of informal logic (Johnson 2003). For further information on this debate about ‘visual argumentation’, including both argumentations in favour and against, (see Alcolea-Banegas 2009; Birdsell & Groarke 1996; Blair 1996; Chryslee c.s. 1996; Groake 2002; Groake 2007; Tarnay 2003). In Van den Hoven 2011, 2012, as well as in the contributions of Feteris, Plug and Kjeldsen in this volume, it has been argued that
multimodal discourse including modes such as (moving) pictures, animations, inserted frames, inserted verbal texts, voice-overs, direct dialogue, answers in interviews, speech of anchor persons in different situations, graphics including symbolic uses of colours, music, non-diegetic sounds and complex editing, can coherently convey standpoints and argumentation. In Van Eemeren 2011, the possibility of other than verbal modalities being able to convey argumentation is recognized. In section 3, a rational argument is (re) constructed that may explain the seemingly so irrational effect of the pictorial materials on the legal decision-making.

Based on this reconstruction, the qualification of the impact of the pictorial materials in the experiment as prejudicial is reconsidered (section 4). In the concluding section 5, we discuss the implications of the alternative explanation of the research data for argument theory.

25.2 The photos depict gruesomeness

We seem to have a certain degree of confidence – rightly or wrongly – that we are able to determine the propositions encoded in a verbal text. We seem to lack this confidence, be it phantasmal or actual, when we encounter pictorial text elements. This makes it hard to determine what exactly the photos in the Douglas, Lyon and Ogloff experiment may add to the statement of the pathologist that was included in the materials. We neither have the statement, nor the photos as used in the experiment at our disposal. But take a look at the following passage taken from the autopsy report of a truly atrocious murder.

Beginning at the middle of the upper right sternocleidomastoid muscle, the right posterolateral and posterior neck have deep, muscular, incised wounds actually representing about two or three total cuts. The left-most aspect has a 1 cm superficial cut while the major cut passing over to the right posterolateral region is 13.5 cms long.

Let us assume that the pathologist in the experiment would describe the incised wounds in a similar way. Let us also assume that a juror who is confronted with the photographs would characterize the stab wounds in the upper body as ‘gruesome’. And, let us further assume that this qualification given by this juror is actually accurate; that is to say, that an expert would draw the same conclusion on the basis of the description of the pathologist. However, a lay juror, due to his or her insufficient experience, confronted
with this highly specialized jargon, may not come to the same conclusion. The ‘gruesomeness information’ – at least for a lay person – lies solely in the photos, not in the verbal description.

From a pragma-semiotic point of view (van den Hoven 2010), it cannot be maintained that the photos ‘merely depicted visually what was described invariantly across conditions’, as the researchers do. What is relevant here are the mental representations of the audience, in this case the mock jurors. In this chapter, we cannot deal with the problem of what exactly is ‘a proposition’, and whether or not the concept of proposition is fit and necessary to characterize argumentatively relevant units of mental representations. There are reasons to assume that the mental representations that are relevant to the juror’s standpoint are richer than merely this ‘proposition’ (probably a scenario of the dynamics required to cause such a gruesome result). For our discussion, however, it suffices to accept the possibility that the number of jurors that has mentally represented something like the ‘proposition’ this murder was really gruesome is substantially larger among those who have seen the photos than among those who have not.

The question to be addressed then is whether the ‘proposition’ that includes the emotive judgement about the gruesomeness of the murder has argumentative relevance.

25.3 A maximally reasonable reconstruction

Let us try to make a ‘maximally reasonable (re)construction’. We borrow this principle from Van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1984, pp. 115v). It is important to underline that neither we, nor the researchers actually have any argumentative discourse brought forward by the jurors. Jurors do not account for their standpoints in this way. What we do have is the decision and the materials that a juror had at his or her disposal. What we can do is assume that the jurors have acted reasonably to the best of their ability. This would seem to be a sound starting point in this context. Obviously, the jurors may feel emotions, but that does not necessarily make them any less aware of the seriousness of their task. They have been given sufficient time to carry out their task carefully and deliberately. They have also been instructed explicitly. Concerning reasonable doubt they will have been reminded explicitly of the level of certainty a juror must have to find a defendant guilty of a crime, even though no further illumination of this concept along the lines of that given in the Lectric Law Library below is ever given to jurors.
A real doubt, based upon reason and common sense after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, or lack of evidence, in a case. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, is proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs. However, it does not mean an absolute certainty (The 'Lectric Law Library).

How rational is the behaviour of the members of a mock jury who have seen the photos and find the suspect guilty? Is it possible to reconstruct the information in the photographs as an element of a rational (though probably not acceptable) argumentation? We think it is.

We start from the assumption that the photos do reveal information about the seriousness and cruelty of the crime that is not revealed to the jurors who merely have access to the testimony of the pathologist. This can be due to the skills of the jury members to read autopsy reports or due to differences between the verbal versus the pictorial mode; the pictorial mode encodes information that the verbal mode does not encode. If we assume that the photos add information, we can attempt to reconstruct this information as an element of the argumentation that supports the verdict.

The degree of cruelty, however, seems unrelated to the plausibility of being guilty. In this particular case, there is nothing that relates the specifics of the crime’s cruelty to the profile of the suspect. So the information in the photos does not have probative value regarding the question whether the suspect committed the crime (as was claimed, for example, by the Crown in the Australian *R v Milat* (1996) case where the horrific details were part of the proof of the savagery and cruelty that connected the murders with the suspect). Therefore, the authors conclude that it must have been prejudicial, triggering some irrational emotional response.

But there is another line of reasoning, as is explained and empirically supported in Kassin and Garfield (1991, see also the culpable control model of Alicke 2000). In this research, a two-part model of decision making is tested. On the one hand, there is the probability of commission. Evidently, the information in the photographs has no argumentative relation to this part. However, the second part in the model concerns the decision about the threshold value for reasonable doubt. How certain do you want to be before you decide that a defendant is guilty? The basic idea is that information indicating that one is dealing with an extremely horrifying crime may be an argument to lower the threshold. In an argument schema:
In the eyes of European continental professionals, such arguments are unacceptable in criminal cases. Also the Australian Law Reform Commission would appear to state that an influence of evidence on the degree of probability required by the fact-finder is improper (see below). But this is not the issue here. What is crucial is that it is possible to reconstruct an insightful argument.

A suspect either did or did not commit the crime. The legal decision maker has to formulate a judgement. This means that there are four options; two of these imply a right decision and two imply a wrong decision. A meticulous discussion of the probability of commission maximizes the chances that a right decision will be taken. But there is always a chance that a judge or jury member will an innocent person guilty (let us call this the \( \alpha \)-error) or will acquit a guilty person (let us call this a \( \beta \)-error). A careful investigation and discussion of the probability of commission minimizes the sum of \( \alpha + \beta \). But the chance of an error always remains and then \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) communicate. Minimizing \( \alpha \) inevitably increases the chances of \( \beta \). So there is a clear motive to exchange arguments on how to determine this threshold of reasonable doubt.

It seems that in the Kassin and Garfield Blood and guts experiments probing information about the seriousness of the crime was a reason for mock jurors to lower the chances of making a \( \beta \)-error, thereby inevitably increasing the chances of making an \( \alpha \)-error. The subjects who had seen a video-tape showing a close-up of the murdered person with stab wounds in
the chest estimated their threshold of proof as being 76%. The subjects who did not see the video or who did see the video but were informed that the video related to another crime estimated their threshold of proof as being 93%. Something that also supports the validity of the rational reconstruction is that in this experiment there is no difference between the groups in reported emotional arousal at the moment of decision-making.

One can disagree with this on ideological grounds, appealing to the presumption of innocence that would require an always fixed threshold corresponding to a low $\alpha$, as suggested in the jury instructions quoted above. On ideological grounds one can promulgate the order that this should not be an issue. But that does not mean that there is no argumentative rationality in acting differently. To commit an $\alpha$-error is always tragic. In cases where severe sentences are involved it is even worse to convict an innocent suspect. But to acquit a defendant suspected of murder while he has actually committed the crime is horrible too. The more horrific the crime is, the more frightening is the idea that the murderer should walk out of court a free man.

Perhaps this (re)constructed argumentation would not survive in a critical debate. Perhaps the propositions that one can ‘read’ in the photos should not be taken to be probative. But this does not mean that they are prejudicial. There is a plausible rational reconstruction that models a logical relation between information about the seriousness of the crime and the standpoint vis-à-vis the defendant’s guilt.

25.4 Prejudicial versus probative?

We derived an evaluative ‘proposition’ from the photos that many jurors may not read (or not as strongly) in the verbal reports. We reconstructed a rational argument that rests on the ‘proposition’ and can account for a standpoint that the suspect should be judged guilty. This is a theoretical reconstruction. But there is some empirical psychological evidence for it too. The affect-as-information theory (discussed in Bright & Goodman-Delehunty 2006) relates affects to decisions. The information about the gruesomeness may raise anger, or sadness or socio-moral disgust or even fear. According to the theory, these affects strengthen the impulse to assign responsibility to an actor.

The problem is how to relate such an explanation to a distinction that is made by legal authorities, a distinction between probative versus prejudicial evidence. Probative value is set against danger of prejudice. As soon as emotions are raised the tendency is to qualify the information that raised these
emotions as prejudicial. The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) makes the following distinction:

By risk of unfair prejudice is meant the danger that the fact-finder may use evidence to make a decision on an improper, perhaps emotional, basis, i.e. on a basis logically unconnected with the issues in the case. Thus, evidence that appeals to fact-finders’ sympathies, arouses a sense of horror, provokes an instinct to punish, or triggers other mainsprings of human action may cause the fact-finder to base his decision on something other than the established propositions of the case (quoted in Bright & Goodman-Delahunt 2004, p. 155).

In section 2, we argued that it is hard to imagine that the jurors read texts, autopsy report and photos, to encode the same set of propositions. Regarding the affect-as-information theory when the photos raise anger, sadness, disgust or fear, some information will be responsible for causing these affects, information that the jurors did not read in the autopsy report (compare also Feigenson & Park 2006). As we demonstrated in section 3, it is somewhat ‘hasty’ to exclude beforehand the possibility of this additional information being ‘formatted’ as a proposition that has a logical relation to the issues of the case.

The opposition of probative versus prejudicial is pre-theoretical and rather naive. The quotation from the ALRC illustrates that there are three criteria determining the probative value. Does information (1) regard an issue that is ideologically recognized as an issue of this case, (2) does it relate ‘logically’ to that issue (= argumentatively relevant) and (3) is the information an ‘established proposition’? If failure to satisfy one of these criteria qualifies information as prejudicial, we have several ‘prejudicial modalities’. We have tried to argue that the effect of the gruesomeness inferred from the photos may not meet (1), but does meet (2) while it remains an issue in a theoretical debate whether (3) has been met or not. If (2) and (3) are met, it would be rather confusing, in my opinion, to use the term ‘prejudicial’, but in the end this is merely a matter of terminology.

Of course this analysis may not reveal the actual decision-making process of the jurors. Although the analysis is consistent with the observations about the burden of proof in Kassin & Garfield (1991), the culpable control model mentioned above offers alternatives that would qualify the process as prejudicial in the sense of violating (2) and (3). Emotions raised by the
gruesome pictures may alter the perception of the evidence concerning the probability that the accused has committed the crime. So a legitimate issue is affected, but in an irrational way because there is no logical relation and it (de)establishes propositions that do not deserve that status. It has been shown for example that subjects who know the dramatic outcome of a traffic accident hold the ‘perpetrator’ more accountable (‘He should have seen the risks he took’) than do subjects who do not know this outcome yet. This is known as the propensity effect (Roese c.s. 2006). The propensity effect does not seem to be relevant here. But a general tendency to judge accusing information more weighty, exonerating information less weighty and therefore judge the probability differently might explain the experimental results. Another mechanism that qualifies in a similar way as prejudicial is called biased information search. The emotions raised by the gruesome information may motivate the jurors to look for anything that may contribute to the plausibility that the accused did indeed commit the crime, overlooking information that could exonerate him.

As we emphasized already, jurors who hold a standpoint do not have the obligation to defend this standpoint against antagonists. So the answer to the question whether they used the information from the photos in a prejudicial way remains a conditional one. When a juror is prepared to take up the role of protagonist in our reconstruction, he or she is not prejudiced (or at least meets criterion (2)). Granting those who are enjoined to silence a maximally reasonable reconstruction seems no more than fair.

25.5 Conclusions
’Argumentation is the verbal, social and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by advancing a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint’ (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, p. 1). Taking this definition literally implies that pictorial texts cannot encode arguments. They are not verbal. This would appear to be untenable. Numerous partly pictorial texts are presented as (elements of) an argumentation in all kinds of serious discussions. We can solve the problem by changing verbal into communicative in the definition, as is also suggested by Van Eemeren (2010, p. 27, fn 5).

The problem now is how to extract propositions from a pictorial text, in particular interpretative or evaluative propositions. Or, in terms that are
relevant to the reconstruction of an argumentative discussion, which propositions that an interpreter ‘reads in the pictorial text’ can be assumed to be the responsibility of the protagonist, and which are the responsibility of the interpreter? This can be rephrased as: which propositions are parts of the rational reconstruction of the protagonist’s communicative acts and which ‘propositions’ are part of the interpreter’s evaluation?

It is a task for visual argumentation theory to develop criteria related to the pragmatics of the situation (relevance, multimodal cohesion, and maybe other criteria as well) and related to the use of cinematographic principles to help to decide whether in a situation as in Douglas, Lyon and Ogloff 1997 criterion (3) is met (compare also Van den Hoven 2012).

In this chapter, we demonstrated not only the theoretical need for but also the practical importance of developing a method to reconstruct multimodal discourse in which pictorial elements and probably also modes such as music and other non-verbal sounds may contribute to the rationality of a protagonist’s position. The tendency seems to be to disqualify such non-verbal, not clearly propositional elements as prejudicial. If, however, we understand pictorial elements in discourse in such a way that the photo in the Douglas, Lyon and Ogloff 1997 experiment does ‘establish the proposition’, then we can quote Jim Steinman, ‘Two out of three ain’t bad’. The mock jurors who have their decision influenced by the photos meet requirements (2) and (3), which seems reason enough to refute Douglas, Lyon and Ogloff’s conclusion that the data make clear that the effect of this type of pictorial materials is prejudicial.

References